In the Matter of the Petition of Hosein

In the Matter of the Petition of Kern Hosein, Misc. No. 24, September Term, 2022. Per Curiam Opinion. INTERPRETATION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE TOLLING ORDERS – During the COVID-19 pandemic, Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera issued a series of administrative orders tolling the running of statutes of limitations and other deadlines for the initiation of matters.

The orders tolled those deadlines from March 16, 2020 through July 20, 2020, the date on which court clerks’ offices were reopened to the public. In the revised administrative order that terminated the tolling period, Chief Judge Barbera extended the deadlines by an additional 15 days. The Supreme Court held that the 15-day extension applied only to those matters with deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-22-000458 Argued: May 4, 2023 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND* Misc.

No. 24 September Term, 2022 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF KERN HOSEIN Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. Per Curiam Opinion Fader, C.J., Booth, and Gould, JJ., concur. Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Hotten., J, concurs. Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this Watts, Biran, and Eaves, JJ., dissent. document is authentic. 2023-08-15 08:41-04:00 Filed: August 14, 2023 Gregory Hilton, Clerk * During the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland.

The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. During the early phases of the State of Maryland’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, former Chief Judge1 Mary Ellen Barbera issued an administrative tolling order on April 3, 2020. The order tolled deadlines related to the initiation of matters effective March 16, 2020, the date on which court clerks’ offices had closed due to the pandemic. Chief Judge Barbera later issued a revised administrative order that terminated the tolling period effective as of the date the clerks’ offices reopened on July 20, 2020.

The revised order also extended the filing deadlines to initiate matters by an additional fifteen days. This appeal concerns the scope of that additional fifteen-day extension. Kern Hosein (“Petitioner”), a Baltimore City police officer, sustained an injury during a motor vehicle accident while responding to an emergency call. On October 6, 2018, Petitioner filed for Line-of-Duty Disability Retirement with the Fire and Police Employees’ Retirement System for the City of Baltimore (“Respondent”).

The Hearing Examiner denied Petitioner’s request and granted him Non-Line-of-Duty Disability Retirement. A copy of the decision was mailed to Petitioner on December 22, 2021. Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on January 25, 2022.2 Respondent moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition was time-barred 1 During the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the title of the “Chief Judge” of this Court to “Chief Justice.” Because the change did not go into effect until after all of the events that are relevant to this appeal, we shall use the title as it existed at all relevant times and as it was reflected in the administrative orders that are at the heart of this matter. 2 There was some confusion regarding the filing date. The record reflects and both parties agree that the date stamp on the Petition for Judicial Review indicates it was filed on January 25, 2022.

The case summary lists the filing date as January 26, 2022 and the because it was filed after the thirty-day deadline of January 21, 2022. Petitioner asserted that his filing was timely because his deadline was February 7, 2022. He reasoned that the fifteen-day extension under the administrative tolling orders applied to all matters, including his case, with filing deadlines that fell within the COVID-19 emergency period between March 16, 2020 and April 3, 2022. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the extension had applied only to deadlines that were tolled during the closure of the clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020.

Petitioner timely appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland.3 While the case was pending, the Appellate Court certified the following question to this Court: “Does the 15-day extension apply to all cases whose statute of limitations and deadlines related to initiation expired between March 16, 2020, and April 3, 2022?” Pursuant to Rule 8-304(c)(3), we issued a writ of certiorari that included the entire action on February 24, 2023. We answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the fifteen-day extension applied only to cases with deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020.4 We therefore affirm the circuit court’s judgment. docket “[e]ntered” date as January 27, 2022. As the choice among these dates is not relevant to the outcome of this case, we will consider January 25, 2022 as the filing date. 3 During the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. 4 Four members of the panel—Chief Justice Fader and Justices Hotten, Booth, and Gould—join this per curiam opinion and subscribe to the holding stated in it.

Chief Justice Fader has filed a plurality concurring opinion, which Justice Booth and Justice Gould join. 2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Underlying Factual Background. A. The Chief Judge’s administrative orders.5 On April 3, 2020, then-Chief Judge Barbera issued the “Administrative Order on Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters[,]” (“First Administrative Order”)6 pursuant to her authority under Article IV, § 18(b)(1) of the Maryland Constitution and Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7).7 Justice Hotten has filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Biran has filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Watts and Justice Eaves join. 5 We will limit our discussion to the pertinent history of the administrative tolling orders. See Murphy v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 478 Md. 333 , 341–63, 274 A.3d 412 , 416–29 (2022) (providing an extensive background regarding the State of Maryland’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic). 6 For brevity, further references and citations to the former Chief Judge’s administrative tolling orders will follow a similar shorthand. 7 Md. Const. art. IV, § 18(b)(1) (providing that the Chief Judge “shall be the administrative head of the Judicial system of the State”); Md. Rule 16-1003(a)(7) (providing that the Chief Judge may “suspend, toll, extend, or otherwise grant relief from time deadlines, . . . where there is no practical ability of a party subject to such a deadline, . . . to comply with the deadline . . . or seek other relief”). The Chief Judge’s authority to issue the administrative tolling orders derived from Title 16, Chapter 1000 of the Maryland Rules, which were adopted to ensure the Judiciary could effectively respond to the COVID- 19 pandemic.

In Murphy, we described the adoption of those rules as follows: On March 13, 2020, the Rules Committee considered a set of proposed rules relating to the emergency authority of the Chief Judge. . . . The Rules Committee approved the proposed rules with minor amendments and submitted its report to the Court of Appeals[.] . . . [On] March 16, the [then- ]Court of Appeals considered the rules in an open hearing. The Court adopted the proposed rules, which are codified at Maryland Rule 16-1001 et 3 First Admin. Ord. at 1 (Apr. 3, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/568M-28TV.

The First Administrative Order tolled the filing deadlines regarding the initiation of matters “effective March 16, 2020, by the number of days that the courts [were] closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency[.]” First Admin. Ord. at 2. The First Administrative Order noted that “[s]uch deadlines further shall be extended by a period to be described in an order by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals terminating the COVID-19 emergency period[.]” Id. The First Administrative Order also provided that “[a]ny such filings made within the period to be described [in a subsequent order] shall relate back to the day before the deadline expired[.]” Id.

The First Administrative Order was amended several times. On April 24, 2020, former Chief Judge Barbera issued an Amended Administrative Order, which clarified that “no . . . parties shall be compelled to prove . . . their practical inability to comply with [a deadline related to the initiation of a matter] if it occurred during the COVID-19 emergency to obtain the relief that this Administrative Order provides[.]” Am. Admin. Ord.

Clarifying at 2 (Apr. 24, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/87KX-Y957. Shortly thereafter, the former Chief Judge issued another Amended Administrative Order on May 4, 2020, which also clarified that the tolling period applied to “deadlines to conduct pending judicial seq[.] . . . [T]hose rules, among other things, delegated to the Chief Judge a conditional authority to extend deadlines that was substantially analogous to the authority that the Governor’s March 12 order had granted to heads of the units of State and local governments for deadlines imposed by the laws that the agencies in those units administered. 478 Md. at 356–57, 274 A.3d at 425–26 (cleaned up). 4 proceedings[.]” Am. Admin. Ord.

Further Clarifying at 3 (May 4, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/9T6H-VPFY. Then, on May 22, 2020, the former Chief Judge issued a Revised Administrative Order, which provided that the “offices of the clerks of court [would] be reopened to the public on July 20, 2020,” pursuant to a separate administrative order. Revised Admin. Ord. at 2 (May 22, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/58SR- UWEH (citing Administrative Order On the Progressive Resumption of Full Function of Judiciary Operations Previously Restricted Due to the COVID-19 Emergency (May 22, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/T34Y-SBN7).8 The Revised Administrative Order defined the timeframe when deadlines related to the initiation of matters were “tolled or suspended” as “the days that the offices of the clerks of court were closed to the public (from March 16, 2020 through July 20, 2020)[.]” Id.

This order also introduced a fifteen-day extension provision: “With the offices of the clerks of courts to be reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters are hereby extended by an additional 15 days[.]” Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). This provision included a footnote example of how the extension would apply: “[I]f two days remained for the filing of a new matter on March 15, 2020, then two days would have remained upon the reopening of the offices of the 8 The administrative order regarding the resumption of judiciary operations limited the types of matters that courts, particularly circuit and district courts, were permitted to hear based on the “Phase” that was in place. Phase I limited courts to emergency and urgent matters; Phase II required this Court and the Appellate Court of Maryland to resume full operations, whereas the circuit and district courts remained largely limited to urgent matters and cases that could be resolved remotely; Phase III required circuit and district courts to resume, among other things, motions hearings and evidentiary hearings; Phase IV required courts to “resume non-jury trials and contested hearings in criminal, civil, family, and juvenile matters[;]” and Phase V resumed full operations for all courts. Admin.

