Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Correia

SALMON, J. About one hundred years ago, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that one who “is engaged in the undertaking of running an elevator as a means of personal transportation” is required to use the “highest degree of care and diligence practicable under the circumstances,” which is the same standard that common carriers are required to meet. See Belvi ³⁶³ dere Bldg. Co. v. Bryan, 103 Md. 514, 539-40, 525 , 64 A. 44 (1906). The rule in Belvidere was reaffirmed in 1930 and again in 1937.

See Owners’ Realty Co. of Baltimore City v. Richardson, 158 Md. 367, 371 , 148 A. 543 (1930); O’Neill & Co. v. Crummitt, 172 Md. 53, 60-61 , 190 A. 763 (1937). Since 1937, no Maryland appellate decision has been called upon to decide whether the rule first enunciated in Belvidere is still binding precedent. 1 ³⁶⁴ On August 30, 2000, Jane Correia was a passenger in an elevator owned and operated by Johns Hopkins Health Services Company and Johns Hopkins Hospital (hereinafter collectively “Johns Hopkins” or “appellant”). The elevator came to a sudden stop because of a mechanical defect. Due to injuries allegedly caused by this malfunction, Mrs. Correia and her husband sued Johns Hopkins, and others, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for negligence.

The matter was considered by a jury in October 2005. The Correias introduced evidence that showed that, in the six months prior to the accident, Johns Hopkins had received thirty-two complaints about the elevator Mrs. Correia was in when the accident occurred. The thirty-two complaints, if accurate, indicated that at various times prior to the accident the elevator was dropping, jumping, jerking, skipping, and sometimes trapping passengers. At the end of a nine-day trial, the court gave the jury the following instruction: The owner of a passenger elevator, in this case ...

Johns Hopkins is the owner of the passenger elevator[,] is bound ³⁶⁵ to exercise to the highest degree of care and skill and diligence ... practicable under the circumstances to guard against injury to individuals riding on those elevators. This rule of law applies to the owner of the elevator only. It does not apply to the service company [co-defendant] Schindler [Elevator Company]. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Correia in the amount of $264,500 and separate $35,500 verdict in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Correia, jointly, for loss of consortium.

Both verdicts were against Johns Hopkins; the jury found that co-defendant Schindler Elevator Company was not negligent. In this appeal, Johns Hopkins contends, among other things, that the trial judge committed reversible error in giving the instruction quoted above. According to appellant, the owner of a self-operating elevator owes a passenger the same duty that any other property owner owes its invitee, i.e., the duty to use reasonable care to see that the portion of the property that the invitee is expected to use is safe. In support of its position, Johns Hopkins advances four major arguments.

First, according to Johns Hopkins, “the application of a common carrier theory of liability to modern building owners is no longer appropriate,” although such a heightened standard of care “may have been appropriate one hundred years ago when Belvidere decided the question as a matter of first impression.” Second, “the cases upon which the trial court” relied in giving the instruction at issue are factually distinguishable from this case. Third, the instruction should not have been given because elevator owners are not common carriers under Maryland law. Fourth, since Belvidere was decided, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has decided a case that suggests that “the proper standard of care for an elevator owner is that of reasonable care.” I. The common law rule in the District of Columbia and fourteen of our sister states is in accord with Johns Hopkins’ ³⁶⁶ position that the duty of an owner or operator of an elevator to its passengers is to use ordinary or reasonable care and not the highest degree of care. See Lowrey v. Montgomery Kone, Inc., 202 Ariz. 190 , 42 P.3d 621, 627 (2002) (the owner/operator of a passenger elevator does not owe “a higher duty toward its passengers than that of reasonable care under all of the circumstances”); Hafferman v. Westinghouse Elec.

