James v. General Motors Corp.

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. Wayne D. James, appellant, filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission a claim for benefits against General Motors Corporation, appellee. His claim, that he was temporarily totally disabled as a result of an occupational disease (bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome) arising out of and in the course of his employment with General Motors, was confirmed by the Commission, and appellee appealed. The appeal was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

Appellant’s motion for judgment made at the end of his case and, again, at the end of the entire case having been denied, one issue, whether appellant was “last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease [bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome before September, 1985] while employed by the General Motors Corporation, Wilmington, Delaware,” was submitted to the jury. The jury answered yes and, accordingly, the court entered judgment on the verdict in favor of appellee. Appellant has appealed, presenting two questions: 1. Did the trial judge err in denying the claimant’s motion for judgment and refusing to affirm the decision of the Maryland’s Workmen’s Compensation Commission, ⁴⁸² in view of the fact that the claimant’s last injurious exposure to the hazards of his occupational disease occurred at the employer’s plant in Baltimore? 2.

Did the trial judge err in denying the claimant’s motion for judgment for failure of the employer to produce legally sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of proving that the decision of the Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Commission was incorrect? Since our answer to the first question is- in the affirmative, we will reverse; therefore, it is unnecessary that we reach question 2. The parties have submitted an agreed Statement of Facts to facilitate our review. That statement is: 1.

The claimant, Wayne D. James, was an employee of General Motors Corporation for 13 years. 2. The claimant was employed as an assembly line worker at the employer’s Baltimore plant until June 1981 when he was laid off. 3. The claimant was rehired at the employer’s Baltimore plant on September 9, 1985. 4. During the interim period between June, 1981 and August 1985, the claimant worked at the employer’s plant in Wilmington, Delaware for approximately three years.

During this employment, the claimant worked with a grinder, repetitively pressing with his hands. 5. The claimant continued working at the employer’s Baltimore plant until April 23, 1986. During this period of employment from September 1985 to April 1986, the claimant used air tools and air guns which turned and jerked his hands and wrists repetitively. 6. The medical experts who testified (Dr. Andrew J. Weiland, the treating orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Carmen Fratto, the employer’s plant physician) agreed that the claimant has an occupational disease of his hands and wrists known as bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.

He began having symptoms of this condition in 1979. ⁴⁸³ 7. On August 2, 1985, the claimant’s expert Dr. Weiland found the claimant had symptoms of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. 8. On September 9, 1985, before commencing his return to actual employment in Baltimore, the claimant underwent diagnostic tests which confirmed Dr. Weiland’s diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. During the next several months, he underwent further examinations and tests which further confirmed this diagnosis.

He began losing time from work when he was hospitalized for surgery on his left wrist on April 23, 1986. He is presently awaiting surgery on his right wrist. 9. Dr. Andrew J. Weiland, the claimant’s expert witness, testified that in his opinion the claimant’s condition is the result of his use of air tools and air guns at the employer’s plant. 10. Dr. Carmen Fratto, the employer’s expert witness, testified that the claimant’s condition could have been caused by his use of air tools and air guns, but it could have also resulted from his use of a grinder at the employer’s plant in Delaware. 11.

Dr. Fratto further testified that it is not medically possible to determine whether a person with a history of football playing, lawnmowing, tennis playing, splitting firewood, snow sking, weightlifting, solder grinding, and the use of air power hand tools, who subsequent to all of these activities develops carpal tunnel syndrome, developed the carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of any particular one or more of these activities to the exclusion of some or all of the others. Evidence from company records introduced during the Employer’s/Self-Insurer’s case demonstrated that the claimant had engaged in all of these activities prior to employment at the Baltimore plant on September 9, 1985. Maryland Rule 2-519 provides, in pertinent part: (a) Generally.—A party may move for judgment on any or all of the issues in any action at the close of all the evidence offered by an opposing party, and in a jury trial ⁴⁸⁴ at the close of the evidence. The moving party shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted.

No objection to the motion for judgment shall be necessary. A party does not waive the right to make a motion by introducing evidence during the presentation of an opposing party’s case. (b) Disposition.—When a defendant moves for judgment at the close of the evidence offered by the plaintiff in an action tried by the court, the court may proceed, as a trier of fact, to determine the facts and to render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the evidence. When a motion for judgment is made under any other circumstances, the court shall consider all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.

This Rule makes clear that when ruling on a motion for a judgment the trial judge must consider the evidence, including the inferences reasonably and logically drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. See Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md.App. 342, 353 , 517 A.2d 1122 (1986). If there is any evidence, no matter how slight, legally sufficient to generate a jury question, the motion must be denied. Virgil v. “Kash N’ Karry” Service Corp., 61 Md.App. 23, 28-29 , 484 A.2d 652 (1984), cert.denied, 302 Md. 681 , 490 A.2d 719 (1985); McSlarrow v. Walker, 56 Md.App. 151, 158 , 467 A.2d 196 (1983), cert. denied, 299 Md. 137 , 472 A.2d 1000 (1984); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. McFarland, 21 Md.App. 501, 513 , 319 A.2d 824 (1974).

On the other hand, where the evidence is not such as to generate a jury question, i.e., permits but one conclusion, the question is one of law and the motion must be granted. Schaeffer v. United Bank & Trust Co., 32 Md.App. 339, 343 , 360 A.2d 461 (1976), aff'd sub nom, United Bank & Trust Co. v. Schaeffer, 280 Md. 10 , 370 A.2d 1138 (1977). An appellate court reviewing the propriety of the grant or denial of a motion for judgment by a trial judge must conduct the same ⁴⁸⁵ analysis. Pahanish, 69 Md.App. at 354 , 517 A.2d 1112 .

Before doing so in the instant case, however, we will review the legal framework in which the analysis is to be conducted. Provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act pertaining to occupational disease give context to the facts which we are called upon to analyze and may be helpful in our determination of the correctness of the trial judge’s ruling on the motion for judgment. Maryland Code Ann. art. 101 § 23(b) embodies the test for determining the employer who is liable for paying compensation to an employee who suffers from an occupational disease. It provides: What employer and insurer liable; amount of compen sation.—When compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of