Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore

ARRIE W. DAVIS (Retired, Specially Assigned), J. The following opening remarks by Judge Hollander, writing for this Court in Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Ernest A. Johnson, 156 Md.App. 569, 572-73 , 847 A.2d 1190 (2004) (footnote omitted), aff'd, 387 Md. 1 , 874 A.2d 439 (2005), provide an excellent introduction for our discussion in the instant case: A retired firefighter who is also disabled as a result of an occupational disease is entitled under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”) to collect both service pension benefits and compensation benefits, in a sum not to exceed the firefighter’s weekly salary. Polomski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 344 Md. 70 , 684 A.2d 1338 (1996). In this appeal, we must determine whether a firefighter’s surviving, dependent spouse is similarly entitled to collect both service related pension benefits and workers’ compensation benefits when the firefighter’s death results ⁶⁷⁹ from an occupational disease. Resolution of the case requires us to construe several provisions of the Labor and Employment Article (“L.E.”) of the Maryland Code (1991, 1999 RepLVol., 2003 Supp.).

Mrs. Johnson claims that, pursuant to L.E. § 9-503(e), she is also entitled to collect workers’ compensation benefits, so long as the total amount does not exceed Mr. Johnson’s average weekly wage at the time of his death. In Johnson, the surviving wholly dependent spouse of Ernest Johnson was ruled to be ineligible for dual benefits. The legislative response to the Ernest Johnson case is the starting point for the similar quest for dual benefits by the surviving wholly dependent spouse of another first responder. This is an appeal by Janice T. Johnson, claimant, from the decision by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reversing an award of survivor’s benefits by a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission. 1 Claimant seeks the same relief that was denied Mrs. Ernest Johnson in the above-referenced, celebrated case, but avers that the General Assembly has stepped in to remedy deficiencies in the Workers’ Compensation Act that led to the denial of dual recovery in the Ernest A. Johnson case. 2 We have jurisdiction to consider whether claimant is entitled to collect both the pension for the employee’s time of service as well as her survivor’s compensation ⁶⁸⁰ benefits, and thus avoid the effect of the Act’s general offset provision. 3 For the reasons set forth below, we shall hold that appellant is not so entitled, because amendments to the provision at issue may not apply retroactively, and we shall therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE The employee, Felix L. Johnson, Jr., served as a firefighter for the City of Baltimore from October 13, 1964 until his retirement on June 9, 1990. On July 2, 1990, the employee and claimant were married. On November 7, 2005, the em ⁶⁸¹ ployee died due to a myocardial infarction. Claimant began receiving pension survivorship benefits at the rate of $266.92 per week.

On January 10, 2006, claimant filed a dependent’s claim for death benefits under the Act. She alleged that the employee’s demise from “heart disease resulting in death” was due to the fact that he had been “continuously exposed to heat, smoke, noxious fumes and the product of combustion[.]” On October 1, 2009, the claim went to a hearing before the Workers’ Compensation Commission. On December 4, the Commission awarded benefits to the claimant. This Order was amended on February 26, 2010 to effect a nominal change in the amount of the award.

In the Amended Award, the Commission first ruled that the employee sustained an occupational disease and that he died as a result thereof on November 7, 2005. The Commission further ruled that claimant was “wholly dependent” upon the employee for support and also concluded that the “Employer and Insurer are entitled to a set off under Section 9-503 of the Labor Article.” 4 The effect of the Commission’s application of the specific offset provision set forth in Section 9-503(e) was to enhance claimants total recovery and to avoid the dollar for dollar offset at Section 9-610. See Md.Code (1991, 1999 RepLVol. 2007 Supp.), §§ 9-503(e), 9-610 of the Labor and Employment Article (“LE” or Act). ⁶⁸² The Employer petitioned for judicial review of the Commission’s award in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. See Section 9-737 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, Md. Code (1999, 2008 ReplVol., 2009 Supp.), § 9-737 of the Labor and Employment Article.

Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the circuit court. Md. Rule 2-501. On September 1, 2010, following a hearing on these motions, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the Employer and also denied appellant’s motion. 5 This timely appeal followed. Discussion Standard of Review We recently pointed out that “[ajppellate scrutiny of a workers’ compensation decision depends upon the manner of the circuit court’s judicial review of the Commission’s decision.” Doe v. Buccini Pollin Grp., Inc., 201 Md.App. 409, 419 , 29 A.3d 999 (2011).

We there cited to “two modalities of judicial review,” viz. a review on the existing record generated before the Commission and a “new evidentiary hearing and decision before a jury[.]” Id. (quoting Baltimore County v. Kelly, 391 Md. 64, 67-68 , 891 A.2d 1103 (2006)). These approaches are embodied in LE § 9-745, which articulates the manner by which judicial proceedings are to be conducted. 6 ⁶⁸³ In the case before us, the issue was joined and decided on cross-motions for summary judgment. Where the case is in this appellate posture, our review of the circuit court’s judgment is plenary, see Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab.

Ltd. P’ship, 375 Md. 522, 533 , 826 A.2d 443 (2003), because a resolution on summary judgment is one of law, and, as Judge Greene recently pointed out for the Court of Appeals, an appellate court reviews the summary judgment decision of the circuit court “for legal correctness.” Wed Mart Stores, Inc. v. Holmes, 416 Md. 346, 358 , 7 A.3d 13 (2010). See Muskin v. State Dep’t of Assessments and Taxation, 422 Md. 544, 554-55 , 30 A.3d 962 (2011); Chesek v. Jones, 406 Md. 446, 458 , 959 A.2d 795 (2008); Doe v. Buccini, supra, 201 Md.App. at 420 , 29 A.3d 999 (review of conclusions of law de novo). Judicial review of agency decisions is constrained. Although we accord due respect for the Commission’s interpretation of its organic statute, see Wal Mart v. Holmes, supra, 416 Md. at 359 , 7 A.3d 13 ; cf. Kim v. Maryland State Board of Physicians, 423 Md. 523, 537 , 32 A.3d 30 (2011) (deference to agency interpretation of own regulations), and are mindful that the Commission’s decision is “presumed to be prima facie correct,” LE § 9—745(b)(1); Kim, 423 Md. at 536 , 32 A.3d 30 “this presumption does not extend to questions of law, which we review independently.” Montgomery County v. ⁶⁸⁴ Deibler, 423 Md. 54, 60 , 31 A.3d 191 (2011) (citing Wal Mart v. Holmes, supra, 416 Md. at 357 , 7 A.3d 13 ).

Introduction—First Principles The fundamental purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act “is to ‘provide employees with compensation for loss of earning capacity, regardless of fault, resulting from accidental injury ... occurring in the course of employment.’ ”... The Act’s principle objective of compensating the injured worker “pursuant to the statutory plan for disabilities which are occupationally related” is its “centerline.” See Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. Humphreys, Jr., Maryland Workers’ Compensation Law, § 2.02 at 2-2 (3d ed.2007). Doe v. Buccini, supra, 201 Md.App. at 420 , 29 A.3d 999 (citation omitted). Such legislation is remedial and it is to be “ ‘construed as liberally in favor of the injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes.’ ” Deibler, 423 Md. at 61 , 31 A.3d 191 (quoting Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 724 , 882 A.2d 817 (2005)).

See Cambridge Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 248, 252-53 , 153 A. 283 (1931) (articulating “philosophy” of the Act). We likewise recognize that worker’s compensation legislation strikes a balance between the competing interests of both employees and employers, Doe v. Buccini, 201 Md.App. at 420 , 29 A.3d 999 because of the “ ‘need to provide some form of financial benefits to the injured or sick employees and the need, of both employers and employees, to avoid expensive and unpredictable litigation over accidents in the workplace.’ ” Sanchez v. Potomac Abatement, Inc., 417 Md. 76 , 82 n. 4, 8 A.3d 737 (2010) (quoting DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 342 Md. 432, 438 , 677 A.2d 73 (1996)). See Polomski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 76-77, 83 , 684 A.2d 1338 (1996) (noting diverse interests).

