John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. of Boston v. Plummer

Delaplaine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, issued in 1932 a life insurance policy agreeing to pay to Augusta C. Plummer, appellee, the sum of $3,000 upon the death of her stepson, Jack W. Plummer. By a supplementary contract, issued in consideration of a special yearly premium of $7.50, the company agreed to pay an additional sum of $3,000 upon proof that the death of the insured occurred directly and exclusively as the result of bodily injury “caused solely by external, violent and accidental means, of which there is a visible wound or contusion on the exterior of the body (except in case of drowning or of internal injuries revealed by an autopsy).” The insured, a shipyard laborer, twenty-eight years old, died on April 7, 1941, after he had been given an anesthetic by his dentist, Dr. Nathaniel S. Nuger. The beneficiary, bringing suit in the Baltimore City Court for the accidental death benefit, alleged that the insured died as a result of an anesthetic administered for the purpose of extracting his teeth.

The court overruled a demurrer to the declaration. On February 25, 1942, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $3,154.50. This appeal was taken from the judgment entered upon the verdict. Dr. Howard J. Maldeis, Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Maryland, who performed an autopsy on the insured’s body, testified that the cause of death was asphyxiation due to the administration of nitrous oxide anesthetic.

On the contrary, Dr. John C. Krantz, Jr., Professor of Pharmacology in the School of Medicine of the University of Maryland, testified that in his opinion, ¹⁴² based on a chemical analysis which he made of a specimen of the insured’s blood, the nitrous oxide gas was not the cause of death. It is beyond question that the death was accidental, for the term “accidental” means that which happens without intention or design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen. United States Mutual Accident Assn. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100 9 S. Ct. 755 , 33 L Ed. 60, 67; 7 A. L. R. 1131; 1 C. J., Accident Insurance, Sec. 72; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Sec. 931.

But the contract now before us does not provide for double indemnity in every case of accidental death, but only in certain casés where death results from bodily injury “caused solely by external, violent and accidental means.” The special premium required by the supplementary contract was small, and the extent of the company’s liability was carefully expressed. It is a fundamental rule that a contract of insurance, like any other contract, should be given a reasonable construction so as to effectuate the real intention of the parties giving to the language employed, when unambiguous, its ordinary and usually accepted meaning. United Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Prostic, 169 Md. 535 , 182 A. 421 . While it is generally accepted that an insurance policy should be construed in favor of the insured in case of ambiguity, the terms of a policy cannot be extended by forced construction where the language is clear and the meaning plain.

Blunt v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 145 Cal. 268 , 78 P. 729 . It would obviously be just as improper for a court to make-a policy more beneficial to the insured by extending its coverage by strained construction as it would be to award more than the stipulated amount of insurance. There is a conflict of opinion in the construction of accident insurance policies on the issue raised by this appeal. Lee v. New York Life Insurance Co., 310 Mass. 370 , 38 N. E. 2d 333 ; 29 Am.

Jur., Insurance, Sec. 1002. But the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out in the Tennessee golfer’s sunstroke case in 1934 that, where the stipulated