Jones v. Jones

Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from the order of the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore city, of the 10th August, 1874, revoking tlie letters of administration of the appellant, on Andrew D. Jones’ estate. From such an order, an appeal is allowed to this* Court. State, use of Calvert vs. Williams, 9 Gill, 176 ; Slattery vs. Smiley, 25 Md., 394 .

The cases of Porter vs. Timanus, 12 Md., 283 , relied upon by the appellee’s counsel, and Shipley & Wife, Admrs. of Wood, ex parte, 4 Md., 493 , refer to orders of the Orphans’ Court, as to the investment of moneys, under section 237 of Article 93 of tlie Code. In such cases, where the Court has not exceeded its jurisdiction, there is no appeal from the exercise of its discretion. The motion to dismiss the appeal must be overruled. Two petitions were presented to the Orphans’ Court, praying to have the letters of the appellant revoked — the one, upon the ground that there had not been a compliance with the order of tlie Court of the 9tb August, 1872, directing the deposit of money belonging to the estate— the other, that tlie appellant had failed to pass the proper ad ministrati o n accou uts.

There can be no doubt, that it was the duty of the appellant, as the administratrix of Andrew D. Jones, accord ³⁶⁰ ing to the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article 93 of the Code, to render accounts as therein specified. It was equally incumbent upon her to deposit the funds of the estate as directed by the order of the Court, according to the 237th sec. of Art. 93 of the Code. Upon her failure to do so, the Orphans’ Court had authority to revoke the letters, and it is to be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the Court faithfully discharged its duty, and properly exercised its power of removal. So far as the record discloses the proceedings, the appellant had ample time and opportunity to have complied with the order for the investment of the money : and to have passed the necessary accounts.

The defence relied upon by the appellant, to excuse her failure, that an appeal was pending as to the distribution of the estate; and that certain proceedings had been instituted in the Circuit Court, as a Court of Equity, afforded no justification for her delinquency. The law prescribing her duty as to the passage of administration accounts, and the due preservation of the funds of the estate, was not suspended by these proceedings. The appeal only stayed such proceedings as were thereby affected, and which could not consistently be carried on until its