Jenkins v. City of College Park

CATHELL, Judge. This case concerns a parcel of property located within the city of College Park, in which both the City of College Park, respondent, and Alvin F. Jenkins, petitioner, claim to own an interest. Petitioner claimed a right to the property in question by adverse possession in two separate actions to quiet title in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Petitioner served process by publication pursuant to Md. Rule 2-122 1 after filing affidavits asserting that no other persons ¹⁴⁵ claimed a right to the property in question and that all persons appearing to have an interest in the property were named defendants whose whereabouts were unknown.

In neither case did petitioner identify respondent as a party or as a defendant, or serve respondent with notice, even though, prior to the filing of petitioner’s cases, the City of College Park purportedly had been deeded rights in the property at issue. Following the expiration of the response time to the pleadings, the Circuit Court entered default judgments in favor of petitioner for both actions. On June 15, 2001, more than thirty days after each judgment had been entered, respondent filed motions to intervene, pursuant to Md. Rule 2-214, 2 and motions to vacate the default ¹⁴⁶ judgments in favor of petitioner, pursuant to Md. Rule 2-535(b). 3 At that time, respondent additionally filed its own Complaint to Quiet Title against petitioner regarding the same property in this case and a motion to consolidate the three matters in the three cases. While the two actions originally filed by petitioner were consolidated by order of the Circuit Court, the Circuit Court denied the consolidation motion in respect to respondent’s complaint.

On December 13, 2001, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, in a formal written opinion and order, denied respondent’s Motions to Intervene and to Amend Judgment. Respondent appealed the Circuit Court’s denial of the motions to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals issued an opinion on March 27, 2003, vacating the decision of the Circuit Court. City of College Park v. Jenkins, 150 Md.App. 254 , 819 A.2d 1129 (2003).

The intermediate appellate court held that it could not resolve the factual questions presented and remanded the case to the Circuit Court. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court, and, on June 19, 2003, we granted the petition. ¹⁴⁷ Jenkins v. College Park, 376 Md. 49 , 827 A.2d 112 (2003). Petitioner presents five questions for our review: “I. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the lower court was incorrect in its ruling that College Park’s motion to intervene was not timely where the motion to intervene was filed more than two (2) years after the judgment had become final and the time for appeal had expired?

II

Where the lower court ruled that the motion to intervene was not timely, did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the Circuit Court failed to decide the merits of the motion to intervene?

III

Where the lower court expressly held that College Park’s motion to intervene was not timely, did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the lower court must explicitly make findings of fact as to each of the remaining three individual factors relevant to a motion to intervene enunciated in Chapman v. Kamara, 118 Md.App. 418 , 702 A.2d 977 (1997)?

IV

Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the lower court erred in requiring that College Park satisfy the requirements of Maryland Rule 2-535 as part of the trial court’s consideration of College Park’s motion to intervene and amend judgment? V. Did the Court of Special Appeals misstate Maryland law as it applies to constructive notice of the contents of public court and land records?” Petitioner’s questions essentially involve whether respondent’s motions to intervene were timely and whether petitioner’s notice by publication in light of respondent’s alleged interest in the properties evidenced by a recorded deed constituted fraud allowing amendment of the Circuit Court’s default judgments. We hold that under the specific facts in the case sub judice, before the timeliness of respondent’s motion to intervene in petitioner’s quiet title cases involving petitioner’s adverse possession can properly be assessed, it is first necessary to ¹⁴⁸ resolve all factual questions regarding the alleged chains of title and boundary/surveying issues for the property in this case. Because the trial court denied respondent’s motion to consolidate respondent’s case with those of petitioner, it is impossible for this Court to now resolve the matters of title which must be resolved in order to determine whether the motion to intervene was timely.

If the City of College Park should have been named as a specific party pursuant to § 14-108 of the Real Property Article, then the order of publication and the supporting affidavits might not have been sufficient to afford notice to it. Once the title to the property is resolved on remand, then the trial court will be able to properly assess whether respondent should have been a named party to these cases pursuant to § 14-108 of the Real Property Article and whether respondent’s motion to intervene was untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals’ vacating the trial court’s order denying the motion to intervene and we remand this case to the Circuit Court with directions to consolidate the cases and resolve the title issues before ruling on respondent’s Motion to Intervene and Amend Judgment. I. Facts 4 On July 3, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint to quiet title, case number CAE97-13340, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County for a property he claimed to own by adverse possession.