Ord. on Prog. Resum., Ex. at 1–18. 5 clerks of court to the public on July 20, 2020. With the additional fifteen days, seventeen days would be left for a timely filing, beginning July 20, 2020.” Id. at 3 n.1. The Revised Administrative Order also amended the relation-back provision to provide: “[a]ny such filings made within the period” of the four-month closure and the fifteen-day extension “shall relate back to the day before the deadline would have expired had it not been tolled or suspended[.]” Id. at 3.

The Fourth Revised Administrative Order, issued on November 12, 2020, and all subsequent administrative tolling orders no longer purported to impose the fifteen-day extension directly but included the following language: “With the offices of the clerks of courts having been reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters having been, extended by previous Order, by an additional 15 days[.]” Fourth Revised Admin. Ord. at 3 (Nov. 12, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/JH9Y-SPE8 (footnote omitted). The Fifth Revised Administrative Order, issued on November 24, 2020, added a provision that retroactively defined “matters” to which the tolling period applied as claims with “deadlines related to initiation [that] would have expired between March 16, 2020, through the termination date of COVID-19 emergency operations in the Judiciary[.]” Fifth Revised Admin. Ord. at 3 (Nov. 24, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/NQY3-LQMQ.

The Fifth Revised Administrative Order also altered the relation-back provision to account for claims with deadlines that would have elapsed during the COVID-19 emergency period, as described in the provision that retroactively defined “matters[.]” Id. at 4. 6 Former Chief Judge Barbera’s subsequent orders, including the Tenth Revised Administrative Order at issue here, retained the pertinent language from prior administrative tolling orders. See Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. (Aug., 6, 2021), archived at: https://perma.cc/5RFY-XAFV.

The Tenth Revised Administrative Order, dated August 6, 2021, contained, in relevant part, the following preamble: WHEREAS, In instances of emergency conditions, whether natural or otherwise, that significantly disrupt access to or the operations of one or more courts or other judicial facilities of the State or the ability of the Judiciary to operate effectively, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals may be required to determine the extent to which court operations or judicial functions shall continue; and WHEREAS, Due to the outbreak of the novel coronavirus, COVID- 19, and consistent with guidance issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Maryland Department of Health (MDH), an emergency exists for which measures continue to be required to mitigate potential for exposure for individuals visiting a court or judicial facility and for judicial personnel; and WHEREAS, The impact of the restrictions required to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic has had a widespread detrimental impact upon the administration of justice, impeding the ability of parties and potential litigants to meet with counsel, conduct research, gather evidence, and prepare complaints, pleadings, and responses, with the impact falling hardest upon those who are impoverished; and WHEREAS, The detrimental impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is so widespread as to have created a general and pervasive practical inability for certain deadlines to be met[.] Id. at 1–2. The Tenth Revised Administrative Order provided, in relevant part, the following operative language: (a) By previous Order, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7), all statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters 7 required to be filed in a Maryland state trial or appellate court, including statutes of limitations, were tolled or suspended, as applicable, effective March 16, 2020, by the number of days that the courts were closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency; and (b) By this Order, those same deadlines remained tolled or suspended, as applicable, effective March 16, 2020, by the number of days that the courts were closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency; and (c) Justice requires that the ordering of the suspension of such deadlines during an emergency as sweeping as a pandemic be applied consistently and equitably throughout Maryland, and no party or parties shall be compelled to prove . . . their practical inability to comply with such a deadline if it occurred during the COVID-19 emergency to obtain the relief that this Order provides; and (d) For the purposes of tolling statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “tolled or suspended by the number of days that the courts were closed” means that the days that the offices of the clerks of court were closed to the public (from March 16, 2020 through July 20, 2020) do not count against the time remaining for the initiation of that matter; and (e) For the purposes of tolling statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “matters” are, nunc pro tunc to March 16, 2020, those matters for which the statute of limitations and other deadlines related to initiation would have expired between March 16, 2020, through the termination date of the COVID-19 emergency operations in the Judiciary as determined by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals; and (f) With the offices of the clerks of courts having been reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters having been extended by previous Order, by an additional 15 days; and (g) Any such filing made within the period described in (d) and (e) shall relate back to the day before the deadline would have expired had it not been tolled or suspended[.] Id. at 2–4 (cleaned up). Section (f) retained the same footnote example from the Revised Administrative Order. Id. at 4.

Several months thereafter, on March 28, 2022, then-Chief 8 Judge Joseph M. Getty issued the Final Administrative Order, which terminated “COVID- 19 emergency operations in the Judiciary” effective April 4, 2022. Final Admin. Ord. at 3 (Mar., 28, 2022), archived at: https://perma.cc/CTL2-JCAV. B. The instant dispute.

Petitioner was injured in a motor vehicle accident while he was responding to an emergency call on October 8, 2013. Petitioner applied for Line-of-Duty Disability Retirement with Respondent on October 6, 2018. Following a hearing on December 13, 2021, the Hearing Examiner denied Petitioner’s claim for Line-of-Duty Disability Retirement and granted him Non-Line-of-Duty Disability Retirement. A copy of the decision was mailed to Petitioner on December 22, 2021.

On January 25, 2022, Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. During all relevant times, the Tenth Revised Administrative Order remained in effect.

II

Proceedings in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. On February 15, 2022, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Petition for Judicial Review was untimely under Maryland Rule 7-203(a)(2) and Baltimore City Code, Article 22, § 33(l)(14), because it was filed after the thirty-day deadline of January 21, 2022. See Md. Rule 7-203(a)(2) (“[A] petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days after . . . the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action to the petitioner[.]”); see also Balt. City Code, Art. 22, § 33(l)(14) (“If neither party seeks judicial review within 30 days following the mailing of the hearing examiner’s written findings of fact, the hearing examiner’s determination is final and binding[.]”).

The circuit court conducted a motions hearing on May 4, 2022. 9 During that hearing, Respondent argued that the fifteen-day extension under the Tenth Revised Administrative Order only applied to “cases that were affected by the court closure[]” between March 16, 2020, and July 20, 2020. Respondent asserted that the extension did not apply to the petition because the “statute of limitations did not [] accrue until December 22nd, 2021,” which occurred after the clerks’ offices reopened. Respondent claimed that the footnote example in Section (f) supported its argument, since it was limited to a case that was affected by the closure. Respondent maintained that this Court in Murphy v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 478 Md. 333, 362 , 274 A.3d 412 , 428 (2022), was “very clear that the tolling order [was] directly ti[ed] to the closure of the courts[,]” because the Order stated that the Revised Administrative Order had “further extended the filing deadlines for the initiation of matters by an additional 15 days past the date on which [c]lerks’ [o]ffice[s] reopened[.]” Respondent claimed that the Tenth Revised Administrative Order did not expressly provide that the fifteen-day extension would apply prospectively to all claims and that such an interpretation required injecting language into the Order.

Petitioner conceded that he filed his petition after the thirty-day deadline. He argued, however, that the Order’s definition of “matters” extended the grace period to all claims that could have been initiated “between March 16, 2020, through the termination date of COVID-19 emergency operations[,]” which was April 3, 2022 according to the Final Administrative Order. Since he filed his petition before April 3, 2022, Petitioner maintained that his filing deadline was February 7, 2022. Petitioner claimed that the preamble supported his position because it stated that the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions 10 had impeded litigants from meeting filing deadlines.

Petitioner considered it “coincidental” that the Tenth Revised Administrative Order exclusively discussed filing deadlines that were tolled during the four-month closure. Petitioner asserted that this Court’s decision in Murphy did not address the scope of the extension. The circuit court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss. The circuit court acknowledged that the preamble “suggest[ed] a very progressive openminded mission with regard to relaxing rules[]” governing filing deadlines, but noted the several “specific references which inextricably intertwine[d] . . . the ability of litigants . . . to meet the statute of limitations with . . . the number of days that the [o]ffices of the [c]lerks of the [c]ourt were closed.” The circuit court determined that the fifteen-day extension was “intended [for] people whose statute of limitations would have run during the time up to which the court wasn’t open at all until the [c]lerks’ [o]ffices reopened in July of 2020.” The circuit court concluded that the Tenth Revised Administrative Order did not apply to the petition because the statute of limitations began to run on December 22, 2021, i.e., the mailing date of the letter notifying Petitioner of the Hearing Examiner’s decision.

