Maryland case law › Jackson v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc.

Jackson v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc.

185 Md. 335 (1945) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedMarkell, J.✓ Good law
HoldingThis workmen's compensation appeal was submitted to the Court of Appeals of Maryland on an agreed statement of facts.

Markell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This workmen’s compensation appeal was submitted to the Court, without a jury, on an agreed statement of facts. The claimant was injured on July 8, 1942. The State Industrial Accident Commission on August 5, 1942, awarded him, for “temporary total disability” under Section 48 (2) of Article 101, “compensation at the rate of $20 a week,” beginning as of July 12, 1942.

As a result of a number of hearings, the Commission on May 22, 1944 passed an order to the effect that the payments of compensation so awarded ceased as of January 11, 337 1944. By the same order the Commission awarded, for “permanent total disability” under Section 48 (1), compensation at the same weekly rate, “not to exceed $6,000,” the maximum total allowable, beginning as of January 12, 1944. It was agreed that the only “issue” submitted is a question of law. The question is, whether (in 1942) (i), the maximum total ($6,000) allowable for “permanent total disability” under Section 48 (1), [a] included or [5] was “in addition to and consecutive with,” (ii) any compensation previously paid for “temporary total disability” under Section 48 (2).

The lower Court held that the former is the correct construction of the statute. We understand that the unbroken practice of the Commission until 1944 was in accord with the decision below in this case. In Gorman v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 1940, 178 Md. 71 , 12 A. 2d 525 , the Commission awarded the claimant compensation (a) for “temporary total disability” under Section 48 (2), at $20 a week for 170 weeks, i.e., $3,400, (b) for “permanent partial disability” under Section 48 (3), for loss of a foot, $18 a week for “the period named in the schedule,” 150 weeks, i.e., $2,700, and (c) for “permanent partial disability” under Section 48 (3), “Other Cases,” $18 a week for 55% weeks but not to exceed $1,000. Thus the total compensation awarded was $7,100.

At the time of the accident (1936) the maximum total allowable for “permanent total disability” under Section 48 (1) was $5,000. Code Supp. 1935, Art. 101, Sec. 36 (1). The employer contended, and the lower Court held, that the total compensation allowable for temporary total disability and permanent partial disability could not exceed $5,000, “the limit of compensation which could be awarded for a permanent total disability,” viz., that after payment of $3,400 for temporary total disability, payments at $18 per week should continue until the total sum paid (including the $3,400) should equal $5,000, whereupon all payments should 338 cease. 178 Md. 73 -74, 12 A. 2d 525 . This Court reversed the lower Court and affirmed the Commission.

In the Gorman case the employer’s contention was based on the assumption that the maximum total ($5,000) allowable for permanent total disability included (and was not in addition to) any compensation for temporary total disability. In this Court’s opinion this premise was not questioned or approved, but was likewise assumed. The question presented i» the instant case, therefore, was not directly presented or decided. Nevertheless, in rejecting the employee’s contention this Court used reasoning and language broad enough to demolish the employer’s premise as well as his conclusion. “Whatever force inheres in the position that an award for a permanent total disability should not be exceeded by the aggregate awards allowable for the lesser result of a temporary total disability followed by a permanent partial disability, the Court may not allow an inference to prevail against the manifest intention of the Legislature.

A temporary total disability and a permanent total disability, a temporary partial disability and a permanent partial disability are four different compensable results; and the measure of the compensation to be appropriately awarded in these instances as they may occur is not for the Court to create nor to change. The Court must declare the legislative intention as expressed by the statute to the exclusion of the suggested interpolations.” (Italics supplied.) 178 Md. 74 -75, 12 A. 2d 527 . We think this reasoning is properly applicable, and should be applied to the question now presented. By thus adhering

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