Nonetheless, courts are enjoined to construe workers’ compensation legislation liberally. See Keystone Masonry Corp. v. Hernandez, 156 Md.App. 496, 513 , 847 A.2d 493 (2004). ⁶⁸⁵ LE §§ 9-502, 9-503—The Occupational Disease Provisions An “occupational disease” has been defined as “one which arises from causes incident to the profession or labor of the party’s occupation or calling. It has its origin in the inherent nature or mode of work of the profession or industry, and it is the usual result or concomitant.” 7 Polomski, 344 Md. at 78 n. 8, 684 A.2d 1338 (quoting Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 379 , 128 A. 635 (1925)). Although the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act in roughly its present form dates from 1914, see 1914 Md. Laws Chap. 800, the first occupational disease provisions did not appear in the Statute until May 24, 1939, when they were added to the Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Act. 8 1939 Laws of Maryland, Chap. 465.

See J. Nicholas Shriver, Jr., The Maryland Occupational Disease Law, 4 Md. L.Rev. 133, 135, 139 (1940). See also Polomski, 344 Md. at 77-78 , 684 A.2d 1338 . The Act was again amended in 1951 to provide that all occupational diseases were compensable, provided that a claimant could establish a nexus between the disease and his or her employment. 1951 Laws of Md., Chap. 287 § 22(a). 9 ⁶⁸⁶ Section 9-502 of the Labor and Employment Article sets forth the compensation provisions for occupational diseases. LE §§ 9-502(a)-(d) provide: (a) In this section, “disablement” means the event of a covered employee becoming partially or totally incapacitated: (1) because of an occupational disease; and (2) from performing the work of the covered employee in the last occupation in which the covered employee was injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease.

(b) Subsection (c) of this section applies only to: (1) the employer in whose employment the covered employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease; and (2) the insurer liable for the risk when the covered employee, while employed by the employer, was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease. (c) Subject to subsection (d) of this section and except as otherwise provided, an employer and insurer to whom this subsection applies shall provide compensation in accordance with this title to: (1) a covered employee of the employer for disability of the covered employee resulting from an occupational disease; or ⁶⁸⁷ (2) the dependents of the covered employee for death of the covered employee resulting from an occupational disease. (d) An employer and insurer are liable to provide compensation under subsection (c) of this section only if: (1) the occupational disease that caused the death or disability: (1) is due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist and the covered employee was employed before the date of disablement; or (ii) has manifestations that are consistent with those known to result from exposure to a biological, chemical, or physical agent that is attributable to the type of employment in which the covered employee was employed before the date of disablement; and (2) on the weight of the evidence, it reasonably may be concluded that the occupational disease was incurred as a result of the employment of the covered employee. In Polomski , the Court of Appeals observed that the Genera] Assembly in 1971 addressed the need for legislation that accounted for increased risks from occupational disease for certain public employees—initially fire fighters—who faced especial hazards due to the risks and demands of their profession: A little more than three decades after its formal recognition of occupational diseases, the General Assembly turned its attention to certain fire fighters, concluding that they were susceptible to diseases formerly not recognized as occupational.

See Board of County Comm’rs for Prince George’s County v. Colgan, 274 Md. 193, 208 , 334 A.2d 89, 97 (1975)(holding that the Legislature may properly determine that fire fighters are exposed to health hazards not shared by other government employees); Soper [v. Montgomery County,] supra, 294 Md. [331] at 335-36, 449 A.2d [1158] at 1160 [ (1982) ]. By Chapter 695 of the Acts of 1971, the Legislature amended the Act and granted a ⁶⁸⁸ presumption of compensability in favor of certain classes of fire fighters suffering from heart or lung disease, or hypertension ____The amendment was first codified as Md.Code (1957, 1971 Cum.Supp.), Article 101, § 64A. In 1972, the scope of § 64A was expanded to include certain police officers as well, Ch. 282 of the Acts of 1972, and is currently codified and amended as § 9-503(a)-(b). Polomski, 344 Md. at 78 , 684 A.2d 1338 .

