Jackson Bro. & Co. v. Wilson

Fowler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The deficiencies of this record have been somewhat supplied by agreement of counsel. There are no objections made, however, to the regularity of the proceed ⁵⁷⁰ ings below, nor to the record of them before us; and it will, perhaps, be sufficient for a full understanding of the questions intended to be presented, and which were argued by counsel, to state briefly the facts which were conceded. Proceeding’s were taken in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, by the committee and trustees of a lunatic, the late Thomas E. Berry, together with the appellants, Jackson Brother & Company, and other creditors, to have his real estate sold for the purpose of paying his debts, and supplying means for his maintenance.

By virtue of a decree passed in these proceedings, the ¡property of the lunatic was sold; and the contention here is in regard to the distribution of the fund arising from such sale, and as to the disposition of certain rents collected by one of the parties to this suit. There are two appeals in this record — that of Jackson Brother & Company from the order ratifying account Q, and rejecting accounts N and P, so far as they reject or disallow certain claims for interest on'notes held by Jackson Brother & Company, and that of Mrs. Rosa P. Suit, in her own right, and as executrix and trustee, from the order ratifying certain accounts charging her, as assignee of T. Owen Berry, with certain rents collected by him. The appellants Jackson Brother & Company contend that they are entitled to ten per cent, interest on their claim from the date of the promissory notes on which it is based to the day of sale, the order appealed from having allowed interest at the rate of tender cent, perannum only to the date of the decree, and thereafter to the day of sale, at the rate of six per cent. By the two notes produced in the cause as evidence of the claim of Jackson Brother & Company it appears that they were to receive interest at the rate of tender cent, per annum until the payment of the principal. ⁵⁷¹ The notes were made in the District of Columbia, where it is admitted the law authorizes interest to the extent of ten per centum per. annum, if the parties make an agreement to that effect.

It is conceded by the appellees that the appellants are entitled to the higher rate of interest to the date of the decree, but after that time, it is contended, that having come into a Court of this State, and converted their original contract into a decree, the appellants are entitled after the date of such decree to only six per centum to the day of sale, because the original contract is by operation of law merged in the decree, and thereby became a debt of record, and was thereafter governed by the lex fori. Although it is often said, in general terms, that a simple contract is merged in a judgment or decree rendered upon it, and that all its powers to sustain rights and enforce liabilities terminated in the judgment or decree, (15 Am. Eng. Encyl., 336,) yet it is also recognized as one of the limitations of this doctrine of merger, that the original contract is not in all cases to be entirely ignored subsequent to the rendition of a judgment or decree.

Freeman on Judgments, (3 Ed.) sec. 244. In the Bank of the United States vs. Merchants Bank of Baltimore, 7 Gill, 431 , it is said that: “It is an acknowledged and familiar principle of the common law, that the original cause of action is considered as extinguished or merged by a judgment, when the judgment is held to be not merely prima facie, but conclusive evidence of the indebtment between the parties, and final, unless reversed, with respect to the subject-matter adjudicated.” Subsequently this Court in Owens, Evans & Co. vs. Sprigg, et al., 2 Md., 457 , fully recognize and approve the general doctrine of merger as limited by Mr. Freeman, ante; and while it is true that the application of the rule as stated in Owens, Evans & Co. vs. Sprigg, et al., ⁵⁷² was held to he error in Pinckney vs. Lanahan, 62 Md., 447 , yet the doctrine itself has not been controverted. It is fully approved of by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Blount vs. Windley, 5 Otto, 176 , and the general tenor of the authorities is to the effect, as held in Owens, Evans & Co. vs. Sprigg, et al., that while a judgment on a note merges the note so that another action cannot be maintained upon it so long as the judgment is unreversed, yet “it is still undoubtedly true that Courts may sometimes look beyond the judgment, to see for what cause it was recovered.” And in Blount vs. Windley, supra, the Supreme Court say: “The essential nature and character of the contract remains unclouded; and in deciding how far it. may be affected by legislation, we must look mainly to the original contract.” It is not necessary, however, to pursue this consideration further; for whatever may have been the effect of the decree in this case, if it had been a final and conclusive adjudication between the parties, we do not think it can be said to have that effect. In Welch vs. Stewart, 2 Bland, 38 ; Hammond vs. Hammond, 2 Bland, 359 ; Rhodes & Williams vs. Amsinck & Co., 38 Md., 345 , it was held that a decree on a creditors’ bill, expressed as the decree in this case is, in the general terms of such decrees, establishes the claims of all the originally suing creditors.

Rut in none of these cases is it held that such establishment of the claim is a final and conclusive ascertainment of the amounts due to the several creditors. In other words, decrees on creditors’ bills, and decrees like the one we are considering, providing for the sale of the debtor’s land to pay his debts, and directing the trustees to give notice to all the creditors of said debtor to file their claims, may be, and often are, said to be conclusive as to the establishment or existence of the debts of the petitioning