Jolley v. State

Orth, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We review this case upon our grant of a writ of certiorari before decision by the Court of Special Appeals. The appeal to the intermediate appellate court was by Tyrone Anthony Jolley from an order of the Circuit Court for Dorchester County issued upon a finding that Jolley was incompetent to stand trial in a criminal cause. ³⁵⁵ I The threshold question is whether an immediate appeal lies from the order. The State did not file a motion to dismiss but argued in its brief that the appeal was not allowed by law.

Maryland Rule 835 a 1. We find that the appeal was properly taken and shall not dismiss it. It is the position of the State that “an order which judicially determines the mental incompetency of an accused to stand trial in a criminal case is not an appealable order.” The basic reason for the State’s position is that the order was not a final one. Appellate jurisdiction in both civil actions and criminal causes is dependent upon a statutory grant of power.

Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. 113, 116 , 321 A. 2d 534 (1974). With exceptions not here relevant, Maryland Code (1974) § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article permits a party to appeal from a final judgment entered in a criminal case by a circuit court. “Final judgment” is defined by § 12-101 (f) of the Article to mean “a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other actions by a court ... from which an appeal, application for leave to appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken.” “This section, however, does not attempt to specify what is an appealable final judgment or order, and' leaves that determination to the case law.” Warren v. State, 281 Md. 179, 183 , 377 A. 2d 1169 (1977). Our cases have held that “to be final a judgment must actually settle the rights of the parties ... or it must finally settle some disputed right or interest of the parties____” Id. at 183 . We observed as early as 1835: “It is time enough for a party to apply to this Court for redress, when it is ascertained that he is to be injured by the judgment of which he complains.” Boteler & Belt v. The State, 7 G. & J. 109, 113 (1835).

We declared: “ ‘[N]o appeal can be prosecuted to this Court, until a decision has been had in the Court below, which is so far final, as to settle, and conclude the rights of the party involved in the action, or denying to the party the means of further prosecuting or defending the suit.’ ” Id. at 113 . We expressed our accord with this view as recently as last year. Warren, 281 Md. at 183 ; United States Fire Ins. v. Schwartz, ³⁵⁶ 280 Md. 518, 521 , 374 A. 2d 896 (1977). The purpose of this general rule is, of course, to prohibit piecemeal disposition of litigation.

Warren at 183 . It enables the combining in one review all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final judgment results. A well recognized corollary to the general rule, however, permits an appeal from a seemingly interlocutory order which denies an absolute constitutional right, Neal v. State, 272 Md. 323, 325 , 322 A. 2d 887 (1974). A qualification of the corollary is that an appeal will not lie from an apparently interlocutory order, even though it denies a constitutional right, if the order is based upon the rightful exercise of a trial court’s discretion.

Pearlman v. State, 226 Md. 67, 71 , 172 A. 2d 395 (1961). See Neal at 325 . An accused has an absolute constitutional right to a speedy trial both under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, applicable to the states through the . Fourteenth Amendment, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213, 222-226 , 87 S. Ct. 988 (1967), and under Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Maryland.

Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 6 , 367 A. 2d 1 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 915 (1977); Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521, 526-527 , 350 A. 2d 628 (1976). Whether or not the refusal of a trial court to dismiss a criminal cause because of an alleged denial of the right to a speedy trial is immediately appealable, 1 it is manifest that under the rationale of Neal, supra, and our other decisions, an appeal will lie from a denial to an accused of the opportunity to assert this absolute constitutional right. The determination by a trial court that an accused is incompetent to stand trial effectively precludes him from invoking the right to a speedy trial. The matter of incompetency vel non does not come within the qualification of the corollary to the general rule because there is qo ³⁵⁷ exercise of judicial discretion in the court’s determination whether an accused is incompetent to stand trial.

If the evidence is not sufficient for the court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is able “to understand the nature of the object of the proceeding against him or to assist in his defense,” Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.) Art. 59, § 23, the court must find him incompetent to stand trial. Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 297 , 372 A. 2d 1069 (1977). A decision that an accused is incompetent to stand trial appears to fall in that small class which finally determines claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.

