Isaacs v. State

Gilbert, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. William Carroll Isaacs, a/k/a Billie Carroll Isaacs, appellant, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, presided over by Judge James S. Getty, of murder in the second degree, kidnapping, and larceny of a motor vehicle. Appellant was sentenced to sixty years imprisonment. * 1 On appeal to this Court, the appellant raises sixfold reasons why he believes the judgments of the circuit court should be reversed. He contends: I. The indictment should have been dismissed because it was called to trial in violation of the Interstate Detainer Act, codified as Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §§ 616A-R; II.

He was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; ⁶⁰⁷ III. Maryland lacked jurisdiction over the kidnapping and larceny charges because the events underlying those charges occurred in Pennsylvania; IV. Testimony relative to “ . . . unrelated offenses in Baltimore County” was erroneously admitted into evidence; V. The verdict of murder in the second degree was illegal.

VI

The evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. The record reveals that appellant, in the company of his brother, Carl Isaacs, his half-brother, Wayne Coleman, and another person named George Dungee, decided to go to Mexico. At that time, Coleman and Dungee were escapees from the Maryland correctional system. Prior to their supposed departure, they burglarized the home of a relative and other dwellings in Maryland and Pennsylvania.

In addition to the burglaries, they engaged in stealing automobiles for their personal use. Two young girls, juveniles, accompanied the males on the crime spree although it does not appear that they were active participants in the commission of the criminal deeds. The two girls were abandoned by the four men in Pennsylvania. In McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania, on May 9 or 10, 1973, the men stole a white pick-up truck because the car they were using had motor trouble.

The quartet had difficulty with the truck, and while they were endeavoring to fix it, Richard Wayne Miller, a McConnellsburg high school student, drove into view. Mr. Miller recognized the truck as belonging to someone he knew. Miller stopped his automobile and told the men to return the truck to the place from which it had been taken. The response was that Miller was held, at gun point, and forced into his own car, which the four culprits commandeered.

They took an unspecified sum of money from Miller’s wallet. The vehicle containing the five persons, including Miller, was driven into Maryland. Miller was led from the vehicle and taken into a wooded area where he was ⁶⁰⁸ slain. The four outlaws went to Florida.

From there they journeyed to Georgia where a number of persons were murdered, and at least one woman was raped and then killed. Leaving Georgia, the culprits fled to West Virginia where they were eventually arrested. They were returned to Georgia for trial where Carl Isaacs, Coleman and Dungee were sentenced to be executed. Appellant, as we have stated in note 1 supra, was sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment in Georgia.

When the appellant was apprehended in West Virginia, he, after being advised of his Miranda rights, made an inculpatory statement in which he readily acknowledged his participation in the murder of Robert Wayne Miller. A similar statement, following renewed Miranda rights admonitions, was made to the Georgia authorities. Appellant, in his subsequent statement to the Maryland officials, recanted his West Virginia and Georgia statements. Specifically, he denied any prior knowledge of the plan to murder Miller and stated that he did not even know that Miller had been slain until the capture of himself and his companions in West Virginia.

Appellant repeated the same version of the events when he was called upon to testify in his own defense at the trial in the instant case. We shall discuss each contention posed to us by the appellant in the order in which he posits them. I. Maryland Ann. Code art. 27, § 616D, provides that whenever a person, serving a term of imprisonment in a State that is a signatory to the Interstate Detainer Act, invokes the statutory rights conferred by the Act, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred and eighty (180) days “ . . . after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court...” a written notice of his imprisonment and the place wherein he is confined and makes a “ . . . request for a final disposition . . . of the [pending] indictment, information or complaint . . . . ” § 616D (a) provides further: “. . . The request of the prisoner shall be ⁶⁰⁹ accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the [S]tate parole agency relating to the prisoner.” An examination of the record now before us discloses that appellant, through the “University of Georgia, School of Law, Legal Aid and Defender Society, Prisoner Legal Counseling Project, Georgia Diagnostic Center, Department of Corrections, Jackson, Georgia,” under date of November 25, 1974, inquired whether there were “ . . . any indictments, charges, or detainers pending against ...” appellant in Allegany County.

