Jenkins v. Charles County Board of Education

Menchine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On February 23, 1973 a sand and gravel truck owned by Charles County Sand and Gravel, Inc. and operated by William Leo Jenkins (appellants) was proceeding in a southerly direction Qn State Route 5. A school bus owned by the Hughesville Motor Co., Inc., under contract to the Charles County Board of Education and operated by Peter Burt Thomas (appellees) was proceeding in a westerly direction on State Route 232. State Route 5 is a four lane highway with two lanes northbound and two lanes southbound separated by a grass median.

In addition right and left turn lanes are provided at the intersection. State Route 232 is a standard two lane highway — one for eastbound, the other for westbound traffic. The intersection is controlled by a flashing amber traffic light facing traffic moving upon State Route 5 and a flashing red traffic light facing traffic moving upon State Route 232. The vehicles were in collision within the intersection.

A number of children, passengers on the school bus, were injured in the ³ crash. They instituted suits against appellants and appellees. Appellees filed a cross-claim against appellants. After appellees effected settlements with all original plaintiffs 1 they brought their cross-claim to trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Charles County (James C. Mitchell, J. presiding).

At the conclusion of the cross-plaintiffs’ (appellees here) case, the trial judge found that Jenkins was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and granted cross-defendants’ (appellants here) motion for directed verdict. The cross-plaintiffs, in lieu of appeal to this Court, elected to pursue the remedy available to them under the provisions of Article IV § 22 of the Constitution of Maryland after reservation of the question for consideration by the court in banc Rule 51Ó. The court in banc passed an order “that the Trial Court’s granting of the Motion for Directed Verdict in favor of the Appellees, Charles County Sand and Gravel, Inc., and William L. Jenkins, be and the same is hereby reversed, and that the case be remanded for new trial.” Its opinion stated, inter alia, that “the sole issue reserved for this appeal is whether the Trial Court was correct in ruling as a matter of law that the driver of the dump truck was not contributorily negligent.” 2 ⁴ The appellees’ cross-claim had alleged alternatively that the negligence of appellants was such as to render them solely or jointly liable for all damages resulting, from the collision. At the trial below, however, appellees conceded their own negligence, limiting their claim against appellants to contribution of a pro-rata share of such damages as a joint tortfeasor under the provisions of Article 50, § 17 (a).

Such a concession was, of course, mandated by the decided cases. A motor vehicle approaching a flashing red light at a highway intersection is bound by the rules of law relating to “boulevards.” A failure by its operator to stop and yield the right of way is negligence as a matter of law. State, u/o Hopkins v. Marvil, 202 Md. 592, 98 A. 2d 94 ; Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24 , 169 A. 2d 661 ; Cornias v. Bradley, 254 Md. 479 , 255 A. 2d 431 ; Roberts v. Fairchild, 14 Md. App. 612 , affirmed by per curiam opinion, 287 A. 2d 778 ; Code Article 66V2, § 11-204. Accordingly, the single issue before us is whether the evidence was legally sufficient to permit a finding that appellant Jenkins, the favored driver, was himself guilty of contributory negligence that was a proximate cause of the collision.

The trial judge determined as a matter of law that it was not. The court in banc determined that the evidence was sufficient to raise a question of fact for the jury’s resolution. In our review we are required to assume the truth of all evidence tending to sustain the claim of the appellees, as well as all inferences reasonably and fairly deducible therefrom. Local 75 v. Regiec, 19 Md. App. 406, 407 , 311 A. 2d 456, 457 , and cases therein cited.

So viewed, the evidence would permit the finding of the following facts. The testimony of Corporal Teffeau of the Maryland State Police was extremely limited in extent. He testified that he investigated an accident at State Routes 5 and 232; that the intersection was controlled by a double flashing amber light for State Route 5 — a double flashing red light for State ⁵ Route 232; that Route 5, a straight road running north and south, is a dual lane highway with two lanes of traffic in each direction, separated by a grass median, with added left and right turn lanes at the intersection; that State Route 232, running east and west, is a highway with a single traffic lane in each direction; that the colliding vehicles were respectively, a 1970 Mack dump truck operated by Jenkins on Route 5 and a school bus operated by Thomas on Route 232. Cross-plaintiffs then called Jenkins as a witness.