See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 , 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949). 2 Like the order in Cohen , the order here is a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it; it does not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment. What the Court said in Cohen is applicable here: “When that time comes, it will be too late effectively to review the present order, and the rights conferred by the [constitutions]..-. will have been lost, probably irreparably. We conclude that the matters embraced in the decision appealed from are not of such an interlocutory nature as to affect, or to be affected by, decision of the merits of this case.” Id. at 546 . We hold that the challenged order is appealable. 3 ³⁵⁸ The State suggests that the statutory scheme embodied in the Mental Hygiene Law, Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl.

Vol.) Art. 59, §§ 1 et seq., whereby the propriety of the involuntary confinement of a person in a facility by reason of a mental disorder so as to require in-patient medical care and treatment for the protection of himself and others, § 12, may be reviewed by way of habeas corpus, § 14, or by petition filed in an appropriate equity court, with right of appeal from decisions on such petitions as in other equity cases, § 15, supplants any right of immediate appeal from an order declaring an accused incompetent to stand trial in a criminal cause. The short answer is that the involuntary admission of a person under § 15 is an entirely different proceeding than commitment in a criminal cause by the trial court upon a determination of incompetency to stand trial pursuant to § 23. The mere fact that the limitation as to frequency of reconsideration of competency to stand trial is the same as that with regard to a petition for release of a person confined. under a § 15 procedure, does not preclude the right to the immediate appeal which we have found is enjoyed by an accused found incompetent to stand trial. 4 ³⁵⁹ II This is not merely another case in which the central issue is the competency of the accused to stand trial. It has an unusual twist.

Ordinarily the accused is aggrieved because the trial court determined that he was competent to stand trial which then proceeded to conviction. The accused here is aggrieved because the trial court found him to be incompetent and refused to allow the trial to proceed. Jolley insisted that he was able “to understand the nature of the object of the proceeding against him and to assist in his defense.” Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.) Art. 59, § 23.

See Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 297-300 , 372 A. 2d 1069 (1977). He claims that the court erred in determining otherwise. It all started with Jolley’s arrest on 2 September 1976 on charges of assault, battery, assault with intent to murder and grand larceny, alleged to have occurred the day before. Upon petition by Jolley’s attorney, the District Court for Dorchester County on 2 September 1976 ordered that Jolley be committed to Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital (Perkins) to determine whether he was competent to stand trial.

On 5 October Perkins reported to the court that “[i]t was the opinion of the medical staff that further psychological testing and further observation of Mr. Jolley’s behavior was necessary in order to answer the question of his competency to stand trial.” Estimating that “an accurate report of his competency can be rendered to the Court within the next thirty days,” Perkins suggested that “if a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is to be entered in Mr. Jolley’s defense, that it be entered promptly so that we could evaluate his mental state at the time of the alleged offenses during this present hospitalization in order to avoid the necessity of Mr. Jolley’s being hospitalized for this evaluation in the future.” On 18 November Perkins reported that it was the opinion of ³⁶⁰ the medical staff that “at the present time the patient is able to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and to participate in his own defense.” Feeling that Jolley was not “in need of inpatient psychiatric care at this time,” Perkins returned him to the custody of the court. On 8 February 1977 a criminal information was filed in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County charging Jolley with assault (1st count), battery (2nd count), assault with intent to murder (3rd count), and grand larceny (4th count). On 10 March Jolley pled not guilty and, pursuant to Code (1957,1972 Repl. Vol.) Art. 59, § 25, alleged “that he was insane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and, therefore, pleads not guilty by reason of insanity.” On 16 March he filed a preliminary motion for a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial, referring to an opinion of Talmage Reeves, M.D., a practitioner in psychiatry, who had examined him and found that he was incompetent to stand trial.

The hearing was held on 26 April 1977. The 18 November 1976 report of Perkins in which Jolley was stated to be competent to stand trial was given after Jolley had “received a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation and other pertinent studies,” the details of which were not set out. The report read: “On November 5, 1976, Mr. Jolley was presented before a Medical Staff Conference at which time he was interviewed and his case reviewed. The patient evidenced many symptoms of schizophrenia, including evasiveness, suspiciousness, flat affect and occasional inappropriate mannerisms.

