In Re William B.

ALPERT, Judge. The plight of William B. and his family is a tragic and frustrating one. One thing is certain: there are no “win ⁷⁰ ners” in this case, regardless of how the appeal is resolved. On December 8, 1986, two protective service workers from the Charles County Department of Social Services removed William and Brandon B. from the home of their natural parents on the ground that their mother, Ms. Peggy B., was unable to care for them.

The Department of Social Services (DSS) requested that a child in need of assistance (CINA) petition be filed on the children’s behalf. After an emergency shelter care hearing on December 9, 1986, Judge Richard Clark of the Circuit Court for Charles County ordered that temporary care and custody of the children be given to the DSS until a final hearing and disposition could be made. The hearing was held on January 7, 1987, and at its conclusion, Judge Clark determined that William and Brandon were children in need of assistance under § 3-801(e) of Cts. & Jud. Proc.

Art. (1984 Repl. Vol., 1987 Cum.Supp.). On February 18, 1987, after receiving a report from the DSS, Judge Clark ordered that the children remain in the care and custody of the DSS until their parents (or either parent) attended an alcohol detoxification in-patient program and followed through with an out-patient program. The children’s natural parents, Ms. Peggy B. and Mr. Julius M., and the attorney for the children appealed the decision as to William but not as to Brandon B. We shall affirm.

It appears from the record that Peggy B. and Julius M. live together with Mr. M.’s mother and sister. It also appears, however, that Peggy B. was the primary caretaker of the children. After the two-day hearing, Judge Clark concluded that the children were not receiving ordinary and proper care because of both parents’ addiction to alcohol. He went on to state: [W]hen people have alcohol abuse problems, severely, they lose interest in everything, their own cleanliness and their own health and own care, they lose interest in their seeing to it that their families are provided with those basic needs of love and that is the situation we have here. ⁷¹ We have people who are totally addicted to alcohol but alcohol is the No. 1 priority in their life and their children, in spite of the fact they profess and probably do in their hearts love their children, they put them second.

There was ample evidence presented that both natural parents had drinking problems. There was testimony by several witnesses as to the consumption of alcohol by Ms. B. The judge also received a copy of a report prepared by the Charles County Health Department prior to disposition. The report, through a Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test, administered on January 14, 1987, diagnosed Ms. B. as an alcoholic. A score of 5 or more points indicated a drinking problem; most alcoholics, however, score 10 points or more.

Ms. B. scored 31 points. The report also indicated that Ms. B. showed evidence of psychological and physical dependence on alcohol. Ms. B. told the tester she hadn’t taken a drink in 36 hours and the report indicated she was going through withdrawal. Although Ms. B. admitted having black-outs, she minimized her alcohol problem.

Julius M. scored a nine on a Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test administered to him on January 14, 1987. The report indicated Mr. M. had been taking medication for seizures for the last several years and that it was dangerous for him to consume any alcohol. Mr. M. informed the counselor that he had not had a drink since November and that prior to that occasion, he had not had a drink in eight months. The counselor found Mr. M. did not display any physical evidence of alcohol abuse.

Additionally, the record showed that at the time of the December 8, 1986 emergency shelter hearing Mr. M. was incarcerated for a Driving While Intoxicated conviction. The date of the offense was not indicated. Three prior reports of neglect had been made to the DSS, and it appears each one was related to the parents’ alcohol problem. In March of 1986, after an evaluation showed she had a drinking problem, the DSS persuaded Ms. B. to go through a detoxification program at the Jude House.

The DSS furnished a parent aide to provide transportation and ⁷² support during Ms. B.’s attempt to correct her problem. When Ms. B. reached the Jude House as scheduled, the program refused to admit her because she had been drinking within the 72 hours prior to admittance. Someone from that program suggested that Ms. B. go to North Arundel’s Detoxification Center. When she arrived at the center, a pint of wine was discovered in her bag.

