Jackson v. Dackman Co.

WRIGHT, J. Zi’Tashia Jackson, a minor, and Tameka Jackson (“appellants”) appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. We are asked to determine: I) whether Md.Code (2007 Repl.Vol.), § 6-801 et seq. of the Environment Article (“Envir.”), The Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act (“Statute”), is constitutional; II) whether appellees, The Dackman Company, Jacob Dackman & Sons, LLC, Elliott Dackman, and Charles Skirven, complied with the Statute and were, thus, entitled to qualified immunity; III) whether the Statute applies to persons at risk who have elevated blood lead (“EBL”) levels below 25 micrograms per deciliter (“fxg/dl”); and IV) whether the Statute bars actions, pursuant to Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), where prop ⁵⁵⁵ erty owners are in full compliance with the Statute’s edicts. In review of these four issues, we affirm the decision of the circuit court with respect to I, III and IV, and reverse with respect to II. 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY On July 11, 2002, Zi’Tashia Jackson (“Zi’Tashia”), through her mother and next friend, Tameka Jackson (“Ms.Jackson”), filed a complaint against the appellees. In the complaint, appellants alleged that Zi’Tashia was exposed to chipping, peeling, and/or flaking lead-based paint, while residing at 1233 Cliftview Avenue and at 706 Mt.

Holly Avenue. The rental units are located in Baltimore City and are owned, managed, and/or operated by the appellees. Appellants further claimed that Zi’Tashia sustained severe and permanent brain injuries, as well as cognitive and behavioral deficits, as a result of Zi’Tashia’s exposure to lead-based paint at both properties. Appellants alleged that appellees violated the CPA and were negligent in failing to properly maintain and safeguard the properties against the presence of chipping, flaking, and/or peeling paint.

Ms. Jackson also brought her own claim against the appellees. On March 13, 2003, appellants filed a First Amendment by Interlineation. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, and, on March 14, 2003, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Judge M. Brooke Murdock presiding, denied the motion to allow for further discovery. On March 25, 2003, the appellees filed an answer to the amendment.

On November 2, 2006, after extensive discovery, appellees filed a second motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in support thereof. Appellants opposed this motion by filing three memoranda of their own. ⁵⁵⁶ On November 30, 2006, the State of Maryland, Department of the Environment (“MDE”), filed a Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae. On December 5, 2006, appellants filed an opposition to appellees’ second motion for summary judgment, along with a memorandum of points and authorities, in support thereof. On the same date, appellees filed an opposition to appellants’ motion concerning the application and/or constitutionality of the Statute.

On December 13, 2006, appellees filed a reply to appellants’ opposition to appellees’ second motion for summary judgment. A hearing on all open motions was held on December 19, 2006. The trial court, Judge Robert B. Kershaw presiding, held the matter sub cuña and issued a memorandum opinion and order on February 1, 2007, granting appellees’ second motion for summary judgment, in part, and denying it, in part. The court determined that the Statute was constitutional and found that (1) the Statute did not violate appellants’ right to a jury trial; (2) the Statute did not impermissibly restrict appellants’ right to access the courts, nor did it restrict appellants’ right to remedy; (3) the Statute did not violate Maryland’s constitutional mandate on separation of powers; and (4) the Statute did not violate appellants’ right to equal protection under the law.

Furthermore, the court found that the Statute applies to persons with an EBL level under 25 |xg/dl and that the Statute barred actions brought pursuant to the CPA, where property owners were in full compliance with the Statute’s edicts. Lastly, the court ruled that there was a dispute of fact with regard to appellees’ compliance with the Statute, during certain periods of time, and, therefore, denied appellees’ motion for summary judgment in that matter. The case was called to trial on July 7, 2007, and the parties agreed to proceed by stipulated facts. 2 This stipula ⁵⁵⁷ tion was put on the record at a pre-trial motion hearing before the circuit court, Judge Gale E. Rasin presiding. As part of the pre-trial motion hearing, appellees’ second motion for summary judgment, which had been previously denied, was renewed.

After hearing arguments, the court ruled that appellees’ filings were timely and that appellees were fully compliant with the Statute, thereby affording them protection from suit. Accordingly, on June 18, 2007, final judgment was entered in appellees’ favor on all counts. On July 17, 2007, both parties filed a joint motion to alter or amend, to correct clerical errors that, technically, prevented the entry of a final judgment for purposes of this appeal. The court granted the joint motion on August 1, 2007, and appellants filed this timely appeal on August 13, 2007.

