Jeandell v. State

MEREDITH, J. James William Jeandell was convicted of rape in 1977. Upon his release from imprisonment, after serving twenty-six years of a forty year sentence, Jeandell was required to register with the State of Maryland’s Sex Offender Registry pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 2001 Repl.Vol., 2004 Cum.Supp.), Criminal Procedure Art. (“C.P.”), § 11-704. The registration statute further provided, in C.P. § ll-705(d), that Jeandell was required to send written notice to the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the “Department”) within seven days of any change in his residence. In May of 2003, Jeandell became homeless.

Jeandell failed to notify the Department in writing that he was no longer living at his registered address, and failed to otherwise inform the Department of his whereabouts. Consequently, Jeandell was charged and found guilty of violating C.P. § 11-721. A ²⁹ time-served sentence was imposed by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Jeandell appeals his conviction, arguing that, as a homeless person, because he did not have a new permanent residence to register with the Department, he was unable to comply with the statutory requirements.

We conclude that the statute was properly applied, and that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that Jeandell was in violation of the registration requirements. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. QUESTIONS PRESENTED Jeandell raises the following questions on this appeal: I. Whether the Maryland sex offender registration statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to homeless persons.

II

Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Jean-dell’s conviction for failure to register a change of residence where Jeandell, as a homeless person, did not have a residence to register. BACKGROUND Jeandell was convicted of rape in 1977, in the Circuit Court for Kent County, and was sentenced to a term of forty years. In October 2002, Jeandell was mandatorily released after having served twenty-six years. Upon his release, and pursuant to C.P. § ll-704(a), Jeandell registered as a sexually violent offender with the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation. 1 ³⁰ Jeandell’s registration statement included the information prescribed by C.P. § 11-706, which requires a registrant to provide the following: (1) the registrant’s full name, including any suffix, and address; (2) (i) for a registrant under § 11 — 704(a)(7)(i) of this subtitle, the registrant’s place of employment; or (ii) for a registrant under § ll-704(a)(7)(ii) of this subtitle, the registrant’s place of educational institution or school enrollment; (3) (i) for a registrant enrolled, or expecting to enroll, in an institution of higher education in the State as a full-time or part-time student, the name and address of the institution of higher education; or (ii) for a registrant who carries on employment, or expects to carry on employment, at an institution of higher education in the State, the name and address of the institution of higher education; (4) a description of the crime for which the registrant was convicted; (5) the date that the registrant was convicted; (6) the jurisdiction in which the registrant was convicted; (7) a list of any aliases that the registrant has used; (8) the registrant’s Social Security number; (9) any other name by which the registrant has been legally known; and (10) the registrant’s signature and date signed.

Jeandell completed his registration with the Montgomery County Police Department (MCPD) on October 8, 2002. Thereafter, Jeandell changed residences four times. Upon each change, Jeandell notified the Department by filling out a change of address card with the MCPD. Jeandell’s last change ³¹ of address notice was completed on April 2, 2003, when Jeandell notified the Department that he was living at 9704 Hastings Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland.

After Jeandell gave the Department notice that he had changed his residence to 9704 Hastings Drive, the MCPD distributed flyers informing Jeandell’s neighbors on Hastings Drive of his past conviction. Two of the neighbors then complained to Jeandell’s landlady about Jeandell’s presence in the building, and Jeandell’s landlady asked Jeandell to vacate the premises. On May 15, 2003, Jeandell showed up for his weekly meeting with his parole agent, John Haffer. In response to questioning by Agent Haffer, Jeandell disclosed that he needed to find a new place to live.

Agent Haffer did not offer Jeandell any assistance in locating a new residence. Haffer simply told Jeandell to report back to him on May 22, 2003. Jeandell reported, as directed, on May 22, 2003, and spoke with another field agent. Jeandell still did not have a new residence to report.

He was told to report back in another week on May 29, 2003. On or about May 23, 2003, Jeandell vacated 9704 Hastings Drive. He failed to make any further contact with the field agents. As a result, on June 3, 2003, Agent Haffer advised Detective Don Edmund, of the MCPD, that Jeandell had “absconded from supervision and was no longer living at his reported address.” Detective Edmund, who is in charge of maintaining the Montgomery County Sex Offender Registry, obtained an arrest warrant for Jeandell on June 20, 2003.

The arrest warrant charged Jeandell with violating C.P. § 11-721 because Jeandell had failed to provide the Department with written notice of his change in residence as required by C.P. § ll-705(d). A bench trial was held in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, and Jeandell was found guilty of violating C.P. § 11— 721. Because he had already been incarcerated for 85 days while awaiting his trial, the court imposed a time-served sentence. Jeandell filed this timely appeal. ³² DISCUSSION I. The Maryland Registration of Offenders statute requires, in C.P. § ll-705(d), that “[a] registrant who changes residences shall send written notice of the change to the Department [of Public Safety and Corrections] within 7 days after the change occurs.” The penalty for failing to notify the Department of any change in residence is set forth in C.P. § 11-721, which states: (a) Prohibited act. — A registrant may not knowingly fail to register or knowingly fail to provide the written notice required under § ll-705(d), (e), or (f) of this subtitle, or knowingly provide false information of a material fact as required by this subtitle.

