Johnson v. State

Nazarian, J. ⁸⁴ After a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Martaz Johnson 1 (formerly a Maryland Transportation Authority Police officer) was convicted of two counts of second-degree assault and misconduct in office. The circuit court imposed sentence and Mr. Johnson was incarcerated. He appealed, then asked the trial court to release him on bond pending appeal, which was granted on condition that he submit to home detention monitoring from a private, court-approved company. He was released from prison and spent nearly sixteen months in home detention before he was released again.

This appeal does not deal with the merits of his convictions, which have now been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. See Johnson v. State , No. 6, Sept. Term 2017 (Md. App. Feb. 21, 2018). This opinion deals instead with the question of whether Mr. Johnson should get credit against his sentences for the time he spent in home detention. The circuit court denied his motion for credit on the ground that his home detention didn't qualify as "time spent in the custody of a correctional facility," as § 6-218(b)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP") requires.

We hold that it did qualify, and we reverse and remand with directions that the court enter an order giving Mr. Johnson credit for time spent in home detention. I. BACKGROUND Following his conviction for two counts of second-degree assault and misconduct in office, the circuit court sentenced ⁸⁵ Mr. Johnson to two concurrent terms of ten years in prison for the former charge and a concurrent five years for the latter, with all but eighteen months suspended. He ²⁶¹ was incarcerated on August 11, 2015, and appealed his convictions. On November 16, 2015, Mr. Johnson filed a petition asking the court to release him on an appeal bond.

The circuit court granted his request but added conditions, among them the requirement that he "obtain[ ] a court-approved private home detention monitoring company to monitor him." The relevant ordering paragraphs spelled out the conditions more precisely: It is hereby ORDERED this 11 th day of December, 2015 by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City that Martaz Johnson be placed on Home Detention as a condition of: Pre-Trial Release After bail in the amount of $25,000 or real property To be supervised by Advantage Sentencing Alternative Programs (ASAP Home Detention) * * * Under the following conditions: Standard Conditions (Allowed to attend work, counseling, medical appointments, legal/probation/home detention, weekly religious service, school, and seek employment. On December 14, 2015, Mr. Johnson was released on an appeal bond of $25,000 and placed in home detention, subject to the court's conditions. Mr. Johnson signed a home detention agreement (the "Agreement") with a company called Advantage Sentencing Alternative Programs Inc. ("ASAP"), in which he agreed to be "confined" to his home and subject to twenty-four hour monitoring through a transmitter device. He agreed as well to permit ASAP to install a "home monitoring unit" in his home and to permit members of ASAP's staff to enter his home at any time to install or inspect the equipment and to ensure his compliance with the rules, regulations, and conditions of the program; to submit to random drug urinalysis and breath alcohol testing; and to refrain from using alcoholic beverages and controlled or uncontrolled substances unless prescribed by a physician.

The Agreement also put Mr. Johnson ⁸⁶ on notice that violation of the listed conditions could be considered an escape for which he could be prosecuted: I understand that my participation in the [ASAP] Home Detention Monitoring Program is Court Ordered and any violation with [ASAP] will be reported to the Court. I additionally understand that a violation of the home detention order or agreement may be considered an escape and subject to prosecution and imprisonment. Shortly after this Court affirmed his convictions, Mr. Johnson filed a motion to amend the trial court's appeal bond order. He asked the court to release him from home detention and credit him for the time he served in home detention.

After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion on the ground that a violation of the bond conditions exposed him only to forfeiture of the bond, not to criminal liability for escape: As stated earlier, this judge and this judge's law clerk have done extensive research on this issue of-on the issue of whether a defendant on appeal with an appeal bond with a condition of home detention could get credit for the time served on home detention. And it is the opinion of this Court that this is a case of first impression never having been decided by a Maryland court or by any other court in the nation. This Court is ... very well aware of the decision in Dedo v. State , and one thing I'd like to point out about Dedo, Dedo was actually committed to the custody of the warden of the WCDC, and throughout the period of his home detention was still in that warden's custody. The appeal bond effectively took this Defendant out of the custody of the Division of ²⁶² Corrections.

He was in their custody for a period of time for which he certainly should get credit for. Defendant relies on Dedo, also relies on the statute and statutes involving escape. Defendant also relies on Spriggs v. State and Kang v. State... In my view, these cases are inapposite.

I recognize that the defendant in each of those cases was on a period of home detention. However, those cases do not involve a situation where the defendant is ⁸⁷ actually free from incarceration. Yes, there is language in Dedo and in Spriggs considering the home to be a place of incarceration or detention whereby the person, the defendant, in that situation could be charged with escape. It is my view that the consequence of failure to adhere to the conditions of the appeal bond would result only in the potential forfeiture of the security for the appeal bond, but would not and could not result in any legally effective charge of escape.