FACTS Zi’Tashia Jackson was born on January 12, 1997. At the time of her birth, her mother, Tameka Jackson, was living at 1904 E. Lanvale Street in Baltimore City. When Zi’Tashia was one year old, she and Ms. Jackson moved to 1233 Cliftview Avenue (“Cliftview”). The tenants of record at Cliftview, during appellants’ residency, were Takia and Tasha Jackson, Zi’Tashia’s maternal aunts.

Appellants lived at Cliftview for approximately one year before they moved to 706 Mt. Holly (“MtHolly”). The tenants of record at Mt. Holly, during appellants’ residency, were Ms. Jackson and Dia Lawrence (“Mr.Lawrence”), Zi’Tashia’s father.

Appellants and Mr. Lawrence lived at Mt. Holly for approximately six months. I. 1233 CLIFTVIEW AVENUE Pursuant to § 6-811 of the Statute, appellees initially registered Cliftview with MDE on March 24, 1995. On February 19, 1997, pursuant to § 6-815 of the Statute, the interior and exterior of Cliftview underwent a full risk-reduction and in ⁵⁵⁸ spection, whereby it was determined that the property met certification criteria and the standards mandated by the Statute.

Pursuant to § 6-818 of the Statute, the full risk-reduction and inspection was conducted by an independent licensed inspector, who was accredited by the State of Maryland. The inspector determined that the interior and exterior paint, the window sashes, jambs, wells, and sills were in satisfactory condition. Consequently, an inspection certificate was submitted to MDE. On March 27, 1997, Zi’Tashia’s aunts executed a lease for a month-to-month tenancy at Cliftview, to commence April 1, 1997.

The lease included a lead paint disclosure form, lead poisoning information packets (as required by § 6-823 of the Statute), and notices of tenant’s rights (as required by § 6-820 of the Statute). Before executing their lease, Zi’Ta shia’s aunts were required to inspect the property and identify, in writing, any defective conditions that were present, including any chipping, flaking, and/or peeling paint. Zi’Tashia’s aunts executed the leases, and they did not reference any chipping, flaking, or peeling paint. They did, however, list Zi’Tashia as one of the children residing or frequently visiting Cliftview.

While residing at Cliftview, appellants allege that Zi’Tashia was lead-poisoned. Zi’Tashia had a blood lead level of 21 |jLg/dl on October 22,1998, and 16 ¡xg/dl on November 18,1998. Appellees, however, never received a notice of defect/notice of EBL level regarding Zi’Tashia. Thus, appellees believed that, pursuant to § 6-819 of the Statute, corrective measures at the property — such as modified risk reductions — were not necessary.

II. 706 MT. HOLLY AVENUE Pursuant to § 6-811 of the Statute, appellees registered Mt. Holly with MDE on March 24, 1995. On January 8, 1999, pursuant to § 6-815 of the Statute, the interior and exterior of Mt.

Holly underwent a full risk-reduction and inspection, wherein it was determined that the property met certification criteria and complied with the standards mandated by the ⁵⁵⁹ Statute. Pursuant to § 6-818 of the Statute, the full risk-reduction and inspection was conducted by an independent licensed inspector, who was accredited by the State of Maryland. The inspector determined that the interior and exterior paint, the window sashes, jambs, wells, and sills were in satisfactory condition. As such, an inspection certificate was submitted to MDE.

On January 29, 1999, Ms. Jackson and Mr. Lawrence executed a lease for a month-to-month tenancy at Mt. Holly, to commence February 1, 1999. The lease included a lead paint disclosure form, lead poisoning information packets (as required by § 6-823 of the Statute), and notices of tenant’s rights (as required by § 6-820 of the Statute). Before executing their lease, Ms. Jackson and Mr. Lawrence were required to inspect the property and identify, in writing, any defective conditions that were present, including any chipping, flaking, and/or peeling paint.

Ms. Jackson and Mr. Lawrence executed the leases, and they did not reference any chipping, flaking, or peeling paint. They did, however, list Zi’Tashia as one of the children residing or frequently visiting Mt. Holly. Zi’Tashia and her family were evicted from Mt.

Holly on August 12, 1999. While residing at Mt. Holly, appellants allege that Zi’Tashia was lead-poisoned. Zi’Tashia had a blood lead level of 15 qg/dl on February 5, 1999, and 9 |ig/dl on January 21, 2000.

