In re Victoria C.

BERGER, J. This case arises from an Order of the Circuit Court for Carroll County granting sibling visitation to Victoria C. (“Victoria”). The circuit court granted supervised visitation to Victoria with her minor siblings, Lance and Evan. The parents of the minor children, George and Kieran, opposed visitation.

George and Kieran filed this timely appeal. On appeal, George and Kieran present one issue for our review, which we have rephrased as follows: Whether the circuit court erred in granting sibling visitation to Victoria. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the circuit court erred, and accordingly, we reverse the visitation order. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Victoria was born on August 25, 1993.

Victoria’s mother is deceased. Victoria’s father, George, married Kieran, Victoria’s stepmother, in 2005. George and Kieran have two chil ⁹³ dren together, Lance, age five, and Evan, age three. Victoria also has an older brother, William, with whom she shares both parents.

Victoria lived with George from birth until March 2009, when she was sent to live with a maternal aunt in Texas. Victoria went to live with her aunt after an abuse allegation against George was sustained. Victoria remained in Texas with her aunt for a period of one year and then returned to Maryland in March 2010. Upon her return from Texas, George did not allow Victoria to live in the family home, and Victoria was taken into the care and custody of the Carroll County Department of Social Services.

The Carroll County Department of Social Services (“CCDSS”) petitioned the circuit court to adjudge Victoria as a child in need of assistance (“CINA”). By court order, Victoria was found to be a CINA on April 26, 2010. As an ancillary action to the CINA proceeding, Victoria sought visitation with her two minor siblings, which George and Kieran opposed. On May 24, 2011, a hearing was held before a Master in the Circuit Court for Carroll County.

At the hearing, Victoria presented testimony from CCDSS social worker Michelle Jacobs, Victoria, and Kieran. Jacobs testified that Victoria was doing well in foster care and had expressed a desire to see her siblings. Jacobs testified that there were attempts at family therapy between Victoria and George, but the therapist determined that continued family therapy was not indicated. Jacobs testified that she believed that it was not in Victoria’s best interest to have contact with her siblings until some sort of relationship could be established between Victoria and George.

Jacobs testified that she believed supervised visitation at the CCDSS would not be adequate. Victoria testified that she had been close to her siblings before she left home and, since she had been unable to see them, “[i]t has been like a hold, kind of. I just—I miss them. They were an entire section of my life.” Victoria also introduced a letter from her therapist, expressing the therapist’s views on the appropriateness of visitation from Victoria’s ⁹⁴ perspective.

On cross-examination, Victoria acknowledged that she had no contact with her siblings during the period of time when she was living in Texas. Victoria further acknowledged that she had told the family therapist that she did not want to. have any relationship with George. Victoria admitted that she had said her father was “totally evil” and acknowledged that she has a hostile relationship with George. Victoria called Kieran as an adverse witness.

Kieran testified that there were no pictures of Victoria displayed in the family home, but that there were also no photographs of other family members displayed in the home. Kieran acknowledged that when Victoria lived in the family home before leaving for Texas, she had a loving and caring relationship with her brothers. The CCDSS offered no witnesses. Counsel for George orally presented a motion for judgment at the conclusion of Victoria’s case, which was denied.

Thereafter, George presented two witnesses, clinical therapist Joan Mclnerney and himself. Mclnerney began working with the family after George initially contacted her. Mclnerney testified that she had seen George individually two to three times and had seen Victoria individually five to six times. Thereafter, she had two joint sessions with both George and Victoria before therapy was discontinued.

Mclnerney testified that she did not believe that George and Victoria were making progress toward reconciliation and both George and Victoria were guarded and emotionally shut down with each other. Mclnerney testified that she “continued to not recommend sibling visitation because of the unresolved and extreme anger and distrust between [George and Victoria] toward each other.” George testified that Victoria had a close relationship with her brothers while still living in the family home. George testified that he had been involved in counseling with Victoria and attempted to continue counseling. He further testified that he would like to attempt to have some sort of relationship with Victoria, but that Victoria had said that she was not interested in any kind of a relationship.