This case is just different from those other cases functionally, and I use the word "functionally" somewhat advisably. The sentence was suspended in a sense, it's out in limbo somewhere until the Court of Appeals acts on the writ of certiorari and either grants it or denies it. But even if it grants it, the Defendant's still on appeal bond until the Court is-Court of Appeals renders a decision. The Defendant's posture legally does just-does not fit within the logic or rationale of Dedo, Spriggs or Kang in my opinion.

For the reasons cited, I deny the motion. Mr. Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal.

II

DISCUSSION This appeal turns on whether Mr. Johnson's time on home detention qualified as "time spent in the custody of a correctional facility." 2 He claims that it did, and therefore that ⁸⁸ the trial court erred in denying him credit against his sentences for the time he served on home detention pending appeal. 3 The State counters that he wasn't in "custody" because he wouldn't have been subject to prosecution for escape, and therefore wasn't entitled to credit. We review the trial court's decision de novo . See Gilmer v. State , 389 Md. 656 , 662-63, 887 A.2d 549 (2005) ("The construction of [ § 6-218 ] of the Criminal Procedure Article implicate[s] a de novo review."). ²⁶³ A. Mr. Johnson Was Entitled To Credit For His Time Served In Home Detention. Mr. Johnson's argument relies on a synthesis of two statutes: CP § 6-218 4 which defines his right to sentence credits, and § 9-405 of the Criminal Law Article ("CR"), which defines the offense of escape. 5 First , CP § 6-218 (b)(1) entitles convicted defendants to credit for time spent in the custody of a correctional facility on the charge at issue: A defendant who is convicted and sentenced shall receive credit against and a reduction of the term of a definite or life sentence, or the minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentence, for all time spent in the custody of a correctional facility , hospital, facility for persons with mental disorders, or other unit because of: (i) the charge for which the sentence is imposed; or (ii) the conduct on which the charge is based. ⁸⁹ Md. Code Ann., Crim.

Proc. (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), § 6-218(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 6-218 was enacted "to ensure that a defendant receive as much credit as possible for time spent in custody as is consistent with constitutional and practical considerations." Fleeger v. State , 301 Md. 155 , 165, 482 A.2d 490 (1984).

The key feature of custody, though, is the defendant's exposure to criminal prosecution for escape if he were to leave the site of his detention. In Maus v. State , 311 Md. 85 , 532 A.2d 1066 (1987), the Court of Appeals considered the meaning of the phrase "in the custody of any state, county or city jail, correctional institutions, hospital, mental hospital or other agency" 6 in the context of a defendant who spent time, as a condition of probation, in a residential drug treatment program. The Court held that the defendant was not "in custody" for purposes of the statute because the program merely provided supervision, and that credit should be awarded for time in drug treatment facilities when the defendant "is civilly committed to the treatment facility and when, in cases of unauthorized departure, he or she is guilty of the crime of escape ." Maus , 311 Md. at 103 , 532 A.2d 1066 (emphasis added). And in that case, the trial court could not have committed the defendant to the facility nor imposed imprisonment as a condition of the defendant's probation.

Id. Similarly, in Balderston v. State , 93 Md. App. 364 , 612 A.2d 335 (1992), we rejected a claim that voluntary home detention, requested by the defendant as a condition of probation, qualified as "custody" under § 6-218 because that defendant's conditions allowed him freedoms inconsistent with the term: [V]oluntary home detention, a situation in which a defendant can leave his home to go to work, and has freedom of movement and association within his home, cannot be considered "custodial," or the equivalent of custody. On the contrary, the reason appellant requested that he be permitted to participate in home confinement is because it is not ⁹⁰ the equivalent ²⁶⁴ of custody, i.e. , he could tend to his responsibilities and maintain his job. Id. at 370 , 612 A.2d 335 .

We noted there that the Court of Appeals had construed the term "custody" in Maus to mean "incarcerative custody, not mere supervision. That is, the custody had to be involuntary and pursuant to a court commitment to a public institution." Id. at 368 , 612 A.2d 335 (quoting Maus , 311 Md. at 101 , 532 A.2d 1066 ). We limited our holding to the particular facts of the case, relying heavily on the fact that the defendant-not the court-had requested placement in a home confinement program. Id. at 370, 612 A.2d 335 .

This case is distinguishable from Maus and Balderston . Although Mr. Johnson requested release pending appeal, the court ordered him into home detention, not a residential drug treatment center as in Maus . Unlike the defendants in Maus and Balderston , his home detention was involuntary, and he was not on probation-he had been convicted. Instead, this case fits more closely with Dedo v. State , 343 Md. 2 , 680 A.2d 464 (1996).

There, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant was entitled to credit for time spent prior to trial in a home detention program. The Court found the set of restraints on this defendant "sufficiently incarcerative" to qualify as custody, and distinguished the case from Maus and Balderston , because the defendant could be punished for escape if he left: Where a defendant is punishable for the crime of escape for an unauthorized departure from the place of confinement, the custody requirement of [ § 6-218 of the Criminal Procedure Article, formerly