Ireland v. Shipley

Offutt, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On July 31st, 1924, Brantley Ireland, while employed by William E. Shipley, at his place of business at the Falls Road and Belvedere Avenue in the City of Baltimore, was engaged in breaking a plastering lath. In the course of his work a piece of the lath struck him in the left eye and caused an intra-ocular hemorrhage, which resulted in a temporary total disability. On August 6th, 1924, the employer reported the accident to the State Industrial Accident Commission, and on August 18th, 1924, the employee filed a claim, stated in the record to be in the following form: “This claim is in the usual form with affidavit.

Brantley Ireland states that he is 23 years old, unmarr ⁹³ ried. That he claims compensation for an injury due to an accident on July 31, 1924, in the course of his employment by William E. Shipley as an electrician. He has worked at his occupation 5% years; for his present employer about ten months. “He is now totally disabled and has been since July 31, 1924. The injury is to his left eye. “Is the injury temporary or permanent?

Temporary. “Describe how the accident occurred. Cutting wooden lath and it flew up and hit eye. “His average weekly wage has been $37.50 which has been reduced 100% by this injury. His employer has provided medical attention. Dr. Hichols and Dr. II.

O. Davis have attended him.” At the same time a report of Dr. H. O. Davis, his attending physician, was filed, in which Dr. Davis stated that the injury had not resulted in a permanent disability, but that its probable duration was not known at that time. The employer and insurer were notified of the claim and informed “that if no request for a hearing has been received or adjournment granted by the Commission, order will be passed on the 26th day of August, 1924, upon the evidence then in the hands of the Commission.” Apparently no hearing was requested, and on August 27th, 1924, the commission ordered that “compensation at the rate of $18.00 per week, payable weekly, be paid to the said Brantley Ireland by William E. Shipley, employer, and New Amsterdam Casualty Company, insurer, during the continuance of his disability subject to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, compensation to begin as of the 4th day of August, 1924, and that final settlement receipt be filed with the Commission in due time.” On January 24th, 1925, a “final settlement receipt” was executed by Ireland in this form: “Case of Brantley Ireland Einal Settlement Receipt “Received of William E. Shipley the sum of Hiñe 00/100 Dollars making in all with weekly pay ⁹⁴ ments already received by me, tbe total sum of Sixty three 00/100 Dollars in settlement of all amounts due for compensation on account of an award made by the State Industrial Accident Commission in settlement of claim No. 75376 (as per claim docket of said Commission) for injuries suffered'by me on or about the 31st day of July, 1924, while in the employ of William E. Shipley * * * “The compensation paid as above recited is computed as follows: Injury occurred 7-31-24 Compensation began 8-4-24 Disability ended 8-28-24 Period of disability 3 weeks and 3 days Average weekly wage $37.50. Rate of compensation' as per award under claim No. 75376: $18.00 Total paid claimant 63.00 In addition to amounts paid claimant:” and was filed with the commission. On May 26th, 1932, over seven years later, Joseph Leiter, counsel for Ireland, addressed to the commission a letter in which he requested it to “set down for hearing the case of Brantley Ireland v. William E. Shipley, to determine the following issue: ‘To determine the nature and extent of permanent disability of the above claimant.’ ” No action was taken in connection with that request until August 9th, 1932, when Ireland filed a more formal petition in which he alleged that when he was discharged on August 28th, 1924, the employer, the employer’s physician, and the insurer had knowledge of an existing permanent disability to claimant’s left eye; that the commission had not passed upon the question as to whether the disability was permanent, but that it could be shown by competent medical testimony that it was in fact permanent; and that no prejudice had resulted from the delay in filing the petition.

Hpon that petition he asked that the case be reopened to allow him to offer testimony as to the “permanent disability to his left eye.” Hpon that petition, after notice, a hearing was had to ⁹⁵ determine these issues: “1. (By Claimant) : Petition to reopen to determine the nature and extent of disability. 1. (By Insurer) : Is the claim barred by section 54, in Acts of 1931, chapter 342. 2. Is the claim barred by the statutory limitations of three years. 3.

