In re the Petition for Reinstatement to the Bar of Raimondi

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We decline in these cases to reinstate Francis X. Dippel and Thomas Paul Raimondi as members of the Bar of this State. The cases are in no way connected. Because the same principles of law and policy are applicable in each case, we have consolidated these two matters for the purpose of an opinion.

Maryland Rule BV14 provides that an attorney’s petition for reinstatement to the bar shall be filed in this Court. It must “set forth facts showing that the petitioner is rehabilitated and is otherwise entitled to the relief sought.” If we reserve judgment until after hearing, as we did here, Bar Counsel is to “conduct an appropriate investigation and shall refer the petition to an Inquiry Panel selected by the Chairman of the Inquiry Committee.” Thereafter the petition is to be heard and determined in accordance with Rule BV6 o concerning complaints and investigations and is to be reviewed by the Review Board in accordance with Rule BV7. Bar Counsel is then to transmit to us the recommendations of the Review Board and any evidence. Rule BV14 c 3 then provides that Rules BV9 e concerning charges and pleadings ⁶⁰⁹ and Rule BV11 b concerning disposition of charges in subsequent proceedings are applicable to proceedings under BV14.

A person desiring reinstatement has the burden under Rule BY14 d 4 “to establish the averments of the petition by clear and convincing proof.” I The law The four principal factors to be considered in evaluating a petition for reinstatement to the bar were set forth by Chief Judge Murphy for the Court in In re Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 199-200 , 316 A. 2d 246 (1974), and repeated by Judge Eldridge for the Court in In re Barton, 273 Md. 377, 379 , 329 A. 2d 102 (1974). They are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the original misconduct; (2) petitioner’s subsequent conduct and reformation; (3) his present character; and (4) his present qualifications and competence to practice law. Judge Eldridge noted in Barton that “the more serious the original misconduct was, the heavier is the burden to prove present fitness for readmission to the bar.” Id. at 380 . This Court has said repeatedly that the purpose of disbarment is not to punish, but to protect the public.

See, e.g., Barton, 273 Md. at 381 ; Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 318 , 329 A. 2d 1 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 974 (1975); Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533 , 325 A. 2d 718 (1974); Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Callanan, 271 Md. 554, 557 , 318 A. 2d 809 (1974); Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549 , 318 A. 2d 811 (1974); Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 519 , 307 A. 2d 677 (1973); Balliet v. Baltimore Co. Bar Ass’n, 259 Md. 474, 478 , 270 A. 2d 465 (1970); and In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 675 , 59 A. 2d 489 (1948). Also, see the opinion by Judge Cardozo in Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84-85 , 116 N. E. 782 (1917), to the same effect. In Meyerson Judge Markell said for the Court, “Whether an application for reinstatement is called an application to set aside a disbarment order or an application for admission to practice, its essential nature is the same.” He then went on to quote from In re Keenan, 310 Mass, 166, 170, 37 N.E.2d ⁶¹⁰ 516 (1941), where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said, “A subsequent petition for admission to the bar involves a new inquiry as to whether, in the interval following the rendering of the judgment of removal, the petitioner has become a proper person to hold such office.” We again quoted that language in Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Boone, 255 Md. 420, 432 , 258 A. 2d 438 (1969). In Meyerson Judge Markell also said for the Court: As disbarment is not punishment, likewise we think due regard for the administration of justice does not permit disbarment and reinstatement to be made mere adjuncts to reform schools and the parole system.

The authorities that seem to us the best considered take a different view, which is consistent with the principles recognized in Maryland. [Id. 190 Md. at 678 .] We quoted that language with approval in Boone, 255 Md. 420, 433 . II Dippel Dippel was originally admitted to the Maryland Bar in November 1947. He practiced law until his disbarment in 1963. 1 During this period he served one year in the House of Delegates and one term in the Maryland Senate. The inquiry panel summarized the facts surrounding his disbarment: [It] was precipitated by investigations and subsequent criminal indictments concerning a scheme devised by [Dippel] and an accomplice, ⁶¹¹ Henry Edward Wisowaty, who also was a member of the Maryland Bar, whereby they would file documents with the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City to gain control of estates of deceased resident aliens, then divest the estates of all capital assets to their own use, the assets being apportioned between them.

The scheme included in some cases the preparation of forged Wills leaving substantial parts of the estate to fictitious heirs, the payment of fictitious claims, and the filing of spurious and false documents. As a result of these activities, six indictments were brought against [Dippel] for embezzlement, larceny and conspiracy, the total amounts embezzled for the six estates being $71,083.46. Eventually, total restitution was made of that sum, [Dippel] having made restitution in the amount of $45,083.46, and Wisowaty having made restitution in the amount of $26,000. In the meantime, however, as a result of those indictments, [Dippel] pleaded guilty to the six indictments charging embezzlement, and the State’s Attorney stetted the companion charges of larceny and conspiracy.