His brief personal testimony was limited to inquiries related to his identity, the identity of the vehicle he operated on the accident date; the direction of his travel; and the fact that he was within the employment of the Charles County Sand and Gravel Company at the time. Cross-plaintiffs then offered in evidence the deposition of Jenkins. It is to that deposition one must look for all facts relating to the collision. Thomas, driver of the school bus, was not called as a witness.

Jenkins (favored driver) was operating his truck in a southerly direction on State Route 5 in the slow lane. He observed a Greyhound bus stopped on the right shoulder of the highway, about 50 feet from the intersection with Route 232. The left turn indicator of the Greyhound bus was blinking. Jenkins directed his attention to the stopped vehicle because “this Greyhound bus had a left hand signal on to pull to the road and I was slowing down thinking that he was going to pull over.” Jenkins continued in the slow lane past the Greyhound bus, explaining that “I did not move to the fast lane because he had never pulled out.” He did not blow his horn.

He said: “As I went by the [Greyhound] bus, then I could look. I looked and then I saw the school bus coming across.” Jenkins had not seen the school bus crossing the northbound lanes of Route 5. He explained he did not see that movement because he was “looking at the Greyhound” because he thought “the man was going to pull into [my] lane * * * they usually do if they put on a signal.” The truck’s speed at the time the school bus first was seen was 35 miles per hour and was slowing. The posted speed limit for Route 5 was 50 miles per hour. ⁶ Jenkins conceded that he could have seen the school bus earlier but for the fact that his attention had been directed to the Greyhound bus.

A diagram, drawn by Jenkins during his deposition testimony, was admitted as cross-plaintiffs’ exhibit 1 and is reproduced herein. Jenkins placed marks upon the diagram to indicate the following: X - Position of Greyhound bus; C - Position of Jenkins where he observed Greyhound’s left turn blinker; A - Position of Jenkins when he first saw school bus; B - Position of school bus when Jenkins first saw it. He saw the school bus when he was 50 feet from the intersection with Route 232. The relative position of the two vehicles at that time is shown by the letters A (truck) and B ⁷ (school bus) on the diagram.

The school bus continued to move past the median strip and across the southbound lanes of Route 5 and the vehicles collided. State, u/o Hopkins v. Marvil, supra, was the first Maryland decision delineating the duty owed by a traveler upon approach to crossing highways controlled as to one by flashing red lights and as to the other by flashing amber lights. The Court of Appeals said at page 598, et seq. [97]: “The legislature has enacted Article 66V2, Sec. 160, Annotated Code of Maryland (1951) which reads as follows: ‘(Flashing Signals). Whenever flashing red or amber signals are used they shall require obedience by vehicular traffic as follows: (1) Flashing red (Stop Signal).

When a red lens is illuminated by rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles shall stop before entering the nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at a limit line when marked and the right to proceed shall be subject to the rules applicable after making a stop at a stop sign. (2) Flashing amber (Caution Signal). When an amber lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles may proceed through the intersection or past such signal only with caution.’ The above statute prescribes separately the rule of conduct for drivers facing flashing red and amber signals at an intersection, but the existence of the red light for the one determines to a degree the caution to be exercised by the other who is confronted with the amber light. Cases dealing with this subject matter are to be found in other jurisdictions.

While not expressly spelled out in all, there is implicit in most of them the theory that a driver on a through street when approaching an intersection controlled by amber and red flashing signals must exercise a caution commensurate with the prudence of a reasonable man — that he has not ⁸ absolute right of way. See Rhoades v. Finn, 288 Mich. 262 , 284 N. W. 720 ; McGowan v. City of Los Angeles and two related cases, 100 Cal. App. 2d 386 , 223 P. 2d 862 , 21 A.L.R.2d 1206 ; Stabler v. Copeland, 304 Mich. 1 , 7 N.W.2d 122 . When the State has erected an amber signal to regulate traffic on a through highway, we think it not unreasonable to find its purpose is to exact from the users of a highway a caution higher than is to be expected in the absence of such a signal.

So to hold does not diminish or render ineffectual the utility of the modern through highway. Nor does it mean that a user of the highway cannot assume that drivers will stop in compliance with stop signs. It means merely that one should not proceed through such an intersection oblivious to it. It does mean, as the statute plainly says, that an amber light is a warning to proceed