In the Matter of Hon. Pamela J. White

Adkins, J. We must decide whether proceedings before the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities ("Commission") violated a judge's due process rights. As we explained last year, although we have no appellate jurisdiction to review a judge's exceptions to the Commission's determination to issue a public reprimand after public charges and a contested hearing, the common law writ of mandamus provides an avenue for a judge to challenge the fundamental fairness of the proceedings before the Commission. Matter of White , 451 Md. 630 , 649-50, 155 A.3d 463 (2017) (per curiam) [hereinafter White I ]. We previously refrained from deciding the due process claims made by Petitioner, Judge Pamela J. White, because we did not have the full record of the Commission proceedings before us.

Id. at 652-53 , 155 A.3d 463 . After review of the complete record, we hold that, although the Commission violated applicable Maryland Rules, these violations did not ultimately deprive Judge White of a fundamentally fair proceeding. BACKGROUND Discipline Or Removal Of Judges Article IV, §§ 4A - 4B of the Maryland Constitution provides a special process for the discipline or removal of a judge who has committed misconduct, or who is found to suffer from a disability. Article IV, § 4A(a) creates the Commission, and Article IV, § 4B(a)(1) authorizes it to conduct investigations of complaints about judges.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Commission may "issue a reprimand and [has] the power to recommend to the Court of Appeals the removal, censure, or other appropriate disciplining of a judge or, in an appropriate case, retirement." Id. , § 4B (a)(2). Commission proceedings are confidential and privileged, except as provided by rule of this Court. Id. , § 4B (a)(3). The General Assembly granted the Commission additional powers relating to investigations and hearings.

See Md. Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.), §§ 13-401 - 13-403 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (power to issue and enforce subpoenas, administer oaths or affirmations, and grant immunity to witnesses). The Constitution also delegates to this Court the task of prescribing "the means to implement and enforce the powers of the Commission and the practice and procedure before the Commission." Md. Const. art. IV, § 4B (a)(5).

We have done so in the Maryland Rules at 18-401 et seq. 1 Maryland Rule 18-402(d) empowers the Commission to appoint an Investigative Counsel. Upon submission of a complaint to the Commission, Investigative Counsel may dismiss the complaint if "the complaint does not allege facts that, if true, would constitute a disability or sanctionable conduct and that there are no reasonable grounds for a preliminary investigation ...." Md. Rule 18-404(c). If Investigative Counsel does not dismiss the complaint, she then conducts a preliminary investigation of the alleged misconduct. Id.

(d). Unless the Commission or the Judicial Inquiry Board ("Inquiry Board") (discussed infra ) directs otherwise, Investigative Counsel shall notify the judge of the pendency of the investigation before its conclusion. 2 Id. (e)(4). Investigative Counsel must "afford the judge a reasonable opportunity to present, in person or in writing, such information as the judge chooses." Id.

(e)(5). Investigative Counsel has 90 days to complete her preliminary investigation. Id. (e)(6).

Upon application by Investigative Counsel, and for good cause, the Inquiry Board shall extend the time for completing the preliminary investigation for an additional 30-day period. Id. The Commission may dismiss the complaint and terminate an investigation if Investigative Counsel fails to comply with these time requirements. Id.

Maryland Rule 18-403(a) requires the Commission to "appoint an [Inquiry] Board consisting of two judges, two attorneys, and three public members who are not attorneys or judges." After completing a preliminary investigation, Investigative Counsel shall report the results of her investigation to the Inquiry Board with a recommendation of either: (1) dismissal; (2) authorization of further investigation; (3) entering into a private reprimand or deferred discipline agreement; or (4) filing public charges. Md. Rule 18-404(f). The Inquiry Board must continually monitor the investigation and review the reports and recommendations of Investigative Counsel. Id.

(g). Upon reviewing the results of the preliminary investigation, the Inquiry Board prepares a report for submission to the Commission. Id. (j)(1).

The report must include a recommendation for further action by the Commission. The Inquiry Board may not recommend a dismissal with warning, a private reprimand, or a deferred discipline agreement unless the respondent judge consents to the remedy. Id. After the Commission receives the Inquiry Board's report, it must promptly transmit a copy to the judge and Investigative Counsel.

Id. (j)(4). Both Investigative Counsel and the judge have an opportunity to file objections to the Inquiry Board's report. Id.