Corp., 653 F.Supp. 423, 430 (D.D.C.1986) (the hotel “owed a duty of reasonable care ...; a duty that included the need to properly inspect and repair the elevator”); McKenna v. Grunbaum, 33 Idaho 46 , 190 P. 919, 921 (1920) (it is the duty of the landlord to use reasonable care to keep and operate its elevator); Summers v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 243 Kan. 393 , 757 P.2d 1255, 1261-62 (1988) (“[T]he elevator ... is not a common carrier and ... the duty to the public with regard to it is that of ordinary care.”); Smith v. Otis Elevator Co., 217 F.Supp.2d 105, 108 (D.Me.2002) (“the owner or operator of an elevator in a lodging establishment” does not have the duty of common carriers to use the highest degree of care); Clarke v. Ames, 267 Mass. 44 , 165 N.E. 696, 697 (1929) (office building owners “in operating an elevator were not common carriers” and thus owed only a duty to use reasonable care); Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich. 204 , 96 N.W. 29, 31 (1903) (owner of store with an elevator “was bound to use the care required of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances”); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Darnell, 221 So.2d 104, 107 (Miss.1969) (“The owner or occupier of business premises [where plaintiff was injured by elevator doors] owes business invitees the duty to exercise reasonable or ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition.”); Stone v. Boscawen Mills, 71 N.H. 288 , 52 A. 119, 121 (N.H.1902) (building owner should “exercise ... ordinary care” with regard to the maintenance of elevators); Rosenberg v. Otis Elevator Co., 366 N.J.Super. 292 , 841 A.2d 99, 105 (2004) (“An owner of a building has a non-delegable duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of tenants and persons contracts for maintenance of an elevator does not relieve it of that duty....”); Griffen v. Manice, 166 N.Y. 188 , 59 N.E. 925, 928-29 (1901) (in a case involving a ³⁶⁷ decedent who was struck by an elevator part, the court said that “sufficient security is afforded the public when owners or occupants of a building are required to use reasonable care in the character of the appliance they provide, and in its maintenance and operation”); Bethel v. New York City Transit Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 348 , 681 N.Y.S.2d 201 , 703 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (1998) (common carrier’s duty in New York is to use “reasonable care under the circumstances”); Williams v. 100 Block Associates, Ltd., 132 N.C.App. 655 , 513 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1999) (no matter the status of the plaintiff or the presence of elevators, all landowners have “only the duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of their premises for the protection of lawful visitors”); White v. Milner Hotels, Inc., 267 Or. 628 , 518 P.2d 631, 633, 635 (1974) (instructing the jury that an elevator operator owes the duty of using the highest degree of care is improper; the applicable duty is to use reasonable care); King v. J.C. Penney Co., 238 S.C. 336 , 120 S.E.2d 229, 230-31 (1961) (the owner of an elevator has the duty to exercise “ordinary and reasonable care as to its operation rather than the high degree of care similar to that imposed upon common carriers”); Dallas Market Ctr. Dev. Co. v. Liedeker, 958 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.1997) (owner/ operator of elevators owes passenger a duty to exercise ordinary care). The common law in twenty-one of our sister states is in accord with the rule set forth in Belvidere.

See Container Corp. of America v. Crosby, 535 So.2d 154, 156 (Ala.1988) (“[A] n elevator, whether passenger or freight, is a common carrier and, as such, is to be operated and maintained with the highest degree of care.”); Little Rock Land Co. v. Raper, 245 Ark. 641 , 433 S.W.2d 836, 841 (1968) (owner of elevator “has the same duty to protect passengers using his elevators from injury as do common carriers of passengers, i.e., to exercise the highest degree of skill”); Lane v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 225 Ga.App. 523, 484 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1997) (“A building owner ... ‘owes a duty of extraordinary diligence to elevator passengers...”); Jardine v. Rubloff, 73 Ill.2d 31 , 21 Ill.Dec. 868 , 382 N.E.2d 232, 236 (1978) (“[Ojwners of buildings with ³⁶⁸ elevators are viewed as common carriers who owe their passengers the highest degree of care----”); Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, 180 Ind. 357 , 101 N.E. 915, 918 (1913) (as to elevator passengers, landlords must “exercise the highest care, as a duty owing by law, to third persons who have a right to their use, or for whom they are provided”); Monaghan v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 184 Iowa 352 , 168 N.W. 892 , 892 (Iowa 1918) (“[0]ne who operates a passenger elevator ... is held to the same measure of care that is required of a public carrier of passengers; that is, the highest degree of skill and foresight consistent with the efficient use and operation of the means of conveyance.”); Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 364 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Ky.1961) (“[H]igh degree of care [is] required of the operator of elevators as in the case of other common carriers of passengers____”); Otis Elevator Co. v. Seale, 334 F.2d 928, 929 (5th Cir.1964) (applying Louisiana law) (the duty of an owner of a passenger elevator “as to protecting the passengers in his elevator from danger is the same as that applicable for” common carriers); Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207 , 42 N.W. 873, 873 (1889) (the owner and manager of a passenger elevator is required to use “the utmost human care and foresight”); Davidson v. Otis Elevator Co., 811 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Mo.App.1991) (owners of elevators “owe passengers the highest degree of care”); Cash v. Otis Elevator Co., 210 Mont. 319 , 684 P.2d 1041, 1043 (1984) (“[I]n the operation of an elevator, we feel the owner owes a higher degree of care.