The inquiry stated that appellant “ . . . believes he was indicted on October 3, 1973 for Murder, Kidnapping, Armed Robbery and Auto Theft.” The State’s Attorney for Allegany County responded, in writing, that there were indeed indictments pending against appellant and that copies of the indictments had been served on the appellant. A paper writing entitled “Demand by Accused for Trial,” dated December 9, 1974, and subscribed by appellant, was received by the Clerk of Court on December 16, 1974. The “Demand” reads as follows: “Defendant. . . makes this his demand for trial and asks that the Court allow this demand and that the same be placed upon the minutes, and that he be tried at this term or at the next term of this Court, or in default of such trial that he be fully acquitted and discharged of said offense.” The State’s Attorney replied to the appellant and the “Prisoner Legal Counseling Project” who had drafted the above quoted “Demand,” that “. . . Georgia and Maryland are both signatories of the Interstate Detainer Act and it would be my opinion that in order for the request [for trial] ⁶¹⁰ to be effective, that [the] statute must be complied with.” Compliance with the Act, art. 27, § 616D (a), was not accomplished until April 9, 1975.

On August 19, 1975, appellant filed a motion to dismiss based on his not being tried within one hundred and eighty (180) days. The State’s Attorney, Lawrence V. Kelly, testified at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Mr. Kelly informed the hearing judge of the facts that we have heretofore recited concerning the Interstate Detainer Act, and, further, that he had traveled to Georgia in March, 1974, in an effort to prevail upon Georgia authorities to relinquish temporary custody of appellant so that he could be tried in Maryland on the pending charge's. The Georgia Attorney General told Kelly that, as the Attorney General, he would advise the Governor of that State that it would be in the best interests of Georgia not to let the appellant out of the jurisdiction of the State.

It was not until May 1, 1975, that Georgia formally agreed to deliver temporary custody of the appellant to the State of Maryland for trial on the charges for which appellant had been indicted in October, 1973. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 616J, mandates that the Interstate Detainer Act “ . . . shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.” The purposes are, in turn, spelled out with clarity in § 616B: “The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with ⁶¹¹ reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures.

It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.” The Court of Appeals, in State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195 , 328 A. 2d 737 (1974), aff'g Barnes v. State, 20 Md. App. 262 , 315 A. 2d 117 (1974), speaking through the late Judge William J. O’Donnell, opined, 273 Md. at 208 , that both the Interstate Act and the Intrastate provisions “ . . . were common in derivation and purpose, were remedial in nature, designed to correct existing law, to redress existing grievances and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good; as such they are to be liberally construed in order to advance the remedy and obviate the mischief.” The phrase “liberally construed” does not, however, mean that courts are free to bend the legislation out of shape or to remold it to some other form. We think the provision of § 616D (a), that “[t]he request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner . . containing the information specified in the statute, is mandatory and not directory. We believe the Legislature so provided because the appropriate State’s Attorney would then be in a position to evaluate whether the nature of the charges pending against the accused was of such a severe degree as to merit further trial in this State in the light of the sentence then being served in the other state that was a party to the interstate agreement. If the State’s Attorney was of the opinion that the best interests of the .people of Maryland lay in pursuing the matter, he could request the production of the accused for trial.

On the other hand, if the sentence the prisoner was serving in the other state were such that bringing the accused to trial in Maryland would serve no useful purpose, he could allow the one hundred and eighty (180) day period to lapse, thus, terminating the matter. From the record in the case now before us, it is manifest that the State’s Attor ⁶¹² ney held the belief that the indictments against appellant, when weighed against the Georgia sentence, necessitated appellant’s trial in Maryland. It is apparent that appellant did not comply with the unambiguous terms of the Act. We reiterate what Judge Orth (now Chief Judge) wrote for this Court in King v. State, 5 Md. App. 652 , 249 A. 2d 468 (1969): “ . ..

