Johnson v. State

Dana T. Johnson, Jr. v. State of Maryland, No. 9, September Term, 2019. Opinion by Getty, J. CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING—CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES—VOLUME POSSESSION The Court of Appeals held that Maryland Code (“Md. Code”) (1957, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.), Criminal Law (“CR”) § 5-612 unambiguously provides the penalty for a violation of the same by stating the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. Further, informed by the legislative history of Article 27, § 286 and CR § 5-612, the Court held that the maximum allowable term of imprisonment under CR § 5-612 is twenty years.

Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. 03-K-17-001060 Argued: September 10, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 9 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ DANA T. JOHNSON, JR. v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Adkins, Sally D. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Getty, J. Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document Booth, J. concurs. is authentic. Watts, J. dissents. ______________________________________ 2020-02-28 13:14-05:00 Filed: February 28, 2020 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Petitioner Dana Terrell Johnson, Jr. was convicted of volume possession of a controlled dangerous substance under Maryland Code (“Md. Code”) (1957, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.), Criminal Law (“CR”) § 5-612 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

Mr. Johnson received a total sentence of fourteen years’ imprisonment, the first five without the possibility of parole. Mr. Johnson now contends that his sentence is illegal because the express language of CR § 5-612 fails to state a maximum potential term of imprisonment. The General Assembly clearly established the maximum term of imprisonment for felony possession of a Schedule I narcotic drug when Article 27, § 286 was originally enacted in 1970: “[a]ny person who violates [Article 27, § 286(a)] with respect to[ a Schedule I narcotic drug] shall, upon conviction, be deemed guilty of a felony and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years.” Article 27, § 286(b)(1) (1970).1 This maximum penalty provision in the broader penalty scheme remained unchanged through several amendments to Article 27, § 286, the recodification of the Criminal Law Article, and CR § 5-612. Until 2005, CR § 5-612 indicated that the maximum penalty associated with volume possession of a Schedule I narcotic drug was twenty years’ imprisonment.

Senate Bill 429 of the 2005 Legislative Session, a well- intentioned bill passed to conform certain criminal laws with recent Supreme Court decisions, had the unintended effect of severing the mandatory minimum penalty in CR 1 As originally enacted, Article 27, § 286(b)(1) created a felony offense for, inter alia, possession of a Schedule I or II narcotic drug with the intent to distribute. The following provision, Article 27, § 287, contained a misdemeanor crime often referred to as “simple possession,” which is not at issue in this case. § 5-612 from the base penalty for possession of a narcotic drug in CR § 5-608. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that CR § 5-612 is unambiguous and Mr. Johnson’s sentence is not illegal because the maximum term of imprisonment under CR § 5-612 is, and has always been, twenty years. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

BACKGROUND Baltimore County Police Department Officers Evan Vicarini and Bryan Trussell patrolled the streets of Woodlawn, Baltimore County, Maryland on a rainy February morning in 2017. The officers observed a silver Acura with abnormally dark, tinted windows. The window tint entirely obscured the officers’ line of sight into the vehicle, leading Officer Trussell to believe the level of tint exceeded the permissible amount allowable under Maryland law. A Motor Vehicle Administration record check revealed that the registered owner of the Acura did not possess a Maryland driver’s license.

The officers activated their patrol car’s emergency equipment to stop the vehicle. The driver of the Acura, later identified as Petitioner Dana Johnson (“Mr. Johnson”), initially complied. As the officers exited their patrol car and approached the vehicle, Mr. Johnson sped away. The officers pursued Mr. Johnson as he crossed into oncoming traffic and failed to stop at a red traffic light.

However, treacherous roadways and poor weather conditions increased the danger to the public and forced the officers to abandon the chase. Officers Vicarini and Trussell deactivated their patrol car’s emergency equipment, resumed normal driving speeds and proceeded in the same direction where they last saw the Acura flee. At the next intersection, the officers spotted the Acura stopped at a red 2 light. This time, the officers pulled up behind the Acura without activating any emergency equipment.

Mr. Johnson again drove away. The officers trailed the Acura at a distance without breaking any traffic laws. From approximately one-half mile behind the vehicle, the officers watched as the Acura ran another red light and collided with another vehicle. The officers approached the crash scene and attended to Mr. Johnson and the other driver.

