In the Estate of Vess

Arthur, J. Nearly six years ago, Claudia Vess commenced caveat proceedings in the Orphans’ Court for Prince George’s County. After several years of litigation, the orphans’ court transmitted five issues to the circuit court for a jury trial. Ms. Vess took a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The circuit court ruled against her.

Ms. Vess appealed from that judgment in In the Matter of Estate of Howard Lewis Vess, No. 372, Sept. Term 2016. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reject her challenge to the circuit court judgment and the underlying order to transmit issues. After the circuit court entered judgment in the de novo appeal, the orphans’ court entered an order “re-submitt[ing]” the issues for trial. In Claudia Vess v. Robert Price, Jr., No. 524, Sept. Term 2016, Ms. Vess appealed directly to this Court from that orphans’ court order.

We also reject her challenge to that order. The combined result of both determinations is that this case can finally proceed to a trial in the circuit court on the issues as framed by the orphans’ court. Factual and Procedural Background A. The Last Will and Testament Dated August 11, 2006 Howard Vess died on June 10, 2011, at the age of 89. He was a widower and had no children.

Mr. Vess’s wife, Katherine, predeceased him in February 2006. Before her death, she had been the principal beneficiary of his two, prior wills. About six months after his wife’s death, Mr. Vess engaged an attorney to prepare a new will. That document is titled “Last Will and Testament of Howard L. Vess” and dated August 11, 2006.

Mr. Vess’s 2006 will revoked all of his prior wills and codicils. He made one specific legacy in the amount of $10 to his brother, provided that he survived Mr. Vess. The only other gift provision was a residuary clause, in which Mr. Vess devised the remainder of the estate to his “good friend, ROBERT V. PRICE, JR., or his issue.” The 2006 will named Mr. Price as personal representative, and named Mr. Price’s wife as a substitute personal representative. 1 Mr. Vess’s brother died in 2009. He had three surviving children: Claudia, Brian, and Debra.

A few weeks after Mr. Vess’s death in 2011, Mr. Price filed a probate petition with the Register of Wills for Prince George’s County. He requested administrative probate of the will dated August 11, 2006. He listed Claudia Vess as an interested person and identified her as Mr. Vess’s surviving niece and a potential heir. The Register of Wills granted Mr. Price’s request that he be appointed as personal representative of the estate.

In addition, the Register docketed the two prior wills and two prior codicils, each of which had been filed with the Register for safekeeping. 2 B. Claudia Vess’s Petition to Caveat the 2006 Will On December 28, 2011, Howard Vess’s niece, Claudia Vess, filed a petition to caveat in the Orphans’ Court for Prince George’s County. She requested that the 2006 will be declared invalid and that “any previous will be declared valid.” She asserted that her interest in the estate was “based on any previous will executed by [Mr. Vess] or by intestacy.” In the caveat petition, Ms. Vess asserted that the document dated August 11, 2006, was not Mr. Vess’s last will and testament. Her petition alleged: that Mr, Vess lacked testamentary capacity and was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of execution; that the instrument was not executed and witnessed properly; that the signature on the document was not Mr. Vess’s signature; that the instrument was procured by fraud; and that the instrument was procured by the exercise of undue influence of Mr. Price, who allegedly maintained a confidential relationship with Mr. Vess. Although Ms. Vess did not include the allegation in her petition, her other submissions assert that Mr. Price established a confidential relationship with Mr. Vess by serving as his financial advisor.

The caveat petition included a request that Mr. Price “be required to answer” the petition. Maryland Rule 6-432(a) states that, within five days after the filing of a petition to caveat, the register of wills must “issue an Order to Answer requiring the personal representative ... to respond to the petition to caveat within 20 days after service[.]” Rule 6-432(b) requires the register of wills to serve that order and the caveat petition on the personal representative. In this case, the register did not issue such an order within that time period. Nevertheless, on the twentieth day after Ms. Vess had filed her petition, Mr. Price responded by filing a motion to dismiss the petition based on lack of standing.

