Johnston v. Frederick
Fryer, T., delivered the opinion of the Court. A very important question is presented on this appeal. It relates to the' disqualification of a witness on the ground of mental incapacity. The suit was brought by a husband against persons alleged to have alienated his wife’s, affections.
The defendants are William O. Frederick and his daughter, Isabelle Frederick, the latter of whom, is charged with having directly caused the estrangement between the plaintiff and his wife, and the former with having encouraged and 274 promoted the conduct which produced that, unfortunate result. At the trial of the case, below, evidence was offered tending] to show that Miss Frederick possessed an abnormal and demoralizing influence over the plaintiff’s wife, and exerted it so actively and persistently as to make inevitable the alienation which in fact occurred. It was then proposed to prove that Mr. Frederick had aided his daughter iu the course of conduct to which we have alluded. For this purpose a sister-in-law of Mr. Frederick, by the name of Mrs. Schultheis, was called as a witness, but objection being made that she was mentally incompetent to testify, an inquiry was conducted by the court on that subject, and she was, held to be disqualified.
The admitted evidence was considered legally insufficient to support a recovery against Mr. Frederick, and a verdict in his favor was directed at the close of the plaintiff’s case. From the judgment entered on that verdict the plaintiff has appealed. The record does not show the result of .the trial so far as Miss Frederick was concerned. There are fifty-three bills of exceptions in the record, but most of them relate to the admission of evidence to prove the incompetency of the witness to whom we have referred.
The rule of law applicable to' an inquiry into, the mental qualification of a witness has been stated by this Court in the case of Weeks v. State, 126 Md. 227 -8. In that case the defendant was under indictment for having carnal knowledge of a woman alleged to he an imbecile. The fact of her imbecility was proven, but it was determined that she was capable of testifying. In discussing that question the opinion of the Court, delivered by Judge Tiiouas, said: “The fact that Carrie Waring was alleged or shown to be an imbecile did not necessarily render her incompetent as a witness.
If an imbecile has sufficient, understanding to appreciate the nature and obligation of an oath and sufficient capacity to observe and describe correctly the facts in regard to' which she is called to testify, there is no reason why her testimony should he excluded.. 2 Russell, Crimes (6th Ed.), 969; 1 275 Greenleaf, Evidence (13th Ed.), sections. 365-367; Hochh eimers Criminal Law, sections 300-303; State v. Meyers, 37 L. R. A. 4-23, and note; State v. Michael, 19 L. R. A. 605, and note. In 40 Cyc. 2201, it is said: ‘An insane person may he a competent witness where, notwithstanding, his affliction, he is capable of observing* accurately and stating* correctly what he ohseiwed and understanding the nature and obligation of an oath’; and in the case of District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 519 , the Supreme Court said: ‘I’he g*eneral rule, therefore, is, that a lunatic or a person affected with insanity is admissible as a witness if he have sufficient understanding* to> apprehend the obligation of an oath, and to be capable of giving, a. correct account of the matters which he has seen or heard in reference to the questions at issue; and whether he have that understanding is a question to be determined by the Court, upon examination of the party himself, and any competent witness who can speak to the nature and extent of his insanity.’ In 4 Words and Phrases, 3391-3392, imbeciles are said to be persons whose mental powers, and resources are limited or whose minds are weak or feeble. After an examination of her testimony and the testimony of the two physicians, we entirely agree with the conclusion of the learned court below that, while Carrie Waring was an imbecile, she was nevertheless competent to testify to the facts as to which she was interrogated. The question of the competency of a witness is one to he determined by the.
Court, and should be disposed of as soon as it arises and before the witness is allowed to testify to the facts in issue. Hochheimer’s Criminal Law, section 300; Arnd v. Amling, 53 Md. 192 ; Freeny v. Freeny, 80 Md. 406 ; District of Columbia v. Armes, supra.” Tlic opinion from which we have just quoted makes unnecessary a further discussion of the principle upon which the present question is to he decided. Our duty is to properly apply that principle to the testimony offered in this instance, to prove the alleged disqualification. 276 The witness-, Mrs. Schultheis, whose capacity to testify is to be considered, was about sixty-eight years of age at the time of the trial. When she first appeared on the witness stand the defendants, while objecting to' her competency, had no testimony then available to sustain their objection, and she was allowed to be questioned for a time as to her relationship to the parties and as to the handwriting of certain letters which Miss Frederick was supposed to have written.