The elevator performs the function of a common carrier in transporting people from one floor to another.”); Dailey v. Sovereign Camp, 106 Neb. 767 , 184 N.W. 920, 924 (1921) (“[T]he owner of a passenger elevator ... is subject to the same degree of care with respect to those using the elevator that is imposed upon common carriers. ... [which is] ‘the utmost diligence and care of very cautious persons, and responsibility] for the slightest neglect.’ ”); M & R Inv. Co. v. Anzalotti, 105 Nev. 224 , 773 P.2d 729, 730 (1989) (“[A]n elevator owner ‘owes a higher degree of care in performing the function of transporting people from one floor to anoth ³⁶⁹ er.’ ”); Norman v. Thomas Emery’s Sons, Inc., 7 Ohio App.2d 41 , 218 N.E.2d 480, 482 (1966) (“[A] passenger elevator is classified as a common carrier so that the duty owed to the passengers [on an automatic elevator] is to exercise the highest degree of care.... ”), rev’d on other grounds; Smith v. Munger, 532 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Okla.App.1975) (“ ‘The owner of passenger elevators owes to the passengers using the same the highest degree of care, vigilance, and precaution.’ ”); Dallas v. F.M. Oxford, Inc., 381 Pa.Super. 89 , 552 A.2d 1109 , 1113 n. 4 (1989) (the owner/operator of the elevator owes a duty of “the highest degree of care to passengers”); Willoughby v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 87 S.W.3d 509, 512 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002) (“[T]he owners and operators of elevators have an ‘obligation to passengers on elevators ... [that] is the same as that of common carriers to passengers, and ... they must use and exercise the highest degree of care and precaution.’ ”); Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297, 301 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (“[E]levator owners should be held to the common-carrier standard of care. The elevator performs the function of a common carrier by transporting people from one floor to another.”); Murphy’s Hotel v. Cuddy’s Adm’r, 124 Va. 207 , 97 S.E. 794, 797 (1919) (“[0]ne maintaining a passenger elevator in a hotel or other public building is ... a common carrier and ... ‘he is required to exercise the highest degree of care.... ’ ”); White v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 242 F.2d 821, 823 (4th Cir.1957) (applying Virginia law) (“[I]n Virginia owners of elevators are common carriers and held to the highest degree of care known to human prudence.”); Pruneda v. Otis Elevator Co., 65 Wash.App. 481 , 828 P.2d 642, 647 (1992) (owner of elevator is a common carrier who has the duty to exercise the highest degree of care); Dehmel v. Smith, 200 Wis. 292 , 227 N.W. 274, 275 (1929) (“The elevator is a common carrier of passengers, and the degree of care ... [is] the highest.... ”). In addition, California has enacted a statute that provides that one controlling or running an elevator owes a passenger the duty to use the highest standard of care.

Gomez v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.4th 1125 , 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 , 113 P.3d ³⁷⁰ 41, 44-45 (2005) (stating that California Civil Code section 2100, which requires “[a] carrier of persons for reward” to use “the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage,” applies to elevators). Although no Maryland appellate court has yet decided the issue, most (but not all) courts in this country impose the same duty upon the owners/operators of escalators as that imposed upon those who own or operate elevators. Nine states hold that the duty owed by an operator or owner of an escalator is merely to exercise ordinary care. 2 Five states, however, hold that under the common law the owner/operator of an escalator owes the passenger the highest degree of care. 3 Two states, ³⁷¹ California and Georgia, have enacted statutes imposing upon the owner/operator of an escalator the duty to use the highest degree of care. 4 In Gomez , the California Supreme Court gave a history of the genesis of the legal principle — now almost universally recognized in the United States — that common carriers owe their passengers the highest degree of care: [The] heightened duty imposed upon carriers of persons for reward stems from the English common law rule that common carriers of goods were absolutely responsible for the loss of, or damage to, such goods. (Beale, The History of the Carrier’s Liability in Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (Assn, of Am.

Law Schools, edit., ³⁷² 1909) p. 148.) Carriers of goods are bailees and, at “early law goods bailed were absolutely at the risk of the bailee.” (Ibid.) Thus, carriers of goods for reward were “ ‘responsible absolutely for the goods delivered, even when lost by theft, and regardless of negligence.’ ” (Id. at p. 149, fn. 4).... The precursor to recognizing a heightened duty of care for carriers of persons came in 1680, when an English court applied the rule regarding carriers of goods to personal property that a passenger on a stagecoach had delivered to the driver, but which the driver failed to return at the end of the journey. (Lovette v. Hobbs (1680) 89 Eng.Rep. 836.) The court rejected the argument that the driver of a stagecoach could not be a common carrier regarding property brought by a passenger, stating: “[I]f a coachman commonly carries] goods, and take[s] money for so doing, he will be in the same case with a common carrier, and is a carrier for that purpose, whether the goods are a passenger’s or a stranger’s____” (Id. at p. 837.) The extension of applying the heightened duty of care for carriers of goods to carriers of persons for reward “is probably of American origin, finding its earliest expression in 1839 in Stokes v. Saltonstall [ 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 181 , 10 L.Ed. 115 , 1839 WL 4317 (1839)].” (3 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, supra, The Nature of Negligence, § 16.14, p. 507.) In Stokes, a passenger in a stagecoach was injured when the coach was upset. The court notes that a carrier of goods was absolutely liable for the loss of or damage to such goods regardless of the cause “except the act of God, and the public enemy,” but recognized that “a contract to carry passengers differs from a contract to carry goods.” (Stokes, supra, 38 U.S. at p. 191 .) “But although he does not warrant the safety of the passengers, at all events, yet his undertaking and liability as to them, go to this extent: that he ... shall possess competent skill; and that as far as human care and foresight can go, he will transport them safely.” (Ibid.) Restating this standard, the court required ³⁷³ the driver to act “with reasonable skill, and with the utmost prudence and caution.” (Id. at p. 193.) 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 352 , 113 P.3d at 43 (footnote omitted).