Mr. Price contended that Ms. Vess would have no direct interest in the estate even if she succeeded in invalidating the 2006 will. He informed the court that Ms. Vess was not a legatee under the several prior wills and codicils and that she would be entitled to receive estate property through intestate succession only if she successfully invalidated each of those instruments, which she had not attempted to do. He argued that, absent some basis for invalidating the prior wills, Ms. Vess’s interest in the estate was too remote to allow her to pursue the caveat. In her response to the motion, Ms. Vess stated that she was “only seeking to ensure her uncle’s wishes are honored fully, whether or not she receives any gain for herself arising out of ... her possible heir status.” She argued that her interest “based by intestacy should provide sufficient standing” to caveat the will.

In April 2012, several months after the filing of the petition, the Register of Wills issued notice of the caveat petition to Mr. Price, as an interested person. The notice stated that, if Mr. Price wished to respond to the caveat petition, he was required to do so “within 20 days after service of this notice[.]” The Register also issued an Order to Answer to Mr. Price, instructing him, as the personal representative, to “respond to the petition to caveat no later than 20 days after service.” Mr. Price did not file an additional response to the caveat petition at that time, because he had already responded through his motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the orphans’ court dismissed the caveat petition, concluding that Ms. Vess lacked standing to challenge the 2006 will. The court reasoned that, if Ms. Vess prevailed in the caveat proceedings, the prior wills would be offered for probate, but that she would receive nothing under either of those wills.

The court noted that Ms. Vess had raised no question as to the validity of the prior wills. Ms. Vess took a de novo appeal to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed the dismissal of the caveat petition and remanded the case to the orphans’ court. In its opinion, the circuit court reasoned that, even though Ms. Vess had only a “slight chance to inherit” by invalidating each of the successive wills, her status as an heir-at-law was itself a sufficient interest for her to pursue the caveat proceeding.

Although Mr. Price could have appealed from the circuit court’s judgment to this Court, he did not do so. 3 C. The Petition to Transmit Issues After the ease returned to the orphans’ court, the court held a hearing in October 2013 on the status of the caveat proceedings. In open court, Ms. Vess and Mr. Price submitted a joint petition asking the orphans’ court to transmit five issues to the circuit court for a jury trial: (a) whether Howard Vess was competent to make the 2006 will; (b) whether the will was procured by the exercise of undue influence; (c) whether the testator’s signature on the will was genuine; (d) whether the will was attested and signed by two credible witnesses in his presence; and (e) whether the will was procured by fraud. The orphans’ court filed a hearing sheet, which stated that the joint petition had been “granted” and that the judge intended “to prepare [an] order” to transmit issues. Two months later, however, before the court finalized the written order to transmit issues, Ms. Vess filed a line in the orphans’ court withdrawing her support for the joint petition.

For the first time, she complained that Mr. Price had never filed a formal “answer” denying the allegations of her petition. She contended that “transmission of the issues first requires an answer to the Petition to Caveat which establishes the existence of a factual controversy.” Immediately upon learning of Ms. Vess’s attempt to withdraw her support for the joint petition (and, in fact, two days before she filed the line with the orphans’ court), Mr. Price filed a formal answer to the caveat petition. In addition to denying specific allegations, he represented: that the 2006 will was executed properly by Mr. Vess and attested by two witnesses, that Mr. Vess had the requisite testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed, and that the will had not been procured by fraud or undue influence. Mr. Price signed a statement verifying the contents of his answer under penalty of perjury.

D. The “Order of Default” in the Caveat Proceeding Soon after Mr. Price filed his answer, Ms. Vess moved to strike it on the ground that it was untimely. She contended that Mr. Price was required by Rule 6—122(b) to file “[a]ny response” to the caveat petition “within 20 days after service” of the petition. She argued that entry of an order of default would be “appropriate” upon the striking of Mr. Price’s answer. Recognizing that the Maryland Rules do not authorize an orphans’ court to render judgment by default, Ms. Vess asked the orphans’ court to apply the rules that govern pleadings in civil cases before the circuit court.

Ms. Vess relied on Rule 6-461, which makes certain Title 2 rules applicable in the orphans’ court and permits the orphans’ court to “apply other rules” from Title 2 “on petition of a party ... and after notice to all persons who may be affected by the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard[.]” Md. Rule 6^161(d). Specifically, Ms. Vess requested that the orphans’ court apply Rule 2-613(b), which authorizes the circuit court to “enter an order of default” where “the time for pleading has expired and a defendant has failed to plead[.]” Mr. Price opposed the motion, arguing primarily that Rule 2-613 did not apply to proceedings in the orphans’ court. In fact, at the time of the motion, Mr. Price was no longer in “default,” because he had filed an answer two months earlier. Rule 2-613 includes no provision authorizing the court to strike a pleading so as to create a default.