Petitioner named the following as defendants in that complaint: the successors and assigns of Fillmore Beall and James C. Rogers, trustees; the heirs, successors, personal representatives, devisees and assigns of Francis Shanabrook; and any and all persons claiming an interest in the specified property. Petitioner did not name respondent as a party. The 0.1145-acre property was described by metes and bounds in an exhibit, a plat prepared by registered land surveyor William Machen. Petitioner alleged that the Prince George’s ¹⁴⁹ County Land Records showed that legal title to the property was conveyed from City and Suburban Railway, owner, and Alan L. McDermott, receiver, to Fillmore Beall and James C. Rogers, appointed trustees of the estate of Francis Shana-brook, 5 by a deed dated October 22, 1903.

The deed was recorded in Liber 17 folio 44. Petitioner also asserted, via affidavit, that after conducting a title search, the whereabouts of the defendants named in the suit were unknown 6 and that ho other persons claimed a right to the property. Petitioner, pursuant to court order, then served process by publication and no response was filed. Petitioner thus obtained an order of default on November 1, 1997 and a default judgment was entered on December 10,1997.

Petitioner filed a second complaint to quiet title, case number CAE98-07817, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on April 17, 1998 concerning a parcel of property contiguous to the parcel subject to the 1997 action. The City of College Park was not named as a defendant. Petitioner described this 0.0455-acre parcel by metes and bounds and again claimed title through adverse possession, naming the same defendants as in his 1997 action. After receiving no response to petitioner’s service by publication within the appropriate time period, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County entered an order of default on March 3, 1998 and a default judgment on May 13,1998.

The two parcels that were the subjects of the two complaints by petitioner are located adjacent to property that petitioner had previously acquired by deed. In both actions, petitioner asserted that the defendants named therein were ¹⁵⁰ the last owners of record pertaining to the property. As we have stated, respondent was not named as a defendant in either case. Petitioner alleged that, by virtue of the October 22, 1908 deed, title of the property was in the trustees of the estate of Francis Shanabrook.

Respondent disputes petitioner’s assertions regarding title in the property. Respondent alleges that the parcels involved in this case, as described in petitioner’s two complaints, lie within, ie., overlap, the railway right of way owned by respondent while the property actually described in the October 22, 1903 deed, aforesaid, does not lie within that right of way. Respondent therefore alleges that petitioner’s complaints describe parcels of land that are not included in the 1903 deed. Respondent allegedly acquired the railway right of way by quitclaim deed from The Bank of New York as the successor trustee of the Riders’ Fund Trust on April 8, 1997, almost three months prior to petitioner filing the first case.

Respondent recorded the deed on April 21, 1997, prior to petitioner filing any complaint to quiet title in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. According to respondent, although some of the conveying instruments are absent from the record in this case, the interest in the railway right of way was conveyed to the trustee by a successor in interest to Columbia and Maryland Railway. Respondent asserts that the property in question in this case, the railway right of way, was retained by Columbia and Maryland Railway (and/or the trustees of the City and Suburban Railway) 7 and its successors and not included as a part of the conveyance in the October 22, 1903 deed. Respondent alleges that several factors support that the railway right of way was not a part of the 1903 deed that is in the “Miller” chain of title. 8 First, respondent argues that the ¹⁵¹ title lines of the property within petitioner’s complaints and the railway right of way merged prior to the October 1903 deed.

The allegations include that Francis Shanabrook conveyed a parcel of property to both Horace Miller, by deed in 1890, and the Columbia and Maryland Railway, by deed in 1895. After an alleged successor to Miller, City and Suburban Railway, had purchased part of the property, it discovered a discrepancy. It then purchased the remaining part of that property from Mr. Miller by deed in 1901 and sued Mr. Shanabrook’s estate. A lawsuit to require the estate to repurchase the area of the parcel that the City and Suburban Railway did not plan to use (the section of the parcel the City and Suburban Railway purchased from Mr. Miller) soon followed.