Today the leading case in Maryland equating the duty owed to a passenger by the owner/operator of an elevator to that of a common carrier is still Belvidere. In Belvidere, the plaintiff, a guest at a hotel, was riding in an elevator that was manned by a Belvedere Hotel employee. 103 Md. at 526-27 , 64 A. 44 . The plaintiff was in the process of stepping out of the elevator onto the second floor when the elevator started downward, which caused the plaintiff to fall for a distance of twelve to fourteen feet. Id.

The trial judge in Belvidere instructed the jury that the hotel owed the highest degree of care toward its elevator passengers. The question addressed in Belvidere was whether that instruction was correct. The Belvidere Court said that the instruction accurately stated the law. It explained: There appears to be an entire concurrence among the standard text writers upon this subject in supporting the instruction given in this case.

Shearman and Redfield on Negligence state the law thus: “For the same reason — a regard for human life — that common carriers are required to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of their passengers, irrespective of any contract of carriage, a like degree of care is exacted of a landlord in transporting persons by elevator between the several floors of his building. He is therefore bound, to use the greatest care, not only in providing, safe and suitable cars, appliances, and machinery for control, but also in managing these means of transportation.” Vol. 2, § 719A. The passage cited from this author, § 719 in [People’s Bank v. Morgolofski, 75 Md. 432 , 23 A. 1027 (1892)], will be found to refer to elevator shafts left open as places of danger to those engaged near them, and not to the operation of the elevator itself as a means of transportation for those authorized to use it. 103 Md. at 535-36 , 64 A. 44 (some emphasis added). The Belvidere Court then proceeded to analyze cases from numerous other jurisdictions dealing with the duty owed to ³⁷⁴ passengers by the owner/operator of elevators.

Id. at 536-40 , 64 A. 44 . The Court concluded its opinion by stating that it adopted the views expressed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127 , 57 A. 356 (1904), because that decision was “grounded both in reason and authority.” Id. at 540, 57 A. 356 . The views expressed in the Fox case and adopted by the Court of Appeals were these: “The foundation of the rule for the protection of a passenger is in the undertaking of the common carrier which is to carry safely; but another reason for it is, that when the passenger commits himself to the carrier he does so in ignorance of the machinery and appliances (as well as their defects) used in connection with the means of transportation, and becomes a passive and helpless creature in the hands of the transportation company and its agents. For the same reason, this rule should be extended to those who operate elevators for carrying passengers from one story of a building to another.

When they undertake to carry they undertake to carry safely. If it is not their express agreement to do so, it is surely an implied one, and the condition of a passenger caged in a suspended car, is one not only of utter ignorance of what has been done or ought to be done for his safety, but of absolute passiveness and pitiable helplessness when confronted with danger against which human knowledge, skill and foresight ought to have guarded; and the rule has been so extended.” Id. (quoting Fox, 57 A. at 358 ). Twenty-four years after Belvidere was decided, the Court of Appeals, in Richardson , was once again called upon to examine the duty owed by an owner of an elevator toward its passengers. 158 Md. at 370-71 , 148 A. 543 .

In Richardson , the plaintiff was injured as she was about to board a self-operated elevator. Id. at 371 , 148 A. 543 . According to the plaintiff, she shoved an elevator door aside and then encountered a “second door or gate of the elevator” that barred her entrance. Id. at 370 , 148 A. 543 .

The second door had a ³⁷⁵ small knob, which the plaintiff took hold of to release the latch that controlled the entrance into the elevator car. The plaintiff testified that “she had barely touched the knob when the elevator door slammed back very rapidly, startling her, and catching her finger” in the door with such force “as to swing her around” as the door closed. Id. at 370-71 , 148 A. 543 . The plaintiff injured her fingers as a result of the action of the elevator door.

