Ireton v. Chambers

ARTHUR, J. One could say that this case is a case about nothing. More precisely, it is a case about whether a court can enter a judgment for nothing in damages against a defendant who has qualified immunity from “civil liability.” A jury found that the Mayor of Salisbury had committed a civil assault, but had not acted with the malice that is required to overcome his statutory immunity from “civil liability” for discretionary acts committed within the scope of his employment. The judge entered a judgment against the mayor for zero dollars. After a protracted post-judgment fight, which saw the judge revise and then re-revise the original judgment, the mayor appealed the zero-dollar judgment against him.

We hold that because of the mayor’s qualified immunity from ¹⁵¹ “civil liability” in the absence of malice, the court should not have entered judgment against him for zero dollars, but instead should have entered judgment in his favor. Factual and Procedural History Dr. Lore L. Chambers is the former assistant city administrator of Salisbury, Maryland, a municipal corporation located in Wicomico County. James P. Ireton, Jr., was the mayor of Salisbury at the time. After an incident, the details of which are not entirely clear, 1 Dr. Chambers was fired.

She sued Mayor Ireton for assault. Among other defenses, the mayor claimed that, under Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. VoL), § 5-507(a)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), he was “immune as an official or individual from any civil liability” for his actions because he acted “without malice.” 2 At the end of a two-day trial on December 9, 2014, the parties agreed on a verdict sheet. Question 1 of the verdict sheet read, “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mayor Ireton assaulted Plaintiff Chambers?” The jury checked, “Yes.” Question 2 read, “If you answered ‘yes’ to Question 1, do you find that Mayor Ireton acted with actual malice?” The jury checked, “No.” Question 3 instructed the jury to “go no further” if it answered no to Question 2.

The jury complied with the instruction and did not reach the next questions, which concerned damages. On December 19, 2014, the clerk docketed a judgment in favor of Dr. Chambers, and against Mayor Ireton, for $0.00, On December 29, 2014, Mayor Ireton moved to revise the judgment, arguing that the court should have entered judg ¹⁵² ment in his favor. In an order filed on January 15, 2015, the judge granted that motion and ordered that the clerk enter judgment in favor of Mayor Ireton. The clerk entered the revised judgment on the docket on January 21, 2015.

On February 20, 2015, Dr. Chambers filed what she called a motion to “vacate” the court’s previous order (and thus to reinstate the original zero-dollar judgment). The court granted that motion on April 1, 2015, and on the following day the clerk docketed an order reinstating the original judgment. On April 10, 2015, Mayor Ireton moved to alter or amend that revised order. On July 6, 2015, the court finally ended the back-and-forth motions, denying the mayor’s motion and leaving the zero-dollar judgment intact.

Mayor Ireton noted this timely appeal on July 17, 2015. Question Presented While the parties dispute both how to reach the question and to frame the standard of review, they both agree that the essential question is, “Did the Circuit Court for Wicomico County properly enter judgment against Mayor Ireton for zero dollars, when CJP § 5 — 507(a)(1) immunized him from ‘any civil liability’?” We answer that the court should have entered judgment in the mayor’s favor and should not have entered judgment against him in any amount — even the amount of zero dollars. Discussion I. Scope and Standard of Review The parties disagree as to the precise standard of review. Mayor Ireton contends that the case presents a legal question, subject to de novo review, as it involves the interpretation of a statute.

Dr. Chambers contends that we are reviewing the circuit court’s decision not to revise the judgment and, hence, may consider only whether the court abused its discretion. To determine the standard of review, then, we must determine what exactly we are reviewing. In this case, the court initially entered its judgment on December 19, 2014. Mayor Ireton filed a timely motion to ¹⁵³ alter or amend that judgment, which effectively deprived the judgment of finality until the court had decided his motion.

See Md. Rule 8-202(e). After the court granted the mayor’s motion to alter or amend, the clerk entered a revised judgment on January 21, 2015. Exactly 30 days thereafter, on February 20, Dr. Chambers filed what she called a motion to “vacate,” but which in substance was a motion to revise the revised judgment under Md. Rule 2-535(a). See Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 650-51 , 574 A.2d 898 (1990). 3 When a party files a revisory motion more than 10 days after the judgment, and the court revises its earlier ruling, the revised ruling becomes the final judgment.

See Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. at 651 , 574 A.2d 898 (citing Yarema v. Exxon Corp., 305 Md. 219, 240-41 , 503 A.2d 239 (1986)). Therefore, when the court granted Dr. Chambers’s revisory motion and re-revised the judgment on April 1, 2015, that ruling, upon its entry on the docket, became the new final judgment. When Mayor Ireton filed a second, timely motion to alter or amend, that motion effectively deprived the new judgment of finality until the court had decided it. See Md. Rule 8-202(c).

The judgment finally became final only when the court denied the second motion to alter or amend on July 6, 2015. Mayor Ireton took a timely appeal from that decision. When a court enters a judgment against a party, as the circuit court did when it granted Dr. Chambers’s revisory motion on April 1, 2015, the party does not forfeit the right to challenge that judgment on appeal merely by filing a timely motion to alter or amend. Hence, when the circuit court denied the mayor’s second, timely post-judgment motion, he ¹⁵⁴ became entitled to appeal the final judgment itself (Md. Rule 8-202(c)), as well as any interlocutory orders previously entered in the action.

Md. Rule 8-131(d). For these reasons, the issue before us is not limited to whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Mayor Ireton’s second motion to alter or amend the re-revised judgment for zero dollars in damages. Instead, we have the power to review the court’s decision to grant Dr. Chambers’s revisory motion and to enter a zero-dollar judgment against Mayor Ireton. Because that decision involves “an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, [we] must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392 , 788 A.2d 609 (2002) (citation omitted). 4 II.

Analysis Both sides agree that, absent malice, Mayor Ireton is “immune as an official or individual from any civil liability” for his tortious conduct (CJP § 5-507(a)(l)), but they disagree about what this qualified immunity entails. Does it mean that a court cannot enter a judgment against the mayor, even for zero dollars? Or does it mean that a court can enter a judgment against the mayor only if it is for no more than zero dollars? 5 Mayor Ireton insists that immunity from “civil liability” equals immunity from any civil judgment, even one for zero ¹⁵⁵ dollars. Dr. Chambers responds by characterizing section 5-507(b)(1) as a barrier to the award of damages.

Neither side discusses the language of the statute, the implications of their respective positions, or the similarities or differences in the language of other immunity statutes in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. We must decide whether the qualified immunity from “civil liability,” within the meaning of CJP § 5-507(a)(l), entails immunity from the entry of a civil judgment or just immunity from a judgment for damages. Obviously, this is a question of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we generally undertake on a de novo basis.

Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142 , 46 A.3d 443 (2012) (citing Gleneagles, Inc. v. Hanks, 385 Md. 492, 496 , 869 A.2d 852 (2005)). “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature.” See, e.g., Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274 , 987 A.2d 18 (2010) (citations omitted). The language of CJP § 5-507(a)(l) is not as clear cut as the parties seem to believe. Black’s Law Dictionary, from the same year the relevant language was inserted into Maryland’s laws, 6 defines “civil liability” in two ways. “Civil liability” is first defined as “[t]he amenability to civil action as distinguished from amenability to criminal prosecution.” Black’s Law Dictionary 223 (5th ed. 1979). However, the next sen ¹⁵⁶ tence defines “civil liability” as “[a] sum of money assessed either as general, special!,] or liquidated damages.” Id.

This first definition supports Mayor Ireton’s view of the law, while the second supports Dr. Chambers’s. 7 The meaning of “civil liability” is not the only ambiguous feature of this statute. It is also unclear from the statute whether a plaintiff must prove malice as an additional element of her case-in-chief or whether the absence of malice is an affirmative defense that an official must raise and prove. 8 In either event, however, a finding of no malice would be fatal to the plaintiffs case. If the plaintiff failed to prove malice as an element of her case, the court would be obligated to enter judgment against her. By the same token, if the defendant established the absence of malice in an affirmative defense that trumped the plaintiffs claims, the court would be obligated to enter judgment against her notwithstanding that she had proved all of the elements of her case.

In short, because Dr. Chambers was not entitled to a