In its present form, LE § 9-503(a) thus accords “special treatment to employees in particular professions” who are afflicted with certain enumerated occupational diseases by creating a presumption of compensability for workers such as firefighters, police officers and other employees in certain occupations. 10 See [Ernest ] Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 387 Md. 1, 15 , 874 A.2d 439 (2005). Of particular relevance, LE § 9-503(a) provides: (a) A paid firefighter, paid fire fighting instructor, or sworn member of the Office of the State Fire Marshal employed by an airport authority, a county, a fire control district, a municipality, or the State or a volunteer firefighter, volunteer fire fighting instructor, volunteer rescue squad member, or volunteer advanced life support unit member who is a covered employee under § 9-234 of this title is presumed to have an occupational disease that was suffered in the line of duty and is compensable under this title if: (1) the individual has heart disease, hypertension, or lung disease; (2) the heart disease, hypertension, or lung disease results in partial or total disability or death; and (3) in the case of a volunteer firefighter, volunteer fire fighting instructor, volunteer rescue squad member, or volunteer advanced life support unit member, the individ ⁶⁸⁹ ual has met a suitable standard of physical examination before becoming a firefighter, fire fighting instructor, rescue squad member, or advanced life support unit member. Md.Code (1991, 2008 RepLVol., 2009 Supp.), § 9-503(a) of the Labor & Employment Article. The offset provision at LE § 9-503(e) in turn now permits the recovery of dual benefits, subject to the amount capped by the employee’s weekly salary, as follows: (e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any paid firefighter ... who is eligible for benefits under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section or the dependents of those individuals shall receive the benefits in addition to any benefits that the individual or the dependents of the individual are entitled to receive under the retirement system in which the individual was a participant at the time of the claim.

(2) The benefits received under this title shall be adjusted so that the weekly total of those benefits and retirement benefits does not exceed the weekly salary that was paid to the ... firefighter[.] LE § 9-503(e) (emphasis added). The emphasized language reflects an amendment to Section 9-503(e) that extends the dual recovery to qualified surviving dependents. See 2007 Md. Laws, Chaps. 350, 351. This is the measure of recovery that has been sought by claimant in the case before us, and had been claimed unsuccessfully by Mrs. Ernest Johnson in 2005.

We first review the decisions from this Court and the Court of Appeals in Ernest Johnson v. Mayor & City Council that provide a context for claimant’s attempt to recover dual benefits subject only to the LE § 9--503(e)(2) offset. Ernest Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City Ernest Johnson (no relation to the firefighter in the case before us), had served as a Baltimore City firefighter for thirty-two years. He was diagnosed with colon cancer, and died from that disease on March 11, 1994. There was no ⁶⁹⁰ dispute that his illness constituted an occupational disease, or that Mrs. Ernest Johnson was a wholly dependent survivor.

She began receiving a service pension benefit from the City. She also filed a claim for survivor’s benefits under the Worker’s Compensation Act. Both the Workers’ Compensation Commission and the circuit court concluded that Mrs. Johnson was entitled to both the pension and the compensation benefits, subject to a set-off as provided in LE § 9—503(e)(2), which capped the total weekly recovery in the amount of the firefighter’s weekly salary, instead of the dollar-for-dollar offset directed by LE § 9-610, the Act’s general offset provision. The City appealed to this Court, which reversed.

Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. [Ernest ] Johnson, 156 Md.App. 569 , 847 A.2d 1190 (2004), aff'd, 387 Md. 1 , 874 A.2d 439 (2005). There, we recognized the “core values” of workers’ compensation legislation, as well as the liberal construction required to ascertain a statute’s meaning, id., 156 Md.App. at 594, 847 A.2d 1190 , but cautioned that we may not “stifle the plain meaning of the Act, or exceed its purposes, [just] so that the injured worker may prevail.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We further noted that “the Act has a purpose broader than serving the interests of employers and their employees ...

