Joiner v. State

CATHELL, Judge. To say that the participants in this case have complicated a simple rule of evidentiary admissibility is an understatement. This complication emanates from a misunderstanding or a misstatement of the purposes for which an extrajudicial identification statement may be admitted at trial. One of the prosecution’s witnesses to a shooting, also its victim, recanted his earlier extrajudicial identification of the defendant as his assailant.

The State’s attorney attempted to admit the extrajudicial identification statements as substantive evidence at trial. The trial judge initially sustained defense counsel’s objection to the evidence and refused to ²⁸⁴ allow in the statements of identification as substantive evidence. Ultimately, the State’s attorney, under pressure from the trial judge, introduced the statements for purposes of impeachment. They were then admitted.

The trial judge thereafter proceeded to consider the extrajudicial identification as substantive evidence in the State’s case, oscillating from his earlier ruling that the statement was not admissible for that purpose. He cited Maryland Rule 1-501 as authority for admitting the statement as substantive evidence. That rule does not involve the admissibility of such statements as substantive evidence, but rather, it states that any party may impeach a witness’s credibility. The trial judge’s consideration of the statements for their substance brought full circle the question of the admissibility of the extrajudicial statements with the State’s attorney reasserting her original reason for admitting them.

The trial judge, having helped to create an evidentiary merry-go-round, fortuitously got off of it at the right place, albeit for the wrong reasons. Pursuant to Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502 , 403 A.2d 1221 (1979), which requires us to affirm the trial court where the record supports its decision, even though the rationale behind the decision is faulty, we will affirm and set out the correct reasons for admitting the statements as substantive evidence. Though this case appears to be complicated at first glance, it actually involves a simple application of the evidentiary principles regarding admissibility of statements of extrajudicial identification. 1 Keith Delante Joiner, appellant, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, in a court trial, of assault with intent to disable and malicious shooting. Sim ²⁸⁵ pie assault and assault and battery counts were merged into the first count.

On appeal, Joiner presents two issues: 1. Whether the prior written statement of a nonparty witness may be admitted at trial as substantive evidence of the truth of the matters asserted therein, where the prior written statement is inconsistent with the witness’s live testimony at trial. 2. Whether the lower court erred in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence. The parties agreed to the following statement of facts: On the evening of November 24, 1987, Ralph Williams (“Williams” herein) was walking near his home along the 1900 block of Brooks Drive, in Capital Heights, Maryland, when a car drove up and an altercation ensued between Williams and two. males occupying the vehicle.

During the altercation, Williams was “shot” in his left ankle, and the two males fled in the car. Williams later gave a written statement regarding the incident to Detective Ricky McCormick of the Prince George’s County Police Department. In that statement, Williams named “Keetie” as his assailant, although he did not identify the other male in the car. Later he called the detective and identified “Keetie” as Keith Joiner.

Williams was shown a photographic array of suspects several days thereafter and identified the photograph of Appellant Keith Joiner as the individual who had shot him. Thereafter, appellant, a juvenile of 17 years of age, was arrested and charged in the case as an adult. Prior to the originally scheduled trial date of July 11, 1988, however, Williams recanted his prior statements in which he identified appellant as his assailant, and informed the Assistant State’s Attorney assigned to the case that he did not know who his assailant was and informed the prosecutor that he had only named appellant because he was “mad at him.” Williams provided a sworn affidavit recanting the identification of appellant as his assailant, which was filed as an attachment to appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment prior to trial. ²⁸⁶ The State called three witnesses during the course of the trial: Williams and Messrs. McCormick and Moran, the two detectives who spoke with Williams following the incident.

The State initially filed a motion to have the court call Williams as the court’s own witness, which the trial judge denied. The State then called Williams to the stand, and Williams testified that two boys attacked him and one of them shot at him from the car, but that he did not see the person who shot at him. The State moved to have Williams declared a surprise witness because Williams’ foregoing testimony conflicted with the prior statements he had given in which he named appellant as his assailant. Over defense attorney’s objection, the trial judge ruled that Williams was a surprise witness and that the State had been prejudiced.