Even on an assumption that the letter of 15 September 1967 was such request [for trial], and that it was filed on time, it was not accompanied by a statement from the warden containing the information required by the Act. The Act was not available to the appellant for that reason. And even if the evidence before the court be considered as showing that the appellant was precluded, from filing the request as required because the warden, although he had knowledge, did not inform the appellant of the source and contents of the untried complaints and of the appellant’s right to request final disposition thereof, [footnote omitted] no relief was available to the appellant under the Act. And even had the evidence proved that the appellant made request as required but that the warden failed to deliver it, accompanied by the statement, to the appropriate State’s attorney and the court, no relief was available to the appellant under the Act.

In short, for reasons we have herein before stated, since it was not established that the appellant and the prison officials did all that they were called upon to do by the provisions of the Act, the Act was not invoked, no matter where the fault lay. ”5 Md. App. at 665-66. (Emphasis supplied). While King was concerned with an intrastate detainer, the rationale is applicable to interstate detainers as well. The “Demand by Accused for Trial” did not comply with the Act.

The information required by § 616D (a) was not supplied, and no certificate of the official having custody of the appellant accompanied the “Demand.” Even after the State’s ⁶¹³ Attorney invited appellant’s attention to the deficiency in the “Demand,” there was no compliance with the Act until approximately four months later. The one hundred and eighty (180) day period in which an accused out-of-state prisoner must be tried did not begin to run until there was full compliance with the Act. Davidson v. State, 18 Md. App. 61, 67 , 305 A. 2d 474, 479 (1973). We think Wise v. State, 30 Md. App. 207 , 351 A. 2d 160 (1976), and Davis v. State, 24 Md. App. 567 , 332 A. 2d 733 (1975), relied upon by appellant, to be inapposite as both are concerned strictly with compliance with the notice provisions of the Intrastate Act, art. 27, § 616S.

Furthermore, a State’s Attorney of Baltimore City or a Maryland county is able to learn quickly the status of a Maryland incarcerated inmate, but ascertaining information about an out-of-state prisoner is not always easily accomplished, moreover, Maryland is unable to proceed where, as here, the matter is delayed by the unwillingness of the State having custody of the prisoner to relinquish, even temporarily, that custody. In our view, Judge Getty correctly denied appellant’s motion to dismiss.

II

Citing the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights, Maryland Constitution, appellant asserts that the indictment against him should have been dismissed on the ground that he was denied a speedy trial. In Davidson v. State, 18 Md. App. at 70 , Judge Carter stated: “This Court has repeatedly held that only the portion of the total delay period which is fairly attributable to this State is to be considered in determining the ‘length of delay’ factor [under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 , 92 S. Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)]. See State v. Dubose, 17 Md. App. 292, 295 , 301 A. 2d 32 [,34 (1973)]; State v. Lawless, 13 Md. App. 220, 230 , 283 A. 2d 160 [,]68-69 (1971)]; Smith v. State, 11 Md. App. 631 , ⁶¹⁴ 634, 276 A. 2d 228 [, 230 (1971)]; King v. State, 5 Md. App. 652, 667 , 249 A. 2d 468 [, 477 (1969)].” We have previously observed that the appellant was indicted in Allegany County on October 3, 1973. The starting point for the consideration of the delay factor of Barker began at that time.

See State v. Hunter, 16 Md. App. 306, 311 , 295 A. 2d 779, 782 (1972), where we held: “ . . . [I]n order to calculate a constitutionally proscribed delay in bringing a matter to trial, we must look back to the date of the commencement of a prosecution by way of arrest, warrant, information or indictment, whichever shall first occur, and then forward to the date of the trial or hearing.” See also Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640 , 349 A. 2d 300 (1975). The appellant, however, was dehors the jurisdiction of the State of Maryland. This State’s jurisdiction over him was not gained until he and the