Nonetheless, the orphans’ court granted Ms. Vess’s motion without a hearing, struck Mr. Price’s answer, and directed that an “order of default” be entered against him, subject to his right to move to vacate the “order of default” within 30 days after its entry. Although Mr. Price continued to argue that Rule 2-613 did not apply, he made a timely motion to vacate the “order of default.” He argued that the untimeliness of his answer should be excused under the circumstances and that the record demonstrated “a substantial and sufficient basis for an actual controversy as to the merits of the action” under Rule 2-613(e). In support, he relied on the verified answer that he had filed before the “order of default” was even entered, the discovery requests and responses that the parties had exchanged, 4 and the parties’ agreement to submit a joint petition for issues, to which he pointed as “an acknowledgement” by Ms. Vess that those issues were contested. He argued that the will was “presumptively valid” because it had an attestation clause and that Ms. Vess would bear the burden of proving otherwise.

He asked the court to vacate the “order of default,” to accept his answer for filing, and to transmit the contested issues to the circuit court for trial. At a hearing on October 22, 2014, the orphans’ court granted Mr. Price’s motion to vacate the “order of default.” At the court’s direction, the Register of Wills made a docket entry stating that the orphans’ court had granted the motion and that the court would prepare an order to transmit issues. On the same day, the court entered a written order transmitting five issues to the circuit court. The issues were the same issues that the parties originally framed in the joint petition.

E. Ms. Vess’s Post-Judgment Revisory Motion to the Orphans’ Court Although Ms. Vess had the right to appeal the order transmitting issues (see, e.g., Hegmon v. Novak, 130 Md.App. 703, 711 , 747 A.2d 772 (2000)) either to this Court 5 or to the circuit court, 6 she did not do so. Instead, she filed a post-judgment motion, in which she asked the orphans’ court to exercise its revisory powers under Maryland Rules 2-534 and 2-535, which apply to “a final order” of an orphans’ court. See Md. Rule 6-461(d). She argued that the order was fully subject to revision because the judgment had “los[t] its finality upon the filing of the ...

Motion pursuant to Rule 2-534 and/or 2-535 within 10 days” after the entry of the judgment. The orphans’ court, however, did not receive Ms. Vess’s motion by Monday, November 3, 2014, the tenth day after the entry of its judgment. 7 The Register of Wills stamped the document to indicate that it was received on November 6, 2014, and made a docket entry noting that the document had been filed on November 6, 2014. Ms. Vess’s post-judgment motion included what she characterized as an “alternative motion” to amend the issues. She cited Rule 6-434(d), which authorizes the orphans’ court, “[u]pon petition,” to “amend, supplement or modify issues previously transmitted to a circuit court.” The court had transmitted two questions asking, respectively, whether the 2006 will had been procured by fraud or undue influence.

Ms. Vess asked the court to modify the questions to ask whether the will was partially invalid on those grounds. On January 12, 2015, the orphans’ court entered an order denying Ms. Vess’s post-judgment motion “in whole[.]” Thirty days after the entry of that order, Ms. Vess filed a notice of de novo appeal to the circuit court. F. De Novo Appeal in Circuit Court from the Order to Transmit Issues After the circuit court received the record from the orphans’ court, Mr. Price filed what he called a “Motion for Summary Judgment” in the circuit court. In essence, he argued that the order transmitting issues was correct and that the circuit court should uphold the judgment on the merits.

In addition to his main argument on the merits, Mr. Price asserted that Ms. Vess had failed to note a timely appeal from the order to transmit issues. He observed that Ms. Vess had not filed a notice of appeal within 30 days after the orphans’ court entered that order on October 22, 2014. He argued that, although a revisory motion filed within 10 days of the date of judgment may extend the time for noting an appeal, Ms. Vess had not filed her motion within that 10-day period. He relied on the docket entry showing that Ms. Vess had filed her post-judgment motion on November 6, 2014, 15 calendar days after the entry of judgment.