Baltimore County Fire and Rescue arrived on scene, extracted Mr. Johnson from the Acura and transported him to Sinai Hospital of Baltimore (“Sinai Hospital”). Baltimore County Police Department Officer Sean Daley accompanied Mr. Johnson to the trauma unit of Sinai Hospital. While tending to Mr. Johnson, Sinai Hospital employees removed Mr. Johnson’s clothes and placed them on the hospital bed. Officer Daley concurrently searched each article of clothing.

Officer Daley discovered a large plastic bag of off-white powder in Mr. Johnson’s undergarments, which he believed to be heroin. A forensic chemist from the Baltimore County Crime Lab later confirmed the substance to be 47.18 grams of heroin. The State charged Mr. Johnson with six counts: (1) volume possession of heroin; (2) possession of heroin with intent to distribute; (3) simple possession of heroin; (4) attempting to elude a police officer; (5) failure to provide license to police on demand; and (6) failure to provide insurance information to another driver after an accident. Mr. Johnson proceeded before a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on August 28, 2017.

The circuit court found Mr. Johnson guilty of possession of heroin in violation of CR § 5-601(a)(1), volume possession of heroin in violation of CR § 5-612, and attempting to elude a police officer in violation of Md. Code (1986, 2012 3 Repl. Vol., 2017 Supp.), Transportation Article (“TR”) § 21-904(c)(1). On September 27, 2017, the court merged the conviction for simple possession into the conviction for volume possession and sentenced Mr. Johnson to fourteen years’ imprisonment, the first five without the possibility of parole. The court concurrently sentenced Mr. Johnson to time served for attempting to elude a police officer.

Mr. Johnson appealed. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions. Johnson v. State, 240 Md. App. 200, 203 (2019). Mr. Johnson then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to determine the maximum allowable period of imprisonment for a violation of CR § 5-612.

More specifically, Mr. Johnson asked the following: 1. Section 5-612 of the Criminal Law Article, which prohibits possession of certain quantities of controlled dangerous substances, provides that “[a] person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 5 years and is subject to a fine not exceeding $100,000.” What is the maximum allowable period of incarceration for a violation of this law? 2. Did the circuit court impose an illegal sentence of fourteen years of incarceration for a violation of section 5-612 of the Criminal Law Article? We granted Mr. Johnson’s petition on April 22, 2019.

Johnson v. State, 463 Md. 550 (2019). As to the first question, informed by the legislative history of former Article 27, § 286 and the current version of CR § 5-612, we hold that the maximum allowable period of imprisonment for a violation of CR § 5-612 is twenty years. It follows, then, that the circuit court did not impose an illegal sentence when it sentenced Mr. Johnson to fourteen years’ imprisonment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 4 DISCUSSION A. The Parties’ Contentions.

Mr. Johnson principally argues that the circuit court imposed an illegal sentence of fourteen years’ imprisonment following his conviction under CR § 5-612. In support of this argument Mr. Johnson contends the plain language of CR § 5-612 is ambiguous for its failure to expressly state a maximum sentence and the statute’s legislative history fails to resolve the ambiguity. In his view, because CR § 5-612 provides notice of only one potential term of imprisonment—the mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment without parole—that penalty must also be construed as the mandatory maximum penalty. Simply put, Mr. Johnson argues that the legislature’s failure to explicitly state a maximum penalty renders CR § 5-612 ambiguous as to the maximum allowable term of imprisonment.

Further, Mr. Johnson contends the legislative history fails to resolve this ambiguity; therefore, the rule of lenity must apply in his favor and the maximum legal sentence under the statute can be no more than five years’ imprisonment. The State counters that Mr. Johnson’s sentence is legal. According to the State, the Legislature’s omission of a maximum sentence grants a sentencing court wide discretion to impose an appropriate sentence. The State urges us to construe statutes lacking a maximum sentence provision as permitting a sentence up to life imprisonment.

The crux of the State’s argument is that CR § 5-612 is unambiguous. The State asserts that a plain reading of CR § 5-612 provides a sentencing “floor,” and not a “ceiling.” Alternatively, the State suggests the surrounding provisions in the Criminal Law Article and the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines display the clear intent of the General Assembly that the maximum 5 sentence is twenty years’ imprisonment. Finally, the State submits that because CR § 5- 612 is not vague or ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply. B. Statutory Interpretation.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 550 (2017) (citing Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467 , 480–81 (2017)). “This Court provides judicial deference to the policy decisions enacted into law by the General Assembly. We assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory language and thus our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the language of the statute to determine the purpose and intent of the General Assembly.” Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 113 (2018) (quoting Phillips v. State, 451 Md. 180, 196 (2017)). The statutory construction analysis begins “with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.” Id.