The circuit court memorialized its oral ruling in a written order dated May 5, 2022. Petitioner timely appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland.

III

Proceedings in the Appellate Court of Maryland. While this matter was pending on appeal, the Appellate Court certified the following question to this Court pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304(a): “Does the 15-day extension apply to all cases whose statute of limitations and deadlines related to initiation expired 11 between March 16, 2020, and April 3, 2022?”9 The Appellate Court observed that this Court had not evaluated the validity of the fifteen-day extension or the definition of “matters” in Murphy. The Appellate Court concluded that this Court was “in a unique position of interpreting its own orders[.]” This Court granted certiorari regarding “the entire action[.]” Md. Rule 8-304(c)(3). STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court “review[s] the grant of a motion to dismiss to determine ‘whether the [circuit] court was legally correct.’” Hancock v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 480 Md. 588, 603 , 281 A.3d 186 , 195 (2022) (quoting D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 465 Md. 339, 350 , 214 A.3d 521 , 527 (2019)).

In its de novo review, this Court assumes the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356 , 374–75, 250 A.3d 197 , 207–08 (2021). The circuit court may only grant a motion to dismiss “where the allegations presented do not state a cause of action.” Id. at 374 , 250 A.3d at 207 (citation omitted).

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS I. Petitioner’s Arguments. Petitioner construes the Tenth Revised Administrative Order as follows: Section (d) handles matters whose statutes of limitations were affected by the closure of the [c]ourt[s], and Section (e) provides for matters whose statutes expire during the emergency operations generally, including the limited period when the [c]ourts were closed in Section (d). Thus, Section (f) applies broadly to the “matters” defined by Section (e). 9 “At any time before issuance of a mandate, the Appellate Court [of Maryland] or the panel of that [c]ourt to which the action has been assigned may certify a question of law or the entire action to the Supreme Court [of Maryland].” Md. Rule 8-304(a). 12 Petitioner maintains that the Judiciary’s “emergency operations” did not conclude until April 3, 2022. In Petitioner’s view, his Petition for Judicial Review fell within the ambit of Section (e)’s definition of “matters,” which were “matter[s] for which the filing deadline was extended by an additional 15 days.” Petitioner emphasizes the language in Section (e) that defines “matters” as claims with deadlines that would have elapsed between March 16, 2020 and April 3, 2022, rather than claims that were affected by the closure.

Petitioner asserts that former Chief Judge Barbera could have limited the scope of the fifteen-day extension to deadlines that were tolled during the closure, but elected not to do so. Petitioner contends that it is immaterial whether the footnote example to Section (f) was limited to a case that was tolled during the closure, because the Order does not expressly foreclose the extension from applying to future claims. Petitioner claims that the preamble supports a broader application of the fifteen-day extension because it recognizes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic upon the ability of litigants to meet their filing deadlines. Based on the preamble, Petitioner concludes that “the intent of the [administrative tolling] [o]rders [was] clearly to maximize the flexibility of the [c]ourts and statutes of limitations during the COVID-19 emergency, and not merely those portions of the emergency when the [c]ourts were closed.” Petitioner asserts that he experienced difficulties during the surge of the COVID-19 Omicron Variant between December 2021 and January 2022.

Lastly, Petitioner argues that this Court did not address the issue at bar in Murphy and that this Court’s “passing reference to the” fifteen-day extension in that case was dicta. 13 II. Respondent’s Arguments. In Respondent’s view, the fifteen-day extension was limited to the four-month closure between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020 because the Tenth Revised Administrative Order expressly refers “to the reopening of the courts to the public in the same paragraph that it discusses extending the deadline[s.]” Respondent notes that the limitations period for the petition did not accrue until December 22, 2021, which occurred after the closure of the clerks’ offices. Respondent argues that the footnote example in Section (f) was limited to a case affected by the closure, and the Order does not expressly provide that the fifteen-day extension would apply to claims following the closure.

Respondent contends that the former Chief Judge could have stated that the fifteen-day extension applied to all claims through April 3, 2022, but elected not to do so. Respondent claims that “th[is] Court’s own description of the 15-day time period [in Murphy] inextricably ties [the extension] to the tolling period, which was the period of the [c]ourt closure.” Respondent frames Petitioner’s focus on the preamble as a request for this Court to equitably extend the statute of limitations. Both parties agree that the circuit court lacked authority to extend the deadline of the Petition for Judicial Review under Maryland Rule 7-203(a). Colao v. Cnty.

Council of Prince George’s Cnty., 346 Md. 342 , 362–63, 697 A.2d 96, 106 (1997) (holding that the thirty-day deadline pursuant to Maryland Rule 7-203(a) is not subject to “any implied or equitable exception[.]” (cleaned up)). We agree. Therefore, the success of Petitioner’s contentions depends upon whether the fifteen-day extension applied narrowly to deadlines 14 that were tolled during the four-month closure or broadly to deadlines that would have elapsed through April 3, 2022. DISPOSITION In answer to the question posed by the Appellate Court, the fifteen-day extension applied only to cases with deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the court clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020.

The judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City is affirmed. CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW ANSWERED AS SET FORTH ABOVE. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 15 Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-22-000458 Argued: May 4, 2023 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND* Misc.

No. 24 September Term, 2022 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF KERN HOSEIN Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. Concurring Opinion by Fader, C.J., which Booth and Gould, JJ., join. Filed: August 14, 2023 * During the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.

Petitioner’s exclusive focus on the Tenth Revised Administrative Order to determine the scope of the 15-day extension is misplaced. That order merely references an extension of “filing deadlines to initiate matters . . . by an additional 15 days” that had been accomplished “by previous Order.” Tenth Rev. Admin. Order at 4. By its plain terms, the Tenth Revised Administrative Order does not establish the 15-day extension, nor does it purport to alter, expand, extend, or affect that previously established 15-day extension in any way.

To determine the scope of the 15-day extension, our focus should be on the orders that established it. When we do that, the answer to the Appellate Court’s inquiry is plain: the extension applied only to deadlines that were tolled during the period in which court clerks’ offices were closed. At the outset, it is worth a brief recitation of the evolution of what became the “additional” 15-day extension through the 17 administrative orders that were issued on the subject of “emergency tolling or suspension of statutes of limitations and statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters[.]”1 That evolution occurred in three 1 All 17 orders in the series identify in their titles that they pertain to the subject of the “emergency tolling or suspension of statutes of limitations and statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters and certain statutory and rules deadlines in pending matters.” The titles of the orders differ only in what precedes the identification of that subject, as follows: • Administrative Order (issued April 3, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/568M-28TV • Amended Administrative Order (issued April 8, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/6TFV-KXT5 • Amended Administrative Order Clarifying (issued April 24, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/87KX-Y957 • Amended Administrative Order Further Clarifying (issued May 4, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/9T6H-VPFY phases. The first phase consists of the four administrative orders beginning with the original Administrative Order, which was issued on April 3, 2020, and carrying through the Amended Order Further Clarifying, which was issued on May 4, 2020.

Each of those orders provides for the tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters beginning on March 16, 2020 and lasting “the number of days that the courts are closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency by order of the Chief Judge • Revised Administrative Order (issued May 22, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/58SR-UWEH • Second Revised Administrative Order (issued June 3, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/H9N3-BJYY • Third Revised Administrative Order (issued October 2, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/PR6S-SCN5 • Fourth Revised Administrative Order (issued November 12, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/JH9Y-SPE8 • Fifth Revised Administrative Order (issued November 24, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/NQY3-LQMQ • Sixth Revised Administrative Order (issued December 22, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/F48Q-6Z59 • Seventh Revised Administrative Order (issued February 2, 2021), archived at: https://perma.cc/77JC-EK5V • Eighth Revised Administrative Order (issued February 16, 2021), archived at: https://perma.cc/T829-7JDS • Ninth Revised Administrative Order (issued May 24, 2021), archived at: https://perma.cc/X7RB-5MW3 • Tenth Revised Administrative Order (issued August 6, 2021), archived at: https://perma.cc/5RFY-XAFV • Eleventh Revised Administrative Order (issued February 18, 2022), archived at: https://perma.cc/76NJ-LGLS • Twelfth Revised Administrative Order (issued March 1, 2022), archived at: https://perma.cc/VDP4-8N4X • Final Administrative Order (issued March 28, 2022), archived at: https://perma.cc/CTL2-JCAV For clarity and ease of reference, I will refer to the orders in the series by these short titles. 2 of the Court of Appeals[.]” E.g., Admin. Order at 1-2. Each order then states that “[s]uch filing deadlines further shall be extended by a period to be described in an order by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals terminating the COVID-19 emergency period.” E.g., id. The second phase consists of the three administrative orders beginning with the Revised Administrative Order, issued May 22, 2020, and carrying through the Third Revised Administrative Order, issued October 2, 2020.