(k). After reviewing the Inquiry Board's report and upon a finding of probable cause, the Commission may direct Investigative Counsel to begin proceedings against the judge by filing charges with the Commission. Md. Rule 18-407(a). The judge may then file a response to the charges.

Id. (c). The Commission must also notify the judge of the date, time, and place of a hearing on the charges. Id.

(d). Following the filing of charges, the respondent judge has several procedural rights expressly recognized by the Rules: The judge has the right to inspect and copy the Commission Record, to a prompt hearing on the charges, to be represented by an attorney, to the issuance of subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for the production of designated documents and other tangible things, to present evidence and argument, and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at (f). The Rules also provide that prehearing discovery is "governed by Title 2, Chapter 400 of these Rules, [ 3 ] except that the Chair of the Commission, rather than the court, may limit the scope of discovery, enter protective orders permitted by Rule 2-403, and resolve other discovery issues." Id.

(g)(3). At the hearing, the rules of evidence apply. Id. (i)(5).

If the Commission finds clear and convincing evidence that the judge has committed sanctionable conduct, "it shall either issue a public reprimand for the sanctionable conduct or refer the matter to the Court of Appeals ...." Id. (j). If it finds otherwise, the Commission will dismiss the charges and terminate the proceedings. Id.

Joyner v. Veolia Transp. Servs. Inc. Since 2007, Judge Pamela J. White (whom we shall sometimes refer to as "Respondent") 4 has served as an Associate Judge of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. She also served as the Supervising Judge for the Circuit Court's Civil Alternative Dispute Resolution Program ("ADR") from 2009 until 2015.

In 2014, Respondent presided over hearings in a civil matter. Louise V. Joyner v. Veolia Transp. Servs. Inc., et al. , Case No. 24-C-014000589 (Baltimore City Circuit Court).

Attorney Rickey Nelson Jones represented the plaintiff, Joyner, in her action for negligence while attorney Andrew Stephenson represented the defendant, Veolia. 5 Early in the litigation, Veolia moved to dismiss Joyner's punitive damages claim. When counsel for both parties appeared before Judge White for a hearing on the motion to dismiss, Jones tried to justify his claim for punitive damages, which stemmed from the phone calls made by an insurance adjuster to the plaintiff following the accident. Dissatisfied with Jones's attempted explanation, Judge White said: The Court: Oh Mr. Jones, are you telling me this with a straight face? .... Are you telling me as an officer of the court, admitted to the bar, with a straight face, that you think you have an ill-will punitive damages claim against Veolia Transportation because of something that an insurance adjuster, employed by an insurance company, has said in the course of calling your client to inquire of her status? ....

Do you think this allegation can stand, in the face of your responsibility as an officer of the court? Jones: Do I believe that a representative of the defendant can act on their behalf, I do believe they can act on their behalf. If you're asking me do I believe another corporation- The Court: I'm asking you, is there any conceivable case authority, any statutory authority, that allows you the chutzpah to claim punitive damages in a negligence case suggesting that a claims adjuster working for an insurance company asking questions of your client about the status her injury should be attributed as an ill-will punitive damages claim by Veolia Transportation? Jones: I have no case law on that, Your Honor.

After this exchange, Respondent granted Veolia's motion and dismissed the punitive damages claim with prejudice. The pretrial scheduling order for Joyner required that "all counsel, their clients and insurance representatives must attend the pretrial conference in person," on September 17, 2014, before another judge of the court (not Judge White). The order also directed that "[a]ny request for accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act should be directed to the Administrative Office of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City," and provided a phone number to contact that office. Finally, the order permitted modification "only upon a written motion for modification setting forth a showing of good cause that the schedule cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the parties seeking modification." On September 5, 2014, Jones filed a pretrial conference statement in which, under the heading "Other Matters," he wrote "Plaintiff requests that her attorney attend the Pretrial Conference alone due to her poor health and doctor recommendation that she not travel without ambulance assistance." (Emphasis in original).

Joyner did not attend the pretrial conference. After the pretrial conference, Jeff Trueman, then the Deputy Director of the Circuit Court's Civil ADR program, advised Judge White of Joyner's unexcused absence at the conference. Judge White issued a show cause order requiring Joyner and Jones to appear at the Circuit Court on October 31, 2014, and explain why the Court should not hold them in civil contempt. In his response to the order, Jones contended that his proffer in the pretrial conference statement sufficed as the written "motion" required for modification of the pretrial scheduling order.