(quoting Schreyer v. Chaplain, 416 Md. 94, 101 (2010)). We read “the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Phillips, 451 Md. at 196–97 (quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 178 (2011)). “We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.” Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Md. Pub. Serv.

Comm’n, 460 Md. 667, 685 (2018) (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 275 (2010)). The plain language “must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 421 (2010) 6 (quoting Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276 ). Our search for legislative intent contemplates “the consequences resulting from one construction rather than another.” Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 69 (1994) (citing Kaczorowski v. City of Balt., 309 Md. 505, 513 (1987)). “We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” Johnson, 415 Md. at 421–22 (quoting Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276 ). When the “words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as a part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia[.]” State v. Bey, 452 Md. 255, 266 (2017) (quoting Johnson, 415 Md. at 422 ); cf. Blaine, 336 Md. at 64 (“Even where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we may look elsewhere to divine legislative intent; the plain meaning rule is not rigid and does not require us to read legislative provisions in rote fashion and in isolation.”) (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 463 (1991)).

Absent ambiguity in the text of the statute, “it is our duty to interpret the law as written and apply its plain meaning to the facts before us.” In re S.K., 466 Md. 31 , 54 (2019). Applying these principles, we begin with the plain language of CR § 5-612: § 5-612. Volume Dealer (a) Unlawful Amounts. A person may not manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess: 7 *** (5) 28 grams or more of morphine or opium or any derivative, salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer of morphine or opium; (6) 28 grams or more of any mixture containing a detectable amount, as scientifically measured using representative sampling methodology, of morphine or opium or any derivative, salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer of morphine or opium; *** (c) Enhanced Penalty.

(1) A person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 5 years and is subject to a fine not exceeding $100,000. (2) The court may not suspend any part of the mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years. CR § 5-612 (2002) (amended 2018).2 Mr. Johnson’s argument centers on the meaning of the phrase “[a] person . . . shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 5 years.” We do not discern any ambiguity from the use of the words “not less than.” That phrase, as defined in Maryland case law, means “at least.” Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Neighborhood Rentals, Inc., 170 Md. App. 671, 682 (2006). The General Assembly’s usage of “not less than” indicates “in the words of Black’s Law Dictionary 1063 (6th ed. 1990), ‘the smallest or lowest degree[, at 2 Captions and catchlines are generally not part of the legislation passed by the General Assembly.

Gilroy v. SVF Riva Annapolis LLC, 234 Md. App. 104, 109 (2017). Instead, captions and catchlines are added by legal publishers after a bill becomes law. Because of this fact, captions and catchlines are not evidence of legislative intent. See Md. Code (1957, 2019 Repl.

Vol.), General Provisions Article, § 1-208. Here, for ease of reference, we include the captions and catchlines that are provided in the recodification bill passed by General Assembly. 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 26, § 2; see Rohrer v. Humane Soc’y of Wash. Cty., 454 Md. 1 , 24 n.15 (2017). 8 the lowest estimate.]’”3 Neighborhood Rentals, Inc., 170 Md. App. at 682 . To be sure, this Court also considered the phrase “not less than” in the context of an election ordinance in Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Supervisors of Elections. 345 Md. 477 (1997).

There, we equated statutory language requiring that a referendum petition contain the “signatures of not less than twenty percentum (20%) of the qualified voters,” as mandating “at least” twenty percent of qualified voters’ signatures. Id. at 481 & n.2. Applying this interpretation to CR § 5-612, it follows that the common-sense use of the phrase “not less than” establishes a “floor” of the potential amount of incarcerable years. Contrary to Mr. Johnson’s position, it would be absurd and illogical to read “not less than 5 years” to be the stated mandatory minimum penalty and also double as the maximum penalty under CR § 5-612.

Johnson, 415 Md. at 422 . Therefore, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals and the State that CR § 5-612 unambiguously provides the minimum, not the maximum, penalty for volume possession of a controlled dangerous substance. C. Development of Article 27, § 286 and CR § 5-612. “In addition to the plain language, the modern tendency of this Court is to continue the analysis of the statute beyond the plain meaning to examine ‘extrinsic sources of 3 The phrase “not less than” is not defined in the most recent edition of Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). However, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage may provide insight as to the apparent exclusion of the phrase.