The Revised Administrative Order was the first that identified July 20, 2020 as the date on which clerks’ offices would be reopened and established that as the end date of the tolling period. Rev. Admin. Order at 2-3. Each of those second-phase orders provides for the tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters from March 16, 2020 through July 20, 2020.

E.g., id. at 2. Each order then provides that “[w]ith the offices of the clerks of courts to be reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters are hereby extended by an additional 15 days[.]” E.g., id. at 3. In each order, that statement is followed by the following footnote: For example, if two days remained for the filing of a new matter on March 15, 2020, then two days would have remained upon the reopening of the offices of the clerks of court to the public on July 20, 2020. With the additional fifteen days, seventeen days would be left for a timely filing, beginning July 20, 2020.

E.g., id. at 3 n.1. The third and final phase of the evolution of the orders consists of the remaining ten orders. Those begin with the Fourth Revised Administrative Order, issued on November 12, 2020, and carry through the Final Administrative Order, issued on March 28, 2022. 3 Each of those orders provides for the tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters from March 16, 2020 through July 20, 2020. E.g., Fourth Rev. Admin.

Order at 2-3. Each order then provides that “[w]ith the offices of the clerks of courts having been reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters having been extended by previous Order, by an additional 15 days[,]”2 followed by the identical footnote quoted above.3 E.g., id. at 3 & n.1. With that background, I turn to section (f) of the Tenth Revised Administrative Order, which is the order that was in place when Mr. Hosein’s time to seek judicial review ran. Tenth Rev. Admin.

Order at 4. Section (f) provides: “With the offices of the clerks of courts having been reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters having been extended by previous Order, by an additional 15 days[.]” Id. That language is particularly notable here for two reasons. First, section (f) does not itself purport to impose, authorize, establish, define, extend, expand, or alter in any way a 15-day extension.

Instead, it references a 15-day 2 In the Fourth Revised Administrative Order, an additional comma is placed between “having been” and “extended by previous Order.” Fourth Rev. Admin. Order at 3. That appears to have been a typographical error that does not affect the meaning of the provision. Beginning with the Fifth Revised Administrative Order, issued on November 24, 2020, the remaining third-phase orders also defined “matters” for purposes of the tolling of deadlines, as “nunc pro tunc to March 16, 2020, those matters for which the statute of limitations and other deadlines related to initiation would have expired between March 16, 2020, through the termination date of the COVID-19 emergency operations in the Judiciary as determined by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals.” Fifth Rev. Admin.

Order at 3. I discuss that addition further below. 3 The Final Administrative order contains a slight difference that is immaterial to this dispute. Final Admin. Order at 3. 4 extension that was already imposed “by previous Order.” Id.

To interpret the scope of that extension, therefore, we should look to the order(s) that established it, not a later order that merely referenced it.4 The three orders containing language purporting to establish the 15-day extension, which comprise the second phase discussed above, are the Revised Administrative Order, the Second Revised Administrative Order, and the Third Revised Administrative Order. The relevant operative paragraphs in all three orders are: (a) By previous Order, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-1003(a)(7), all statutory and rules deadlines related to the initiation of matters required to be filed in a Maryland state trial or appellate court, including statutes of limitations, were tolled or suspended, as applicable, effective March 16, 2020, by the number of days that the courts were closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency; and (b) By this Order, those same deadlines remain tolled or suspended, as applicable, effective March 16, 2020, by the number of days that the courts were closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency; and (c) Justice requires that the ordering of the suspension of such deadlines during an emergency as sweeping as a pandemic be applied consistently and equitably throughout Maryland, and no party or parties shall be compelled to prove his, her, its, or their practical inability to comply with such a deadline if it occurred during the COVID-19 emergency to obtain the relief that this Administrative Order provides; and 4 In her separate concurrence, Justice Hotten points out that each of the various administrative orders in the series rescinded the prior orders. Concurring Op. of Hotten, J. at 1-2, 4-5, & 9 n.3. She concludes from that fact that, by the time of the Tenth Revised Administrative Order, the earlier orders that actually established the 15-day extension were rescinded and could no longer be the source of the extension.

Id. at 4-5. But if she is correct, then there would be no 15-day extension at all, because the Tenth Revised Administrative Order plainly does not establish one. No party argues for that result, presumably because the Tenth Revised Administrative Order also treats the previously established 15-day extension as continuing in effect. That, however, is no reason to look to the Tenth Revised Administrative Order, which merely references the previously established extension, to import ambiguity that does not exist in the orders that established and defined the extension. 5 (d) For the purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “tolled or suspended by the number of days that the courts were closed” means that the days that the offices of the clerks of court were closed to the public (from March 16, 2020 through July 20, 2020) do not count against the time remaining for the initiation of that matter; and (e) With the offices of the clerks of courts to be reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters are hereby extended by an additional 15 days; and (f) Any such filings made within the period described in (d) and (e) shall relate back to the day before the deadline would have expired had it not been tolled or suspended[.] E.g., Rev. Admin.

Order at 2-3 (footnote omitted). In sections (a), (b), and (d) of those orders, Chief Judge Barbera established a tolling period for deadlines for the initiation of matters that began on March 16, 2020 and ended with the reopening of the court clerks’ offices on July 20, 2020. E.g., id. at 2. In section (c) of those orders, Chief Judge Barbera provided that the tolling period applied to all parties in all matters, without the need for an individualized showing of a practical inability to comply with a deadline.

E.g., id. And in section (e), Chief Judge Barbera established the 15-day extension, expressly connecting it to the reopening of the court clerks’ offices that constituted the end of the tolling period: “With the offices of the clerks of courts to be reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters are hereby extended by an additional 15 days[.]” E.g., id. at 3. The operative provisions of the orders that established the 15-day extension thus link it to matters with deadlines that had been tolled until the reopening of the clerks’ offices. There is no ambiguity.5 And because the 5 Mr. Hosein’s interpretation of section (f) effectively renders it a non sequitur, with an initial phrase—which references the reopening of the clerks’ offices—that is untethered 6 Tenth Revised Administrative Order does not purport to alter the scope of the 15-day extension in any way, but instead simply refers to its existence and imposition “by previous Order,” it cannot have introduced any ambiguity into it.

The 15-day extension thus unambiguously applies only to matters that had previously been tolled. Second, the Tenth Revised Administrative Order describes the earlier orders as having added “an additional 15 days” to “filing deadlines” that had previously “been extended.” Tenth Rev. Admin. Order at 4. However, the only extension of deadlines that had previously been accomplished by this series of administrative orders was the tolling of deadlines from March 16 through July 20, 2020, which is referred to in sections (a), (b), and (d) of the Tenth Revised Administrative Order (and in those same sections of the orders in the series going back to the original Revised Administrative Order).

E.g., id. at 2-3. Consistent with the plain language of the prior orders, the plain language of section (f) thus unambiguously refers to an additional extension of the previously tolled deadlines, not a from its concluding phrase—which he interprets to establish a freestanding deadline extension unconnected to the tolling period. The Dissent goes one step further, stating that, “as a matter of logic, Chief Judge Barbera must have implemented the 15-day extension for reasons other than the closure of the clerk’s offices, because the extension was only going to become effective after the clerk’s offices reopened to the public.” Dissenting Op. of Biran, J. at 10. The Dissent thus considers it logical to interpret the 15-day extension enacted in the second half of the one-sentence section (e) as necessarily unrelated to the first half of that same sentence.

I see neither grammatical coherence nor logic in that conclusion. It is far more likely that the two halves of the sentence are related, and that the purpose of the 15-day extension was to create a buffer period so that litigants were not caught off guard by the resumption of the running of statutes of limitations and other deadlines. That purpose, which is also reflected in the footnote attached to section (e) in all relevant orders, may have become less relevant as the pandemic wore on, but it is safe to say that on May 22, 2020, when the 15-day extension was put in place, no one had any idea how long emergency operations would continue. 7 new extension of deadlines that were not previously subject to tolling. For that reason, as well, the 15-day extension referred to in the Tenth Revised Administrative Order unambiguously applies only to matters that had previously been tolled.

