Jones v. Jones

⁴³² EYLER, DEBORAH S., J. In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Prince Carmen Jones, Sr., and Candace Jackson, as next friend of Nina Jones, brought a ■wrongful death action against Corporal Carlton B. Jones, Prince George’s County (“the County”), Sergeant Alexandre Bailey, and Police Chief John Farrell, over the shooting death of the decedent, Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. Ms. Jackson was the decedent’s fiancée and is the mother of his child. Mr. Jones was the decedent’s father. 1 Mabel S. Jones, M.D., the decedent’s mother, was appointed personal representative of his estate, by the Register of Wills of Prince George’s County, where the decedent was living at the time of his death. Dr. Jones filed a motion to intervene as a use plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 15-1001, which was granted. Thereafter, she filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that, because the death occurred in the State of Virginia, the Virginia Wrongful Death Act controlled and, under that act, the personal representative is the only person with standing to bring suit.

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Jones on that ground and “dismissed” the entire case. 2 The plaintiffs noted an appeal and, before this Court decided the matter, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari. The Court held, inter alia, that the plain language of the Maryland Wrongful Death Act provides that, when the wrongful act occurs in another state, the substantive law of that state applies; the circuit court therefore erred in ruling that the place of the death, as opposed to the place of the wrongful act, determines as a matter of substance which state’s wrongful death statute applies. The Court observed that the allegations against the defendants included some wrongful acts in ⁴³³ Maryland and others in Virginia. Jones v. Prince George’s County, 378 Md. 98, 109 , 835 A.2d 632 (2003) (“Jones I”).

The Court further held that the issue of who has standing to file a wrongful death action in Maryland is procedural, not substantive, and so is governed by the law of the forum state. In Maryland, such matters of procedure are determined by the Maryland statutes on point, the Maryland Rules, and common law standing principles. The Court ruled that, because neither the Maryland Wrongful Death Act nor the Maryland Rules specify who may properly file a wrongful death action in Maryland when the wrongful acts alleged to have caused the death occurred, at least in part, outside of Maryland, common law standing principles applied; and that, under those principles, the plaintiffs and intervenor were aggrieved people with standing to sue. Jones I, at 118, 835 A.2d 632 (citing Sugarloaf Citizens’ Assn. v. Dept. of Env’t, 344 Md. 271 , 686 A.2d 605 (1996)).

The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding a claim for violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C section 1983. The defendants then removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. That court determined that there was no factual basis alleged that could support the section 1983 claim, and remanded the case to the circuit court.

Beginning on January 9, 2006, a jury trial was held, which resulted in verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs on their claim of violation of the decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights and against the plaintiffs on their claims of negligence and battery. The jury awarded $2.5 million in damages to Ms. Jackson, as next friend of Nina; $1 million dollars in damages to Dr. Jones; and $200,000 in damages to Mr. Jones. Thereafter, Cpl. Jones and the County filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), new trial, or to revise.

The court granted the motion in part, striking the judgment in favor of Mr. Jones and Dr. Jones because neither ⁴³⁴ one was a permissible beneficiary under the Virginia Wrongful Death Act. Mr. Jones and Dr. Jones each filed notices of appeal. Cpl. Jones and the County then filed a notice of cross-appeal as to those appeals, and a notice of appeal as to the judgment in favor of Ms. Jackson, as next friend of Nina.

Ms. Jackson then filed a notice of cross-appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, Mr. Jones and Ms. Jackson, on behalf of Nina, entered into settlements with Cpl. Jones and the County, and voluntarily dismissed their appeals and cross-appeals. The only remaining appellant is Dr. Jones.

Cpl. Jones and the County are the appellees and cross-appellants. The parties on appeal pose the following questions for review, which we have rephrased: By Dr. Jones: I. Did the trial court err in rejecting her argument that the appellees waived the issue of whether she was a permissible beneficiary under the Virginia Wrongful Death Act and in any event err in ruling that she was not a permissible beneficiary? By Cpl.

Jones and the County: II. Did the trial court err in denying Cpl. Jones’s motion for judgment on the excessive force constitutional claim for insufficient evidence? We answer “no” to Dr. Jones’s appeal question, and on that basis affirm the judgment in favor of Cpl.

Jones and the County on her claim. Because we have resolved the appeal issue in Cpl. Jones’s and the County’s favor, their issue on cross-appeal is moot. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS As noted, at the time of his death, the decedent was a resident of Maryland.

When the events relevant to this case took place, his fiancée, Ms. Jackson, was living in Fairfax ⁴³⁵ County, Virginia, with their minor daughter Nina. The decedent’s parents, both Maryland residents, had divorced many years prior. Cpl. Jones was a member of the Prince George’s County Police Department.

Sgt. Bailey was his supervisor. As mentioned, Chief Farrell was the chief of the police department. On September 1, 2000, Cpl.