There, an entry defines “no less:” “[t]he phrase no less, just like less, best refers to amounts or to mass nouns, not countable numbers. [ ] No fewer is the better phrase when discussing numbers of things.” Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 606 (3rd ed. 2011). We adhere to the definition of “not less than” as it has been judicially determined by our case law. See Neighborhood Rentals, Inc., 170 Md. App. at 682 . 9 legislative intent’ in order to ‘check [ ] our reading of a statute’s plain language’ through examining ‘the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.’” In re S.K., 466 Md. at 50 (alteration in original) (quoting Brown, 454 Md. at 551 ). “Archival legislative history includes legislative journals, committee reports, fiscal notes, amendments accepted or rejected, the text and fate of similar measures presented in earlier sessions, testimony and comments offered to the committees that considered the bill, and debate on the floor of the two Houses [of the General Assembly] (or the Convention).” State v. Phillips, 457 Md. 481, 488 (2018) (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 57 (2003); Boffen v. State, 372 Md. 724 , 736– 37 (2003)). An examination of the extensive legislative history present in this case ensures we meet our oft-stated intention: “[i]n every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” Johnson, 415 Md. at 422 (quoting Lockshin, 412 Md. at 276 ).

Our inquiry into the legislative history of CR § 5-612 begins with its predecessor: Article 27, § 286. Prior to the 2002 recodification of the Criminal Law Article, statutory crimes and punishments were compiled in a numbered Article designated as Article 27. In 1970, the General Assembly enacted Article 27, §§ 276 through 302 as a “comprehensive set of schedules, regulations, offenses, and penalties for . . . controlled dangerous substances.” 1970 Md. Laws, ch. 403; Oberlin v. State, 9 Md. App. 426, 434 (1970). In pertinent part, the original 10 enactment provided as follows: [§]286.

Offenses and Penalties: (a) Except as authorized by this subheading, it shall be unlawful for any person: (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or to possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity to reasonably indicate under all circumstances an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance; *** (b) Any person who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) with respect to: (1) a substance classified in Schedules I or II which is a narcotic drug shall, upon conviction, be deemed guilty of a felony and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years, and a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or both. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent, prohibit or make ineligible any convicted defendant from participating in the rehabilitation program under Article 43B, Sections 12 and 13, as amended from time to time, because of the length of sentence. 1970 Md. Laws, ch. 403 (emphasis added). Possession of a Schedule I narcotic drug “in sufficient quantity to reasonably indicate under all circumstances an intent to . . . distribute” is separate and distinct from Article 27, § 287, in which the General Assembly established the misdemeanor crime of simple possession. Under the Article 27, § 286 enactment, a conviction stemming from felony possession of a Schedule I or II narcotic drug carried a “term of imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years . . . .” Article 27, § 286(b)(1) 11 (1970).4 This language is the first indication of the General Assembly’s intent to set the maximum penalty for felony possession at twenty years’ imprisonment.

Id. The discussion that follows tracks this same language concerning the maximum penalty through periodic updates and amendments. The General Assembly has amended Article 27, § 286 and CR § 5-612 twenty-seven times since its inception.5 Because not every amendment bears on the determination of this case, we shall discuss only those amendments affecting the development of the penalty section of CR § 5-612. The first amendment of import affecting the penalty provision under Article 27, § 286(b)(1) occurred in 1982.

The General Assembly amended Article 27, § 286(b) to establish mandatory minimum sentences for individuals previously convicted of manufacturing or distributing a controlled dangerous substance. See 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 470. The language of the 1970 enactment remained unchanged, leaving the twenty year maximum penalty intact: (b) Any person who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) with respect to: (1) A substance classified in Schedules I or II which is a narcotic drug is 4 Mr. Johnson has limited the focus of our inquiry to the maximum allowable term of imprisonment under CR § 5-612. For clarity, we have omitted all discussion of the potential fines enumerated under the statute. 5 1971 Md. Laws, ch. 493; 1973 Md. Laws, ch. 332; 1978 Md. Laws, ch. 491; 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 470; 1982 Md. Laws, ch. 770 § 4; 1984 Md. Laws, ch. 449; 1986 Md. Laws, ch. 676; 1988 Md. Laws, ch. 439; 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 5 § 1; 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 287; 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 679; 1990 Md. Laws, ch. 6 § 2; 1990 Md. Laws, ch. 347; 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 55 § 1; 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 157; 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 185; 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 328; 1993 Md. Laws, ch. 5 § 1; 1994 Md. Laws, ch. 542; 1999 Md. Laws, ch. 64; 1999 Md. Laws, ch. 500; 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 35; 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 449; 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 26 § 2; 2005 Md. Laws, ch. 482; 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 515 § 2; 2018 Md. Laws, ch. 145. 12 guilty of a felony and is subject to imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than $25,000, or both.