Justice Hotten finds ambiguity in section (f) of the Tenth Revised Administrative Order, concluding that it “is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations: (1) once the clerks’ offices reopened, all filing deadlines through April 3, 2022 received a fifteen-day extension; or (2) only the filing deadlines that were suspended during the court closure received a fifteen-day extension.” Concurring Op. of Hotten, J. at 8. The Dissent agrees that section (f) is ambiguous. Dissenting Op. of Biran, J. at 2, 5-13. For the reasons already discussed, I reach the opposite conclusion.

Nevertheless, I agree with Justice Hotten that if section (f) were ambiguous, “other indicia” of Chief Judge Barbera’s intent overwhelmingly support the interpretation that the 15-day extension applied only to deadlines that were tolled between March 16 and July 20, 2020. Id. at 9-30. To that point, I would emphasize three things: • First, the 15-day extension was initially added in the original Revised Administrative Order, issued on May 22, 2020. That is the same order that first identified the date on which court clerks’ offices would be reopened and tied the end of the tolling period to that reopening.

There is no provision in any order that references a freestanding 15-day extension or that ties the extension to anything other than the cessation of the tolling period. • Second, as Justice Hotten ably discusses, all other relevant sections of the Tenth Revised Administrative Order, as well as its predecessor and successor orders, were addressed to the tolling and suspension of deadlines. Concurring Op. of Hotten, J. at 9-13 & 16-17. Even without knowing the history of the evolution of those provisions, it would be illogical to read section (f) as a stand-alone provision creating an independent extension unconnected to what is identified as the subject matter of the order. Had that been Chief Judge Barbera’s intent, it would have been much simpler to state 8 that all deadlines for the initiation of matters were extended by 15 days for the duration of the COVID-19 emergency. • Third, the footnote example included in the final 13 administrative orders in the series reflects the intent that the “additional” 15-day extension apply only to deadlines that had been subject to tolling.

Had Chief Judge Barbera intended to extend all deadlines, the example would have been unnecessary. Mr. Hosein’s argument relies in part on two portions of the Tenth Revised Administrative Order. Even were that the appropriate order to be examined to define the scope of the extension, neither section provides the support he claims. First, Mr. Hosein emphasizes section (e), which provides: For the purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters, in this Order, “matters” are, nunc pro tunc to March 16, 2020, those matters for which the statute of limitations and other deadlines related to initiation would have expired between March 16, 2020, through the termination date of COVID-19 emergency operations in the Judiciary as determined by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals[.] Tenth Rev. Admin.

Order at 3. Mr. Hosein contends that by defining “matters” in section (e) to include all those for which a limitations period or deadline would have expired while the Judiciary was in emergency operations, Chief Judge Barbera intended the 15-day extension referenced in section (f) to apply to all those matters. I disagree. As an initial matter, section (e) expressly states that it is defining “matters” for a specific purpose: “tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters.” That tolling began on March 16, 2020 and ended on July 20, 2020.

Mr. Hosein’s interpretation requires that we read the definition to additionally apply for the different and broader purpose of creating a freestanding extension of all statutes of limitations and deadlines running during the entire emergency period, regardless of 9 whether they were subject to tolling. Mr. Hosein’s interpretation thus runs headlong into the provision’s express statement of purpose. Moreover, the paragraph that appears as section (e) in the Tenth Revised Administrative Order first appeared in the Fifth Revised Administrative Order. The last administrative order that purported to establish the “additional” 15-day extension, as opposed to referring to it as having previously been established “by previous Order,” was the Third Revised Administrative Order.

Mr. Hosein’s argument would require us to conclude that it was Chief Judge Barbera’s intent to employ a definition of “matters” that she expressly identified as serving a limited, different purpose to also retroactively expand the substance of an extension that had been established in prior orders, and that she intended to do so indirectly and without comment or acknowledgment.6 Instead, the stated and apparent purpose of section (e) is to clarify that the benefit of the tolling period was not 6 Because section (e), defining “matters,” did not become part of the administrative orders until November 2020, its application was made nunc pro tunc to the beginning of the emergency period, March 16, 2020. Notably, however, it was made nunc pro tunc to that date for the purpose expressly identified in section (e): tolling. There is no indication that it was intended to alter the scope or applicability of the “additional” 15-day extension beyond the tolled matters to which that extension applied. In an effort to draw that connection, the Dissent posits a creative interpretation of the phrase “For the purposes of tolling statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters” as possibly referring to (1) the tolling of statutes of limitations and, separately, (2) other deadlines related to the initiation of matters.

Dissenting Op. of Biran, J. at 12-13. In doing so, the Dissent would seemingly break the connection between tolling and all deadlines for initiating matters other than statutes of limitations—in contrast to their treatment throughout the remainder of the orders—for no apparent purpose other than adding a 15-day extension in the following section. Regardless of whether that acontextual interpretation could pass muster if the isolated language were analyzed in a vacuum—and I do not think it could—it cannot survive when viewed in context of the other provisions of the orders. 10 limited to those matters for which a statute of limitations or deadline would have expired during the tolling period itself. Rather, it applied to all matters for which such a limitations period or deadline would have expired during the period of emergency operations.7 Section (e) simply cannot bear the weight Mr. Hosein places on it.

Second, Mr. Hosein relies on the following two paragraphs included in the preamble to the Tenth Revised Administrative Order: WHEREAS, The impact of the restrictions required to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic has had a widespread detrimental impact upon the administration of justice, impeding the ability of parties and potential litigants to meet with counsel, conduct research, gather evidence, and prepare complaints, pleadings, and responses, with the impact falling hardest upon those who are impoverished; and WHEREAS, The detrimental impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is so widespread as to have created a general and pervasive practical inability for certain deadlines to be met[.] Tenth Rev. Admin. Order at 1-2. Mr. Hosein interprets the inclusion of those paragraphs after clerks’ offices were reopened to the public to reflect an acknowledgment that “even though the Courts were open, its emergency operations were necessary due to the ‘detrimental impact of the COVID-19 pandemic’ and its effects not only on the Courts, but on the public.” However, those two paragraphs of the preamble were introduced in the Amended Administrative Order Clarifying, which was issued on April 24, 2020. That same order 7 Thus, for example, a claim with a three-year statute of limitations that would have expired in April 2021 was to receive the benefit of tolling just as a claim with a similar limitations period that would have expired in April 2020. 11 also introduced, for the first time, the following operative paragraph, lettered (b) in that order and, eventually, (c) in most succeeding orders, including the Tenth: Justice requires that the ordering of the suspension of such deadlines during an emergency as sweeping as a pandemic be applied consistently and equitably throughout Maryland, and no party or parties shall be compelled to prove his, her, its, or their practical inability to comply with such a deadline if it occurred during the COVID-19 emergency to obtain the relief that this Administrative Order provides[.] E.g., Amended Admin.

Order Clarifying at 2. The purpose of the preamble paragraphs was therefore to support the new operative paragraph clarifying that the tolling period applied to all parties in all matters, without any need for an individualized showing of a practical inability to comply with a deadline. Notably, the inclusion of those preamble and operative paragraphs came: (1) two orders in sequence before the order that first included the “additional” 15-day extension; and (2) five orders in sequence before the order that added the definition of “matters” in new paragraph (e). In context, therefore, the continued inclusion of the same preamble paragraphs in subsequent orders simply supported the continued inclusion of the same operative paragraph in subsequent orders.

In sum, the relevant provisions of the relevant administrative orders are not ambiguous. The “additional” 15-day extension was added to the tolling period—the only thing it could possibly have been additional to—initially by the Revised Administrative Order. After the Third Revised Administrative Order, none of the subsequent orders, including the Tenth, purported to alter, expand, extend, or amend that “additional” extension into a freestanding extension applicable to all limitations periods and deadlines, regardless of whether they had been tolled while court clerks’ offices were closed to the 12 public. For those reasons, I concur with the Per Curiam opinion that: (1) the answer to the question posed by the Appellate Court of Maryland is that “the fifteen-day extension applied only to cases with deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the court clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020”; and (2) the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City is affirmed.

Justices Booth and Gould advise that they join this concurring opinion. 13 Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-22-000458 Argued: May 4, 2023 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND* Misc. No. 24 September Term, 2022 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF KERN HOSEIN Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. Concurring Opinion by Hotten, J. Filed: August 14, 2023 * During the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.

