In Re Sophie S.

SHARER, J. In this appeal we are asked to decide whether a juvenile court has jurisdiction to award custody to a formerly noncustodial parent when the Department of Social Services (“the DSS”) dismisses a CINA petition without having sustained any of the allegations against the formerly custodial parent. 1 As we shall discuss, infra, the DSS has moved to dismiss this appeal on mootness grounds. Despite mootness of the custody issue, we shall reach the merits of appellant’s argument and vacate the order of the juvenile court. FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Sophie S. was born on September 11, 1993, to Lisa R., appellant, and John S. At the time of the hearing before the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, sitting as a juvenile court, Lisa was living in Richmond, Virginia. John, at that time, was living in North Pole, Alaska, where he was stationed with the U.S. Air Force.

Living with John were his wife and Sophie’s older sister, Brianna, who is Lisa’s child as well. Lisa is also the mother of a son, Danny R., who is not John’s child. ⁹⁴ At some point, Lisa moved from Baltimore County to Richmond, allegedly abandoning both Danny and Sophie. Danny, who is now over the age of 18, was taken in by the family of a school friend. 2 Similarly, Sophie was provided a home by the family of a school friend. At the time of the hearing, it was the wish of both appellant and Sophie that Sophie continue to reside with the friend’s family.

In this appeal, we have not been provided with Sophie’s position regarding her custody. 3 ■ The involvement of the DSS was triggered by Danny’s having been left alone in a home with no furnishings, no food, and no money. In the course of its investigation, the DSS became aware of Sophie’s situation as well. The investigation resulted in the filing of a petition alleging both Danny and Sophie to be CINA. When John learned of Sophie’s situation, and the involvement of the DSS, he moved promptly to file a complaint for change of custody in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. ⁹⁵ He sought pendente Lite custody of Sophie and requested an emergency hearing, which was conducted by the court on January 10, 2005.

By order of the circuit court of January 11, 2005, John’s petition for ex parte, pendente lite relief was denied, but the court ordered that “in light of the related CINA proceeding pending in this Court, neither party shall remove Sophie [S.] from the State of Maryland, subject to further Order of this Court.” As a result, custody effectively remained with Lisa, although Sophie was not, at that time, physically living with her mother. The CINA petition came on for hearing in the juvenile court oh February 18, 2005. Briefly stated, the juvenile court, upon motion of the DSS, dismissed the CINA petition and ordered Sophie to the custody of her father, John. That action gave rise to Lisa’s appeal.

Before addressing the merits of the appeal, we shall first take up appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal on mootness grounds. Mootness The facts supporting the DSS’s motion to dismiss are that, subsequent to the order of the juvenile court of February 18, 2005, John’s still-pending custody suit was taken up by the equity court. Testimony was taken on September 12, 2005, before a Family Law Master of the circuit court, whose recommended order provided: Plaintiff [John] was present with counsel, 4 testimony [was] taken and exhibits [were] presented, and finding that a material change in circumstances exists to warrant a modification of custody, it is ... ORDERED that John [S.] be and hereby is granted sole custody of the two minor children of the parties; namely ⁹⁶ Brianna Michelle [S.] and Sophie Jean [S.], with reasonable visitation to Lisa Ann [R.]....

The proposed order was adopted by the circuit court, signed by a judge of that court on September 28, 2005, and enrolled as a judgment on October 3, 2005. No appeal was taken from that judgment. Hence, appellee posits, issues relating to Sophie’s custody are moot. It is well-settled Maryland law that “ ‘[a] question is moot if, at the time it is before the court, there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which the court can provide.’ ” Hill v. Scartascini, 134 Md.App. 1, 4 , 758 A.2d 1087 (2000) (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Anne Arundel County Sch.

Bus Contr’s. Assn., 286 Md. 324, 327 , 407 A.2d 749 (1979)). The essence of the rule is that appellate courts “do not sit to give opinions on abstract propositions or moot questions; appeals which present nothing else for decision are dismissed as a matter of course.” In re Riddlemoser, 317 Md. 496, 502 , 564 A.2d 812 (1989). Generally, moot questions will be dismissed “without expressing [appellate] views on the merits of the controversy.” Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 562 , 510 A.2d 562 (1986).

When, however, “ ‘the urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest [and requires] a departure from the general rule and practice of not deciding academic questions!,]’ ” the appellate court is justified in ruling on the issue. Bond v. Slavin, 157 Md.App. 340, 354 , 851 A.2d 598 (2004)(quoting Mercy Hosp., supra, 306 Md. at 562-63 , 510 A.2d 562 ). The Court of Appeals explained the concept of an expression of the Court’s views in a moot case in greater detail in J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 368 Md. 71, 96-97 , 792 A.2d 288 (2002), saying that mootness will be overlooked when “the urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest. ... If the public interest clearly will be hurt if the ⁹⁷ question is not immediately decided, if the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between government and its citizens, or a duty of government, and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to prevent a decision, then the Court may find justification for deciding the issues raised by a question which has become moot, particularly if all these factors concur with sufficient weight.” (quoting Lloyd v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43 , 111 A.2d 379 (1954)); see also In Re Justin D., 357 Md. 431, 444-45 , 745 A.2d 408 (2000).