Article 27, § 286(b)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). The 1982 amendment added the following mandatory minimum statutory language: Any person who has previously been convicted under this paragraph shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 10 years. Neither the sentence nor any part of it may be suspended, and the person shall not be eligible for parole except in accordance with Article 31B, § 11. Id.

Therefore, effective July 1, 1982, a violation triggering Article 27, § 286(b)(1) subjected an individual to imprisonment for not more than twenty years. If that individual had a prior conviction under Article 27, § 286(b)(1), ten of those potential twenty years’ imprisonment became mandatory. Id. Importantly, the maximum potential term of imprisonment remained unchanged.

Six years later in 1988, the General Assembly restructured the mandatory minimum scheme to more harshly penalize those individuals convicted of controlled dangerous substance crimes. The 1988 amendment removed the “not less than 10 years” provision added to Article 27, § 286 (b)(1) in 1982 and created sections (c), (d), and (e). 1988 Md. Laws, ch. 439. The amendment created increasing mandatory minimums based on the number of an offender’s prior convictions: (c)(1) Any person who has previously been convicted under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section shall be sentenced, on being convicted a second time under either subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section, to imprisonment for not less than 10 years. *** (d)(1) Any person who has been convicted on 2 separate occasions under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section or a combination of 13 either, where the convictions do not arise from a single incident, and who has served at least 1 term of confinement of at least 180 days in a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a previous violation of § 286 or § 286A of this article, shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third time under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section or a combination of either, to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in any event, not less than 25 years. *** (e)(1) Any person who has served 3 separate terms of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of 3 separate convictions under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section or a combination of either shall be sentenced, on being convicted a fourth time under subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2) of this section or a combination of either, to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but in any event, not less than 40 years. 1988 Md. Laws, ch. 439 (emphasis added). Simply put, one prior conviction under Article 27, § 286(b)(1) or (b)(2) subjected the offender to a ten-year minimum sentence.

Two prior convictions under Article 27, § 286(b)(1) or (b)(2) required a twenty-five year minimum sentence. Three prior convictions under Article 27, § 286(b)(1) or (b)(2) mandated a forty- year minimum sentence. Notably, the maximum penalty under Article 27, § 286(b)(1) remained the same as it did in 1970 and 1982: “imprisonment for not more than 20 years.” Article 27, § 286(b)(1) (1988). The divergence giving rise to the issue in the instant case began in 1989 when the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 400, entitled the Drug Kingpin Act. 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 287.

The Drug Kingpin Act sought to “reduce the supply of drugs in Maryland by establishing harsher penalties for dealers and by decreasing the profitability of participating in a drug trafficking crime.” State of Maryland, Office of the Governor, Briefing Document and Synopsis of Drug Enforcement – The Drug Kingpin Act, Senate 14 Bill 400/House Bill 502, at 4 (“Senate Bill 400 Briefing Document”); see also Floor Report, House Bill 502, Law Enforcement – The Drug Kingpin Act, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee of the Maryland Senate, 1989 Leg., 399th Sess. (Md. 1989) at 3 (“House Bill 502 Floor Report”).6 To accomplish this major objective of the legislation, the Drug Kingpin Act established “a variety of measures specifically designed to apprehend and punish the ‘higher ups’ in drug distribution networks.” Allen v. State, 89 Md. App. 25, 50 (1991) (citing Department of Legislative Reference, Session Review V– 6 (1989)). Of import here, the Drug Kingpin Act amended Article 27, § 286 to add subsection (f), which provided penalties for the possession of controlled dangerous substances in large quantities; i.e., volume possession. This component of the Drug Kingpin Act recognized “that there need[ed] to be some distinction made between the individual who handles a substantial volume of drugs as compared to the person who handles a minimal amount.” Senate Bill 400 Briefing Document at 5.