Respectfully, I concur with the Per Curiam opinion’s conclusion regarding the fifteen-day extension enshrined in Section (f) of the “Tenth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters” (“Tenth Revised Administrative Order” or “Order”).1 Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. (Aug., 6, 2021), archived at: https://perma.cc/5RFY-XAFV. I agree that the fifteen-day extension only applied to filing deadlines that were tolled during the closure of the clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020.

I write separately because, in my view, the scope of the fifteen-day extension under the Tenth Revised Administrative Order is ambiguous. Section (f) does not purport to implement the fifteen-day extension; rather it implicitly serves in an advisory capacity because it indicates that a previous order effectuated that extension. The reference to a previous order belies the fact that each successive administrative tolling order expressly rescinded its predecessor. Therefore, the scope of Section (f) must be apparent from the plain language of the only administrative tolling order in effect during the relevant time, i.e., the Tenth Revised Administrative Order.

Otherwise, Section (f) is necessarily ambiguous. Section (f) does not explain whether the fifteen-day extension, as implemented by a previous order, remains in effect. Section (f) also does not identify the claims to which the fifteen-day extension applied. None of the other operative provisions clarify the scope of the fifteen-day extension.

The 1 Subsequent references and citations to the Chief Judge’s administrative tolling orders will follow a similar shorthand. only clue to Section (f)’s true meaning lies in its reference to a rescinded order. As with the evaluation of any extrinsic indicia of intent, such as superseded statutes, the evaluation of rescinded orders falls within the domain of an ambiguity analysis. Although I conclude that Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera2 intended for the fifteen-day extension to narrowly apply to claims that were tolled during the closure of the clerks’ offices, that conclusion does not rely solely on the Tenth Revised Administrative Order. Instead, that conclusion requires evaluating extrinsic indicia to clarify the ambiguity of the fifteen-day extension.

ANALYSIS I. The Tenth Revised Administrative Order is Ambiguous Regarding the Scope of the Fifteen-Day Extension. This Court applies canons of statutory construction when interpreting the Maryland Rules, including administrative orders issued pursuant to those rules. See Lopez-Villa v. State, 478 Md. 1, 10 , 271 A.3d 1228 , 1234 (2022); English v. Quinn, 76 Va. App. 80 , 85– 86, 880 S.E.2d 35 , 38 (2022) (noting that “[s]tatutory construction principles guide [the] interpretation of the Supreme Court[ of Virginia’s administrative tolling] orders.” (citation omitted)); Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Melendez, 488 Mass. 338 , 341, 173 N.E.3d 356 , 360 (2021) (applying “basic principles of statutory construction[]” when interpreting the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ administrative tolling orders).

To ascertain the Chief Judge’s intent, this Court “begin[s] with the plain language of the” administrative order. Lopez-Villa, 478 Md. at 11 , 271 A.3d at 1234 (citation omitted). This Court “need The change from “Chief Judge” to “Chief Justice” or from “Court of Appeals of 2 Maryland” to “Supreme Court of Maryland” had not occurred during all relevant times. Accordingly, I will use the former titles throughout this opinion where appropriate. 2 not look beyond the [administrative order’s] terms to inform [its] analysis[,]” where the “language is clear and unambiguous[.]” Id., 271 A.3d at 1234 (cleaned up).

This Court evaluates the administrative order “as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless[,] or nugatory.” Elsberry v. Stanley Martin Cos., LLC, 482 Md. 159, 179 , 286 A.3d 1, 12 (2022) (cleaned up). An administrative order is ambiguous when its words are “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger [] scheme[.]” Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 276 , 987 A.2d 18, 29 (2010) (citations omitted). Where an administrative order is ambiguous, this Court will search for indicia of the Chief Judge’s intent by considering prior administrative orders to reconstruct the “history” of the order at issue, as well as “other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the” Chief Judge’s deliberative process. Id., 987 A.2d at 29 .

This Court will also consider “the structure of the [order], how it relates to other [orders], its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.” Id., 987 A.2d at 29 (citations omitted). Language contained in an administrative order’s preamble and title “may be considered in conjunction with the body of the [order] to determine its intent, purpose and effect[.]” Clarke v. Cnty. Comm’rs for Carroll Cnty., 270 Md. 343, 349 , 311 A.2d 417, 421 (1973) (citations omitted). “To the extent that the preamble collides with the plain and unambiguous language of the [administrative order], the latter must prevail.” Id., 311 A.2d at 421 . 3 In the case at bar, Kern Hosein (“Petitioner”) argues that the fifteen-day extension applied broadly to all claims with filing deadlines that would have expired during the COVID-19 emergency period between March 16, 2020 and April 3, 2022. The Fire and Police Employees’ Retirement System for the City of Baltimore (“Respondent”) contends that the extension applied narrowly to claims that were tolled during the closure of the clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020.

Both parties assert that the plain language of the Tenth Revised Administrative Order is dispositive in this case. I disagree. The plain language of the fifteen-day extension is ambiguous. Section (f) states: “With the offices of the clerks of courts having been reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters having been extended by previous Order, by an additional 15 days[.]” Tenth Revised Admin.

Ord. at 4 (footnote omitted). Section (f) does not discuss the relationship between the clerks’ offices reopening and the application of the extension. Section (f) also does not define the scope of the extension. It merely states that a “previous [o]rder[]” extended “the filing deadlines to initiate matters[.]” Id.

Section (f)’s reference to a “previous [o]rder[]” suggests that the Tenth Revised Administrative Order itself does not implement the fifteen-day extension; rather, it was a “previous [o]rder[]” that did so. Id. Section (f) does not indicate whether the “previous [o]rder[’s]” extension remained in effect. Id.

Although Section (f) invites this Court to consider the scope of the “previous [o]rder,” that invitation undermines the fact that the Tenth Revised Administrative Order, as with all successive administrative tolling orders, had expressly rescinded its predecessor. Id. at 4–5; see Lockshin, 412 Md. at 275 , 987 A.2d at 29 (“[This Court] . . . do[es] not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do[es] [it] 4 confine strictly [its] interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.” (citations omitted)). By voiding their predecessors, the administrative tolling orders exclusively operated under the terms of the specific order that was in effect at any given time, which, in this case, was the Tenth Revised Administrative Order. Therefore, the scope of Section (f) must be apparent from the plain text of the Tenth Revised Administrative Order, or it is necessarily ambiguous.

See id. at 276 , 987 A.2d at 29 (noting that language that appears “clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation[]” may “become ambiguous when read as part of a larger [] scheme[.]” (citations omitted)). The footnote in Section (f) provides no clarity. Although the footnote describes a case that was affected by the closure, the omission of claims with deadlines following the closure does not foreclose a broader extension. See Tenth Revised Admin.

Ord. at 4 n.1. On one hand, the footnote may illustrate the only types of claims that Chief Judge Barbera had envisioned would receive an extension. On the other hand, the footnote may simply illustrate the most complex and salient application of the fifteen-day extension for litigants who anticipated the clerks’ offices reopening. The operative language in the Tenth Revised Administrative Order also fails to conclusively establish the meaning of Section (f).

Section (a) explains that a prior order had tolled all filing deadlines during the closure. Id. at 2–3. Section (b) maintained that tolling period. Id. at 3.

Section (c) excuses parties from establishing their “practical inability to comply” with a tolled deadline. Id. Section (d) defines the tolling period as the court closure between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020. Id.

Sections (a) through (d) 5 do not discuss the fifteen-day extension or provide guidance regarding its scope. Id. at 2– 3. Section (e) warrants further discussion because Petitioner relies on its language. From the outset, Section (e) states that it exists “[f]or the purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters[.]” Id. at 3.

The gerund “tolling” combined with the preposition “of” indicate that the action of “tolling” pertains to the terms that follow. Id. Generally, the term “and” “is a conjunction meaning ‘[t]ogether with or along with; in addition to; as well as[; u]sed to connect words, phrases, or clauses that have the same grammatical function in construction.” SVF Riva Annapolis LLC v. Gilroy, 459 Md. 632, 642 , 187 A.3d 686, 692 (2018) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the use of “and” in the prefatory clause connects “statutes of limitations” with “other deadlines related to the initiation of matters[.]” Tenth Revised Admin.