That section of the parcel was sold back to the Shanabrook Estate after the suit via the October 22, 1903 deed between the City and Suburban Railway and the Trustees of the Shanabrook Estate. Because the estate bought back only the property City and Suburban Railway did not need, City and Suburban Railway retained ownership of whatever property, if any, that was within the right of way that it had originally been conveyed. Respondent alleges that the October 22, 1903 deed left the Shanabrook Estate with title to nothing more than this remaining property and not title to the land within the right of way. On June 15, 2001, respondent filed a Motion to Intervene and to Amend Judgment in both of petitioner’s quiet title actions.

As previously mentioned, the motion to intervene was filed pursuant to Md. Rule 2-214 and the motion to amend the judgment was filed pursuant to Md. Rule 2-535(b). Respondent additionally filed a complaint, naming petitioner as a defendant, to quiet title in the property at issue in this case. Along with its intervention request, respondent argued that all three actions be consolidated. The Circuit Court for ¹⁵² Prince George’s County granted respondent’s motion to consolidate with respect to the two actions initiated by petitioner but denied the motion to consolidate petitioner’s actions with the one initiated by respondent.

The Circuit Court then conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding respondent’s motions to intervene and filed a written opinion on December 13, 20Q1. The trial court denied respondent’s motions. In so doing, the trial court noted “its position that the City could not intervene in the Jenkins’ case without satisfying the requirements of Maryland Rule 2-535.” In denying respondent’s motion pursuant to Md. Rule 2-535, the trial court found “nothing in the evidence that constitutes clear and convincing evidence of fraud.” II. Discussion While the questions presented to the Court in this case involve respondent’s Motion to Intervene and to Amend Judgment, the determinative issues in this dispute are what, if any, interest does respondent still have in the property in question and, if so, whether respondent should have been a named defendant in petitioner’s actions to quiet title in the property in question. 9 We hold that a determination of whether respondent should have been a named defendant in petitioner’s two complaints, ie., whether petitioner’s notice by publication was sufficient notice as to respondent, first requires a resolution of the conflict regarding the title of the property.

The state of the record before this Court, however, is insufficient to resolve the conflict between the two alleged titles. Because another quiet title action regarding this property, initiated by respondent, is not before this Court, the record in this case regarding both alleged chains of title is incomplete. ¹⁵³ It is impossible to remove the clouds on the title to this parcel of property, and to know whether respondent should have been named as a defendant in the case at bar, while the cases remain separate. An appropriate way to eliminate this cloud on the title would have been to consolidate the three lawsuits, a course of action rejected by the Circuit Court in the case sub judice. Although it was not presented as a specific issue to this Court, it is inextricably intertwined with the issues presented to this Court, see Eid v. Duke, 373 Md. 2 , 816 A.2d 844 (2003).

We hold that the Circuit Court abused its discretion by denying respondent’s motion to consolidate respondent’s case with the two cases initiated by petitioner, i.e., the two actions that embody the present case. A. Timeliness Motions to Intervene are governed by Maryland Rule 2-214, “Intervention.” In the case of intervention as a matter of right, Rule 2-214(a) states: “(a) Of right. Upon timely motion, a person shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when the person has an unconditional right to intervene as a matter of law; or (2) when the person claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and the person is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the ability to protect that interest unless it is adequately represented by existing parties.” In the case sub judice, petitioner’s main contention is that respondent’s motion to intervene was untimely. Petitioner argues that “there exists a presupposition that the action sought to be intervened in is currently pending when the motion to intervene is filed” and that, ultimately, once “a final judgment has been entered and enrolled, a motion to intervene is not timely as a matter of law because there is no longer a pending action.” Respondent argues that a “motion to intervene must be granted when the party has an unconditional right to intervene as a matter of law, or when the party’s interest is such that it will not be adequately repre ¹⁵⁴ sented” and that a “requirement that a motion be timely in the circumstances is meant to protect the rights of the parties, not to punish a litigant for tardiness.” We set out the standard for assessing the timeliness of a motion to intervene in the case of Maryland Radiological Society, Incorporated v. Health Services Cost Review Commission, 285 Md. 383, 388-89 , 402 A.2d 907, 910-11 (1979), when we stated: “Whether intervention be asked as of right or permissively, it is manifest ... that timely application is a prerequisite to such a request being granted.