On that basis, he contended that “the appeal must be dismissed” by the circuit court. In response, Ms. Vess argued that her appeal was timely as to the order to transmit issues. She claimed that her attorney “filed the Motion to Alter or Amend” with the orphans’ court “on November 3, 2014 by placing the Motion in the overnight box of the Circuit Court.” She submitted a separate motion to the circuit court, styled as a “Motion to Correct Estate Docket.” During a hearing on the dispositive motion, Ms. Vess’s attorney offered a billing record indicating that he had submitted the post-judgment motion on the night of November 3, 2014. He believed that the original version of the motion had a time-stamp from the circuit court, but the stamp was not visible on the copies sent from the orphans’ court as part of the de novo appeal.

The hearing judge stated that he was familiar with the circuit court’s night box, which he described as “a wooden box in the commissioner’s office where pleadings can be deposited after hours[.]” The judge stated that he was unaware that the orphans’ court used a night box. In response, Ms. Vess’s attorney claimed that a circuit court employee “generally” separates the circuit court filings from the orphans’ court filings and does something (it is not clear what) to ensure that the orphans’ court filings “get” to the orphans’ court. The circuit court concluded that the docket entries were “presumptively correct” and that those entries were “disposi-tive evidence” of the filing date of November 6, 2014. The court reasoned that the presumption of correctness could not be rebutted by presenting a “lawyer’s bill for the time spent going on the date to file it.” The court announced that it would grant Mr. Price’s “motion for summary judgment” and that the “whole appeal” would be “dismissed.” The court denied all other pending motions, including the motion to correct the estate docket, on the ground that they were “moot.” In her written opposition, Ms. Vess had argued that, even if her motion to alter or amend was not timely, her post-judgment motion had included timely “alternative motions” to revise the judgment under Rule 2-535(a) and to amend the issues previously transmitted under Rule 6-434(d).

She argued that her appeal was timely at least as to the denial of those motions and, therefore, that the circuit court had the authority to reconsider the underlying orphans’ court orders. After the court announced during the hearing that it was “dismissing everything,” counsel for Ms. Vess asserted that her appeal was “still viable” as to the petition to amend the issues that were to be transmitted. Her attorney did not, however, elaborate on why he believed that the issues needed to be amended. The circuit court said that it would consider those other matters if Ms. Vess raised them in a timely motion.

On November 10, 2015, the circuit court entered a written order granting Mr. Price’s “Motion for Summary Judgment” and remanding the matter “to the Orphans’ Court to certify and send issues to [the circuit court] as framed by Order of Orphans’ Court dated October 22, 2014.” The court also entered a separate order denying Ms. Vess’s motion to correct the estate docket as “moot.” G. The Motion for Reconsideration in the Circuit Court Within 10 days after the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Mr, Price, Ms. Vess moved to “alter, amend, revise and/or reconsider” the judgment. She asked the court to reconsider the conclusion that she had failed to file a post-judgment motion within 10 days after the orphans’ court entered the order to transmit issues. Ms. Vess offered additional evidence that she had filed her post-judgment motion on the night of November 3, 2014. The evidence consisted of images of the original versions of her post-judgment motion, along with affidavits to authenticate those images.

The images showed that the document had been stamped three times. The first stamp, from the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, reads: “2014 NOV 3 PM 8:32.” The second stamp marks the document as “PILED” with the clerk of the circuit court on “NOV 3 2014.” The third stamp marks the document as “PILED” on “NOV 06 2014” with the Register of Wills for Prince George’s County. Ms, Vess argued that the first stamp proved that the document had been filed “in the ‘night box’ in the Courthouse” at “8:32 p.m. on November 3,2014.” The circuit court held a hearing on the motion for reconsideration. After examining the images, the court concluded that the document “was received in the Circuit Court’s box at 8:32 p.m., on November 3rd.” The court commented that the motion “certainly would have been timely” if it had been “a filing in the Circuit Court[.]” The court explained, however, that the document “need[ed] to be filed with the Register of Wills, the Orphans’ Court, not with the Circuit Court[.]” Therefore, the court upheld its determination that Ms. Vess did not file the post-judgment motion with the orphans’ court until the register of wills received it on November 6, 2014.