Judge Charles Harris in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City sentenced [Dippel] to terms totalling 15 years in the Maryland Penitentiary, which was later reduced to 5 years after partial restitution had been made, and after serving approximately 21 months of his sentence, [Dippel] was paroled after one previous parole application had been denied. T. Hughlett Henry, Jr., Esq., of the inquiry panel, pressed Dippel as to the reason for his criminal activity. Dippel replied, “It wasn’t a question of earning money because I was earning money — $40,000 to $50,000 a year from about 1950. I can’t say and I will not blame it on my wife or anybody except stupidity on my own part.” He was then asked whether he thought “it was just a clever operation,” to which he replied, “Well, it appeared so easy.” Upon his release from prison Dippel secured employment ⁶¹² as an insurance consultant through the efforts of friends.

Thereafter he became employed by the Social Security Administration on August 8,1966. He is still employed there as a labor relations specialist. He was granted a full pardon on November 10, 1976. The panel heard numerous witnesses.

All of those produced by Dippel praised him, saying what a fine, outstanding gentleman he is today, and recommending his reinstatement. Two attorneys were produced by Bar Counsel in opposition to the reinstatement. Both had been actively involved in the extensive investigation into Dippel’s wrongdoings, one as a member of the Grievance Committee of the Bar Association of Baltimore City and the other as a representative of true heirs of one of the estates involved. Each subsequently served as president of the Maryland State Bar Association.

Each of these attorneys strongly opposed reinstatement. The panel recognized the criteria for consideration of a petition for reinstatement set forth in Barton, Boone, and Braverman . It addressed itself to each of those criteria. It said relative to the cause of his disbarment: The misconduct of [Dippel] which led to the various investigations, both civil and criminal, resulting in indictments and court proceedings, disbarment, conviction, and sentencing, was of the most severe nature that an attorney can be guilty and was not a single, isolated aberration or youthful prank, but a deliberate plan to scheme and defraud innocent people out of funds belonging to them.

It concluded that his conduct “subsequent to his release from prison has been exemplary and he has made genuine efforts to reform himself in his life style, the community, and job.” It found “no indication that [Dippel’s] present character has been blemished to any extent which would in itself prohibit his reinstatement.” Concerning his present qualifications and competence to practice law, it observed in pertinent part: [Dippel] has been away from the active practice of law since at least June of 1963, a period of over 15 ⁶¹³ years, and his efforts to keep current with Maryland law have been very limited. With respect to his competence to practice law, there is, of course, always some question in the case of a lawyer who has been unable to practice for 15 years. The criteria set, however, in grave crimes require a substantial period for rehabilitation and reformation and it is unlikely, in a case of such gravity of misconduct leading to disbarment as this, that a shorter time than 15 years would ever be acceptable. Hence, to consider competence, we must measure this applicant against others forbidden to practice for such a period.

Dippel has proven his competence in a specialized field of law ™ labor relations, and has participated as an advocate in many matters where a licensed lawyer was not required. He admits he has made only casual efforts to keep abreast of the changes in Maryland ease and statute law. He asserts that he would know when he was incompetent and would associate with him a competent lawyer when the occasion arose. If this competence criterion were the only one standing in the way of reinstatement, it would point up the need for a rule permitting conditional reinstatement at the end of a period of refresher legal education.

The primary consideration deals with the gravity of the original misconduct and the extent that Petitioner has shown his reformation and the improbability of a repetition of such conduct if reinstated. The burden of proof is Petitioner’s and the graver the misconduct the greater the burden. The crimes that he committed are peculiarly available to unscrupulous lawyers and the fraudulent devices used — false wills, false claims pursued in Court, and false affidavits to support them —- fall within the areas of the legal training he ⁶¹⁴ received at the outset. It is possible, but not probable, that these fraudulent schemes could have been carried out by one who was not a member of the Bar.

A lawyer who uses his legal skills to defraud has been put in the position to victimize the public through the sanction of the bar in its prior approval of his integrity and morality. [Dippel] committed crimes not only against the dignity of the State, but also against his profession and the Courts of which he was an officer. It is difficult enough to envision reinstatement of a lawyer who embezzles funds entrusted to him without the mitigating circumstances of an irresistible motive. Petitioner did not commit one embezzlement under the pressure of dire need or duress. He committed a series of carefully schemed embezzlements because, in his words, he was “stupid — it appeared so easy.” He was apparently an able lawyer at the time of the original misconduct and some of his schemes were ingenious, so the explanation of stupidity is unacceptable.

That the money was easy to take seems the most reasonable explanation of his fraudulent acts. He should not have the sanction of the bar to invite the public to entrust to him more funds that are easy to take. The Panel has not been persuaded that [Dippel] has met the heavy burden of proof entitling him to reinstatement. Pursuant to Rule BV14 d 2 the Review Board, for which provision is made in Rule BV7, reviewed the matter.

It unanimously “concurred] in and adoptfed] the Inquiry Panel’s recommendation that [Dippel’s] Petition for Reinstatement should be denied____” III Raimondi Thomas Paul Raimondi was admitted to practice before this Court on October 15, 1953. We