Thus, before proceeding to consider the substantive merits of an intervention motion, a trial court should require that the applicant demonstrate the promptness of his request. Whether it is so shown is dependent upon the individual circumstances of each case and rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, which, unless abused, will not be disturbed on appellate review. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365-66 , 93 S.Ct. 2591 , 37 L.Ed.2d 648 (1973). In considering the promptness factors contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, which is almost identical to our Rule 208, the United States Supreme Court stated in NAACP that ‘[although the point to which the suit has progressed is one factor in the determination of timeliness, it is not solely dispositive.

Timeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances.’ Id. at 365-66 , 93 S.Ct. 2591 (footnote omitted). Even though all relevant circumstances should be taken into account in assessing the timeliness of an intervention motion, as a general guide for the trial courts of this State in their consideration of the issue we now fashion from the federal authorities the following framework for inquiry: one, the purpose for which intervention is sought; two, the probability of prejudice to the parties already in the case; three, the extent to which the proceedings have progressed when the movant applies to intervene; and four, the reason or reasons for the delay in seeking intervention. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1977); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d ¹⁵⁵ 501, 506 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 , 96 S.Ct. 2628 , 49 L.Ed.2d 375 (1976).” [Footnote omitted.] In Coalition for Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No. 622, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, 333 Md. 359, 367-69 , 635 A.2d 412, 416 (1994), we later stated that: “As the language of Rule 2-214 requires, timely application is a prerequisite for intervention. See Maryland Radiological Society v. Health Serv., 285 Md. 383, 388 , 402 A.2d 907, 910 (1979).

Timeliness depends upon the individual circumstances of each case, ‘and rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, which, unless abused, will not be disturbed on appellate review.’ Maryland Radiological Society v. Health Serv., supra, 285 Md. at 388 , 402 A.2d at 910 , citing NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365-366 , 93 S.Ct. 2591, 2603 , 37 L.Ed.2d 648, 662-663 (1973). “Neither the federal cases ... nor the decisions of this Court set forth any special standard or requirement ... for intervention after the trial court’s decision. Rather, under circumstances like those in the present case, where the losing party declines to appeal, courts generally permit an applicant to intervene for the purpose of appeal where the applicant has standing and where the applicant acts promptly after the trial court’s decision. See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 395-396 , 97 S.Ct. 2464, 2470-2471 , 53 L.Ed.2d 423, 432-433 (1977) (‘The critical inquiry in every such case is whether in view of all the circumstances the intervenor acted promptly after the entry of final judgment.... Here, the respondent filed her motion within the time period in which the named plaintiffs could have taken an appeal’); Yniguez v. State of Ariz., 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.1991) (“ ‘post-judgment intervention for purposes of appeal may be appropriate if the intervenors ... meet traditional standing criteria,’ ” quoting Legal Aid Soc’y of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1328 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 , 100 S.Ct. 3010 , 65 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1980)); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Miscellaneous Warehousemen’s, 629 F.2d 1204 , 1213 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 937 , 101 S.Ct. 2016 , 68 L.Ed.2d 324 (1981) ¹⁵⁶ (‘an application for intervention is timely if it is brought shortly after the [existing party representing similar interests] indicates that she will not appeal’). “If ... the cases dealing with post-judgment intervention are analyzed as requiring an ‘exceptional circumstance’ before such intervention is allowed, the requisite ‘exceptional circumstance’ would be the losing party’s failure to appeal or the real possibility that the losing party will fail to pursue appellate remedies.” [Footnote omitted.] Just as a losing party’s failure to prosecute an appeal is an “exceptional circumstance” allowing a motion to intervene filed after a trial court’s judgment to be characterized as timely, a motion to intervene can be timely even after a judgment has been entered where a party holding a properly recorded title to a parcel of property, as alleged in this case, was not named as a defendant pursuant to Maryland law.

In Maryland, actions to quiet title are governed by Md. Code (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 14-108 of the Real Property Article. Section 14-108, in its entirety, states: “ § 14-108. Quieting title.