It was the unanimous impression of the medical staff that the diagnosis is schizophrenia, paranoid type. The medical staff expressed the further opinion that this patient’s mental condition is one which has been present for some time and is in stable, controlled status.” Jolley offered Dr. Reeves’ report in evidence. 5 The report ³⁶¹ gave in letter form, addressed to Jolley’s attorney under date of 7 February 1977, a psychiatric evaluation of Jolley made at the attorney’s request. Dr. Reeves had interviewed Jolley’s mother, father, older brother, and, on 5 February, Jolley himself “at length.” “The patient was extremely difficult to interview in that he was very evasive and repetitive in his remarks.” After giving a detailed account of his interviews with Jolley and Jolley’s family, 6 the report went to the heart of the matter: “Mr. Jolley was evaluated at Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center in the fall of 1976. They had a difficult time with their evaluation in that Mr. Jolley was also extremely evasive with them.

They sent out an initial examination and asked for an increase in the time for a complete evaluation. For the most part I agree with their diagnosis. Young Mr. Jolley does present himself as a psychopath or anti-social personality and also he is very definitely psychotic at the present time with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. However, in no way can I agree that he is capable of helping in his defense in that he has no conception of reality at the time I interviewed him.

It is my professional opinion that he is psychotic, that he is unable to help with his defense and that I feel he could very easily be homicidal. This for the most part would be directed towards white people but he has inflicted bodily harm on at least two occasions towards his own black race. In a mental hospital setting and on appropriate anti-psychotic drugs, I feel that Mr. Jolley would respond and improve as far as his psychosis is concerned. However, I believe with his limited ability for insight that once he is discharged he will stop his medication and become ³⁶² psychotic and homicidal again.

This is where the difficulty in how he should be handled in our society arises. When his psychotic process is under control the mental hospitals do not want him and he would be discharged to the general population only to stop taking his medication and be a detriment to society again. The only possible way this could be averted is for him to be put on a lifelong type probation where he is required to report to a mental health clinic and they be held in contempt of court if they did not report his not keeping his appointment so that he could be treated with intermuscular injections which last two weeks. If it is not handled in a form similar to this, when he does go psychotic he is quite capable of hurting someone.” Dr. Reeves gave his thoughts on why Perkins stated that Jolley was now competent to stand trial: “I am not sure but I would imagine the reason Clifton T. Perkins stated that he was now capable of handling his own defense was that they had him on anti-psychotic drugs there.

He is not on any medication in the Dorchester County Jail and is certainly now presently psychotic.” George D. Willoughby, the Chief Deputy Sheriff for Dorchester County, was called by Jolley. Willoughby had observed Jolley during Jolley’s confinement in the Dorchester County Jail. Jolley would send Willoughby “a note about three or four days out of a week, usually in the morning---[NJothing makes any sense that he writes, just a jumbled up bunch of words on a piece of paper.” A sample of the type of letter was admitted in evidence. It read: “ ‘Dear Sir: Tyrone A. Jolley, I like to sign up for two more months Clifton T. Perkins Institution.’... ‘evaluation, Ward 4, the one I left.

Sincerely yours. When me things are placed money, etc., especially 9433503. Mrs. Dorsey Dixon 2,500 to 3,500 watchbaiid 9434208 money mother $500 pay for ³⁶³ cooperation today or as soon as possible, two months at or as you see reasonable.’ ” Willoughby was not sure that Jolley knew “the charges pending against him,” although he knew he was in jail “[bjecause he shot a man.” When Jolley was arrested he told Willoughby “he had to do it. He didn’t say why he had to do it.” Emory Tamplin, Jolley’s attorney, took the stand at his own behest.

He testified: “Your Honor, concerning the competency of the defendant to stand trial at this time in this matter, I have had occasion to speak with him prior to his originally going to Clifton T. Perkins where he spent sixty days, and I have had an opportunity to speak with him upon his return; and, also, have had an opportunity to confer with family and other people who have had contact with him. And, based on my personal contact with him and my personal conversations with him as his attorney to explain the nature of the offense, what is involved for the offense, the seriousness of the matter, Mr. Jolley has exhibited to me that he did not comprehend that he is the person on trial. He has at times expressed the opinion that it is not he who is on trial, it is the person who was shot here who is on trial, and that the charges were charges brought by him against the other party. He has requested to have those charges pressed when I have tried to explain that there are no such charges.” Upon inquiry by the court, Tamplin said that there were times when he believed that Jolley knew the charges pending against him.