The answers- of Mrs. Schultheis to these inquiries appeared to- be rational. Her testimony was then suspended for a hearing, before the court alone, of the question raised as to her sanity. In the course of this hearing she was recalled to the witness stand and interrogated by the court and counsel as a means of ascertaining her mental condition. The able judge who tried the case could not discover in the demeanor and replies of the witness any sufficient ground, as- he stated, for declining to have the jury receive her testimony.
Speaking as- to the result of his own observation, he said: “If there is anything wrong, it seems to me to be very mild.” So far as we can judge from the report in the record of the testimony of Mrs. Schultheis, it is coherent and intelligent. It does not compare unfavorably in those respects with the testimony of the average witness whose sanity is unquestioned. The trial judge solved the problem by ruling against the competency of the proffered witness in accordance with what he regarded as the weight of the independent evidence on the subject. The first witness examined as to the mental condition of Mrs. Schultheis was her sister, Mrs. Wyman, who- expressed the opinion that the former was incapable of testifying in this case.
The reasons given for that opinion were that: “She imagines she is persecuted, people want to- harm her and she is never treated right. That is the way her mind goes and we have done everything in the world to make it pleasant for her. * * * She has an excellent memory to carry tales and she has a convenient memory at times to keep things to 277 herself. * * * There is an exaggeration all the time.” The witness did not consider her sister “capable of taking a good religious oath.” “My sister,” she said, “never hears a sermon unless it is at a funeral and we cannot prevail upon her to go to church.” At the suggestion of a physician who was consulted about Mrs. Schultheis, the witness took her to- the Phipps Clinic for examination. The record of that investigation was offered in evidence. ■ It includes, in addition to- references to* the family history, the following statements: “Chief complaint given by sister, general senility, talkative and cannot control herself. The patient says, Tt is not that bad.
I have a cold. I am not crazy.’ “Since her husband’s death she has felt that the world was not treating, her right, she did not have as much money as she ought. She nursed her sister, who died in April, and since her sister’s death has felt ill-used, felt that she should have been paid and has been resentful toward her brother-in-law and niece.” “She is very talkative; but this is nothing new. She has always talked of her troubles to others.” “The patient is irritable, angry, and has frequent crying spells.
Tier mental status shows that she is irritable and cranky, contradicting angrily statements of sister. She talks about her troubles very much in detail and gives the impression of exaggeration. She is correctly oriented, retains nine digits with one transposition. Memory for past events: Born, July 31, 1853; married in 1810 at the age of 11.
Husband died in 1892, when she was 39. Memory for the recent past correct. Grasp of general information good. Calculation, some transpositions.
Apparently no insight. Diagnosis: Psycopath, with involutional exacerbation.” The term “psycopath” was later defined by an alienist, who testified for the defendants, as meaning one who is abnormal mentally from birth. It is “applied to an individual who is horn with or all his life has an abnormal mental state, irrespective of what that particular state is so long as it is abnormal or different from the normal, so that 278 it is a very broad classification.” The words “involuntary exacerbation,” as used in the clinic report, meant “an increase in her symptoms due to old age.” The alienist said that a psycopath may be not irresponsible. After being examined at the Phipps Clinic, Mrs. Schultheis left the hospital and continued her usual course of life.
Dr. Houck, at whose suggestion she had been taken to the clinic for examination, testified that when Mrs. Wyman spoke to him about having her sister declared insane he told her she was very foolish, “and then,” he said, “I referred her to the Phipps Clinic, and I think they sustained my ideas.” He further testified that he had been visited by Mrs. Schultheis several times about some minor ailment, and that he did not observe anything wrong with her mind. George W. Hoffman, a brother of Mrs. Schultheis, after stating that he thought his sister incapable of testifying, was asked by the court: “Suppose you and she should enter into a contract, would she be able to tell what she did
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