Separately, Ms. Vess argued that her appeal had been timely from the orphans’ court’s denial of her “alternative motion” to amend the issues to include questions about partial invalidation of the 2006 will. She argued that her request to amend the issues under Md. Rule 6—434(d) was not subject to the 10-day deadline for filing a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Md. Rule 2-634. The circuit court agreed that her petition to amend the issues had been timely under Rule 6-434(d). 8 But after Ms. Vess conceded that the decision to allow the amendment was discretionary, the judge ruled that amending the issues was not “necessary or appropriate under all of these circumstances.” On April 12, 2016, the circuit court entered an order denying Ms. Vess’s motion for reconsideration. The order reiterated that the case was remanded to the orphans’ court for that court to transmit issues for trial.

H. Notices of Appeal in the Circuit Court and in the Orphans’ Court On April 18, 2016, the circuit court’s civil coordinating judge signed an order directing the orphans’ court to “immediately frame the issues” for trial. The order stated that the case needed to be “returned to [the circuit] court promptly for trial” beginning on October 3, 2016, a little less than six months from the date of the order. The order was docketed on April 21, 2016. The orphans’ court evidently received the order from the circuit court’s civil coordinating judge even before it was docketed: on April 20, 2016, the orphans’ court entered another order stating that the same five issues from the October 22, 2014, order to transmit issues were being “re-submitted for trial.” On April 28, 2016, Ms. Vess filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court to the Court of Special Appeals.

Her notice identified three circuit court orders for review: the order granting judgment in favor of Mr. Price; the order denying Ms. Vess’s motion for reconsideration; and the subsequent order issued by the civil coordinating judge. That appeal is now before this Court as In the Estate of Howard Lewis Vess, No. 872, Sept. Term 2016. On the same day that she filed her notice of appeal in the circuit court, Ms. Vess filed a line in the orphans’ court, notifying that court of the appeal that she had noted in the circuit court. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Vess filed an additional notice of appeal from the orphans’ court directly to the Court of Special Appeals.

Her notice stated that she was appealing from the orphans’ court order that “re-submitted” five issues to the circuit court for trial. That notice gave rise to a separate appeal: Claudia Vess v. Robert V Price, Jr., No. 524, Sept. Term 2016. Ms. Vess moved to consolidate the two related appeals. This Court denied her motion, but scheduled both cases for argument on the same day.

Although these cases are not consolidated, we have issued this joint opinion to avoid duplication of our summary of the extensive procedural background of these two appeals. In the Estate of Howard Lewis Vess, No. 372, Sept. Teem 2016 The first appeal comes to this Court from the final judgment of the circuit court in the de novo appeal from the orphans’ court. Based on its conclusion that Ms. Vess’s notice of appeal was untimely as to the order to transmit issues, the court announced that it was “dismissing” the de novo appeal, granted what it called “summary judgment” in favor of Mr. Price, and remanded the case to the orphans’ court. In her appeal from that judgment, Ms. Vess presents two questions.

Her first question concerns the circuit court’s ruling in her de novo appeal: 1. Did the circuit court err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion when it granted Price’s motion for summary judgment, thereby disposing of [Ms. Vess’s] entire appeal, and then refused to reconsider its earlier Order? For the reasons discussed below, the answer to first questions is: No. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment of November 10, 2015, and the order denying the motion for reconsideration of that judgment on April 12, 2016. The second question relates to the propriety of the order issued by the civil coordinating judge a week after the denial of reconsideration.

Ms. Vess asks: 2. Did the Circuit Court abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law when it scheduled a non-jury trial to begin on October 3, 2016, and then further directed the Orphans’ Court to “immediately” frame the issues for the trial scheduled on that date, thereby making it practically impossible to exercise a right of appeal that is conferred by statute? There is no need to answer the second question, because the record shows it is moot. The appeal is dismissed under Rule 8-602(a)(10) to the extent that it challenges the civil coordinating judge’s order, which was signed on April 18, 2016, and docketed on April 21, 2016.

I. Judgment of the Circuit Court in the De Novo Appeal Generally, parties have two alternative methods to obtain appellate review of a final judgment of an orphans’ court. See Md. Rule 6-463. A party may appeal from the final judgment of an orphans’ court directly to the Court of Special Appeals. Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl.

