Jackson v. Hines

Offutt, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The Baltmore, Chesapeake & Atlantic Railway Company is a common carrier operating certain railway lines between Claiborne and various points on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, and in connection with them it operates a ferry between Baltimore and Claiborne, where it maintains, for use in connection with both its land and water service, a terminal consisting of a pier, waiting room, office, platform, tracks and other facilities for the shipment and discharge of both passengers and freight to and from its boats and trains. The pier extends westerly into the waters of Eastern Bay, an arm of the Chesapeake, and the water on either side of it ⁶²³ is deep enough to allow the appellee’s ferry boats to dock there. Two sets of railroad tracks are laid along the pier from its eastern end to a point on it near where the boats usually dock.

On either side of these tracks are two platforms elevated about two feet and seven inches above the surface of the ground, each about twenty-four feet wide, for the use of passengers boarding or leaving the train?. The western ends of these two platforms are connected by a narrower .platform of the same elevation and about four feet and eight inches wide. At the end of each set of tracks is a bumper constructed of heavy timber, one of which is about four and one-half inches from this narrow platform. The part of the pier occupied by the tracks and platforms is inclosed on its south, west, and north sides, and is covered by a roof.

The part of the pier lying west of this train shed is open and uninclosed. In the partition wall separating the train shed from the open pier are two doors called the south door and the north door, leading respectively from the southern and northern sides of the train shed to the open pier. Around this train shed, at'intervals of twenty-five feet, coal-oil lamps are placed at an elevation of about seven feet to furnish light when required. There are no lights on the open pier except a range light for the guidance of mariners, because other lights on this part of the pier would be confusing to pilots and dangerous to navigation.

So that when vessels come in at night the two doors leading from the lighted train shed to the open pier are also closed, in order to cut off the light shining through them. The ferry boats land indifferently on either side of the pier according to the conditions of wind and tide and weather. The appellee’s trains, which are run in over the two tracks to meet the boats, come in sometimes on the north tracks and sometimes on the south tracks, as the exigencies of the appellee’s business require. When the trains come in on the north track, and the boat is on the' south side of the pier, the passengers reach the south side either across the narrow platform, or by going through the north door, and across the ⁶²⁴ open pier and through, the south door.

The latter way was the one which the appellee contends was actually designed for the use of its passengers, while the narrow platform was only intended for the use of its employees. There was, however, at the time of the accident, nothing in the way of a gate, obstruction, warning’, or direction of any kind giving notice that this narrow platform which afforded a direct open and apparent connection between the two main platforms was not for the use of any person having occasion to go from the north side of the train shed to the south side thereof and in fact, although at times guards were placed on the pier to direct passengers over the proper route, the narrow platform waá extensively used not only by the appellee’s employees, but also by its passengers. On the evening of November 9th, 1918, Harry H. Jackson, a farmer, contractor, and engineer, of Easton, came to the pier to meet his brother, whom he expected on an incoming boat. He arrived there shortly before the boat docked and walked with the crowd through the south door of the train shed on to the open pier.

He watched the boat come in and after it had passed him he turned to re-enter the train shed, but found that the south door had been closed, but that the north door was open. He crossed the pier to the north door, entered the train shed through it, and started to cross over the narrow platform to the south side of the shed where the passengers from the boat would be discharged. In crossing this platform he walkéd so near the edge that he caught his foot in the four and one-half inch space between the bumper of the north set of tracks and the platform, so that he fell over the bumper which projected above the platform at that point to the tracks. As a result of this fall he sustained severe injuries, which interfered with his capacity for doing the work and labor for which he was fitted, and to which he had been accustomed.

Just how or why the plaintiff stepped into the crevice or space between the bumper and the platform does not clearly ;.'.c i • ⁶²⁵ appear in the record. The platform, while narrower than the main platform, was still quite wide enough for him to have proceeded safely over it by the use of ordinary care, as others constantly did, if there was light enough for him to have seen his way. His own explanation is that he walked right into the crevice because he was confused by the lighting and did not see where he wras going. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the court directed a verdict for the defendant, and this ruling is the subject of the only exception presented by the record.

The ruling rests upon one or both of two propositions, one that there was no evidence in the case legally sufficient to show that the defendant was guilty of negligence, and the other that the plaintiff’s own negligence directly contributed to the happening of the accident which resulted in the injuries complained of, and these two propositions we will take up1 in the order in which they have been named. Before referring, however, to the facts involved in their consideration, we will examine and briefly state certain principles of law applicable to them. It is generally recognized that a common carrier of passengers, because of the nature and character of its business, must provide such stational facilities and conveniences as are reasonably necessary for the accommodation of its passengers, actual and prospective, and that it owes, to all persons coming to such station through its express or implied invitation, the duty of making and keeping the station, the approaches thereto, and the surroundings thereof where persons lawfully in the station would be likely to go, in a safe condition. 2 Hutchinson, Carriers, par. 928; Burke v. Md., D. & V. R. Co., 134 Md. 156 . Such an invitation may of course be expressed, or it may be implied from the customs and usages of the carrier, its employees and patrons.

For instance, the custom of friends and relatives to accompany to the station persons leaving by train, for the purpose of assisting or of comforting them, or merely as a mark of friendly interest and affection, as well as the custom of ⁶²⁶ friends and relatives going to the station for like reasons to meet persons coming in is so uniform, universal and longstanding, and is so much a part and parcel of the business of carrying passengers, and has been so uniformly acquiesced in for so long by the carrier, that it would be absurd to regard a person coming to a railroad station to meet an incoming friend or relation either as a trespasser or a bare licensee, to whom the carrier owes no duty but that of refraining from wanton or wilful negligence. On the contrary such persons are to be regarded as invitees or licensees, to whom the carrier owes the duty of reasonable and ordinary care, and if they suffer injury as a result of any neglect or default of the carrier in the performance of that duty, it will be responsible therefor. The duty of keeping its stations, their approaches, and surroundings, safe for the use of persons in the exercise of ordinary care, includes the obligation of seeing that such places are properly lighted. A large number of cases illustrating the applications of the principles thus stated to varying conditions of fact are collected in notes to Galveston, H. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matzdorf, 20 L. R. A. N. S. 833, and to Johnson v. Charlotte, etc., R. Co., 20 L. R. A. 520, and Hutchinson, Carriers, par. 991.

The care which the carrier is required to exercise under such circumstances differs in degree from that which it is bound to exercise in the actual transportation of its passengers, and the obligation for its exercise arises from a different source. Eor while in the transportation of its passengers, the contract of transportation imposes upon the carrier the duty of exercising “the utmost care and diligence which human foresight can use” to protect the passenger (B. & O. R. Co. v. Breinig, 25 Md. 378 ; P. B. & W. R. Co. v. Allen, 102 Md. 110 ), in the case of an invitee its duty is to use only ordinary and reasonable care for his protection, and that duty arises by implication as a matter of law. 4 R. C. L., 1053. ■ Applying these principles to the facts before us, it appears that the appellant was in the appellee’s station, at the time ⁶²⁷ of the accident of which he complains, as an invitee, and that as such the appellee owed him the duty of exercising reasonable and ordinary care to see that the station, its approaches, and surroundings likely to be used by its passengers and persons with them, were in a safe condition. The question then is, in what respect did the appellee fail in the performance of this duty ? So far as the record discloses, three particulars are specified: first, that the platform was too narrow; seo ond, that it was not properly lighted, and third, that it was not protected by a hand rail.

If the accident had occurred as