Jones and Sgt. Bailey were conducting an undercover surveillance operation, seeking to arrest two men who had stolen a police officer’s weapon and were believed to be at large and armed and dangerous. Although they were working together, each officer was driving an unmarked sport utility vehicle (“SUV”). As part of their undercover role, they were unkempt and were dressed in tattered clothing.

The officers began their surveillance in the District of Columbia. They knew that the people they were looking for had been driving a black Jeep Cherokee with Maryland tags. While in the District, Cpl. Jones saw a Jeep with Pennsylvania tags; he determined that that vehicle could have been the Jeep the officers were looking for, with a newly attached set of tags.

Cpl. Jones wrote down the Pennsylvania tag number, but then lost sight of the Jeep. Cpl. Jones then drove to a location in Prince George’s County where one of the suspects was known to stay.

There, he saw the same black Jeep with the Pennsylvania tags. He paused to run the license plate number, and again lost sight of the Jeep. Sgt. Bailey spotted the Jeep nearby, and the two followed it from Maryland into Virginia.

As it turned out, the Jeep the officers were following belonged to the decedent and was being driven by him. The decedent had nothing whatsoever to do with the suspects or crimes that were being investigated. His ultimate destination that night was Ms. Jackson’s house, in Virginia. Apparently perceiving that he was being followed, the decedent pulled into a driveway (not Ms. Jackson’s) on a street in Fairfax County, turned around, and drove back in the di ⁴³⁶ rection of Cpl.

Jones’s SUV. Cpl. Jones started to make a three-point turn in the street, to change course and follow the Jeep. When Cpl.

Jones’s SUV was in the middle of the three-point turn, and perpendicular to the street, the decedent pulled past Cpl. Jones, put his Jeep into reverse, and backed it into Cpl. Jones’s SUV, pinning the driver’s side door closed. The decedent then got out of his vehicle and ran toward Cpl.

Jones. When Cpl. Jones drew his gun and yelled “police,” the decedent returned to his Jeep. He drove forward slightly, away from Cpl.

Jones’s SUV, but then put his Jeep in reverse and again rammed the SUV. The decedent then pulled forward and it appeared that he was about to back into Cpl. Jones’s SUV for the third time. Cpl.

Jones fired 16 shots at the decedent. Five shots hit him in the back and one hit him in the arm. The decedent was able to drive a short distance away from Cpl. Jones before collapsing.

He died of his wounds a short time later. The wrongful death action was tried on a number of theories of liability: 1) constitutional violation: that Cpl. Jones violated the decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him, in the process killing him; 2) negligence: that Cpl. Jones performed his surveillance task negligently, causing the decedent’s death; and 3) battery: that Cpl.

Jones committed a battery against the decedent, killing him. The excessive force and battery theories were based solely upon conduct of Cpl. Jones that, occurred in Virginia. The negligence theory was based upon some conduct of Cpl.

Jones in Maryland and other conduct on his part in Virginia. There also were failure to supervise, supervisory liability, and respondeat superior claims made against Sgt. Bailey, Chief Farrell, and the County. The trial court ruled that the evidence adduced was legally insufficient to prove any negligent act by any defendant in the State of Maryland.

The theories of liability that were submitted to the jury, by means of a special verdict sheet, were use of excessive force, battery, and negligence (based upon conduct in Virginia only). The court granted motions for judgment ⁴³⁷ in favor of the respondeat superior defendants (except the County); those rulings are not being challenged in this appeal. The jury deliberated and returned a special verdict finding that Cpl. Jones had used excessive force against the decedent, causing his death; that Cpl.

Jones was not entitled to qualified immunity; that Cpl. Jones was negligent in causing the decedent’s death; that the decedent was contributorily negligent; and that Cpl. Jones did not commit a battery against the decedent. The jury awarded damages as set forth above.

As explained, the trial court entered an order striking the verdicts in favor of Mr. Jones and Dr. Jones, on the ground that neither one is a permissible wrongful death beneficiary under the Virginia Wrongful Death Act. DISCUSSION Appeal I. Dr. Jones contends that the trial court erred by striking the verdict in her favor on the ground that she is not a permissible wrongful death beneficiary under the Virginia Wrongful Death Act. She argues 1) that this issue was waived by Cpl. Jones (and hence the County) because he did not raise it in his motion for judgment at the close of the evidence, and therefore the trial court was not empowered to grant a JNOV based upon that issue; and 2) “that the Virginia Wrongful Death Act had no application to the litigation below whatsoever.” Cpl.

Jones responds that he did not waive the permissible beneficiary issue and that the trial court correctly ruled that the Virginia Wrongful Death Act applied and that neither Mr. Jones nor Dr. Jones, as parents of the decedent, could recover damages in tort for the death of their son. Waiver At the close of all the evidence, defense counsel moved for judgment “as to all counts.” He first argued that there ⁴³⁸ was insufficient evidence to support a finding of any violation of the Maryland constitution. The court granted his motion in that regard. He next argued that there was insufficient evidence to support findings of “supervisory liability” on the part of Sgt.

Bailey or for any alleged