Jones also included, in a postscript to his letter response that was not sent to opposing counsel, an offer to speak to Judge White about the postponement. Judge White immediately responded in writing that trial would go forward. The next day, October 15, 2014, Jones and opposing counsel appeared before Judge White for trial. Jones requested a postponement and presented a motion for Judge White's recusal.

He alleged three "partial" acts by Respondent. First, he argued that the Judge insulted him by "questioning his bar membership" during the May 5, 2014 hearing. Second, he alleged that Respondent incorrectly issued the show cause order. Finally, he contended that Respondent was not impartial because she had directed him to Postponement Court.

Responding to the recusal motion in open court, Judge White recused herself and said the following: [B]ecause I am incredulous, because I am in disbelief, because I find myself incapable of believing virtually anything that Mr. Jones has just told me, I'm in the unfamiliar territory of finding that I must recuse myself from any further proceedings in this case because I cannot believe anything that the Reverend Rickey Nelson Jones[,] Esquire [ 6 ] -and I'm reading off the letterhead-tells me. I think that 99% of what Mr. Jones has told me about his conduct on behalf of his client is pure bullshit[.] So I'm forced to recuse myself and I can't get past the idea that I cannot believe a darn thing that Mr. Jones tells me now. So I am compelled under ... Rule 2.11 [of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct] [ 7 ] to disqualify myself in any further proceedings in this case, because I now believe, based on Mr. Jones' conduct and representations in this case, in his discussion and exploration of "who struck John" in recent days about his request for accommodation, all without following the precise instructions and procedures in the Scheduling Order and the website and resources available to him.

I find that I cannot be impartial. I am personally biased or prejudiced concerning Mr. Jones and his conduct. So, I'm going to recuse myself. Regarding the request for postponement, Judge White raised her voice and admonished Jones for offering to engage in ex parte communication with the Court.

She then added: I am dumbfounded at your irresponsible behavior, Mr. Jones. All the more reason I am compelled by your dumbfounding behavior to recuse myself because I cannot believe a single word you say. And what I am compelled to do now because the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Judicial Code compel me to do so is to reexamine what I just said and heard and reported on the record whether I must report you to the Attorney Grievance Commission. * * * * In addition to not believing a word that Mr. Jones tells me, I am so very frustrated with his failure to attend to the basic rules of procedure. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge White issued a written order explaining her recusal from Joyner . 8 At the hearing on the show cause order, Jones attempted to explain why his client could not come to court without an ambulance.

Judge White acknowledged the plaintiff's status and inquired as to how Jones felt he had complied with the pretrial scheduling order. Jones presumed that his warning that he would attend without his client, made in his pretrial conference statement, sufficed as a "motion" to modify the scheduling order. After some discussion, Judge White held Jones in contempt of Court. 9 Proceedings Before The Inquiry Board Five days after Judge White recused herself from Joyner , the Commission received Jones's first complaint regarding her. 10 He complained of Respondent's comments and conduct during the hearings on Veolia's motion to dismiss, and on his motion to recuse. He also averred that, although Judge White had recognized she could not be impartial, she refused to recuse herself from the hearing on her show cause order.

After receiving Jones's first complaint, the Commission's Investigative Counsel, then Carol A. Crawford, opened a preliminary investigation into Respondent's conduct. On November 17, 2014, the Commission received Jones's second complaint against Judge White. Jones based this complaint on Respondent's conduct during the October 31 hearing. He also alleged that Judge White improperly decided not to recuse herself from considering the show cause order.

The Inquiry Board extended the time to complete the preliminary investigation and delayed giving notice to Judge White, for "good cause shown," in January, February, and April. In April, Investigative Counsel sent a letter notifying Judge White of the two complaints. 11 Judge White timely responded to Jones's first two complaints, asserting that her demeanor toward Jones was appropriate because he showed no concern for the rules of procedure or proper professional behavior. She also averred that she properly presided over the show cause proceedings because Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct ("MCJC") Rule 2.11 did not require her recusal. The following day, Investigative Counsel submitted a memorandum to the Inquiry Board recommending that the Inquiry Board find that Judge White committed sanctionable conduct "with regard to her demeanor throughout the [ Joyner ] proceedings," and by failing to recuse herself from the October 31 hearing.