In view of the later final, and unappealed, custody order of the circuit court, the order of the juvenile court is moot. 5 Nonetheless, as we consider the record of the proceedings in the juvenile court, and the question presented in this appeal, we are satisfied that we have before us an issue that is likely to recur. We reach that conclusion because this Court has been presented with a similar issue in other recent appeals, 6 and because the effect of our opinion will serve the interests of masters and judges sitting in juvenile courts in the various subdivisions. Moreover, the issue is one that involves “a relationship between government and its citizens” and is significant because it involves, at the same time, the best interests of allegedly neglected children and the inherent rights of natural parents. The Juvenile Court Proceedings ⁹⁸ At the juvenile court hearing, all parties were represented by counsel, including Sophie.

At the outset, counsel for the DSS advised the court that it intended to seek an adjudication of CINA as to Danny, dismiss the petition as to Sophie, and grant John custody of Sophie. Thereafter, the hearing was taken up with proffers from counsel for all parties as to what might, or might not, be proved, and assertions of the wishes of their respective clients. Lisa always denied the allegations of the petition and was prepared to defend. Sophie, it was proffered, would testify that the allegations of her mother’s neglect were untrue.

As we have noted, Sophie wished to remain with her friend’s family until the end of the school year and then return to her mother’s custody. John, of course, asserted that, as a parent against whom there were no allegations of unfitness, he was presumptively fit and should be granted custody of Sophie. After hearing counsel preliminarily, the court observed: Well, I’m in a complete quandary about what to do with these cases because if Sophie is here today and she says she wants to live with her mom, just based on what I’ve read and I haven’t heard the testimony, I think [the mother is] completely and totally unfit to have either one of these children in her custody, completely unfit and Mr. [S] is here, willing to take custody of Sophie. He’s the father.

He would certainly be preferred as a custodian of the child over someone who is a stranger. That’s the law. The hearing concluded with the following exchange among counsel and the court: [THE COURT]: All right. Now, we’re back on the matter of Sophie [S.], case number 104-501.

How are we going to proceed? [DSS COUNSEL]: Well, as far as the agency is concerned, your Honor, we would be dismissing the petition because under Russell G. we have an appropriate care provider and we would make the recommendation and ask your Honor to award custody to the father. ⁹⁹ [THE COURT]: Is there any objection to that? What’s the objection? [COUNSEL FOR SOPHIE]: Your Honor, Sophie would object to that. She does not want to go with her father and she wants to have custody go back to her mother. [THE COURT]: Mr. [Counsel for Lisa]? [COUNSEL FOR LISA]: Again, your Honor, renew my argument that [3-819] 7 of Courts and Judicial Proceedings, Subsection [ (e)], if the Department is withdrawing their petition then facts are not sustained against any parent and, therefore, it would be inappropriate for the Court to make a custody decision. What my suggestion would be is if the Court would feel more comfortable because Ms. [R.] is not planning on taking Sophie anywhere.

She wants Sophie to continue with the [¶] family], pass an Order controlling conduct, let the parties file in ... [THE COURT]: No, no, no. Let’s see. If 1 commit Sophie to the agency for placement, can, would the agency have the authority to then place Sophie with her father? [DSS COUNSEL]: We’d have to do, we, we’d have to do a formal interstate (inaudible). We got Alaska to do an informal check, gave us a report that everything is fine and so on.

We could place the child with the father in Alaska pursuant to the Interstate Compact but that couldn’t occur today. [THE COURT]: So she would stay with the [U. family] (inaudible), correct? [DSS COUNSEL]: Well, if the [U. family] were appropriate, we did a check with regards to them. [THE COURT]: They haven’t been checked either? [DSS COUNSEL]: Well, they’ve been checked but ... [THE COURT]: I thought so. ¹⁰⁰ [DSS COUNSEL]: ... they would be in, in a, as foster parents, if that’s what they’re going to be, there’s a, there’s a procedure for foster parents since they’re non-related. [THE COURT]: Right. [DSS COUNSEL]: That we would have to undergo but the child could be placed with them pursuant to a commitment. [THE COURT]: So if I find she’s a child in need of assistance and commit her to the agency, then the agency would just make a placement, is that right? To an approved foster home? [DSS COUNSEL]: That’s correct, your Honor. [COUNSEL FOR JOHN]: Your Honor, if I might. (Inaudible) will allow you to determine custody in the absence of (inaudible), however, [3-819(e)] would certainly, I mean, if we go ahead with the hearing, if there are allegations sustained against only one of the parents ... [THE COURT]: I know, you told me that before. [COUNSEL FOR JOHN]: (inaudible) [3-819(0(2)] would allow you to determine custody, visitation, support or paternity in accordance with [3-819] (inaudible) and none of this would preclude you from awarding custody to my client in the absence of a CINA finding other than you’d have to do the CINA finding for the [3 — 819(e)] to apply you have to actually have the, the finding. [THE COURT]: Right. [COUNSEL FOR JOHN]: Even without that, I believe the statute allows you to make a custody determination although it’s discretionary. [DSS COUNSEL]: If I may, your Honor? [THE COURT]: Urn hm. [DSS COUNSEL]: The parties are correct only in part. The entire purpose of [3-819(e)] is to expand the Russell G. decision. [THE COURT]: Right. [DSS COUNSEL]: Which basically said by the Court of Appeals that you can’t make a CINA determination unless ¹⁰¹ both parents are CINA.

The case did not, however, go the logical step and address the fact that in some cases that would mean that without a CINA finding, the child would go back to the offensive parent. [THE COURT]: That wouldn’t make any sense at all. [DSS COUNSEL]: Exactly. Russell G. was never meant to be a sword which