Jackson v. Birgfeld

Delaplaine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This action of assumpsit was brought by Louis M. Jackson and Fannie L. Jackson, his wife, lessors, against H. William Birgfeld, Jr., and Douglas Birgfeld, lessees, to recover $1,200 for the rent for a cannery building and its equipment in Bethesda. The lease demises “premises No. 4717 Miller Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, consisting of a one-story building and including all equipment therein contained,” for the term of five years from May 1, 1946, to April 30, 1951, for the sum of $36,000, payable in monthly installments of $600 each. The lease gives lessees the right to renew the lease for an additional term of five years and also an option to purchase the property.

Lessees refused to pay the rent for the months of October and November, 1946, on the ground that prior to the time lessors had excavated t!he ground in the rear of the building to a depth of several feet. The Court ruled that the excavation constituted a partial eviction, and entered judgment for defendants. From that judgment plaintiffs appealed to this Court. The word “premises” has a varied meaning depending upon its context and the object to which it is applied.

In the instant case the lease does not describe the property as a one-story building and premises; it demises “premises * *' * consisting of a one-story building.” The fact that it does not call for anything more, except the equipment in the building, is in itself quite significant. In determining what constitutes the “premises” intended by the parties to a written instrument, the Court, after considering the language of the instrument itself, considers the nature of the building and surounding property arid the general purposes of the parties. Jacobs Concessions v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 181 Md. 113 , 28 A. 858 ; De Prizio v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 291 ⁵⁵⁵ Mass. 143, 196 N. E. 910 . The building in this ease was leased for the purpose of canning chili con carne.

Later, on account of meat shortage, lessees changed to chow mein. Lessees do not conduct a retail business. After the food is canned it is delivered by trucks to hotels and restaurants. In the operation of the business they purchase meat by the barrel, vinegar by the barrel, beans in 100-pound bags, sacks of flour, large crates of celery, boxes of onions, and canned goods.

Motor trucks use the driveway to haul the supplies to the side door, which is twice as wide as the front door. The right to use the driveway is appurtenant to the building. There can also be no doubt that lessees are entitled to access to the fuel oil tank near the rear of the building, which can be reached by a hose attached to an oil truck. It is a settled principle that a deed, in the absence of any language indicating a contrary intention of the grantor, passes to the grantee everything that is properly appurtenant to the land conveyed, i. e., everything essential or reasonably necessary to the full beneficial use and enjoyment of the property.

Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. 177 , 17 L. Ed. 822, 826 . This principle is equally applicable to a lease of real property. It is also an established rule that a description of premises in a lease of a building by the street number includes only so much of the lot on which the building stands as is necessary to the complete enjoyment of the building for the purpose for which it was leased. Houghton v. Moore, 141 Mass. 437 , 6 N. E. 517 ; M. M. Rowe Co. v. Wallerstein, 145 Va. 191 , 133 S. E. 669 ; Kuschinsky v. Flanigan, 170 Mich. 245 , 136 N. W. 362 , 41 L. R. A., N. S., 430, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1228; Ravet v. Garelick, 221 Mich. 70 , 190 N. W. 637 , 28 A. L. R. 1331.

Whether land in the rear of a building is necessary to its complete enjoyment is a question for the jury depending upon the facts of each particular case. Among the questions which may have an important bearing in determining whether vacant land in the rear of a building is a part of the premises are: (1) whether the land is situated in a ⁵⁵⁶ thickly settled community; (2) whether it is enclosed by a fence; (3) whether the business conducted on the premises is such as requires its use for storage, shipment, or other purposes; (4) whether its abuts on a street; and (5) whether there are adjoining landowners or tenants who have a special use for it. H. B. Earhart, Inc. v. Haw, 251 Mich. 11 , 231 N. W. 103 . Here the building, which stands 20 feet back of the building line of Miller Avenue, is 30 feet wide and 50 feet long.

It is located on lot 10 in the subdivision of lots known as J. H. Miller’s Addition to Bethesda. As this lot is 90 feet long, the rear wall of the building is 20 feet south of the north line of the lot. Along the west side of the building there is a concrete driveway 12 feet wide. This runs on the east side of lot 8.

Lessees argue that, although the lease does not mention the land in the rear of the building expressly, it was the intention of the parties that the lease should demise all of lot 10 and all that portion of