Investigative Counsel recommended that the Inquiry Board, in turn, recommend to the Commission, that a private reprimand be issued. The memorandum attached copies of Jones's complaints, audio recordings of the hearings, and Respondent's response to the complaints. On December 11, 2015, the Inquiry Board forwarded its report and recommendation to the Commission, but no copy was sent to Respondent. Proceedings Before The Commission At its December 2015 meeting, the Commission reviewed the complaints, recordings of the hearings, Judge White's correspondence with Investigative Counsel, and the recommendations of the Inquiry Board and Investigative Counsel.

The Commission concluded that probable cause existed to believe that Respondent had committed sanctionable conduct and, by unanimous vote, directed Investigative Counsel to initiate proceedings against Respondent by filing public charges. It was only when Judge White was notified of this action that her counsel requested, and finally received on January 12, 2016, a copy of the Inquiry Board's report. In a 40-page filing, Respondent objected to the report and argued that her conduct in Joyner did not amount to misconduct, and requested a hearing before the Commission. At its February 2016 meeting, the Commission voted to set the matter for further discussion at a special meeting.

That special meeting was held on March 2, 2016. But the Commission rejected Respondent's objections to the Inquiry Board's report, denied her request for a hearing, 12 and again directed Investigative Counsel to file charges. The Commission filed public charges against Judge White on March 31, 2016, alleging that she violated several provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically MCJC 1.1 (Compliance with the Law), 13 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary), 14 2.2 (Impartiality and Fairness), 15 2.3 (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment), 16 2.11 (Disqualification). 17 In her answer, Respondent moved to dismiss the charges. She argued that her decisions in Joyner were legal judgments not subject to scrutiny through the disciplinary process and that, even if the Commission had the authority to review her actions, she did not commit misconduct.

Respondent also alleged a due process violation after Investigative Counsel failed to comply with certain time standards, did not inform her of Jones's complaints in a timely fashion, and failed to convey information about the proceedings to Judge White. Respondent served interrogatories on Investigative Counsel pursuant to the civil discovery rules, specifically Md. Rule 2-421. In response, Investigative Counsel filed a request to strike the discovery demands. Investigative Counsel explained that, although the Rules expressly provide that discovery in judicial disciplinary proceedings shall be governed by civil discovery rules, this "does not mean that every rule in [the civil discovery rules] is relevant, appropriate, or applicable to proceedings before the Commission." Investigative Counsel also contended that Judge White could not serve her with requests for admissions because Investigative Counsel "is neither a party nor a witness ...." Investigative Counsel closed her request by asking the Commission to enter a protective order prohibiting Judge White from receiving certain documents prepared by Investigative Counsel.

Investigative Counsel claimed that these documents were subject to confidentiality restrictions ( see, e.g. , Md. Rule 18-409(a)(4) ) and amounted to attorney work product. After a hearing, where both Investigative Counsel and Respondent's attorney appeared, the Commission denied Judge White's motion to dismiss. The Commission opined that it had no power to dismiss the charges under Md. Rule 18-406 until after it held a hearing on the merits under Md. Rule 18-407. The Commission also interpreted the discovery rules to vest complete discovery authority in the Chair of the Commission.

Without further explanation, the Commission simply stated that the decision to strike Respondent's interrogatories and request for admissions did not eliminate her access "to a fair discovery process." The Commission held an evidentiary hearing on July 7 and 8, 2016. Investigative Counsel called no witnesses, but offered five exhibits: (1) the Baltimore City Circuit Court file for Joyner ; (2) video recordings of the May 5, 2014, October 15, 2014, and October 31, 2014 proceedings before Judge White; (3) a transcript of the October 15, 2014 proceeding; (4) a transcript of the October, 31, 2014 hearing; and (5) a copy of the charges. Investigative Counsel then played recordings of the May 4, October 15, and October 31 proceedings for the Commission. In addition to her own testimony, Judge White presented five witnesses: (1) Circuit Administrative Judge W. Michel Pierson; (2) Judge in charge of the Civil Docket, Athea M. Handy; (3) retired Judge Carol E. Smith; (4) Jeff Trueman; and (5) Andrew Stephenson.