Vol.), § 12-501(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”). Or a party may appeal from the orphans’ court to the circuit court for that county, except in Harford County and Montgomery County, where the circuit court sits as the orphans’ court. CJP § 12-502(a)(l)(i). Here, the orphans’ court entered an appealable, final judgment on October 22, 2014, the date that the Register of Wills docketed the order transmitting issues to the circuit court for a jury trial.

See Kao v. Hsia, 309 Md. 366 , 372 n.4, 524 A.2d 70 (1987); Banashak v. Wittstadt, 167 Md.App. 627, 685-88 , 893 A.2d 1236 (2006); Hegmon v. Novak, 130 Md.App. at 709 , 747 A.2d 772 . Ms. Vess could have secured appellate review of that judgment in this Court by filing a notice of appeal with the register of wills within 30 days after the entry of the orphans’ court’s judgment. See Md. Rule 8-202(a). Alternatively, she could have secured review in the circuit court by filing a notice of appeal with the register of wills during that period.

See Md. Rule 7-503(a). But she did not file a notice of appeal to either court within 30 days after October 22, 2014. Instead, within that 30-day period, Ms. Vess made the motion styled as a motion to “Alter, Amend, Revise, and/or Reconsider Order Transmitting Issues” pursuant to Rules 2-534 and 2-535. When a party files a Rule 2-534 motion to alter or amend within 10 days after the entry of judgment, Maryland Rule 8-202(c) extends the time period for noting an appeal to this Court until 30 days after the motion is withdrawn or decided.

Rule 8-202(c) also extends the time period for noting an appeal to this Court when a party files a revisory motion under Rule 2-535 within 10 days after entry of judgment. See Committee Note to Rule 8-202(c); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane v. Tornillo, 320 Md. 192, 200 , 577 A.2d 34 (1990). The courts sometimes say that a timely, 10-day post-judgment motion causes the judgment to “lose its finality” for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., Green v. Hutchinson, 158 Md.App. 168, 171 , 854 A.2d 889 (2004).

By its own terms, however, Rule 8-202(c) changes the time for noting an appeal only when a party files a “timely motion.” A motion styled as a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 2-534, if filed more than 10 days after entry of judgment, does not stay the time period for noting an appeal to this Court. See, e.g., Blake v. Blake, 341 Md. 326, 331 , 670 A.2d 472 (1996); Pickett v. Noba, Inc., 122 Md.App. 566, 570 , 714 A.2d 212 (1998). Rules 2-534 and 2-535, which govern post-judgment revisory motions in the circuit court, also apply to a “final order” of an orphans’ court. See Md. Rule 6-461(c).

Rule 6-461(c) “transports] the tolling effect of those two rules, under Rule 8-202(c), to appeals to this Court from final judgments of the orphans’ court.” Edery v. Edery, 213 Md.App. 369, 383 , 73 A.3d 1229 (2013) (emphasis added). But Title 8 of the Maryland Rules, including Rule 8-202(e), applies only to “appellate procedure in the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals.” Md. Rule 8-101. Rule 8-202(c), therefore, does not apply to appeals from an orphans’ court to a circuit court. The rules governing appeals from an orphans’ court to a circuit court are found in Title 7, Chapter 5, of the Maryland Rules, which first took effect in 2008.

See Md. Rule 7-501 (“[t]he rules in this Chapter govern appeals to a circuit court from a judgment or order of an orphans’ court”). Rule 7-502(a) provides that review in the circuit court of a judgment or order of the orphans’ court “may be obtained only if a notice of appeal is filed with the Register of Wills within the time prescribed in Rule 7-503.” (Emphasis added.) Unlike Rule 8-202(c), Rule 7-503, which governs the timing of de novo appeals from the orphans’ court to the circuit court, does not extend the deadline until the withdrawal or disposition of a timely, post-judgment motion: (a) Generally. Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by law, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry pursuant to Rule 6-171 of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. (b) Appeals by Other Party.