Appellees, however, never received a notice of defect/notice of EBL level regarding the appellant. Thus, appellees believed that, pursuant to § 6-819 of the Statute, corrective measures at the property — such as modified risk reductions — were not necessary. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment on all counts. This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo.

Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 373 Md. 149, 154 , 816 A.2d 930 (2003) (citations omitted). The proper scope of appellate review turns on whether the court below was “legally correct.” Lo ⁵⁶⁰ pata v. Miller, 122 Md.App. 76, 83 , 712 A.2d 24 (1998). If no material facts are disputed, we determine whether the circuit court correctly granted judgment as a matter of law. Todd, 373 Md. at 155 , 816 A.2d 930 .

DISCUSSION The Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act is codified primarily in Title 6, Subtitle 8 of,the Environment Article. Enacted by the 1994 General Assembly, it became effective on February 24, 1996. The Statute was intended “to reduce the incidence of childhood lead poisoning, while maintaining the stock of available affordable rental housing.” Envir. § 6-802. The Statute is based on recommendations made by the Lead Paint Poisoning Commission (“Commission”), which was established by the Legislature in 1992 to comprehensively examine childhood lead poisoning and recommend a legal framework.

Members of the Commission included property owners, health and child advocates, housing experts, and representatives of other interest groups. In December 1993, the Commission presented its draft report (“Commission Report”) to the General Assembly. 3 The Commission Report identified childhood lead poisoning as the number one preventable environmental disease affecting children in the United States and concluded: 1) One of the most important sources of exposure to lead paint is lead-contaminated dust in older housing with deteriorated lead paint; 2) the practice of ordering full abatement after identification of a lead-poisoned child residing in the property has not been an effective solution; 3) a preventive approach is needed; 4) owners of low and moderate income rental housing generally cannot afford to make the expenditures necessary ⁵⁶¹ to entirely remove lead hazards from all of their properties without substantially increasing rents; 5) tenants cannot absorb significant rent increases; 6) performance of lead hazard reduction treatments that fall short of full abatement would be considerably less costly; 7) the current tort system, in which landlords are subject to costly lawsuits and the threat of litigation, discourages landlords from renting to families with children, particularly those with elevated blood lead; 8) the general unavailability of liability insurance covering lead risks has decreased the marketability of older rental properties, thereby preventing property owners from obtaining financing to perform abatements; and 9) the most important component of successfully treating lead poisoning is to remove the child from the leaded environment. See Report of the Lead Paint Poisoning Commission, 3-7 (May 5, 1994). The Statute implemented the Commission’s recommendations.

It has four principal components. First, it establishes a mandatory lead hazard risk-reduction standard for all residential rental properties built before 1950 (“Affected Property”). Envir. §§ 6-815, 6-817, 6-819. Second, the Statute provides a compensation mechanism for children under the age of six and pregnant women (“Persons at Risk”) living in Affected Properties that are in compliance with the law but who, nonetheless, suffer from EBL levels.

Envir. § § 6-828-6-842. Third, the Statute provides an incentive for property owners to comply by affording them the opportunity to limit their liability to Persons at Risk. Envir. §§ 6-835, 6-836. Fourth, the Statute requires insurers to provide lead hazard liability coverage to compliant property owners.

Md.Code (2006 RepLVol.) §§ 19-701 et seq. of the Insurance Article. Owners of Affected Properties that are not certified as lead-free must comply with all applicable provisions of the Statute by: ⁵⁶² 1) registering the properties with MDE and renewing the registration annually; Envir. §§ 6-811, 6-812. 2) bringing the properties into compliance -with the full risk-reduction standard at the first change in occupancy after February 23, 1996, and at every change in occupancy thereafter; Envir. § 6-815(a). 3) bringing the properties into compliance with the modified risk-reduction standard within 30 days following receipt of a notice of defect, or receipt of notice that a Person at Risk with an EBL level of 15 [xg/dl or more prior to February 24, 2006, or 10 gg/dl or more on or after February 24, 2006, resides in the unit; Envir. § 6-819; and 4) providing the tenant, by verifiable method, a copy of the current verified inspection certificate, a lead poisoning informational packet, and a Notice of Tenant’s Rights package. This must be done at the inception of each tenancy and every two years thereafter. Envir. § § 6-820, 6-823.