Did the claimant file his petition to reopen within a reasonable time, after knowledge of the condition complained of. 4. Have the rights of the employer and insurance carrier been prejudiced by the claimant’s failure to file his petition to reopen, within a reasonable time, after the knowledge of the condition complained of.” At that hearing Dr. Davis testified that he had examined Ireland at the time he was injured, and that “ ‘the internal of the eye and part of the front part of the eyeball was filled with fresh blood and the vision in the eye was reduced to perception of light,’ that he saw him on nine different occasions subsequently, the last time being September 4th, 1924. ‘At the end of that time the hemorrhages had cleared up and the vision had improved 20/200’s or one-tenth of normal vision. There was, however, a partial cataract formed in the eye at that time. Now I didn’t see him any more until a couple of days ago, when the condition of his eye was exactly the same as when I last saw him.

That is a period of eight years.’ Q. This cataract you speak of, is that a traumatic cataract? A. I don’t see what else you could call it.” Ireland also testified to the impairment of the vision of his left eye, and further testified when asked “Why didn’t you file your claim in September, 1924?” “I left the state and was out of it three years, and when I came back in 1927 I didn’t know I had any money due for this eye injury. When I left the state I thought it would get better and when I came back "in 1927 and I started to see professional men about it they advised me to come down and see about it, and I put it off and I finally didn’t come down.” Upon that record the; commission found for the claimant on the “first and second issues” and awarded him compensation for a permanent partial disability, at the rate of eighteen dollars a week for the period of ninety weeks to begin at the ⁹⁶ end of the total temporary disability determined by its order of August 27th, 1924. Subsequently that order was modified so as to require the payment of the compensation awarded to begin on August 9th, 1932.

From that order the employer and the insurer appealed to* the Baltimore City Court, which, after a hearing upon the motion of the insurer and employer, reversed the order of the commission and entered a judgment for costs in their favor. The appeal is from that judgment. The questions which it presents are whether, under chapter 342 of the Acts of 1931, the claim was barred (a) because it was* not filed within one year next following the order of August 27th, 1924, (b) because it was not filed within one year next following the passage of said act, to wit, April 17th, 1931, and (c) because it was not filed within one year from the time said act became effective, to wit, June 1st, 1931. Stated in another way, the inquiry is whether the Act of 1931 applies to claims which, while in existence when it was passed, had not then been filed, and if it does, whether the period of one year should be reckoned from the date of the “final award” or from the date of the passage of the act or from the date on which it became effective.

The two questions last stated, however, only become material if the letter of May 26th, 1932, is accepted as a sufficient request to reopen the'case, for the formal petition was filed more than one year' after the act became effective. Section 54 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, prior to* the passage of chapter 342 of the Acts of 1931, provided that: “The powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case shall be continuing and it may from time to time make such modifications or change with respect to* former findings or orders with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justified.” Code, art. 101, sec. 54. Under the law as it then stood there was no stated limitation upon the'time within which the commission might reopen a case for the purpose of modifying an award, but chapter 342 of the Acts of 1931 repealed and re-enacted section 54, amending it by adding these words “provided, however, that no modification or change of any ⁹⁷ final award of compensation shall be made by the Commission unless application therefor shall be made to the Commission within one year next following the final award of compensation. ” The effect of that act was to chang'e the existing law by imposing, upon the right of one affected by an award to. have it conform to changed conditions, the limitation that such right could only be asserted within one year next following “the final award of compensation.” The contention of the appellees is that that act (1) annihilated such rights in all cases in which there had been a final award more than one year before the passage of the act, or more than one year before it became effective, but, (2) even if it did not have that effect, it nevertheless, affected such rights to the extent that they could not validly bei asserted more than one year next following the effective date of the act. And in that connection they further contend that the letter of May 26th, 1932, was not a valid or sufficient “application” for a change or modification of the award of August 27th, 1924, and that that was a final award.

