Johns Hopkins University v. Pinckney
Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. By the fourth clause of his will, the testator directed his executors to invest the sum of ten thousand dollars in some safe secui’ity, and to pay the income thereof annually to Theodora Pinckney, so long as she remained unmarried. “ My object,” says the testator, “in giving this 380 legacy, is to show my grateful sense of the Christian sympathy in my sufferings, of one met in Rome several years since, and to testify to the influence for good of her inculcation and practice of the precepts of divine truth, in strengthening my efforts to seek the kingdom of G-od and his righteousness.” The will was executed at Madrid, in Spain, on the 17th of May, 1873. After his return to this country, the testator on the 26th of February, 1876, made the following codicil: “ First. I revoke all devises and bequests given by me to my son, Claude Baxley, therein, absolutely, and in lieu thereof, I devise to him all my real estate for life; after his death, then to go to the trustees of the Johns Hopkins University, for them therewith to endow any medical professorship therein, they may think proper. “Secondly.
I bequeath to my brother, J. Brown Baxley, in lieu of the $1000 in said will given, the sum of $5000 for life; after his death, to go to said trustees of said University for said purpose. “ Thirdly. I bequeath the $15,000 in bonds in my box in bank and the money on deposit in the banking house of J. S. Grittings & Co., and any other personalty of which I am possessed, to the said trustees of said University for said purpose, hereby republishing said will in every other respect.” The question in this appeal, is whether the codicil revokes the legacy of $10,000 to Miss Pinckney, in the fourth clause of the will ? In determining the question of revocation of a will by a codicil, all the cases agree: 1st. That the codicil does not operate as a revocation of a devise or bequest in a will, unless there is an express clause of revocation, or unless the provisions in the codicil, are so inconsistent with the will, that the two cannot stand together. 381 2nd.
If revocation is to be implied from inconsistent provisions, it will be limited to such provisions of the will, as are plainly inconsistent with the codicil. 3rd. Where the devise or bequest in the will, is clear and free from doubt, the intention to revoke by the codicil, must be equally clear and explicit. Jones vs. Earle, Ex’r, 1 Gill, 395 ; Lee vs. Pindle, 12 G. & J., 305 ; Douglas vs. Blackford, 7 Md., 8 ; Doe vs. Hicks, 8 Bing., 475 ; 1 Cl. & Fin., 20; Alexander vs. Alexander, 6 De G., M. & G., 593; Agnew vs. Pope, 1 De G. & J., 49; Patch vs. Graves, 3 Drew, 348; Williams’ Ex’rs, (6th Am. Ed., 220;) 4 Kent, 531.
The governing principle which lies at the bottom of these well settled rules, is the intention of the testator, to be ascertained from the face of the will and codicil, construed as one instrument. Apart from these general rules, where the question is one of intention, judicial decisions in other cases, afford but little assistance in the construction of testamentary papers, because it rarely happens, that two wills are expressed precisely in the same language. Tested by these general principles, the question here is whether the gift to Miss Pinckney is revoked by the codicil. So far as the will is concerned, there is no doubt of the testator’s intention to give to her the interest on $10,000 during her single life.
This is declared in plain and explicit terms, and the impulse which prompted the bestowal of it, is expressed with unusual earnestness and force. It will not be contended there is any clause in the codicil expressly revoking this gift. The testator does revoke in express terms the devises and bequests to his son Glaude', and in lieu thereof, he gives to him a life estate in the realty, with remainder to the trustees of the University. He also modifies the provision in favor of his brother, J. Brown Baxley, and in lieu of the $1000, gives him $5000 382 for life, and after his death the $5000 to the University.
There is no reference whatever to the legacy to Miss Pinckney, and if it he revoked at all, it must he by the operation of the last clause in the codicil, in which he gives the $5000 in bonds, and his monej'' on deposit, and such other personalty of which he was possessed at the time of his death to the University. Standing alone, this clause might he construed as a bequest of all other personal property belonging to the testator, not otherwise disposed of by the
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