Investigative Counsel thoroughly cross-examined Judge White. Members of the Commission also questioned her. On August 3, 2016, the Commission, by unanimous vote, publicly reprimanded Judge White. The Commission concluded that Judge White violated the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct through her "undignified, discourteous, and unprofessional" treatment of Jones and her failure to recuse herself from the show cause hearing after admitting that she could not be impartial.

DISCUSSION As we explained in our earlier opinion, while we do not have " appellate jurisdiction for review of Judge White's claims, this Court is able to review her allegation that the Commission proceeding denied her procedural due process as a petition for a common law writ of mandamus." White I , 451 Md. at 649 , 155 A.3d 463 (emphasis in original). Our jurisprudence on common law mandamus is well established: [C]ommon law mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is generally used to compel inferior tribunals, public officials or administrative agencies to perform their function, or perform some particular duty imposed upon them which in its nature is imperative and to the performance of which the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right. The writ ordinarily does not lie where the action to be reviewed is discretionary or depends on personal judgment. Falls Road Cmty.

Ass'n, Inc. v. Baltimore Cty. , 437 Md. 115 , 139, 85 A.3d 185 (2014) (cleaned up); " 'Mandamus is an original action, as distinguished from an appeal.' " Goodwich v. Nolan , 343 Md. 130 , 145, 680 A.2d 1040 (1996) (cleaned up). The Commission's public reprimand of a sitting judge is a unique circumstance, which permits the availability of the ancient writ for our review of a judge's claims of constitutional defects, but not review of a claim that there was no sanctionable conduct. We reiterate our previous holding wherein we explained that the common law writ of mandamus may not be employed to review the merits of the Commission's decision to issue a public reprimand. White I , 451 Md. at 651 -52 , 155 A.3d 463 .

Such a decision is "properly classified as a non-ministerial discretionary act that is dependent upon the judgment of the Commission members[,]" and beyond the scope of mandamus review. Id. 18 As we explained in White I , 451 Md. at 651 , 155 A.3d 463 , "the Commission has a duty to provide procedural due process, as set forth in the State Constitution and Maryland Rules, to an accused judge ...." The Maryland Constitution "defers to this Court the task of designing a fair process by rule." Id. at 647 , 155 A.3d 463 . During the disciplinary process, the Commission is bound by "the fundamental rules of fairness." Id. at 647-48 , 155 A.3d 463 . According to the Maryland Constitution and our Rules "an accused judge is entitled to these elements of procedural due process-notice, an opportunity to respond, [and] a fair hearing-regardless of the outcome- i.e. , whether the Commission ultimately decides to dismiss the charges, reprimand the judge, or recommend that we censure, discipline, or remove the judge." Id. at 648 , 155 A.3d 463 .

Minor deviation from the Rules without prejudice to the judge does not undermine this guarantee. Id. Judge White contends that the Commission proceedings lacked fundamental fairness, in several respects, and denied her right to procedural due process. In our Discussion, below, we divide her contentions into two categories: (1) those relating to preliminary matters before the Commission decided to issue charges ("Proceedings Preliminary to Charges"), and (2) those relating to events occurring after public charges were filed against her ("Proceedings After Charges Filed").

Overall, Judge White insists that the Commission's material deviations from the requirements of the Maryland Constitution and the Rules were serious failures that deprived her of procedural due process and thus rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair. I. PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO CHARGES Prompt Notification Of Investigation Judge White contends that Investigative Counsel failed to promptly notify her of the complaints. Specifically, she asserts that Investigative Counsel waited approximately six months from when Jones filed his first complaint to notify her. Respondent asserts that this delayed notification prejudiced her ability to dispute the allegations before the Inquiry Board, and to raise objections to Investigative Counsel's failure to comply with time standards.

Maryland Rule 18-404(e)(4) requires that Investigative Counsel notify the judge of a complaint before the completion of the preliminary investigation, which is due within 90 days of the complaint filing. It also permits the Inquiry Board to delay giving notice of the investigation to the judge "for good cause shown" by Investigative Counsel. Id. Because Jones filed his first complaint on October 20, 2014, the preliminary investigation was due to be completed on January 19, 2015.

Id. (e)(6). Judge White did not receive notice until three months after that date-on April 17, 2015. In the meantime, though, on January 15, 2015, the Inquiry Board granted a 30-day extension "for good cause shown" as allowed by the same Rule, and a second 60-day extension thereafter.