The appellant on the other hand contends that section 54, article 101 of Hie Code, as it stood prior to the Act of 1931, imposed no time limitation upon the right of the claimant to have his case reopened and additional compensation awarded, and that chapter 342 of the Acts of 1931 imposed no such limitation, because, he contends^ its operation is prospective and not retrospective, but that, if it is retrospective in its operation, nevertheless it does not affect his case, because no “final award” within the meaning of the act of 1931 was ever passed therein. He further contends that, if the act affects his claim at all, the limitation period should be computed from the day on which it became effective, and that if so computed his letter of May 26th, 1932, was a sufficient application, filed within one year next following the effective date of the statute. It may be stated, as a general principle of statutory construction, that in the absence of a clear manifestation of a ⁹⁸ contrary intent, or unless such a construction would he inconsistent with the purpose and nature of the legislation, that the operation of a statute which adversely effects substantial rights will be assumed to be prospective rather than retrospective. Williar v. Balto.

Butchers’ Loan Assn., 45 Md. 546 ; Chilton v. Brooks, 71 Md. 445 , 18 A. 868 ; Gable v. Scott, 56 Md. 176 ; Johnson v. Johnson, 52 Md. 668 ; Williams v. Johnson, 30 Md. 500 ; Grinder & Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299 ; Savings Bank v. Weeks, 110 Md. 90 , 72 A. 475 ; Hemsley v. Hollingsworth, 119 Md. 441 , 87 A. 506 ; Fidelity Sav. Bank v. Vandiver, 125 Md. 355 , 93 A. 978 ; Vandiver v. Fidelity Sav. Bank, 120 Md. 623 , 87 A. 1086 ; Ellicott City v. Howard County, 127 Md. 581 , 96 A. 798 ; Jeavons v. Pittman, 126 Md. 653 , 95 A. 1070 ; State v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 132 Md. 251 , 103 A. 435 ; Bartlett v. Ligon, 135 Md. 626 , 109 A. 473 .

It is also settled law in this state that, where a statute is repealed and -re-enacted with amendments, and the amended statute contains substantially the same provisions as the original, the continuity of the original as to those provisions is not affected. Watts v. Port Deposit, 46 Md. 500 ; Dashiell v. Baltimore, 45 Md. 615 . But where the effect of the statute is not to obliterate existing substantial rights, but affects only the procedure and remedies for the enforcement of those rights, “prima facie it applies to all actions — those which have accrued or are pending, and future actions.” Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 674. Since the state itself has not the power to destroy vested rights without compensation, except in some legitimate exercise of its police power, statutes are not to be construed as operating retrospectively where such a construction would have that effect, unless such a construction is unavoidable.

Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 641. But the same reason does not apply to statutes affecting procedure or remedies, which do not destroy or impair a substantial right, because ordinarily there is no vested right “in any particular mode of procedure for the enforcement or defense of” the right. Id. 674 . And ordinarily legislation affecting procedure only is construed as operating on all proceedings ⁹⁹ instituted after its passage, whether the right accrued before or after that event. 27 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 161; Duggan v. Ogden, 278 Mass. 432 , 180 N. E. 301 ; 82 A. L. R. 765; 25 R. C. L. “Statutes,” sec. 38; 59 C. J. “Star lutes ” sec. 700.

Rut while statutes of limitation are incidental to procedure, unless a contrary intent is clearly manifested, the general rule is that such statutes will not be construed as operating retroactively, so as to bar the enforcement of rights existing at the time they were passed, but prospectively, so that the period prescribed will as to such rights begin to run at the time when the statute takes effect. Thomas v. Higgs, 68 W. Va. 152 , 69 S. E. 654 ; Manning v. Carruthers, 83 Md. 8 , 34 A. 254 ; 37 C. J. “Limitations of Actions,” sec. 10; Garrison v. Hill, 81 Md. 551 , 32 A. 191 ; Baumeister v. Silver, 98 Md. 418 , 56 A. 825 ; Frey v.