If one party files a timely notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 10 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal was served or within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken, whichever is later. Consequently, in de novo appeals from an orphans’ court to a circuit court, such as Ms. Vess’s appeal from the orphans’ court order that transmitted issues and struck the “order of default,” the filing of a post-judgment motion -within 10 days of the judgment does not extend the time for taking an appeal. In light of Rule 7-503, it does not matter whether Ms. Vess filed her post-judgment motion within 10 days of the judgment or more than 10 days after the judgment—i.e., it does not matter whether Ms. Vess is deemed to have filed her post-judgment motion with the orphans’ court by putting it in the circuit court’s night deposit box on the evening of the tenth day, or whether she is not deemed to have filed the motion until the orphans’ court actually received it three days later. Even a timely, 10-day post-judgment motion does not extend the 30-day deadline for noting an appeal from the orphans’ court to a circuit court.

See Md. Rule 7-503. Therefore, Ms. Vess’s post-judgment motion had no effect whatsoever on her 30-day deadline for filing an appeal to the circuit court. Because Ms. Vess did not appeal to the circuit court until well over 30 days after the entry of the judgment in which the orphans’ court transmitted issues and struck the “order of default,” her appeal was not timely as to the merits of that judgment. See Md. Rule 7-503(a).

The result would not change even if we assumed that when a party files a timely motion to alter or amend an orphans’ court’s judgment, Rule 8-202(c) somehow operates to delay the time period for noting a de novo appeal not only to this Court, but to the circuit court as well. Ms. Vess contends that she “filed” her post-judgment motion with the orphans’ court by delivering it to the circuit court’s night deposit box on the evening of November 3, 2014. She contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that she did not “file” her post-judgment motion with the orphans’ court until Thursday, November 6, 2014, and consequently that her motion did not extend the deadline for noting an appeal from the order to transmit issues. The ultimate determination of when a document is deemed to be “filed” under a rule or statute is a conclusion of law that is subject to de novo review.

See In re Vy N., 131 Md.App. 479, 482 , 749 A.2d 247 (2000); see also Molé v. Jutton, 381 Md. 27, 35 , 846 A.2d 1035 (2004). Where the court looks outside the docket entries and considers other evidence about the circumstances of the filing, the court’s factual findings about the delivery of the document are entitled to deference on appeal unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See In re Vy N., 131 Md.App. at 482 , 749 A.2d 247 (deferring to district court’s factual findings about time of delivery of juvenile delinquency petitions). “ ‘In modern usage, the “filing” of a paper consists in placing it in the custody of the proper official who makes the proper indorsement thereon.’ ” Cherry v. Seymour Bros., 306 Md. 84, 92 , 507 A.2d 613 (1986) (quoting Levy v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 210 Md. 265, 273 , 123 A.2d 348 (1956)). “ ‘[A] paper is said to be “filed” when it is delivered to the proper officer and received by him [or her] to be kept on file.’ ” Id. at 92, 507 A.2d 613 (quoting Levy v. Glens Falls Indem.

Co., 210 Md. at 273 , 123 A.2d 348 ). “ ‘The date that a pleading or paper is “filed” is the date that the clerk receives it.’ ” Bond v. Slavin, 157 Md.App. 340, 351 , 851 A.2d 598 (2004) (quoting Paul V. Niemeyer & Linda M. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary 47 (3d ed. 2003)). “ ‘A pleading or paper is filed by actual delivery to the clerk.’ ” Id. (quoting Paul V. Niemeyer & Linda M. Schuett, Maryland Rules Commentary, supra, at 47); Lovero v. Da Silva, 200 Md.App. 433, 442 , 28 A.3d 43 (2011); Cave v. Elliott, 190 Md.App. 65, 75 , 988 A.2d 1 (2010). Maryland Rule l-322(a), which governs the filing of an item with a court, provides that “[o]n the same day that an item is received in a clerk’s office,” the clerk must “note on it that date it was received and enter on the docket that date[.]” The paper is “deemed filed on ... the date noted by the clerk on the item.” Id. This Rule “requires that, to be filed, pleadings and papers must be actually delivered, either in person or by mail, to the clerk or a judge of the court in which they are sought to be filed.” Blundon v. Taylor, 364 Md. 1, 11 , 770 A.2d 658 (2001). 9 As Mr. Price points out, Rule l-322(a) does not strictly apply in proceedings before the orphans’ court.