The needs and expectations of society, in addition to those of the work force, come into play.” Id. at 595 , 847 A.2d 1190 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming that the General Assembly had inadvertently omitted language offering dual recovery in favor of dependents, we pointed out that, “[w]hen an omission in the language of a statute ... appeared to be the obvious result of inadvertence, a court may not invade the function of the legislature by reading missing language into a statute[.]” 11 Id., 156 Md.App. at 596, 847 A.2d 1190 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ⁶⁹¹ The Court of Appeals affirmed. In so doing, the Court emphasized that a court may not “assume authority to read into the Act what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out.” [Ernest ] Johnson, 387 Md. at 14 , 874 A.2d 439 . In ruling that the language of LE § 9~503(e) of the Act as written was unambiguous, and that there was no basis to conclude that the dependents of deceased firefighters would be entitled to dual benefits, the Court explained: The “preferential treatment” for firefighters ... does not pertain to the provision for dual benefits found in § 9-503(e)....

The dependents of deceased firefighters, along with living firefighters, are entitled to that statutory presumption of compensability if the firefighters suffer from one of the diseases mentioned in § 9-503. That does not mean, however, that the dependents of deceased firefighters are entitled to the dual benefits provided to firefighters and others by § 9-503(e). As previously noted, § 9~503(e) does not mention dependents. The language in that section reads as if the Legislature intended to provide benefits to firefighters and (other public safety employees) who are living but unable to work as a result of their occupational diseases. ⁶⁹² The statute in the instant case is not ambiguous.

Moreover, even if it were, a review of the treatment of dependents throughout the Act would lead to the same result. In the present case, there is no limited restriction on benefits that implies a general entitlement to benefits. Rather, there is a general restriction on collecting dual benefits (§ 9-610) and a limited exception for certain public safety workers suffering from particular occupational diseases (§ 9-503). Johnson, 387 Md. at 15-16, 19 , 874 A.2d 439 (footnotes omitted).

Amended LE § 9-503(e) Clearly aggrieved by the Court of Appeals’ decision in Ernest Johnson, the General Assembly sought to remedy what was viewed as a defect in the current law, and amended LE § 9-503(e) to include surviving dependents of the enumerated public employees so they, too, would be entitled to benefit from the offset afforded by LE § 9-503(e). 2007 Md. Laws, Chaps. 350, 351. The title clauses for Senate Bill 752 and House Bill 1117 explained that the General Assembly was amending LE § 9-503(e): FOR the purpose of clarifying that surviving dependents of certain individuals are eligible to receive the same workers’ compensation benefits as the individual received at the time of death; and generally relating to workers’ compensation benefits for dependents. The temporal reach of the amended version of LE § 9-503(e) lies at the heart of this appeal. If the current Statute applies, then claimant is entitled to dual recovery of her survivor’s benefits under the Act as well as the employee’s service pension.

If the amendment is not applied retroactively, the instant claim is covered by the statute in force at the time of the employee’s death. In that instance, claimant’s recovery would be subject to the general offset provision found at LE § 9-610. Statutory Interpretation To determine the meaning and application of a statute, we must adhere to the “cardinal rule of statutory ⁶⁹³ interpretation,” which dictates that we “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Chesek v. Jones, ante, 406 Md. 446, 458 , 959 A.2d 795 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[0]ur primary goal is always ‘to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision’ ... We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute.... ” Montgomery County Volunteer Fire-Rescue Ass’n v. Montgomery County Bd. of Elections, 418 Md. 463, 471 , 15 A.3d 798 (2011) (citation omitted).

Where the language is “clear and unambiguous and expresses] a plain meaning,” we effectuate the provision as written. See Chesek, 406 Md. at 459 , 959 A.2d 795 (quoting WFS Financial, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 402 Md. 1, 13 , 935 A.2d 385 (2007)). An Amendment’s Temporal Reach— The Issue of Retroactivity This appeal requires a corollary inquiry into whether the Legislature intended the statutory provision at issue to have retroactive effect. “Generally speaking, [t]he legislative function is principally concerned with the establishment of future rules of conduct.” Doe v. Roe, 419 Md. 687, 699 , 20 A.3d 787 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It has been long established that there exists a general presumption in the law that an enactment is intended to have purely prospective effect.