George testified that ⁹⁵ he believed it was inappropriate for Victoria to visit with the boys given the strained relationship between George and Victoria. He stated: “I think it could be emotionally damaging to the boys to have an awkward scenario like that. I really think that I need to have at least a neutral relationship with my daughter before she can have a relationship with the two young boys.” He expressed concerns that, given Victoria’s long absence from her siblings’ lives, “what we would be doing is introducing them to a stranger and telling them they should have a relationship with a stranger. Even though she is their sister, they do not know who she is.” George reported that his older son, William, does have a relationship with the boys and stays with the family when he is home on vacation from college.

Kieran also testified. She expressed concern regarding the hostility Victoria displays toward George and concern about “how she might, unintentionally, but might influence the relationship between my sons and my husband and my sons and myself.” Kieran echoed the same concerns expressed by George, stating: “I don’t feel comfortable introducing my two young children to someone I don’t already have at least a neutral relationship with.” Kieran reported that Lance occasionally asks about Victoria but does not recognize her in the family’s wedding photos. Evan does not recall Victoria at all. Kieran testified that when Lance has asked about Victoria, she and George have explained that Victoria is living elsewhere, either in Texas or elsewhere in Maryland.

The Master filed her findings and recommendations on June 15, 2011. The Master recommended that Victoria be allowed visitation with her siblings. The Master found “there is sufficient evidence that exceptional circumstances exist as required [by Maryland law].” George and Kieran timely filed exceptions. On August 25, 2011, Victoria turned eighteen years old.

The circuit court heard argument on the exceptions on September 29, 2011. After the exceptions hearing but before the circuit court issued its opinion, in October 2011, Victoria ⁹⁶ informed CCDSS that she was no longer willing to work with the CCDSS in any capacity and that she planned to leave her foster placement the weekend of October 14-16, 2011. As a result, CCDSS care and custody was terminated on October 18, 2011. The circuit court issued its opinion on February 2, 2012, denying George and Kieran’s exceptions.

George and Kieran noted a timely appeal on March 2, 2012. While the appeal was pending, George and Kieran filed a motion for reconsideration. Due to the pending appeal to this court, the circuit court did not take any action on the motion for reconsideration. We shall include additional facts, as necessary, in our discussion of the issues.

STANDARD OF REVIEW" We generally review orders related to visitation or custody applying an abuse of discretion standard. Brandenburg v. LaBarre, 193 Md.App. 178, 186 , 996 A.2d 939 (2010). “However, where the order involves an interpretation and application of statutory and case law, the appellate court must determine whether the circuit court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Id. (quoting Barrett v. Ayres, 186 Md.App. 1, 10 , 972 A.2d 905 (2009)). The order in the instant case involved the application of the law of third-party visitation to the context of an adult seeking visitation with her siblings, and thus, we review the order de novo.

DISCUSSION The overarching issue before us is the standard that applies to an adult sibling seeking visitation with her minor siblings, and whether, under the applicable test, the circuit court erred in granting Victoria visitation. We first consider the applicable standard for an adult sibling seeking visitation with minor siblings. ⁹⁷ A. Applicable Standard George and Kieran argue that the test articulated in Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404 , 921 A.2d 171 (2007), which considered a constitutional challenge to Maryland’s grandparent visitation statute, applies in the context of adult siblings seeking visitation. Victoria argues that the sibling relationship is granted particular protection under Maryland law, and accordingly, siblings are granted a different status than other third parties seeking visitation. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the standard articulated in Koshko applies to adult siblings seeking visitation with minor siblings.

It is well established that parents “are invested with the fundamental right ... to direct and control the upbringing of their children.” Id. at 422 , 921 A.2d 171 . “As a natural incident of possessing this fundamental liberty interest, [parents] are entitled to the long-settled presumption that a parent’s decision regarding the custody or visitation of his or her child with third parties is in the child’s best interests.” Id. at 423 , 921 A.2d 171 . Accordingly, a court may not impose third-party visitation in a manner that infringes upon a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions about the care, custody, and control of his or her children. In Koshko, supra, 398 Md. 404 , 921 A.2d 171 , the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of third-party visitation within the context of Maryland’s Grandparent Visitation Statute (“GVS”). The Court determined that “a threshold showing of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances indicating that the lack of grandparental visitation has a significant deleterious effect upon the children who are the subject of the petition” was required before a court could reach the best interests analysis.