See Md. Rule 1—101(a) (providing that Title 1 of the Maryland Rules applies to all courts in this State except the orphans’ courts). But although there is no equivalent rule in Title 6 for the filing of items in the orphans’ court, Ms. Yess argues that cases interpreting Rule l-322(a) should guide the determination of when an item is “filed” with the orphans’ court. We agree that those authorities provide guidance here. The relevant “filing” requirement comes from Rule 2-534, a rule governing motions to the circuit court, which is then made applicable in the orphans’ court.

The determination of when a motion to the orphans’ court is “filed” under Rule 2-534 should be largely consistent with the determination of when such a motion is filed with the circuit court under that Rule. The main difference is that, in the orphans’ court, the register of wills takes the place of the “clerk” of the court. See Md. Rule 6-105(b) (“ ‘Clerk’ when used in any rule incorporated by reference into this Title means the register of wills”). Thus, in general, a motion under Rule 2-534 is “filed” with the orphans’ court on the day when it is actually received by or delivered to the register of wills.

In the vast majority of cases, there are no disputes about when a particular document has been filed with the court, because the docket entries of the clerical staff create a public record of the filing date, so that all parties may rely on those docket entries. “Docket entries are made under the eye of the court, and by its authority, and are presumed to be true until corrected.” Mateen v. Saar, 376 Md. 385, 396-97 , 829 A.2d 1007 (2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Maryland appellate courts “have consistently held that docket entries are presumptively correct, and will be considered dispositive evidence of when a paper was filed in court[.]” Estime v. King, 196 Md.App. 296, 304 , 9 A.3d 148 (2010) (citing Waller v. Maryland Nat’l Bank, 332 Md. 375, 379 , 631 A.2d 447 (1993); Lawson v. State, 187 Md.App. 101, 108 , 975 A.2d 357 (2009); Shade v. State, 18 Md.App. 407, 411 , 306 A.2d 560 (1973)); see also Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Suchoza, 212 Md.App. 43 , 62 n.10, 66 A.3d 1073 (2013) (“[i]n the absence of a court order changing the filing date ..., we must accept the date of filing as the one entered in the docket entries”).

This presumption of correctness can be overcome if the docket entry conflicts with a transcript of court proceedings, but where “the rules rely upon the form and date of the docket entry to establish the finality and date of finality of an order, the docket entry will control” unless and until it is corrected. Estime, 196 Md.App. at 305 , 9 A.3d 148 (citing Waller, 332 Md. at 379 , 631 A.2d 447 ). The circuit court expressly relied on Estime when it reasoned that the docket entry was “presumptively correct and considered to be dispositive evidence” that Ms. Vess had filed her post-judgment motion in the orphans’ court on November 6, 2014. The court commented that it “would completely eviscerate the purpose of docket entries” if a party could override the docket entry simply by proffering a “lawyer’s bill for time spent going on the date to file it.” We see no error in the circuit court’s analysis.

Although Estime and other cases discuss the presumption of correctness for docket entries of other courts, the registers of wills have a duty to “keep a proper docket showing ... a short entry of every paper filed in the court and every order of the court or the register, setting forth the nature of the order or paper.” Md. Code (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.), § 2-208(d) of the Estates and Trusts Article. Furthermore, the estate docket should be “similar in every respect to the dockets required to be kept in the offices of the equity courts.” Id. Ms. Vess contends that docket entries made by the register of wills are not entitled to any presumption of correctness.

The only authority she cites in support of that assertion is Anthony v. Clark, 335 Md. 579 , 644 A.2d 1070 (1994). As part of its opinion in that case, the Court of Appeals addressed a dispute about the date of entry of an orphans’ court’s judgment. The orphans’ court had granted a motion to dismiss a caveat petition, and the docket entry from the same date read: “ ‘Motion to dismiss petition to caveat and order.’ ” Id. at 584 , 644 A.2d 1070 . The Court of Appeals rejected the argument (id. at 588-89, 644 A.2d 1070 ) that the register of wills had failed to make a proper record of that judgment under Rule 6—171(b), which requires that the register of wills “enter an order or judgment by making a record of it in writing” in the docket.

The Court of Appeals concluded that Rule 6—171(b) was “not intended to be interpreted identically” to the rule governing entry of judgments in the circuit court. Anthony v. Clark, 335 Md. at 592-93 , 644 A.2d 1070 . The Court held that Rule 6—171(b) “simply requires that it be noted on the docket in an orphans’ court that an order has been filed