In the Matter of Cromwell

Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases came before us at an earlier stage, on petitions to release the appellants from the custody of the training schools to which they had been committed as juvenile delinquents, pending the hearing of these appeals. We declined to do so, holding that the temporary commitments violated no constitutional principle, and that the trial court was not clearly wrong in declining to release these children to the custody of their mothers under the circumstances of the case. We took judicial notice of the fact that the Governor had sent the State Militia to Cambridge to prevent threatened outbreaks of violence.

We pointed out that the trial court may well have felt that it was in the best interests of the children that they be removed from the scene of danger, where they would be safe from the physical injuries they might suffer if they remained at home and persisted in their past course of participating in protests against racial segregation that were not always peaceful or law-abiding. Ex parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 309 . ⁴¹² We advanced these appeals for hearing, and the case was heard on a stipulated statement of facts in lieu of a transcript of proceedings. We take judicial notice of the facts that the militia is still in Cambridge and that a Charter Amendment designed to clear the air, by forbidding discrimination in restaurants and certain other places of public accommodation, was defeated by popular vote on October 1, 1963. The appellants, Dwight Cromwell and Dinez White, contend that they were denied their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment h> the Federal Constitution, in that the court found them to be juvenile delinquents simply because of their participation in civil rights demonstrations.

They argue that in picketing the Board of Education and in walking down the streets of Cambridge, they were merely exercising a right of free speech and assembly. The other three demonstrations in which they participated were “sit-ins” of privately operated places of public accommodation. They argue that these actions did not constitute unlawful trespass or disturbances of the peace, to justify a conviction either under the State Trespass Law (Code (1957), Art. 27, sec. 577), or the State Disorderly Conduct Law (Code (1957), Art. 27, sec. 123) or the local law of Dorchester County, P.L.L. (1961 Ed.) Art. 10, sec. 91 (Disorderly Conduct).

The Juvenile Court Act (Code (1957), Art. 26, sec. 52 (e)) provides: “ ‘Delinquent child’ means a child (1) Who violates any law or ordinance, or who commits any act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment; (2) who is incorrigible or ungovernable or habitually disobedient or who is beyond the control of his parents, guardian, custodian or other lawful authority; (3) who is habitually a truant; (4) who without just cause and without the consent of his parents, guardian or other custodian, repeatedly deserts his home or place of abode; (5) who is engaged in any occupation which is in violation of law, or who associates with immoral or vicious persons; or (6) who so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals of himself or others.” The appellants were each 15 years of age when arrested on charged of disorderly conduct in connection with the “sit-in” ⁴¹³ demonstrations. Being of an age where the Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction under Code (1957), Art. 26, sec. 53, in the absence of waiver under sec. 54, they were charged with delinquency in the juvenile court, on petitions assigning as the only reasons thierefor, disorderly conduct on three occasions identified by dates in one case, and on four occasions in the other. At the hearing they were represented by counsel. In the previous appeal we expressed no opinion as to the validity of the finding of delinquency, stating that the only matter then before us was the propriety of the ruling that the infant petitioners be lodged in the training schools pending the determination of these appeals.

The question reserved is now before us. We have no difficulty in holding that there was evidence before the trial court to support a finding that each child had committed acts, which if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of trespass and disorderly conduct. We refer particularly to an incident mentioned in our prior opinion, where they entered the Dorset Theatre without tickets while a show was in progress, lay on the floor, used profane language and refused to leave until arrested. If we assume, without deciding, that children have the same rights of protest enjoyed by adults, such conduct, we think would justify a conviction in the case of adults.

See Bell v. State, 227 Md. 302, 305 , and cases there cited. (The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, and in the earlier case of Griffin v. State, 225 Md. 422 , and these cases will be argued, or reargued in the current term.) Under the existing law, unless and until it be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, we find no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the assertion of a private proprietor’s right to choose his customers, or to eject those who are disorderly or enter without paying a charge imposed upon all patrons. But the difficulty in the case at bar is that a mere finding of a basis for delinquency is not enough. Code (1957), Art.