Id. at 441 , 921 A.2d 171 (footnote omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that “visitation is a species of custody, albeit for a more limited duration.” Id. at 429 , 921 A.2d 171 . The Court emphasized that although “the grant or modification of visitation involves a lesser degree of intrusion on the fundamental right to parent than the assignment of custody,” it did not warrant a lesser degree of ⁹⁸ constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 430 , 921 A.2d 171 (emphasis in original).

Rather, the Court explained: [A]lthough there may be a difference in the degree of intrusion, it is not a difference of constitutional magnitude. Visitation, like custody, intrudes upon the fundamental right of parents to direct the “care, custody, and control” of their children. Through visitation decisions granting such privileges to third parties may tread more lightly into the protected grove of parental rights, they tread nonetheless .... [T]he weight of the footfalls on that territory is sufficiently direct and substantial as to require rigorous scrutiny. Id. at 430-31 , 921 A.2d 171 .

Because grandparent visitation interferes with a fundamental right of the parent, the Court in Koshko applied the strict scrutiny standard and determined that “requiring a threshold showing of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances indicating that the lack of grandparental visitation has a significant deleterious effect upon the children who are the subject of the petition” was necessary in order “[t]o preserve fundamental parental liberty interests.” Id. at 441 , 921 A.2d 171 . We see no reason why the Koshko test does not apply in the instant case. George and Kieran clearly possess a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of Lance and Evan. As a result, Victoria’s petition for visitation must be considered within a framework that safeguards George and Kieran’s constitutional right.

Victoria argues, however, that there is a “Maryland common law presumption in favor of siblings” articulated in In re: Tamara R., 136 Md.App. 236 , 764 A.2d 844 (2000). We first note that In re: Tamara R. was decided seven years before the Court of Appeals decision in Koshko. In re: Tamara R., therefore, has limited utility to an analysis of third-party visitation post -Koshko. Still, assuming arguendo that the holding of In re: Tamara R. is still good law, it is distinguishable from the instant case.

In re: Tamara R. involved a minor child, Tamara, who sought visitation with her ⁹⁹ minor siblings. Tamara had been adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance and was in the custody of the State; her minor siblings were in the custody of her father, who opposed visitation. While recognizing the father’s fundamental right to care, custody, and control of his minor children, the Court concluded: [T]he State’s interest in the protection of a minor child who has been removed from her parent’s care is sufficiently compelling to justify over-riding her parent’s opposition to visitation with her sibling, if there is evidence that denial of sibling visitation would harm the minor child who is separated from her family; it is not necessary that denial of visitation also would harm the siblings whom the separated child seeks to visit. In re: Tamara R., supra, 136 Md.App. at 254 , 764 A.2d 844 .

In this case, unlike In re: Tamara R., the sibling seeking visitation is an adult. 1 Therefore, In re: Tamara R., in which the Court balanced the parent’s constitutional interest against the State’s interest in the protection of a minor child, is of limited relevance. Here, there is no State interest implicated. Although In re: Tamara R. emphasized the importance of sibling relationships, we do not read In re: Ta- ¹⁰⁰ mam R. to stand for the proposition that, unlike the standard applied for all other third parties seeking visitation, a different standard should apply for adult siblings seeking visitation. We acknowledge that “Maryland courts ... have frequently expressed the view that ordinarily, the best interests and welfare of the children of the same parents are best served by keeping them together to grow up as brothers and sisters under the same roof.” Id. at 256, 764 A.2d 844 .

We further recognize that “the sibling relationship has long been recognized as an important one, which will be given significant consideration and protection by courts involving the family.” Id. at 259 , 764 A.2d 844 . This relationship, however, has generally been discussed in the context of a sibling relationship between minor children, and in the instant case, the sibling seeking visitation is an adult. Some courts have held the right to associate with one’s sibling to be a constitutional right, while other courts have declined to hold that there are constitutional grounds for protecting the sibling relationship. Id. at 257-59 , 764 A.2d 844 (collecting cases from various jurisdictions).

We recognize that siblings often enjoy close relationships, and that some courts have held that the sibling relationship enjoys constitutional