At other times Tamplin was sure that Jolley did not feel that charges were pending against him, but that the charges were against the victim of the crimes. Tamplin could not explain how Jolley related the victim to the case. 7 It was ³⁶⁴ Tamplin’s opinion that Jolley could not assist in the defense. Jolley could not inform Tamplin in a rational manner of the names of witnesses he would like to testify in his behalf. “The people he would mention at times would have no connection to this.” Since Jolley had been in jail, he had made a number of unusual requests of Tamplin “of a nature that have been far out of the ordinary from what you would expect from the normal request made to an attorney in a normal client relation — attorney/client relationship.” Jolley took the stand at his own request. He said that he wanted to be questioned.

His attorney said he had no questions to propound. The State attempted to question him but desisted when he seemed incoherent. The State called Dr. Ido Adamo, a physician specializing in psychiatry at Perkins. It was stipulated that he was so qualified.

He said that on 5 November 1976 the medical staff of Perkins became aware that Jolley had a mental disorder, the diagnosis being schizophrenia, paranoid type, but “for the purpose of competency he seemed to be aware of the charges and he seemed to possess the capacity to assist in the defense.” Dr. Adamo was asked to explain the apparent incongruity between Jolley’s competency to stand trial and his mental disorder. He said: “When we say competent to stand trial, we don’t consider at all the extent of the mental disorder. We consider whether they understand the nature and the object of the proceedings against them and whether they have a capacity to assist in the defense. People can be psychotic and be competent to stand trial.” Upon inquiry by the court, the witness stated that a person could be competent to stand trial and at the same time meet the legal definition of insanity “because the criteria for insanity is to lose capacity to appreciate the conduct and to conform and or to conform with that conduct to requirements ³⁶⁵ of the law.

So that is a different criteria for competency.” Also a person could be insane at the time of the commission of a crime and sane at the time of trial. On cross-examination Dr. Adamo indicated that Jolley’s condition had not changed during the period from 5 February 1976, when Dr. Reeves saw him, to 5 November 1976 when the Perkins staff had its conference. “[L]et’s not forget that we never said he was not competent. We really — we always felt he was competent from the very day he came to Perkins. Perkins asked for more time because “[w]e wanted to be better documented as to the analysis and competency.

We did not administer any medication whatever, none, injectable or by mouth.” The difference between the opinions of Dr. Reeves and Dr. Adamo was that, although both agreed that Jolley was psychotic, suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type, Reeves believed that Jolley was unable to understand the nature of the object of the proceeding against him and to assist in his defense and Adamo believed that Jolley was able to do so. Thus, the trial court was confronted with the conflicting opinions of two qualified expert witnesses. Although the two witnesses were in complete agreement, not only that Jolley suffered from a mental disorder but as to the nature of that disorder, they were diametrically opposed as to his competency to stand trial. There was no indication that either of them based his opinion on this issue upon any criteria not considered by the other.

It was simply, as Adamo put it, “[Reeves] says [Jolley] is psychotic and therefore not competent; and, I say that he can be psychotic and still be competent.” It was the duty of the trial court to “determine upon testimony and evidence presented on the record” whether Jolley was competent to stand trial in the contemplation of Art. 59, § 23. A determination that an accused is competent to stand trial must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Raithel, 280 Md. at 297 ; Hill v. State, 35 Md. App. 98, 101-104 , 369 A. 2d 98 (1977); Colbert v. State, 18 Md. App. 632, 641 , 308 A. 2d 726 , cert. denied, 269 Md. 756 (1973); Rozzell v. State, 5 Md. App. 167, 175 , 245 A. 2d 917 (1968), cert. denied, 252 Md. 732 (1969); Strawderman v. State, 4 Md. App. 689, 697 , 244 A. 2d 888 (1968), cert. denied, 252 Md. 733 (1969). It ³⁶⁶ appeared to the judge that “under the evidence I am compelled to reach a finding that it has not been shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused understands the nature and object of the charges against him and is able to assist in his defense.” Jolley was to be committed to Perkins “until such time as the court is satisfied the defendant is competent to stand trial.” The judge indicated that Perkins should also evaluate Jolley as to his criminal responsibility at the time of the commission of the offenses.

On 2 May 1977 the court issued two orders committing Jolley to Perkins, by the first until such time as the court was satisfied that he was “competent to stand trial or has ceased to be, by reason of mental disorder, a danger to himself or to the safety of the person or property of others,” and by the second “until it has been determined whether [he] was legally insane at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.” These orders were not challenged. Under date of 11 August 1977, Perkins submitted a report to the court in compliance with