Williams then read his prior written statement and admitted to having written everything in it. The trial judge ultimately admitted the statement into evidence over the objection of defense counsel that the State was attempting to offer it as substantive evidence. 2 Williams also read into evidence a statement on the back of a photograph of appellant that purported to be his handwriting, although Williams stated he could not remember writing it. The statement was, “This is Keith Joiner. He shot me.” The photograph and statement were later admitted into evidence over objection of defense counsel.

Additionally, one of the detectives testified as to oral statements made to him by the witness in which the witness identified the defendant as his assailant. I The prior written (and oral) statements admitted in this case were not just inconsistent statements, they were statements of extrajudicial identifications made by the witness prior to trial in which the witness identified the defendant as his assailant. ²⁸⁷ McCormick on Evidence, § 251 (3d ed. 1984), under the section entitled “Prior Statements of Witnesses as Substantive Evidence,” states: [T]he Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence adopted an intermediate position, neither admitting nor rejecting prior statements of witnesses in toto, but exempting from classification as hearsay certain prior statements thought by circumstances to be free of the danger of abuse. The exempt statements are (A) inconsistent statements, (B) consistent statements when admissible to rebut certain attacks upon the credibility of the witness, and (C) statements of identification. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) provides: (d) Statements which are not hearsay.

A statement is not hearsay if— (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him____ 6 McLain, Maryland Evidence, § 801(3).l, provides: Under Maryland case law, proof of a prior identification of the accused as the perpetrator of an alleged crime is admissible as substantive evidence, under an exception to the hearsay rule, if the person who made the identification is in attendance and available for cross-examination and the identification was made under circumstances preventing unfair suggestion or confusion. Although earlier cases suggested that the evidence of the prior identification might be admissible only as corroborative evidence of a judicial identification, the current case law states that the prior identification may suffice to ²⁸⁸ sustain a conviction, even when the witness is unable to identify the defendant in court, [footnotes omitted] The case of Johnson v. State, 237 Md. 283 , 206 A.2d 138 (1964), involved multiple counts of robbery, taking place at different taverns. Some of the witnesses to the Bower’s Cafe robbery, charged in one count, testified that they had identified the robbers at lineups but were not asked to identify, nor did they identify, the defendants in court.

Another witness testified that he could not identify any of the robbers. A police officer who had made a record of the identifications made by the witnesses was permitted to testify that the witnesses had identified the robbers. The witnesses to the Dutch’s Tavern robbery testified that they had made lineup identifications, but did not testify as to whom they had identified. The police officer testified that these witnesses had identified the defendants.

The witnesses were then recalled and verified the officer’s statement. The Court of Appeals stated: The admissibility of this type of evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule was recognized by this Court in Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643 , 119 A.2d 917 (1956). There it was held that testimony of an extrajudicial identification was admissible where the identification was such as to preclude any suspicion of unfairness or unreliability. Evidence of this nature was, at first, admitted as corroborative of a judicial identification, but it was later held to be admissible, under some circumstances, as substantive evidence.

See Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168 , 146 A.2d 29 (1958).... # * * * # * While the cases, which are collected in an annotation in 71 A.L.R.2d 449 , indicate that the primary objection to testimony of an extrajudicial identification is that it is hearsay, it is evident that the use of such identifications either as corroborative or substantive evidence is gaining recognition in the courts of other jurisdictions as well as this. In Judy v. State, supra, we recognized (at p. 174 of 218 Md. [ 146 A.2d 29 ]) that “evidence is hearsay only ²⁸⁹ when it derives its value, not solely from the credit given to the witness himself, but in part from the veracity and competency of another person.” However, where the out-of-court declarant is available as a witness, the dangers sought to be avoided by the hearsay rule are not present____ We hold therefore that where, as here, the identifying victims or eyewitnesses were present and subject to cross-examination, the testimony of the police officer as to the extrajudicial identifications was admissible. Even where witnesses do not make a courtroom identification of the indictees, an extrajudicial