In Richardson , the Court said: The defendant was engaged in the carriage of its tenants and their servants and visitors by means of an automatic elevator, which was operated by those using it without any assistance, direction, or supervision by the defendant. It was an economical method to cast the burden of its operation upon those having occasion to go to and from the several apartments of the six storied building, but the knowledge of the defendant that it would be run by a number of persons, who would represent a wide range of age, experience, intelligence, and capacity, cast upon the defendant all the more care in the selection and maintenance of the mechanical device which was adopted by this general service. The rule approved by this court is that the landlord engaged in transporting passengers by elevators must exercise great care not only in their operation but in providing safe and suitable equipment. It is a rule which has its sanction in sound public policy, which exacts a high degree of care where security of person and life is frequently involved, under circumstances in which the carrier is in control of the movement or of the equipment.

Belvidere Bldg. Co. v. Bryan, 103 Md. 514, 534-540 , 64 A. 44 ; Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (6th Ed.), § 719a and notes; Cooley on Torts (3rd Ed.), p. 1378. The smallness of the knob and its closeness to the upright would naturally cause the fingers of the hand of the user to project and be caught and injured between the closing laths of the collapsible door, provided their movement was so rapid as not to afford a warning and opportunity for the ³⁷⁶ user to let go the knob and withdraw the fingers in time to avoid injury. Id. at 371, 148 A. 543 (emphasis added).

In O’Neill, the plaintiff was in the defendant’s store when she decided to exit an elevator that had been stopped by a store employee at the third floor. 172 Md. at 57 , 190 A. 763 . The floor of the elevator car, however, was approximately four inches above the level of the third floor. Id. According to the plaintiff, as she lifted her right foot to step to the floor of the building, the elevator dropped suddenly, causing plaintiff to lose her balance and to fall in such a manner as to cause the lower part of her back to strike the elevator car.

Id. The Court, citing Belvidere, various text writers, and precedent from other states, said: Many authorities hold that one operating a passenger elevator is a common carrier, and the rule seems almost universal that the degree of care due by the owner of a passenger elevator to those who are expressly or impliedly invited to ride therein is similar to that which a common carrier owes its passengers. Id. at 60 , 190 A. 763 . The O’Neill Court went on to say that “the carrier of a person by elevator is required to exercise the highest degree of care and diligence to prevent injury to such person,” id., and that, in light of the rule set forth in Belvidere, the question as to the applicable duty of care was no longer “an open one in this state.” Id. at 61 , 190 A. 763 .

In the subject case, Johns Hopkins argues: [T]he application of a common carrier theory of liability to modern building owners is no longer appropriate. Such a heightened standard of care may have been appropriate one hundred years ago when Belvidere decided the question as a matter of first impression. However, advancements in the elevator industry and distinctions between elevator owners and common carriers have dissolved many of the justifications for holding elevator owners to the heightened standard applicable to common carriers. ³⁷⁷ ... [C]ommon carrier liability is no longer appropriate for elevator owners because human attendants have been replaced by automatic elevators. In the past, the presence of human attendants justified a heightened standard of liability for elevator owners in two respects.

First, elevator attendants were hired, trained, and supervised by the building’s owner, and acted as agents of the building owners. When elevators were operated by persons analogous to bus drivers, taxi drivers, or locomotive engineers, elevator owners bore more similarity to common carriers. Additionally, the presence of human attendants raised the risk of operation by introducing the element of human error. Today, the invention of the automatic elevator has eliminated the nexus between the elevator owner and the active negligence of the human attendant.

The passenger elevator was first made possible in 1853 when Elisha Otis invented a safety clamp that prevented elevator cars from falling if the hoist rope broke. 8 New Encyclopedia Britannica 1042 (1995). The first such elevator was installed in a building in the United States in 1857, about forty-nine years prior to the Belvidere decision. Id. See also Dallas Mkt.

Ctr. Dev. Co. v. Liedeker, 958 S.W.2d at 384 . As Johns Hopkins stresses, there have been many scientific advancements in elevator technology in the last century.

But we fail to see why advancement in elevator technology should reduce the duty owed by owners/operators of elevators to elevator passengers. Such scientific advancements have not changed the fact that an elevator, if not maintained and operated with the highest degree of care, is now, as it was when Belvidere was decided, “in many respects a dangerous machine.” Belvidere, 103 Md. 514 , 64 A. 44 . Moreover, the fact that technology has improved in the last century does not impact upon the main reasons the Belvidere rule was adopted in the first place, i.e., in almost all cases when a passenger steps into an elevator, he or she does so in ignorance of any defects that might exist in the appliance and is “a passive and ³⁷⁸ helpless creature in the hands of the” owner/operator of the device. Id. 5 At the time Belvidere was decided, the highest degree of care was almost universally imposed in the United States on common carriers who transported human passengers.

