Jaffray v. King

Miller, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit, begun by attachment on warrant, was brought by the appellee against the appellants, merchants of New York city, to recover damages for the wrongful dismissal of the plaintiff by the defendants from their service and employment. The contract between the parties was in writing, and is contained in the following letter, addressed by the defendants to the plaintiff, dated the 19th of February, 1869 : “Dear Sir: We hereby engage your services as salesman from this date, ’till the 30th of June next inclusive, at the rate of $350 per month. Your particular field will be the city of Baltimore, and you are at liberty to solicit all such dealers there as we do not already sell to.

All new trade from that city, introduced by you, will go to your credit, and all orders obtained by you, whether from old or new customers, will likewise be credited to you.” The plaintiff was dismissed from this employment, by letter from the defendant, dated the 8th of May, on the alleged ²²¹ ground that they had ascertained he had been attending to the business of another house. The only important testimony in the case was that given by the plaintiff himself. All the prayers offered on both sides were rejected, and an instruction granted by the Court whereby two questions are presented, the settlement of which will dispose of the whole case. 1st. What is the true construction of this written contract between the parties ? 2d.

Can the defendants reduce the damages in this case, by the sum of $200 earned by the plaintiff after his discharge, and before the 30th of June? 1st. There was no proof of usage, nor was there any other evidence aliunde to explain any of the terms of this contract, even if it were, in any respect, ambiguous, and the Court instructed the jury that, by its true construction, the plaintiff did not agree to give his whole time to the business of the defendants, but engaged to serve them efficiently and in good faith as salesman in the city of Baltimore, in the sale of their goods, and if the jury found from the evidence that he undertook the sale of, and sold goods of other persons, in violation of his duty to, and injuriously to the interests of the defendants, they had the right to terminate their agreement with him, and that the undertaking to sell, and the sale on commission for other persons, of goods of like character with those of the defendants, to the same class of buyers with the buyers of their goods, would be an employment inconsistent with his duty and injurious to the interests of the defendants, but if they found he did not perform such services for others, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover. This, we are satisfied, is the true construction of the contract. It is not an agreement of hiring, by which, as for a menial employment, the master or employer is entitled to the entire time and services of the servant or employee in any service he may choose to dictate, for stipulated wages, but a contract by which the plaintiff became the defendants’ agent ²²² for special purposes, and with limited powers, that is, to sell by sample and promote the sale.of their goods, and increase their business connections in a particular and distant market.

In the discharge of that duty, he was bound to serve them in good faith, and to the extent of his ability, but if doing this did not require his whole time, he could, without violating his engagement with them, occupy the remainder in any other pursuit he might deem advantageous to himself, provided