In Re Shannon A.

BLOOM, Judge. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, after an adjudicatory hearing on November 21, 1983, determined the appellant, Shannon A., to be a delinquent child. The court found that Shannon had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of manslaughter, assault and battery, and illegal use of a handgun. Following a disposition hearing on December 16, 1983, the court placed Shannon on probation under supervision of the Department of Juvenile Services and, among other conditions of probation, ordered him to perform 1000 hours of community services providing physical therapy to a brain-damaged child.

Appealing from that order, appellant raises the following issues: 1. Did the hearing judge err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress statements made to Officer Malloy and Detective Moore? ⁴⁰³ 2. Did the hearing judge err in admitting testimony at the adjudicatory hearing as to the results of a polygraph examination? 3. Did the hearing judge err in imposing 1000 hours of community service as a condition of probation?

We will answer “No” to all three questions and affirm the circuit court’s order. FACTS On August 11, 1983, appellant, then 13 years old, his sister Tracey, 10, and Jeffrey Talbot, 10, were playing at appellant’s house in Millersville, Anne Arundel County. Neither of appellant’s parents was at home. At approximately noon on that day, the paramedic unit of the fire department responded to a call at appellant’s home where they found young Jeffrey outside on the lawn bleeding profusely.

Jeffrey was transported to the hospital and pronounced dead at 4:14 p.m.; his cause of death was later determined to be a gunshot to the head. After the paramedics arrived at the hospital, they notified their central dispatcher, who in turn notified the police, that a possible shooting had occurred. Several officers arrived on the scene around 1:00, among them Officer Malloy, a neighbor of appellant. Officer Malloy spoke to Shannon outside of the house and asked him what had happened.

Another officer spoke with appellant’s sister. Shannon told Malloy that Jeffrey had fallen and hit his head on a chest of drawers. Shannon then showed Malloy the bedroom in which Jeffrey was hurt. Shannon’s mother returned home, and by this time a crowd of neighbors had gathered.

Malloy took Shannon and his mother into his squad car to discuss the incident more privately. Shortly thereafter, Malloy was notified by one of the other officers present that a bullet had been recovered from Tracey’s bedroom. Malloy informed appellant that physical evidence had been located which contradicted his story. Shannon then broke down and amended his story.

He ⁴⁰⁴ claimed that he had found a gun in his parents’ bedroom while cleaning, that the gun had accidentally cocked, and that he and Jeffrey were trying to uncock it when the gun went off. Two guns, one of which was loaded, were subsequently retrieved from the bedroom of appellant’s parents. Around 3:30 that afternoon, appellant was taken to the Winterrode Building in Crownsville for further questioning. His mother and sister were present in the building during the inquiry, as was his father who arrived later.

Appellant was then advised of his rights by Detective Moore. He initialled the standard Miranda form utilized by the police department, indicated to Detective Moore that he understood the rights explained to him, and stated that he had no questions about them. Moore also asked Shannon if he wanted to answer questions without an attorney present, and Shannon agreed. Appellant was then given a polygraph examination by Detective Moore.

Apparently Shannon repeated the story he had given to Officer Moore and Officer Malloy earlier, that the gun had accidentally cocked and the two boys were trying to disengage the hammer when the gun discharged. Moore turned off the machine and explained the difficulties with Shannon’s story — namely, that a gun such as the one which killed Jeffrey could not accidentally cock. While the polygraph machine was still turned off, appellant changed his story again and told Moore that he went into his parents’ bedroom, got the gun, cocked it intentionally, took it back into his sister’s room where Jeffrey and Tracey were playing, pointed it at Jeffrey and it fired. At no time during the questioning did Shannon ask to speak to an attorney or his mother or father.

On November 21, 1983, a motion to suppress statements made by Shannon to Officer Malloy and Detective Moore was denied by the presiding judge. The judge determined that the statement to Malloy was made before appellant was in custody and that the statement to Moore was made after appellant had waived his Miranda rights. At the ⁴⁰⁵ adjudicatory hearing, which immediately followed the suppression hearing, the statements to Moore and Malloy were admitted into evidence. Shannon did not testify at this hearing.

I. SUPPRESSION A. Statement to Officer Malloy Appellant asserts initially that the determination by the presiding judge to admit the statement made to Officer Malloy was error. Specifically, he contends that the statement’s admission violated appellant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination, as Shannon had not been given his Miranda warnings at the time he spoke to Malloy. The threshold question in any case where there is a purported Miranda violation is a determination of whether the questioned party was in custody. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

If there was a custodial interrogation and no warnings were given, then any statement made by the suspect is excluded from evidence. When the subject answers questions while not in custody, such statements may be admitted even if no Miranda rights were accorded. Id. The Court of Appeals discussed the question of what constitutes custody in Whitfield v. State, 1 287 Md. 124 , 411 A.2d 415 (1980).

Quoting from Myers v. State, 3 Md.App. 534 , 240 Md.App. 534 (1968), the Court explains the general test as follows: [CJustody occurs if a suspect is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is being deprived or restricted ⁴⁰⁶ of his freedom of action or movement under pressures of official authority. * * * [T]he custody requirement of Miranda does not depend on the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer-interrogator but upon whether the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by such interrogation. * * * Whitfield 287 Md. at 140 , 411 A.2d 415 . Factors are enunciated in Whitfield that should be considered by the court in resolving the issue of whether or not there was custody for purposes of Miranda . These factors include: those facts intrinsic to the interrogation: when and where it occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present, what the officers and the defendant said and did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door, and whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or as a witness. Facts pertaining to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially how the defendant got to the place of questioning — whether he came completely on his own, in response to a police request, or escorted by police officers.

Finally, what happened after the interrogation — whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested — may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning. [.Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888 at 895 (Alaska 1979) (footnote omitted).] Whitfield at 141, 411 A.2d 415 . After the testimony was presented at the suppression hearing, the hearing judge decided that Shannon was not in custody when he. first spoke to Officer Malloy because he was not a suspect at that time. On the facts in the record before us, we agree. ^ ⁴⁰⁷ The police arrived at appellant’s house after being notified of a “possible shooting.” They had no tangible evidence when they arrived at the house that any crime had been committed; there was merely a vague notion that there had possibly been a shooting. The questioning of appellant by Officer Malloy, therefore, was more in the nature of “[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process,” Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 477 , 86 S.Ct. at 1629 , which does not require Miranda warnings to be admissible.

Officer Malloy simply asked appellant what had happened. Appellant’s sister was similarly questioned by another officer. Suspicion clearly had not focused on appellant at the time he initially spoke with Malloy. This statement, that Jeffrey fell down and hit his head, was clearly admissible.

Shannon’s second statement, to the effect that he accidentally found the gun, that he accidently cocked the gun and that the gun accidentally fired when he and Jeffrey were trying to uncock it, was made after Malloy told him that the police knew Jeffrey had been shot. By the time Shannon told the