In Re Virgil M.

Liss, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. As a result of an adjudication hearing held on December 3, 1979, in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County sitting as a Juvenile Court, Virgil M., the appellant, a seventeen year old boy, was found to be delinquent because of an assault committed upon his mother. At a subsequent disposition hearing held in the same court on January 3, 1980, the appellant was committed to the custody of the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene and placed under the supervision of the Juvenile Services Administration. On appeal, the appellant contends: 1.

That the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Juvenile Court’s finding of delinquency; 2. That the court failed to comply with the provisions of Maryland Rule 915 b; and 3. That appellant was denied the right of allocution at the disposition hearing. 1. Maryland Code (1980) Section 3-801 (k) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article defines "delinquent act” as "an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult.” Subsection (1) defines a "delinquent child” as "a child who has committed a delinquent act and requires guidance, treatment or rehabilitation.” At the adjudication hearing, the Juvenile Court judge had before him testimony; that Virgil came into the bedroom of his mother and performed a "karate kick” which landed in close proximity to her face; ⁶⁵⁶ that after being admonished by his mother to discontinue such behavior, Virgil "grabbed” her by her forearms, "squeezed with all he had and started pushing [her] around”; and that the mother was "very frightened and very scared” but was not injured.

If believed by the court, there was sufficient evidence from which the judge could and did find beyond a reasonable doubt that the child had committed an assault and battery upon his mother, which act if committed by an adult would have amounted to the commission of a crime. See Aye v. State, 17 Md. App. 32 , 299 A.2d 513 (1973). We, therefore, find no merit in the contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the lower court’s finding of a delinquent act. 2. Maryland Rule 915 b provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The disposition made by the court shall be in accordance with Section 3-820 (b) of the Courts Article.

If the disposition hearing is conducted by a judge, and his order includes placement of the child outside the home, the judge shall announce in open court and on the record or shall prepare and file with the clerk, a brief statement of the reasons why that placement is necessary. Rule 915 b is mandatory. In re Appeal No. 1327, Term 1975, 32 Md. App. 478 , 361 A.2d 156 (1976). It refers to Section 3-820 of the Courts Article and indicates that among the reasons upon which the judge must base his determination as to the placement of a child are the best interests of the child and the feasibility of programs which allow the child to remain at home.

The State concedes that the juvenile judge did not comply with the mandatory requirements of the rule and that this case should, therefore, be remanded so that the necessary statement may be filed by the judge. ⁶⁵⁷ Appellant’s third issue is novel and, so far as we can determine, has never been decided in the Maryland Courts. Maryland Rule 772 d 1 mandates the right of allocution for a criminal defendant who has been convicted of a crime and requires that the defendant be advised by the court of his right to make a statement. In interpreting this rule, we had before us Dishman v. State, 45 Md. App. 236 , 413 A.2d 565 (1980), in which a convicted defendant contended that he was denied his right of allocution prior to disposition of his case. It was conceded that his counsel had argued to the court below in mitigation of the offense committed.

In the present case, the State contends: At the disposition hearing below, Appellant’s counsel was afforded ample opportunity to speak in mitigation of sentence. A review of the transcript of the hearing reveals that there was no denial of Appellant’s right of due process because Appellant’s counsel was given a full opportunity to allocute prior to the determination