The minutes for the Inquiry Board meeting, and the Commission's brief, fail to articulate any explanation of the "good cause" the Inquiry Board relied upon to extend the deadline. See Md. Rule 18-405(a). 19 This Court can readily understand Judge White's frustration when she learned that the complaint was filed six months before she was given notice thereof, especially when the "good cause" extension was unclear. Judges, who hold positions of great responsibility and respect, need to be trusted by the public, and are rightfully sensitive about ethics complaints against them. Her frustration may have been compounded when she later learned that Investigative Counsel's disposition recommendation explained that the investigation consisted merely of reviewing: (1) Mr. Jones's complaints; (2) the recordings of the hearings held before Judge White; and (3) Judge White's response.

At oral argument, the Commission explained that there can be extensive delays in obtaining either a recording or transcript from a trial court. This, we think, would be sufficient reason to grant an extension under Md. Rule 18-404(e)(4). On the other hand, Investigative Counsel's volume of work would probably not be sufficient, absent some unusual circumstance. There is nothing in the record to document the reason for the delay in this case.

Although there is no requirement in Md. Rules 18-404 or 18-405 that the Commission document the reason for extension, it would be better practice in future cases to do so-thus, perhaps, avoiding a future challenge of this nature. To resolve this case, we assume that the delay was without due cause, and move on to consider the consequences of this Rule violation. Judge White contends that the delay affected her due process rights because it prejudiced her ability to defend herself even at the very early stages in the disciplinary process. We are not persuaded this is so.

As we recognized in White I , 451 Md. at 648 , 155 A.3d 463 , "an accused judge is entitled to ... notice, an opportunity to respond, [and] a fair hearing ...." But deviation from the Rules without infringing on these rights would not undermine this guarantee. Id. Other jurisdictions have held that due process considerations do not require a judge to receive notice of a preliminary investigation before a determination of probable cause. See Ryan v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance , 45 Cal.3d 518 , 247 Cal.Rptr. 378 , 754 P.2d 724 , 729 (1988), modified on denial of reh'g (June 30, 1988) (judge's due process claim rejected because, "[s]imply stated, a judge does not have the right to defend against a proceeding that has not yet been brought"); In re Flanagan , 240 Conn. 157 , 690 A.2d 865 , 874-76 (1997) ("[T]he due process protections afforded in disciplinary proceedings ... are inapplicable unless and until the review council brings formal charges ...."); In re Graziano , 696 So.2d 744 , 752-53 (Fla. 1997) ; 20 In re Karasov , 805 N.W.2d 255 , 273-74 (Minn. 2011) ("[D]ue process does not require notice of a judicial discipline investigation.").

This rule applies to the judicial discipline process in Maryland as well. In terms of due process, Judge White had sufficient opportunity, even before the filing of public charges, to defend against the misconduct allegations made by Jones, and she took advantage of that opportunity, filing extensive written objections with the Commission before public charges, and afterwards, a motion to dismiss the charges, with a hearing thereon, as well as a full-fledged defense on the merits. Further, Respondent does not offer any explanation of what she would have done during those 90 days ending with April 17, 2015, to enhance her defense against the charges. We can see no due process violation. 21 Investigative Counsel's Communications With The Inquiry Board And The Commission Judge White objects to several instances of so-called " ex parte " communications between Investigative Counsel and the Inquiry Board or Commission.

The Inquiry Board discussed Respondent's case with Investigative Counsel, but without Respondent's counsel, at its meetings in 2015. Investigative Counsel advised the Inquiry Board of her conversations with Respondent's attorneys, yet Respondent's attorneys were not present during these meetings. After the Inquiry Board issued its report to the Commission, Investigative Counsel was present when Respondent's case was discussed at the Commission meetings. Again, Judge White's attorney did not attend these meetings.

Respondent contends that Investigative Counsel's communications with the Inquiry Board and Commission resulted in prejudice to her because she had no way of knowing that her submissions to the Inquiry Board and Commission were presented accurately and she could not refute any assertions made by Investigative Counsel. As the Commission argues, the Rules plainly contemplate ongoing communications and coordinated activity between Investigative Counsel, the Inquiry Board, and the Commission. Specifically, the Rules permit Investigative Counsel to take several actions without notice to the judge. Investigative Counsel must "inform the Board or Commission that the preliminary investigation is being undertaken." Md. Rule 18-404(e)(1).