Ms. B. stayed at the center for approximately one week, and it appears she made some progress toward combatting her alcohol problem. She subsequently completed a 28-day program at the Jude House and attended Alcoholics’ Anonymous meetings at least two or three times a week until June 25. When the parent aide from DSS came to transport Ms. B. to the AA meeting on June 25, however, Ms. B. was intoxicated and refused to go. After that date, the aide said Ms. B. had been drinking on most of the occasions that the aide saw her.

Finally, on December 3, 1986, when the aide went to the house to transport Ms. B. to a doctor’s appointment, Ms. B. was intoxicated and abusive. Ms. B. and Mr. M., although present throughout the proceedings, presented no evidence. Judge Clark found that this ongoing problem with alcohol made the parents either unable or unwilling to take adequate care of the children. Section 3-801(e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides that a child may be judicially determined to be in need of assistance if (1) He ... is not receiving ordinary and proper care and attention, and (2) His parents ... are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and his problems.

Md.Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-801(e) (1984 Repl. Vol., 1987 Cum.Supp.). Appellants have not appealed the finding that William is a child in need of assistance.

Rather, Ms. B. and Mr. M. contend that the facts and circumstances presented at the hearing do not warrant the “drastic remedy” of separating William from his parents. Although we agree that this is not a step to be taken lightly, we hold the trial ⁷³ judge did not err when he removed William from the care and custody of his parents. The Code provides that a child may be separated from his parents “only when necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety.” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-802(a)(3) (emphasis added).

We have explained “necessity” by stating “only under the most extraordinary circumstances [may] a parent ... be divested of [the] right and custody of a child.” In re McNeil, 21 Md.App. 484, 497 , 320 A.2d 57 (1974). See also In re Beverly B., 72 Md.App. 433 , 530 A.2d 766 (1987) (“removal of a child from her mother is a drastic remedy which should be avoided”); In re Christiana G., 72 Md.App. 443 , 530 A.2d 771 (1987) (a child should be removed from his home only “ ‘for the most urgent reasons’ ” (citing In re Jertrude O., 56 Md.App. 83, 99 , 466 A.2d 885 (1983)). ALCOHOLISM AS A GROUND FOR REMOVING A CHILD FROM CUSTODY OF HIS PARENTS Mere alcoholism of the parents is not grounds under the statute for removing a child from his home with his parents. The law permits involuntary separation of a child from his parents only if the parents are unable or unwilling to give the child ordinary care and attention, and even then only if the court finds that the drastic remedy of removing the child is necessary for his welfare.

See Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 3-801(e) and § 3-802(a)(3). Other jurisdictions agree. See Matter of S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190 (Alaska 1976) (alcoholism); In Interest of Robbins, 230 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1975) (drug addiction); In re Phifer, 67 N.C.App. 16 , 312 S.E.2d 684 (1984) (alcoholism).

The judge, however, may find that the parents’ alcohol dependency causes them to fail to give the child ordinary care and attention. Although the parents’ battle with the disease of alcoholism entitles them to compassion, it does not absolve them from their duties to their children under the statute. As explained by the Supreme Court of Alaska: ⁷⁴ The petitions with which we are concerned are not based on the disease of alcoholism, as such, but on observations of extensive intoxication____ Even, however, if the intoxication under these circumstances is to be considered a disease, it does not mean that it cannot be regarded as a fault____ For example, insanity is a form of mental illness. While no moral opprobrium should be attached to such a condition, insanity or other severe mental illness could still constitute a fault or defect in the context of child care.

Although an isolated incident of intoxication of short duration might not be considered sufficient to constitute a fault for the purposes of a dependency finding, we hold that intoxication over an extended period of time does constitute a “fault”____ Matter of S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d at 1197 . Cf, In Re Beverly B., 72 Md.App. 433 , 530 A.2d 766 (Appellant’s contention that her daughter was removed from her home because of her mental illness was incorrect. The daughter was removed because of the adverse impact appellant’s mental illness had on her child’s development.). The Alaska court then went on to explain: As we have previously indicated, the fault must be related to the “lack of parental care” of the child.

Thus, we must determine whether the use of alcohol resulted in a lack of proper care for M.D., A.D. and I.D. Looking to the term