Since then, motor buses have replaced the stage coach, taxi cabs have replaced Hanson cabs, and overall transportation and safety technology has improved exponentially. Yet the duty owed by the common carrier to its passengers has remained constant. This being so, we can see no principled reason why the duty owed to an elevator passenger should be reduced simply because of technological advances. We agree with appellant’s point that, unlike the situation existing one hundred years ago when the Belvidere case was decided, almost all elevators in this country are now self-operated.

We disagree, however, with Johns Hopkins’ contention that the presence of a human elevator attendant in Belvidere constituted, in part, justification for the higher standard of care enunciated in that case. First, the higher standard of care mentioned in Belvidere was said to be imposed not only upon the elevator attendant but also upon the owner of the elevator who was required to “use the greatest care” in providing “safe and suitable cars, appliances, and machinery.” 103 Md. at 535 , 64 A. 44 . This point was reinforced in Richardson , decided about seventy-five years ago, which dealt with a plaintiff injured while entering onto a self-operated elevator. 158 Md. at 371 , 148 A. 543 . In the Richardson case, the Court of Appeals affirmed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and in doing so held that the elevator owner owed the highest degree of care not only in the operation of the elevator but also “in providing safe and suitable equipment.” Id.

That holding is important in this case because the primary act of negligence alleged against ³⁷⁹ Johns Hopkins was that it did not provide safe and suitable equipment. The Ohio Court of Appeals has ruled that the duty to exercise the highest degree of care is even more exacting in the case of automatic elevators because of their distinguishing features from manually operated elevators designed to be run by an attendant, where the automatic elevator is designed to be operated by its passengers without the assistance of a trained attendant, and because of these automatic features it is said that operating owners and ones under contract to service and inspect must act with a higher degree of care. Norman v. Thomas Emery’s Sons, Inc., 7 Ohio App.2d 41 , 218 N.E.2d 480, 482 (1966). We need not go so far as the Ohio Court of Appeals did in Norman .

For our purposes, it suffices to say that we can see no good reason to reduce the duty owed by the owner of an elevator simply because the elevator installed is automatic rather than one operated by an attendant. Appellant next argues that common carrier liability is now inappropriate because building owners no longer service and maintain their elevators. In this regard, Johns Hopkins stresses that it paid co-defendant Schindler Elevator Company, a licensed elevator contractor, $36,000.00 per month to ensure that the elevators on its property operated safety and effectively; moreover, argues appellant, Johns Hopkins, at the time of the accident, “was not an expert in the inspection, maintenance, repair, replacement, or safety of [its] elevators.” By contrast, according to appellant, when Belvidere was decided, the Court was addressing a situation where the owner of the premises, the Belvedere Hotel, had its own engineer who maintained the elevators and was on duty at the time of the accident. See Belvidere, 103 Md. at 530 , 64 A. 44 .

While Johns Hopkins does not say so directly, it impliedly argues that the duty to use the highest degree of care should be held to be delegable because it, unlike the licensed elevator contractor it hired, does not have the requisite expertise to ³⁸⁰ perform the necessary elevator maintenance and repair. While it may be true that Johns Hopkins is lacking in expertise — as far as elevator maintenance is concerned — it does not follow logically that it therefore does not have the duty of exercising the highest duty of care. Appellant cites no case from any jurisdiction standing for the proposition that the higher duty of care is owed only in situations where the elevator owner performs its own maintenance and repair. Moreover, we can see no appropriate reason for such a rule, inasmuch as, in many elevator cases (including the one sub judice), one of the acts of negligence alleged against the owner/ operator is that the defendant failed to call in an expert to fix the elevator after it was put on notice that the elevator was malfunctioning. 6 Additionally, in a number of cases from sister jurisdictions, which apply the same rule as set forth in Belvidere , the Court has held that the owners/operators had the duty to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of their passengers, even though, in those cases, the owner had hired third parties to perform elevator maintenance work.

See Little Rock Land Co. v. Raper, 433 S.W.2d at 840 ; Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 364 S.W.2d at 339 ; Otis Elevator Co. v. Seale, 334 F.2d at 929 (applying Louisiana law); Cash v. Otis Elevator Co., 684 P.2d at 1042 ; M & R Inv. Co. v. Anzalotti, 773 P.2d at 730 ; Norman v. Thomas Emery’s Sons, Inc., 218 N.E.2d at 481 ; and Smith v. Munger, 532 P.2d at 1203-04 .