Investigative Counsel can also apply to the Inquiry Board for an extension of the time for completing the preliminary investigation and must report the results of the preliminary investigation to the Inquiry Board. Id. (e)(6), (f). Investigative Counsel must also "report and make recommendations to the Commission as directed by the Commission." Md. Rule 18-402(d).

Indeed, the Maryland Constitution authorizes the Commission to investigate, as well as hear charges. See Md. Const. art. 4, § 4B (a). We have previously examined the unique role of the Commission. In In re Diener , 268 Md. 659 , 677, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), we considered two judges' contentions that they were denied a fair process "because the Commission acted as investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury in ... [a judicial discipline] proceeding." We ultimately recognized that judges are not denied a fair and impartial process merely because the Commission operates as both investigator (through Investigative Counsel) and decision-maker in judicial discipline cases.

Id. at 678-79 , 304 A.2d 587 . Diener 's recognition that a quasi-judicial body may determine probable cause and continue to adjudicate the matter, without creating impermissible bias or prejudice, is consistent with Supreme Court precedent as well as other cases from this Court. See, e.g. , Withrow v. Larkin , 421 U.S. 35 , 52-58, 95 S.Ct. 1456 , 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975) ("It is also very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting enforcement proceedings and then to participate in the ensuing hearings. This mode of procedure ... does not violate due process of law."); 22 Public Serv.

Comm'n v. Wilson , 389 Md. 27 , 92, 882 A.2d 849 (2005) ("We are unwilling to assume the apparent premise of ... [the] argument that some kind of blind pride of authorship or hubris of power renders an administrative decision-maker ipso facto unable to assess fairly and objectively arguments that his or her decision should be revisited, changed, or abandoned."); see also Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Russell , 691 So.2d 929 , 946 (Miss. 1997) (bifurcated judicial disciplinary process presented "no more evidence of bias or the risk of bias ... than inheres in the very fact that the Board had investigated and would now adjudicate."). Indeed, Judge White cites no authority holding to the contrary. By modifying our Rules of Procedure, we have taken steps intended to reduce the potential that the Commission would learn of unfairly prejudicial information in its role as investigator. At the Commission's request in 2007, we created the Inquiry Board-which would monitor investigations by Investigative Counsel, and submit a report and recommendation to the Commission that filtered out any inadmissible evidence regarding a pending case.

See Md. Rule 18-404(j)(2) ("The information transmitted by the Board to the Commission shall be limited to a proffer of evidence that the Board has determined would be likely to be admitted at a plenary hearing.") (emphasis added); see also Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 157th Report , 239 (2006); 157th Report of the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure: Hearing , Court of Appeals of Maryland (2007) (testimony of Sally D. Adkins, former Chair of the Comm'n on Judicial Disabilities). We did not, however, undertake to insulate the Commission entirely from its constitutionally authorized power to investigate, conduct hearings, and issue reprimands. See Md. Const. art. 4, § 4B. We always bear in mind, that, absent violation of a Federal constitutional right, we are constrained by the Maryland Constitution and the General Assembly's legislative mandates.

White I , 451 Md. at 634-37 , 646-47 , 155 A.3d 463 ; In re Diener , 268 Md. at 688 -89 , 304 A.2d 587 . The Commission was accorded the authority and obligation to investigate, initiate prosecutions, and make decisions. Md. Const. art. IV, § 4B (a)(1)-(2).

To override a decision on the merits of a complaint by the Commission because it also made preliminary decisions in its oversight of Investigative Counsel would, we think, run afoul of the Maryland Constitution and the General Assembly's legislative intent. 23 Our own precedent also constrains us. We rejected an argument similar to Judge White's in Diener, 268 Md. at 679 , 304 A.2d 587 ("It is well settled that a combination of investigative and judicial functions within an agency does not violate due process." (cleaned up) ). Before any finding of sanctionable conduct or discipline, Judge White appeared and presented her defenses-both at the hearing on her motion to dismiss and at the evidentiary hearing. We conclude that her lack of any personal appearance before the Commission, prior to her charging, did not violate the Rules and did not prevent her from being accorded a fair proceeding.

Respondent made a request to appear before the Commission, but her request was denied. 24 Md. Rule 18-404(l) (Commission may authorize a judge, upon a written request to "appear before the Commission on terms and conditions established by the Commission."). Nevertheless, she was given an opportunity