By February 24, 2001, property owners were required to have at least fifty percent of their Affected Properties in compliance with the full risk-reduction standard, regardless of whether there was a change of occupancy. Envir. § 6-817. On and after February 24, 2006, property owners were required to have one hundred percent of their Affected Properties in compliance with a risk-reduction standard. Envir. §§ 6-817, 6-819(e).

The Statute bars Persons at Risk from filing civil suits for damages as a result of alleged ingestion of lead paint while residing in an Affected Property that is in compliance with the Statute at the time of the alleged ingestion. Envir. §§ 6-828, 6-836. If a Person at Risk is diagnosed with an EBL level of (1) 25 (xg/dl or more, on or after February 24, 1996; (2) an EBL level of 20 (xg/dl or more, on or after February 24, 2001; (3) or an EBL level of 15 (xg/dl or more, on or after February 24, 2006, a property owner must make the Person at Risk a qualified offer (within 30 days of receiving written notice of ⁵⁶³ the EBL), to maintain limited liability protection. Envir. §§ 6-828, 6-831.

This qualified offer must cover relocation expenses, up to $9,500.00, to allow the family of the Person at Risk to move to lead-safe housing. Envir. § 6-840. Relocation expenses include a rent subsidy of up to 150% of the tenant’s existing monthly rent, for the period until the Person at Risk reaches the age of 6 years, or, in the case of a pregnant woman, until the child born as a result of that pregnancy reaches the age of 6 years. Id.

Relocation expenses also include incidentals that may be incurred by the household, such as transportation and child care fees. Id. The property owner’s qualified offer must also pay for all medically necessary, uninsured medical expenses associated with treatment of the EBL, either up to $7,500.00, or until the child reaches the age of 18. Envir. §§ 6-839, 6-840.

Furthermore, the qualified offer must include the owner’s certification that he has complied with registration, risk-reduction, and tenant notification requirements. Envir. § 6-839(c). Acceptance of the qualified offer releases a property owner from all further liability to the Person at Risk, with regard to the EBL allegedly caused by ingestion of lead in the Affected Property. Envir. § 6-835.

Rejection of the qualified offer also releases an owner from liability, if the property owner complied with the Statute. Envir. § 6-836. On the other hand, a tenant may reject the qualified offer and file suit, if the property owner was not in compliance with the Statute during the time of the alleged ingestion. Envir. §§ 6-836, 6-838.

In an action for damages by a Person at Risk, the property owner’s failure to comply with risk-reduction or distribution of educational materials creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Envir. § 6-838. I. The Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing Act is Constitutional. Appellants contend that the Statute violates the constitutions of the United States of America and of the State of Maryland.

Specifically, appellants argue that the Statute (1) violates their right to a jury trial and access to courts under ⁵⁶⁴ the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and under Articles 5, 20, and 23 of the Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights (“Declaration”); (2) violates their right to access courts and remedies under Article 19 of the Declaration; (3) violates due process and equal protection of the law, under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 24 of the Declaration; and (4) violates Article 8 of the Declaration, which addresses Separation of Powers. We disagree and discuss those issues, in that order. A. The Right to a Jury Trial Appellants argue that the Statute violates their right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 The Seventh Amendment, however, “does not apply to the states.” Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 189 , 874 A.2d 919 (2005) (citing Md. Aggregates Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 337 Md. 658 , 681 n. 14, 655 A.2d 886 (1995)).

Thus, the Seventh Amendment cannot be the basis of a challenge to the constitutionality of the Statute’s provisions. Next, appellants argue that the Statute violates their right to a jury trial under Articles 5, 20, and 23 of the Declaration. Article 5 of the Declaration provides: That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes ... and also of all Acts of Assembly ... except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State ... ⁵⁶⁵ (Emphasis added). Therefore, Maryland is “subject to the common law, except where it has been changed or modified by legislative action.” Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md.App. 718, 727 , 415 A.2d 625 (1980).

In other words, the right to a jury trial exists only to the extent that it has not been abrogated by the Legislature. In this case, the General Assembly removed the right to trial by jury by enacting the Statute. Appellants attempt to strengthen their argument by citing Article 20 of the Declaration, which states: “That the trial of facts, where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estate of the People.” Article 20 has primarily been treated as a venue provision. See, e.g., Greco v. State, 307 Md. 470, 474 , 515 A.2d 220 (1986); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 707 , 490 A.2d 1228 (1985), vacated on other grounds by 475 U.S. 1078 , 106 S.Ct. 1452 , 89 L.Ed.2d 711 (1986), on remand, 307 Md. 233 , 513 A.2d 299 (1986), and cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1086 , 106 S.Ct. 1469 , 89 L.Ed.2d 725 (1986).