To “distinguish the volume drug dealer from the street corner dealer,” the Drug Kingpin Act “establish[ed] a mandatory minimum penalty of 5 years in jail for the possession of certain threshold quantities of a controlled dangerous substance.” Id. The 1989 amendments to Article 27, § 286, in pertinent part, added the following: (f)(1) If a person violates subsection (a)(1) of this section and the violation involves any of the following controlled dangerous substances, in the amounts indicated, the person is subject to the penalties provided in 6 A floor report is a document prepared by the relevant committee’s staff, in this case the staff for the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, for the purpose of preparing the Committee Chairman who presents the second reader report on the Senate floor. 15 paragraph (3) of this subsection upon conviction: *** (III) 28 grams or more of morphine or opium or any derivative, salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer of morphine or opium or any mixture containing 28 grams or more of morphine or opium or any derivative, salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer of morphine or opium; *** (3)(i) A person convicted of violating paragraph (1) of this subsection is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced as otherwise provided for in this section, except that it is mandatory upon the court to impose no less than 5 years’ imprisonment, and neither that term of imprisonment nor any part of it may be suspended. *** 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 287 (emphasis added). Under this reorganized statute, the base penalty for a violation of Article 27, § 286(a)—i.e., a first-time offender who did not possess a controlled dangerous substance in a volume amount—remained in Article 27, § 286(b). The newly added Article 27, § 286(f)(3)(i) provided only a sentencing enhancement for convictions stemming from the volume possession of a controlled dangerous substance.

An individual convicted under Article 27, § 286(b) with a controlled dangerous substance in the amount indicated in Article 27, § 286(f) became subjected to the mandatory five years’ imprisonment. Article 27, § 286(f)(3)(I) (1989). The maximum potential term of imprisonment, unchanged from the 1970, 1982 and 1988 enactments, remained “imprisonment for not more than 20 years.” Article 27, § 286(b)(1) (1989). Under this arrangement, all aspects of a potential sentence 16 were clearly stated in Article 27, § 286.

In 1992, the General Assembly’s Legislative Policy Committee established the Article 27 Revision Committee (“Article 27 Committee”) to review and recommend substantive revisions to the criminal laws of Maryland. See Legislative Policy Committee, Defunct Units: Maryland Manual Online.7 After the Article 27 Committee’s work updated Article 27, the Code Revision Committee implemented non-substantive revisions to prepare the statute for recodification of Maryland crimes and punishments into the Criminal Law Article.8 Id. While the Criminal Law Article was enacted in 2002, the Article 27 Committee continued to provide post-code revision and substantive recommendations before disbanding in 2008. Id.

The General Assembly’s 2002 recodification legislation repealed Article 27 in its entirety and replaced it with the Criminal Law Article. 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 26. The stated purpose, as we noted, was to “revise, restate, and recodify the laws of the State relating to criminal law[.]” Id. Under the new statutory arrangement, CR § 5-602 established the 7 https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/07leg/html/com/01legpd.html, archived at https://perma.cc/S7BU-WMLK. 8 We recently noted in In re S.K., “code revision is a periodic process by which statutory law is re-organized and restated with the goal of making it more accessible and understandable to those who must abide by it.” 466 Md. at 56 n.21 (quoting Smith v. Wakefield, LP, 462 Md. 713 (2019) (citing Alan M. Wilner, Blame it all on Nero: Code Creation and Revision in Maryland (1994))). “Maryland Code Revision began in 1970 as a long-term project to create a modern comprehensive code when Governor Marvin Mandel appointed the Commission to Revise the Annotated Code. This formal revision of the statutory law for the General Assembly was coordinated by the Department of Legislative Services.

Code Revision was completed in 2016 with the enactment by the General Assembly of the Alcoholic Beverages Article.” Id. 17 primary criminal violation: § 5-602. Manufacturing, Distributing, Possession with Intent to Distribute, or Dispensing Controlled Dangerous Substance. Except as otherwise provided in this title, a person may not: (1) Manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled dangerous substance; or (2) Possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity reasonably to indicate under all circumstances an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled dangerous substance. 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 26. CR § 5-608 provided the base penalty when an individual’s violation of CR § 5-602 through CR § 5-606 implicated a narcotic drug: § 5-608.

Same – Narcotic Drug. (A) In General. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person who violates a provision of §§ 5-602 through 5-606 of this subtitle with respect to a schedule I or II narcotic drug is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 20 years or a fine not exceeding $25,000 or both. 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 26 (emphasis added). CR § 5-608(b)–(d) allowed more severe penalties for second, third and fourth time offenders.

CR § 5-612 completed the trifecta, articulating the penalties when a violation of CR § 5-602 implicated a narcotic drug in a volume amount: § 5-612. Volume Dealer. (A) Unlawful Amounts. A person who violates § 5-602 of this subtitle with respect to any of the following controlled dangerous substances in the amounts