(b) Penalty. — A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding $5,000 or both____ Jeandell argues that the charges filed against him should have been dismissed because, he contends, C.P. § ll-705(d) is unconstitutionally vague when applied to homeless registered sex offenders. Jeandell contends that his homeless status rendered him unable to comply with the statute’s requirements because he did not have either a residence or a mailing address to register. Jeandell further asserts that the Maryland Registration of Offenders statute fails to define the term “residence,” and fails to provide clear guidance to.homeless offenders on how to satisfy the statute’s requirements. Jean-dell urges us to find the statute void for vagueness. 2 ³³ In Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1 , 616 A.2d 1275 (1992), the Court of Appeals discussed the void-for-vagueness doctrine, and noted that it “requires that a penal statute ‘be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ ” Id. at 8 , 616 A.2d 1275 (quoting Connally v. General Const.

Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). Quoting from Williams, supra, and Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115 , 389 A.2d 341 (1978), the Court further elaborated upon the doctrine in Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 615-16 , 781 A.2d 851 (2001): A well grounded principle in federal constitutional law is that, when considering the void-for-vagueness doctrine, courts consistently consider two criteria or rationales. See, e.g., Williams, 329 Md. at 8 , 616 A.2d at 1278 ; Eanes, 318 Md. at 459, 569 A.2d at 615; Bowers, 283 Md. at 120-21 , 389 A.2d at 345 . The first rationale is the fair notice principle that “persons of ordinary intelligence and experience be afforded a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior accordingly.” Williams, 329 Md. at 8 , 616 A.2d at 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 121 , 389 A.2d 341 ); see Ferro v. Lewis, 348 Md. 593, 607 , 705 A.2d 311, 318 (1998).

The standard for determining whether a statute provides fair notice is “whether persons ‘of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the statute’s] meaning.’ ” Williams, 329 Md. at 8 , 616 A.2d at 1278 (alteration in original) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2913 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if the meaning “of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.” Bowers, 283 ³⁴ Md. at 125, 389 A.2d at 348 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Eanes, 318 Md. at 460, 569 A.2d at 615-16. The second criterion of the vagueness doctrine regards enforcement of the statute. This rationale exists “to ensure that criminal statutes provide ‘legally fixed standards and adequate guidelines for police, judicial officers, triers of fact and others whose obligation it is to enforce, apply and administer the penal laws.’ ” Williams, 329 Md. at 8 9, 616 A.2d at 1278 (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 121 , 389 A.2d 341 ).

To survive analysis, a statute must “eschew arbitrary enforcement in addition to being intelligible to the reasonable person.” Williams, 329 Md. at 9 , 616 A.2d at 1279 . In Bowers , we determined that, as to this standard, a statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because it allows for the exercise of some discretion on the part of law enforcement and judicial officials. It is only where a statute is so broad as to be susceptible to irrational and selective patterns of enforcement that it will be held unconstitutional under this second arm of the vagueness principle. 283 Md. at 122 , 389 A.2d at 346 ; see Eanes, 318 Md. at 464, 569 A.2d at 617. As a general rule, the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the application of the statute to the “facts at hand.” Bowers, 283 Md. at 122 , 389 A.2d at 346 (citations omitted).

A. The Fair Notice Principle Turning to the facts of the instant case, we conclude that neither C.P. § 11 — 705(d) nor C.P. § 11-721 is unconstitutionally vague. Applying the first criterion of the doctrine, the fair-notice principle, we conclude that “persons of ordinary intelligence and experience [are] afforded a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited” by § ll-705(d) and § 11-721. Williams, supra, 329 Md. at 8 , 616 A.2d 1275 . Specifically, § ll-705(d) requires all registrants who change residences to send written notice of the change to the Depart ³⁵ ment within 7 days after the change occurs.

Jeandell argues this statute is unconstitutionally vague because the term “residence” is not defined anywhere in the statutory scheme. Jeandell contends that a homeless person is someone who does not have a “residence,” and therefore, cannot report a change in residence. We disagree. As stated in Galloway, supra, 365 Md. at 615 , 781 A.2d 851 , “A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if the meaning of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.” In the absence of a statutory definition, we endeavor to construe the words used in a statute according to their common meanings, and seek to give the statute a reasonable interpretation in the context of the overall statutory scheme.

Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 387 Md. 1, 11-12 , 874 A.2d 439 (2005). The term “residence” not only has a common and generally accepted meaning, it is also defined consistently in dictionaries. Black’s Law Dictionary 1335 (8th ed.2004), for example, defines the term as follows: 1. The act or fact of living in a given place for some time.... 2.

The place where one actually lives, as distinguished from a domicile.... Residence usu. just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place; domicile usu. requires bodily presence plus an intention to make the place one’s home.... The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 618 (New ed.2004) defines residence as: 1: the act or fact of residing in a place as a dweller or in discharge of a duty or an obligation!;] 2: the place where one actually lives!;] • • • Because the commonly accepted meaning of “residence” as that word is used in the context of C.P. § ll-705(d) is clearly “the place where one actually lives,” the Maryland Registration of Offenders statute does provide adequate guidance on ³⁶ how to comply with its requirements. Section ll-705(d) simply requires a registrant to provide written notice to the Department within seven days after there has been a change in the place where the registrant was living.

Even a homeless person lives someplace. In other words, even though a homeless person may not have a structural residence that the person permanently occupies, that