Thus, the circuit court did not violate the appellants’ rights with regard to Article 20, because the trial was, in fact, held in Baltimore City — where Zi’Tashia’s alleged injury arose. Furthermore, the parties agreed to proceed by stipulated facts, rendering a “trial of facts” unnecessary. Appellants’ argument, rooted in Article 23, 5 also fails, for this reason. While Article 23 guarantees the right to a trial by jury in civil proceedings, the right applies, specifically, to all issues of fact.

In this case, no material facts were disputed at trial, so there was no issue for the jury. Instead, the question of limited liability under the Statute became an issue of law. Furthermore, there was no violation of Article 23 because the Legislature, by enacting the Statute, abrogated the common law cause of action. In Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 372 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992), the Court of Appeals stated: ⁵⁶⁶ Where, however, the General Assembly has provided that a matter shall not be resolved in a judicial proceeding, by legislatively abrogating or modifying a cause of action, no question concerning the right to a jury trial arises.

As such, in this case “there is no cause of action [and] ... nothing to which the right of trial by jury can attach.” Jacobs v. Adams, 66 Md.App. 779, 798 , 505 A.2d 930 (1986). B. The Right of Access to Courts and Remedy Appellants argue that Section 6-828(b) 6 of the Statute violates Article 19 of the Declaration, which states: That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law of the land. “The ‘law of the land’ in Article 19 is the same due process of law required by the fourteenth amendment.” Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 298 , 385 A.2d 57 (1978) (citing In re Easton, 214 Md. 176, 187 , 133 A.2d 441 (1957)). “A statutory restriction upon access to the courts violates Article 19 only if the restriction is unreasonable.” Murphy, 325 Md. at 365 , 601 ⁵⁶⁷ A.2d 102 (citations omitted). In this case, we hold that the restriction imposed by the Statute is reasonable. In enacting the Statute, the Legislature’s goal was to reduce childhood lead poisoning, while maintaining the stock of affordable rental housing.

Based upon the Commission Report, the Legislature reasonably concluded that capping liability and limiting exposure to costly litigation (for landlords who comply with the statute) would provide an incentive to bring older rental properties into compliance with the law, thereby reducing lead hazards, without restricting housing stock. It was also reasonable for the Legislature to conclude that the provisions of the Statute and the terms of a qualified offer, if applicable, would result in Persons at Risk having safe housing, prompt relocation, and medical care if, in spite of the landlord’s compliance, lead exposure occurs. Furthermore, the Legislature’s decision to set decreasing levels of EBL through time was a reasonable restriction of access to courts because it was based on data presented by the Commission. Next, appellants assert that the Statute restricts their access to remedy.

The Court of Appeals has upheld statutes that abrogate or limit causes of action when they bear a reasonable relationship to legitimate legislative goals. For example, in Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 691, 705 , 501 A.2d 27 (1985), the Court upheld an amendment to a statute of limitations governing medical malpractice actions in which a cause of action had accrued prior to the amendment, finding that it did not violate Article 19. The Court held that, if rights have vested in a case, the Legislature cannot enact “a statute of limitations applicable to an existing cause of action in such a way as to preclude any opportunity to bring suit.” Id. at 702 , 501 A.2d 27 (citing Allen v. Dovell, 193 Md. 359, 363-64 , 66 A.2d 795 (1949)). The Court further noted that because “common law is subject to legislative change, there is no vested right in any common law rule.” Hill, 304 Md. at 703 , 501 A.2d 27 (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1876)). ⁵⁶⁸ Likewise, “[sjeveral restrictions upon traditional remedies or access to the courts have been upheld under Article 19 as reasonable.” Piselli v. 75th St. Med., 371 Md. 188, 206 , 808 A.2d 508 (2002).