Ord. at 3. Taken together, the plain language of the prefatory clause clarifies that the operative language addresses the dual “purposes of tolling of statutes of limitations[,]” as well as the “tolling of . . . other deadlines related to the initiation of matters[.]” Id. Section (e) then defines “matters” retroactively as claims with filing deadlines that would have elapsed “between March 16, 2020, through the termination date of COVID-19 emergency operations in the Judiciary[.]” Id. COVID-19 emergency operations in the Judiciary extended beyond the emergency tolling period, but that alone does not clarify the scope of the fifteen-day extension.

See Final Admin. Ord. at 3 (Mar., 28, 2022), archived at: https://perma.cc/CTL2-JCAV (defining the “COVID-19 emergency” period as March 16, 2020 through April 3, 2022). Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, Section (e) does not suggest that the definition of “matters” is related to the application of the fifteen-day 6 extension. Like the other operative provisions, Section (e) does not discuss the fifteen-day extension at all.

Instead, Section (e) serves a clarifying function regarding the scope of the “matters” subject to the “tolling of statutes of limitations and other deadlines related to the initiation of matters[.]” Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 2–3. The only type of tolling discussed in the Tenth Revised Administrative Order involved the closure of the clerks’ offices. Section (g) is similarly unhelpful.

It provides that “[a]ny such filings made within the period described in [Sections] (d) and (e) shall relate back to the day before the deadline would have expired had it not been tolled or suspended[.]” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The phrase “[a]ny such filings” refers to the initiation of matters, as described in the Order. Id. The “period described in [Sections] (d) and (e)” concern two different timeframes: (1) the four-month closure of the clerks’ offices under Section (d); and (2) the entire COVID-19 emergency period under Section (e).

Id. at 3–4. Although these two periods initially suggest an ambiguity in Section (g), the provision proceeds to connect its operation to cases that were “tolled or suspended[.]” Id. at 4. Section (g) does not mention deadlines that were “extended[,]” which limits any relation-back to cases that were “tolled or suspended[]” during the four-month closure of the clerks’ offices. Id. at 4.

Regardless of the scope of Section (g), nothing in its language clarifies the operation of Section (f). Sections (a) through (e), as well as (g), all concern the emergency tolling period, which Section (d) defines as the closure of the clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020 through July 20, 2020. Id. at 3. This suggests that the operation of Section (f) is limited to that period.

Since the four-month closure had long passed when the Tenth Revised 7 Administrative Order was issued, that would mean Section (f) was inoperative and served in an advisory capacity during all relevant times in this matter. That interpretation, however, belies the fact that Section (f) was included in the Tenth Revised Administrative Order in the first place. The inclusion of Section (f) implies that the Chief Judge had intended for that provision to have some effect. Petitioner highlights the tension between an inoperative fifteen-day extension and its inclusion in the Order: [N]o further tolling orders would be necessary after the [c]lerks of [c]ourts’ offices reopened on July 20, 2020, because all conceivable limitations periods that were tolled by the original orders would have completed running despite the extended time.

Yet the [Chief Judge] ha[d] issued at least nine additional orders on emergency tolling of statutes of limitations prior to the Tenth [Revised Administrative] Order and continued to issue modified orders until March 2022. In essence, the plain language of the Order does not, by itself, explain the scope of Section (f) or indicate whether the extension that the “previous [o]rder[]” had purportedly established remained in effect. Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 4.

Absent clarification, Section (f) could be interpreted to be broad or narrow. Thus, Section (f) is susceptible to two reasonable interpretations: (1) once the clerks’ offices reopened, all filing deadlines through April 3, 2022 received a fifteen-day extension; or (2) only the filing deadlines that were suspended during the court closure received a fifteen-day extension. The first interpretation would broaden the scope of the extension beyond the emergency tolling period, whereas the second interpretation would render Section (f) vestigial, despite its inclusion in the Tenth Revised Administrative Order. See Elsberry, 482 Md. at 179 , 286 A.3d at 12 (noting that courts avoid constructions that either “add []or delete language” or render language “surplusage, superfluous, meaningless[,] or nugatory.” (cleaned up)). 8 To resolve this ambiguity, this Court must consider other indicia of the Chief Judge’s intent, including the preamble, title, other administrative tolling orders, relevant case law, and the Maryland Rules governing the administrative tolling orders.

See Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276 , 987 A.2d at 29 (“[A] court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process.” (citations omitted)).3 It is clear upon reviewing those extrinsic sources that the fifteen-day extension applied only to claims that were tolled during the closure of the clerks’ offices between March 16, 2020 and July 20, 2020.

II

Other Indicia Reveal that the Tenth Revised Administrative Order’s Fifteen- day Extension Narrowly Applied to Deadlines that were Tolled During the Closure of the Clerks’ Offices. A. The history of the fifteen-day extension. The Tenth Revised Administrative Order is a byproduct of several amendments, which “largely consisted of updated cross-references to other administrative orders 3 This Court’s modern trend when evaluating unambiguous language is to use legislative history to “check” any conclusions drawn from the plain language. See Elsberry, 482 Md. at 190 , 286 A.3d at 19 .

Here, Section (f)’s reference to a “previous [o]rder[]” invites this Court to consider the history of the administrative tolling orders. Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 4. Those prior orders cannot be considered a part of a “scheme” of administrative tolling orders that would be subject to this Court’s plain language analysis because each administrative tolling order expressly rescinded its predecessor.

See Elsberry, 482 Md. at 180 , 286 A.3d at 13 (“[T]he plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs[.]” (citation omitted)). Thus, evaluating prior orders to interpret a provision in the only operative order, i.e., the Tenth Revised Administrative Order, is akin to considering legislative history and superseded statutes to resolve statutory ambiguity. Id. at 179 , 286 A.3d at 12 (“This Court need not resort to other rules of statutory construction when the plain language of the statute unambiguously communicates the intent of the General Assembly.” (citation omitted)). 9 concerning the COVID-19 pandemic.” Murphy v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 478 Md. 333, 362 , 274 A.3d 412 , 429 (2022) (footnote omitted). The context and history of an administrative order, including its relationship with earlier and subsequent orders, may “eliminate another version of [the Chief Judge’s] intent alleged to be latent in the language.” See Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 113 , 191 A.3d 1188, 1203 (2018) (citations omitted). Chief Judge Barbera alluded to the fifteen-day extension in the First Administrative Order, dated April 3, 2020. See First Admin.

Ord. at 2 (Apr. 3, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/568M- 28TV. That order tolled the filing deadlines for matters “by the number of days that the courts [were] closed to the public due to the COVID-19 emergency[.]” Id. Then, the order provided that “[s]uch deadlines further shall be extended by a period to be described in an order by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals terminating the COVID-19 emergency period[.]” Id. The phrase “[s]uch deadlines” is critical because it connects the operation of the extension directly to the deadlines that were tolled during the closure.

Id. at 1. If the Chief Judge initially raised the extension in connection with the closure, then the implementation of that extension must be imbued with that same context, absent contrary language. The Revised Administrative Order, dated May 22, 2020, introduced the following provision: “With the offices of the clerks of courts to be reopened to the public on July 20, 2020, the filing deadlines to initiate matters are hereby extended by an additional 15 days[.]” Revised Admin. Ord. at 3 (May 22, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/58SR- UWEH.

This provision fulfilled the Chief Judge’s promise to extend filing deadlines that were tolled during the closure. The extension appeared in anticipation of the clerks’ offices 10 reopening, which clarifies why the footnote example pertained to a case that was affected by the tolling period. This history also clarifies the ambiguous language of Section (f) under the Tenth Revised Administrative Order. The Order states that “the filing deadlines to initiate matters ha[d] been extended by previous Order[.]” Tenth Revised Admin.

Order at 4 (emphasis added). The Revised Administrative Order, as the progenitor of the fifteen- day extension, was the very order that Section (f) had referenced. None of the orders subsequent to the Revised Administrative Order purported to modify the fifteen-day extension. Although the Fifth Revised Administrative Order introduced two substantive changes, they have no bearing on the scope of the fifteen-day extension.

The Fifth Revised Administrative Order: (1) added Section (e), which defined “matters[,]” “[f]or the purposes of tolling[,]” as claims with deadlines that would have elapsed from March 16, 2020 through the end of COVID-19 emergency operations; and (2) altered the relation-back provision to refer to Section (e) instead of the fifteen-day extension. Fifth Revised Admin. Ord. at 3–4 (Nov. 24, 2020), archived at: https://perma.cc/NQY3-LQMQ. These changes are unremarkable.