(a) Conditions. — Any person in actual peaceable possession of property, or, if the property is vacant and unoccupied, in constructive and peaceable possession of it, either under color of title or claim of right by reason of his or his predecessor’s adverse possession for the statutory period, when his title to the property is denied or disputed, or when any other person claims, of record or otherwise to own the property, or any part of it, or to hold any lien encumbrance on it, regardless of whether or not the hostile outstanding claim is being actively asserted, and if an action at law or proceeding in equity is not pending to enforce or test the validity of the title, hen, encumbrance, or other adverse claim, the person may maintain a suit in equity in the county where the property lies to quiet or remove any cloud from the title, or determine any adverse claim. (b) Proceeding. — The proceeding shall be deemed in rem or quasi in rem so long as the only relief sought is a decree ¹⁵⁷ that the plaintiff has absolute ownership and the right of disposition of the property, and an injunction against the assertion by the person named as the party defendant, of his claim by any action at law or otherwise. Any person who appears of record, or claims to have a hostile outstanding right, shall be made a defendant in the proceedings.” [Emphasis added.] The statute clearly mandates that, in pursuing an in rem proceeding to quiet title, a plaintiff shall name all persons identified by the land records as having an interest in the property or otherwise claiming an interest in the property in question. The last phrase of § 14 — 108(b) specifically directs that, “[a]ny person who appears of record, or claims to have a hostile outstanding right, shall be made a defendant in the proceedings” (alteration added) (emphasis added).

In the actions initiated by petitioner in the case sub judice, respondent was not named as a defendant although respondent claims that the prior recorded quitclaim deed to it identifies it as a title owner of record in respect to the property involved in petitioner’s cases. Petitioner argues that, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-122, his service by publication provided sufficient notice as his title search did not reveal respondent as being in the chain of title to the properties. 10 Rule 2-122(a), the relevant portion of Md. Rule 2-122, states: “(a) Service by posting or publication. In an in rem or quasi in rem action when the plaintiff has shown by affidavit that the whereabouts of the defendant are unknown and that reasonable efforts have been made in good faith to locate the defendant, the court may order service by the mailing of a notice to the defendant’s last known address and: (1) by the posting of the notice by the sheriff at the courthouse door or on a bulletin board within its immediate vicinity, or ¹⁵⁸ (2) by publishing the notice at least once a week in each of three successive weeks in one or more newspapers of general circulation published in the county in which the action is pending, or (3) in an action in which the rights relating to land including leasehold interests are involved, by the posting of the notice by the sheriff in a conspicuous place on the land. Additionally, the court may order any other means of notice that it deems appropriate in the circumstances.” Petitioner’s notice of publication for both cases did not specifically name respondent, but included the language, “and any and all persons or corporations having or claiming to have any interest in the property described____” If respondent’s interest does not fall within the purview of § 14-108 of the Real Property Article, then this notice would appear to have been valid notice to respondent.

The determinative question, therefore, is whether the deed of conveyance to respondent was properly within the chain of title, so that respondent’s alleged title in the property should have been discovered by petitioner’s title search, thus requiring the specific naming of respondent as a defendant in petitioner’s quiet title actions. If respondent should have been a named defendant in both cases, petitioner’s affidavits certifying that he notified the proper defendants would have provided incorrect information and the resulting orders allowing notice by publication pursuant to Rule 2-122 would be invalid. 11 If the notice by publication was invalid, then respondent’s motion to intervene may not have been untimely because respondent would not have received ¹⁵⁹ notice of the pending quia timet proceedings in violation of both § 14-108 and Rule 2-122. The only way to determine whether respondent’s interest in the property entitled respondent to be a named defendant pursuant to § 14-108 is to examine the chains of title, and by doing so, establish the exact nature of respondent’s interest, if any, in the property. If respondent did indeed possess a valid interest in the title to the property in this case which was recorded prior to petitioner’s complaints being filed with the Circuit Court, then petitioner’s notice by publication was not valid to notify respondent of the quiet title actions.

Under those circumstances a delay in the filing of respondent’s motion to intervene might well have been justifiable. B. Alleged Chains of Title & Consolidation 1. Alleged Chains of Title As we have noted, however, the record in this case does not reflect the full and complete chains of alleged titles of both petitioner and respondent. We now include, as best we can given the state of the record, an overview description of the alleged chains contained in that record as follows.

Both alleged chains of title date back to the August 1889 deed to Francis Shanabrook, filed at Liber J.W.B. 18 folio 467. The problem leading to the alleged split in the chain of