For example, the Court of Appeals indicated that “the Legislature may reasonably limit the amount of damages recoverable in tort cases for non-economic damages without violating Article 19.” Id. at 207 , 808 A.2d 508 (citing Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. at 366 , 601 A.2d 102 ). The Court of Appeals has also held that “the Legislature may ordinarily substitute a statutory remedy, including a statutory administrative and judicial review remedy, for a common law remedy without violating Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights.” Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 446-47 , 788 A.2d 636 (2002). “Where a person clearly has a right to money or property under a statute or common law principle, and no statute specifically provides for a remedy, Article 19 guarantees a common law remedy to enforce the right.” Piselli, 371 Md. at 206 , 808 A.2d 508 (citing Robinson, 367 Md. at 444 , 788 A.2d 636 ) (emphasis added). In this case, appellants argue that, under the Statute, remedy is provided only to the injured child’s parents and “there is no remedy actually given to the injured child.” We disagree and hold that the Statute specifically provides several remedies to the injured child. First, the Statute allows the plaintiff to pursue existing remedies if the Property Owner does not comply with the Statute.

Second, the Statute gives Persons at Risk the benefit of living in compliant housing by having Property Owners perform inspections regularly. Third, the Statute gives Persons at Risk the benefit of getting immediate lead-reduction treatments, so long as they notify the Property Owner, in writing, of defective conditions. Fourth, Persons at Risk are entitled to qualified offers that include relocation and medical expenses. Because the restrictions on access and remedy imposed by Section 6-828(b) of the Statute are reasonable, we hold that the Statute does not violate Article 19 of the Declaration. ⁵⁶⁹ C. Dm Process and Equal Protection Appellants argue that the Statute violates their right to equal protection, as guaranteed by the Declaration, Article 24. 7 In so arguing, appellants contend that the Statute creates two statutory classifications: 1) a division between children injured, specifically, by lead paint and all other injured children; and 2) a division between children who suffer from an EBL level above 25 p.g/dl and children who suffer from an EBL level below 25 jxg/dL In Murphy, 325 Md. at 353-54 , 601 A.2d 102 , the Court of Appeals stated: Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection clause, it is settled that the Due Process Clause of the Maryland Constitution, contained in Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, embodies the concept of equal protection of the laws to the same extent as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [W]e have consistently taken the position that the Maryland equal protection principle applies in like manner and to the same extent as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Thus, United States Supreme Court opinions concerning the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are practically direct authorities with regard to Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights. (Citations omitted). In reviewing classifications challenged under equal protection guarantees, we consider the three standards that have evolved in Maryland: (1) strict scrutiny, (2) intermediate scrutiny, 8 and (3) rational basis. Id. at 355-58 , 601 A.2d 102 . ⁵⁷⁰ First, “[e]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.” Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 601 , 380 A.2d 1052 (1977). “Laws which are subject to this demanding review violate the equal protection clause unless the State can demonstrate that such laws are necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 706 , 426 A.2d 929 (1981) (citations omitted).

Second, “classifications which have been subjected to a higher degree of scrutiny than the traditional and deferential rational basis test, but which have not been deemed to involve suspect classes or fundamental rights and thus have not been subjected to the strict scrutiny test,” are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny. Murphy, 325 Md. at 357 , 601 A.2d 102 . In order to be sustained, this type of classification “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). “There is no brightline diagnostic, annunciated by either [the Court of Appeals] or the U.S. Supreme Court, by which a suspect or quasi-suspect class may be recognized readily.” Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 277 , 932 A.2d 571 (2007). The Court of Appeals, however, has adopted “criteria used by the Supreme Court in assessing claims of a new suspect or quasi-suspect classification.” Conaway, 401 Md. at 279 , 932 A.2d 571 .

They are as follows: (1) whether the group of people disadvantaged by a statute display a readily-recognizable, obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define the group as a discrete and insular minority; (2) whether the impacted group is saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process; and ⁵⁷¹ (3) whether the class of people singled out is subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities to contribute meaningfully to society. Id. at 278 , 932 A.2d 571 (citations omitted). Third, “[i]n most instances when a governmental classification is attacked on equal protection grounds, the classification is reviewed under the ... ‘rational basis’ test.” Murphy, 325 Md. at 355 , 601 A.2d 102 . “Generally under that test, a court will not overturn the classification unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that the court can only conclude that the governmental actions were irrational.” Id. (citations omitted). “The Supreme Court, in applying this test, has been willing to uphold the constitutionality of an enactment when ‘any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ ” Waldron, 289 Md. at 707 , 426 A.2d 929 (quoting McGowan v. State of Md., 366 U.S. 420, 426 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)).