Prior to the Fifth Revised Administrative Order, it was unclear whether the tolling period applied solely to filing deadlines that would have elapsed during the four-month closure or included filing deadlines that had accrued before the closure but would not expire until a later date. With the addition of Section (e), Chief Judge Barbera clarified that the tolling period applied to the latter. Section (g) accounts for matters with longer filing deadlines that happened to overlap with the four-month closure. That is why Section (g) references “deadline[s] [that] would have expired had [they] not been tolled or 11 suspended[.] Id. at 4 (emphasis added).

That language remained unchanged under the Tenth Revised Administrative Order. Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 3–4. Critically, the Final Administrative Order clarified that the administrative tolling orders had applied to “matters for which the statute of limitations and other deadlines related to initiation would have expired between March 16, 2020, through . . .

April 3, 2022, but for the tolling or suspension described in this Order[.]” Final Admin. Ord. at 3 (emphasis added). In light of the Final Administrative Order, the application of Section (e), and by extension Section (g), cannot extend beyond claims that were affected by the tolling period. Since none of the administrative tolling orders modified or extended the operation of the Revised Administrative Order, it follows that the fifteen-day extension had only applied to the deadlines that were tolled during the closure of the clerks’ offices.

The above history confirms that Section (f) was inoperative under the Tenth Revised Administrative Order and had merely advised the public that a prior order had extended filing deadlines. Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 4. This history further establishes that the fifteen-day extension from the Revised Administrative Order remained in effect under each successive order, notwithstanding the rescission of prior orders, including the “previous [o]rder[]” that initially implemented the extension.

Id. Though this Court generally disfavors interpretations that render operative language “surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory[,]” the advisory capacity of Section (f) “reconcile[s] and harmonize[s]” the tension between Section (f)’s reference to a “previous [o]rder[]” with the rescission of that order. Id.; Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 384 , 250 A.3d 197, 213 (2021) (citation omitted); Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276 , 987 A.2d at 29 (citation omitted). 12 Accordingly, the history of the fifteen-day extension reflects that the Chief Judge had contemplated a narrower extension.

B. The Maryland Judiciary’s understanding of the fifteen-day extension and communications to the public. The Maryland Judiciary, of which Chief Judge Barbera was the administrative head during the relevant time period, communicated to the public that the fifteen-day extension only applied to claims affected by the closure. On the same day that Chief Judge Barbera issued the Revised Administrative Order, the Maryland Judiciary published a press release stating, in relevant part: “Filing deadlines to initiate matters will be extended by an additional 15 days, depending on the date in which a specific clerk’s office opens.” Press Release, Md. Jud. Gov’t Rels. & Pub.

Affs., Maryland courts announce plan to gradually reopen through phased approach (May, 22, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/LT68- AV5H. The Maryland Judiciary’s website published all of the Chief Judge’s administrative tolling orders pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-1003(d). Md. Jud., (COVID-19) Administrative Orders, archived at: https://perma.cc/6XCF-AGMG; see Md. Rule 16- 1003(d) (requiring “a copy of all directives and orders issued under [Maryland Rule 16- 1003(a)] . . . [to be] posted on the Judiciary website.”). The Maryland Judiciary website also maintained a “COVID-19 Timeline of Events[,]” which summarized the Chief Judge’s administrative tolling orders as they were issued.

Md. Jud., COVID-19 Timeline of Events, archived at https://perma.cc/VU32-3M4G. The timeline document summarized the Revised Administrative Order’s new provisions as follows: [T]he number of days that the courts were closed to the public does not count against the time remaining for the initiation of a court matter. Filing 13 deadlines to initiate matters will be extended by an additional 15 days, depending on the date in which a specific clerk’s office opens. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).

An extension that was intended to apply to all filings, regardless of whether they were impacted by the closure, would not “depend[] on the date in which a specific clerk’s office opens.” Id. (emphasis added). The People’s Law Library of Maryland (“PLL”)4 reflected the same interpretation of the extension. The PLL’s website states that “[t]he deadlines [to initiate new matters were] tolled or suspended by the number of days the courts [were] closed plus an additional 15 days.” Filing Deadlines and Statutes of Limitation, COVID-19 Updates, archived at: https://perma.cc/Z6UL-5CFR.

Together, these public resources establish that the Maryland Judiciary conveyed to the public that the fifteen-day extension would only apply to deadlines that were suspended during the closure of the clerks’ offices. These public communications are especially notable because Chief Judge Barbera expressly advised Maryland attorneys to rely upon the Maryland Judiciary’s website for updates regarding the Judicial Branch’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. A Message from the Chief Judge to Attorneys on COVID-19 | Maryland Judiciary | March 23, 2020, archived at: https://perma.cc/W7MC-J7T9. 4 PLL “is a legal information and self-help website maintained by the Thurgood Marshall State Law Library, a court-related agency of the Maryland Judiciary[.]” The People’s Law Library of Maryland, Introduction to the People’s Law Library, archived at: https://perma.cc/XP5G-ZDZT. The website is designed “to provide self-represented litigants in Maryland state courts information about the law, including summaries of the law[.]” Id. 14 Chief Judge Barbera was not only aware of the interpretation of her administrative tolling orders that the Maryland Judiciary was communicating to the public, but she also participated in disseminating it.

On January 8, 2021, the Chief Judge “provided a further briefing to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on ‘the Courts and Criminal Justice System During the COVID-19 Pandemic.’” Murphy, 478 Md. at 363 , 274 A.3d at 429. The meeting agenda included a copy of the COVID-19 Timeline of Events, which contained the above summary of the Revised Administrative Order. Id. at 363 n.34, 274 A.3d at 429 n.34 (citing Maryland Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Briefing on the Courts and Criminal Justice System During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Agenda (Jan. 8, 2021), archived at: https://perma.cc/DZP4-5X4H). In alignment with these statements to the public, the Chief Judge continued to promulgate updated administrative tolling orders that maintained the same language.

See Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 693 , 69 A.3d 1149, 1157 (2013) (explaining that inaction is persuasive evidence of intent in some circumstances). This Court should hesitate to retract an interpretation of the fifteen-day extension that the Maryland Judiciary had communicated to the public. Assuming, arguendo, there was no evidence the Chief Judge was aware of the Maryland Judiciary’s communications to the public, this Court must presume that she exercised her emergency powers with “full knowledge and information” regarding her “prior and existing” administrative tolling orders, as well as the Maryland Judiciary’s publications. Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 693 , 861 A.2d 727, 732 (2004) (citation omitted). 15 C. The Order’s title mentions “[e]mergency [t]olling[.]” The Tenth Revised Administrative Order’s title reflects that any relief under the Order pertained to “[e]mergency [t]olling[,]” which was limited to the four-month closure.

Just as “a bill’s title and function paragraphs are indicative of legislative intent[,]” an administrative order’s title is indicative of its drafter’s intent. See Elsberry, 482 Md. at 187 , 286 A.3d at 17 (cleaned up). The Order is entitled “Tenth Revised Administrative Order on the Emergency Tolling or Suspension of Statutes of Limitations and Statutory and Rules Deadlines Related to the Initiation of Matters and Certain Statutory and Rules Deadlines in Pending Matters[.]” Tenth Revised Admin. Ord. at 1.

The title provides two purposes: (1) the emergency tolling of deadlines related to the initiation of matters; and (2) emergency suspension of deadlines in pending matters. The first purpose is relevant to this Court’s analysis. The operative language in the Order pertains to emergency tolling. Sections (a) through (f) discuss the emergency tolling period, which Section (d) defines as the four- month closure of the clerks’ offices.

Id. at 2–4. Sections (a), (b), and (d) mention the tolling period in the context of “the number of days that the courts were closed to the public[,]” which Section (d) defined as the days when the clerks’ offices were closed to the public. Id. at 2–3. Section (c) excuses parties from demonstrating their inability to comply with those tolled deadlines.

Id. at 3. Both Sections (d) and (e) exist to define terms relevant to the scope of the tolling period, with Section (d) defining the four-month closure and Section (e) defining the scope of “matters” subject to the provisions of the order. Id. 16 In that context, Section (f) references the fifteen-day extension after mentioning the reopening of the respective offices of the clerks of court on July 20, 2020. Id. at 4; see D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 , 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789 (2008) (“Logic demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and the command. . . .

That requirement of logical connection may cause a prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative clause.”). Petitioner’s interpretation would render Section (f) an anomaly among the other clauses, interjecting an entirely different extension unconnected to the tolling period, and render the Order’s title misleading. Indeed, this Court must