For the foregoing reasons, we reject Johns Hopkins’ argument that the rule first enunciated in Belvidere should be either overruled or modified simply because the owner/operator of the elevator has contracted with a third party to maintain and repair that device. ³⁸¹ Johns Hopkins also argues that the Belvidere rule should be overruled because “elevator transport shares little in common with carriers.” Appellant’s argument continues: Maryland courts emphasize that common carriers are of a “public” nature; they have variously been described as satisfying an “urgent public need” serving the public “indiscriminately” and “affect[ing] the public interest.” Gunther v. Smith, 78 Md.App. 508, 510 , 553 A.2d 1314 ... (1989).... Additionally, common carriers are obligated to “serve all who apply.” Id. In contrast, Johns Hopkins is a private institution.

Although Johns Hopkins elevators may well serve a large number of people, Johns Hopkins does not undertake to transport the public in the manner of a common carrier. Additionally, unlike common carriers, elevator owners do not charge fares. Maryland case law has noted that the heightened standard available to common carriers arises in part from the fact that the passenger compensates the carrier for safe passage, thus creating a “contract of transportation.” St. Michelle v. Catania, 252 Md. 647, 654 , 250 A.2d 874 ... (1969) (plaintiff who was robbed and raped by taxicab driver was deemed a passenger because contract of transportation had not been completed); Ragonese v. Hilferty, 231 Md. 520, 526 , 191 A.2d 422 ...

(1963) (compensated carrier owes the highest degree of care to their passengers); Belvidere[,] 103 Md. at 539 , 64 A. 44 ... (owner of building and elevator receive no compensation for transporting passengers and was not a common carrier). Arguably at least, it may be true, as Johns Hopkins contends, that “elevator transport shares little in common with [common] carriers.” There is usually no contract of carriage, fares are almost never charged, and ofttimes the public at large is not invited into the facility where the elevators are located. But the same was true when Belvidere was decided.

Moreover, it should be noted that the Belvidere Court specifically said that the owner/operator of an elevator was not a common carrier. 103 Md. at 539 , 64 A. 44 . The court’s reference to common carrier liability plainly was made in ³⁸² order to show that the duties undertaken by the owner/operator of an elevator were the same as the responsibilities undertaken by a common carrier, and thus each should have a similar duty to protect their passengers from harm. Id. at 540 , 64 A. 44 (quoting Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127 , 57 A. 356 (1904)). See also language used by the Belvidere Court at 103 Md. at 535 , 64 A. 44 (“For the same reason — a regard for human life — that common carriers are required to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of their passengers irrespective of any contract of carriage — a like degree of care is exacted of a landlord in transporting persons by elevator between the several floors of his building.”).

Johns Hopkins also claims that the higher duty of care set forth in Belvidere should be abandoned because that standard “has been applied to elevator owners [only] in a limited number of cases since its inception.” This argument is unpersuasive. Unless a case can be distinguished on its facts, this Court does not have the option of disregarding Court of Appeals’ decisions that have not been overruled, no matter how old the precedent may be. Appellant’s penultimate assertion concerning the court’s instruction is that “there is case law in Maryland supporting the proposition that the duty of an elevator owner to a passenger is that owed by a property owner to an invitee.” Johns Hopkins points out that in the case of Swann v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 95 Md.App. 365 , 620 A.2d 989 (1993), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann, 334 Md. 231 , 638 A.2d 762 (1994), the jury was instructed that the elevator owner owed the plaintiff/invitee the duty of reasonable care.

Id. at 416, 638 A.2d 762 . In the course of a forty-nine page opinion, “[w]e perceive[d] no error” in giving the aforementioned instruction. Id. at 417, 638 A.2d 762 . The “[w]e perceive no error” statement was made in response to the plaintiffs’ contention that the court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that the property owner had “a non-delegable duty to correct all unreasonable risks, or to warn invitees of them, if they knew ³⁸³ or should have known of such risks.” Id. at 416, 638 A.2d 762 .

Johns Hopkins maintains that the statement by the Swann Court implies that the rule set forth in Belvidere was considered to be no longer applicable. That argument has no merit. Plaintiffs’ attorney in Swann never suggested that the rule first enunciated in Belvidere should be followed, and Belvidere and its progeny was not even mentioned in our opinion. Under such circumstances, the “we perceive no error” statement was non-binding dicta insofar as the Belvidere rule is concerned.

Lastly, Johns Hopkins contends that the instruction given by the trial judge concerning the heightened standard of care was bound to have confused the jury because the court also instructed as follows: Now, an invitee is a person who is invited or permitted to be on another person’s property for purposes related to the owner or occupant’s business. The duty owed to an invitee is reasonable care to see that the portions of the property which the invitee may be expected to use are safe. Appellant’s counsel never contended at trial that the instructions were confusing. Thus, this issue is not preserved for review.