In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute is not given retrospective effect.... In examining both the statutory language and the legislative history, this presumption must be considered to determine whether there are sufficient indicia of a contrary legislative intent. Traore v. State, 290 Md. 585, 593 , 431 A.2d 96 (1981) (citations omitted). 12 Indeed, “the presumption against retroactive leg ⁶⁹⁴ islation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 , 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). The “rationale underlying the general rule provides that retrospective application, which attempts to determine the legal significance of acts that occurred prior to the statute’s effective date, increases the potential for interference with persons’ substantive rights.” WSSC v. Riverdale Heights Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 561 , 520 A.2d 1319 (1987).

The Court’s decision in Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396 , 754 A.2d 389 (2000) is instructive. In that case, the Court confronted the issue of retroactive legislation in the context of three paternity actions. Two men who had been adjudged to be fathers sought to obtain blood or genetic testing in the hope of overturning declarations of paternity. The men sought relief under Section 5-1038 of the Family Law Article, as amended subsequent to their paternity adjudications.

Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1995 Supp.), § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 of the Family Law Article (“FL”). In short, application of the amended FL § 5—1038(a)(2)(i)2 would permit the men to challenge the adjudication of paternity on the basis of a blood or genetic test that would exclude them as the father. Notwithstanding the logic of their position, the attempts by the adjudicated fathers met with some resistance. The principal stumbling block to the use of new technology, either to ascertain the true father or rule out someone who clearly was not, was the fact that the operative amendments came after ⁶⁹⁵ their paternity adjudications.

The mothers asserted that stringent rules governing the revisory authority of the trial courts were to apply. They argued for the application of stringent revisory procedures pursuant to Md. Rule 2-535 that would constrain a circuit court’s authority to revise an adjudication of paternity. This had been the holding of the Court in Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303 , 648 A.2d 439 (1994), the case which prompted the General Assembly to act. A majority of the Court of Appeals in Langston ruled that the amendment to FL § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 should apply retroactively to afford relief to the adjudicated fathers, who were thus given the opportunity to rule out their paternity.

Instead of the strict revisory rule set forth in Md. Rule 2-535 with its restrictive time constraints, FL § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 afforded access to a post-declaration blood or genetic test. The Court concluded that the General Assembly, in amending the statute, sought to negate the effects of the Tandra S. decision. Mindful of the presumption that amended statutes would be limited to prospective effect, the Court determined that the amendment was remedial and that it was aimed at all paternity claims and declarations. The legislative history of FL § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2 likewise showed the Legislature’s concern with the Tandra S. decision and its implications.

The Court explained that, “[cjlearly, the perceived injustices to putative fathers in situations similar to the putative fathers in the Tandra S. case could not be remedied by legislation with a strictly prospective effect.” Langston, 359 Md. at 412 , 754 A.2d 389 (footnote omitted). The Langston majority concluded: We hold that the extensive legislative history in this case indicates that, in enacting Chapter 248, the General Assembly intended the Act to be remedial in nature. As the Court of Special Appeals pointed out below, Chapter 248 “is remedial in that it is an expansion of the equitable grounds on which a court may relieve from the effect of a paternity judgment an adjudged father who later has been determined not to be the biological father of the child in question.” ... More simply, it is procedural and remedial in ⁶⁹⁶ that it relieves putative fathers from the effects of the Tandra S. opinion by expanding the procedure for remedying the perceived problem.

In this case, it is appropriate to apply section 5-1038 retrospectively, due to the Legislature’s clear intent to restore that provision to its originally intended purpose by providing putative fathers with an additional procedure or remedy to challenge prior paternity declarations. Langston, 359 Md. at 417-18 , 754 A.2d 389 (citation omitted). Although we recite the facts in Langston at length, we also conclude