See Md. Rule 2-520(e) (“No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.”). In summary, we hold that in Maryland the legal principles first enunciated in Belvidere are still applicable. The owner of an elevator presently owes passengers the duty to exercise the highest degree of care and skill in operating and maintaining the device. The trial judge did not err in instructing the jury as to the duty owed by Johns Hopkins to Mrs. Correia.

II

Johns Hopkins also contends that on several occasions the trial court committed reversible error in allowing plaintiffs’ ³⁸⁴ counsel to ask questions that should have been disallowed and in denying its motion for mistrial. The facts set forth in Section A below are pertinent to those issues. A. Johns Hopkins, at all times here relevant, owned and operated 120 elevators. Four of those elevators were in the Nelson Building, which was located on the East Campus of Johns Hopkins Hospital.

For several years prior to July 1, 2000, appellant’s elevators were maintained by Montgomery Kone Elevator Company. In the spring of 2000, however, Johns Hopkins put out for competitive bidding a contract for the maintenance of the elevators. The successful bidder was Millar Elevator Service Company, now known as Schindler Elevator Company (referred to hereinafter as “Schindler”). Schindler took over maintenance of the elevators on July 1, 2000, which was approximately two months before Mrs. Correia’s accident.

Prior to the acceptance of its bid, Schindler proposed to install new equipment in the four Nelson Budding elevators. The exact work to be performed was not mentioned, however, nor was a specific price set. On August 30, 2000, Jane Correia was a passenger on Elevator No. 2 in the Nelson Building. This slow-speed (357 feet per minute) elevator was descending from the fifth to the first floor when it came to an unexpected and abrupt stop.

Mrs. Correia, who had previous back problems, immediately complained of significant pain in her back due to the jolt she received as a result of the stop. She was taken by wheelchair to the Johns Hopkins Emergency Room and later underwent surgeries due to injuries she claimed were caused by the elevator’s malfunction. Sometime in September 2000, two representatives of Schindler inspected the four elevators in the Nelson Building. 7 The ³⁸⁵ inspection was not as a result of Mrs. Correia’s accident. Instead, the inspection was made as a follow-up to the proposal Schindler made before it was awarded the maintenance contract by Johns Hopkins.

The purpose of the inspection was to allow Schindler to make a proposal concerning what upgrades were needed in the four Nelson elevators, to specify the exact work that needed to be performed, and to propose a price. One of Schindler’s representatives who inspected the elevators in September 2000 was Charles Stump (“Stump”). He supervised other Schindler mechanics who worked at Johns Hopkins to make sure they did their jobs properly, and he was Schindler’s man in charge of the elevators at Johns Hopkins. When Stump made his September 2000 inspection, he did so in the company of one of Schindler’s elevator mechanics.

After the inspection, Stump prepared an “upgrade/repair proposal” and sent it to Johns Hopkins on October 6, 2000 — about five weeks after the subject accident. This upgrade/repair proposal (hereafter “the October 6 report”) was marked for identification at trial as plaintiffs’ Exhibit 54. It was not, however, introduced into evidence. At trial, Stump was asked numerous questions about the observations he had made concerning the four Nelson elevators as reflected in the October 6 report.

In the excerpt from the report set forth below, we have emphasized the portion of plaintiffs’ Exhibit 54 about which Stump was asked questions: REPLACE CAR DOOR GIBS The [elevator] car door gibs, which are what guide the door panel in alignment, are very worn or damaged. These gibs should be replaced with new ones to prevent car door problems and costly repairs. REPLACE CAR DOOR HANGERS Your elevator car door hangers are worn, damaged or do not meet current safety standards. To meet code and avoid ³⁸⁶ undue and costly breakdowns, they should be replaced with modern hangers.

REPLACE CAR DOOR CLUTCH The existing car door clutch assembly shall be replaced in order to facilitate the installation of the new door operator and associated equipment. HOISTWAY: REPLACE DOOR OPERATOR Your door operator no longer meets safety code. It is worn■, damaged and components are becoming increasingly more difficult to obtain due to [obsolescence]. To achieve reliable as well as safe operation, your existing door operator should be replaced with a current model.

REPLACE HOISTWAY DOOR INTERLOCKS The present interlocks are damaged, or do not comply with current code requirements. This presents a potential safety hazard. The interlocks should be replaced with new ones. REPLACE HOISTWAY DOOR HANGERS The present door hangers are worn, damaged or do not meet current safety standards.

They should be replaced with hangers conforming to current code requirements. REPLACE HOISTWAY DOOR GIBS The present door gibs, which are what guide and hold the door panel in alignment, are worn or damaged. To avoid door opening/closing problems, new gibs should be installed. (Emphasis added.) At trial, Patrick McPartland, an elevator expert called by plaintiffs, explained that an elevator interlock device is a mechanism that insures that the