Jones v. Prince George's County

ELDRIDGE, Judge. The principal issue in this case concerns the proper party or parties to bring a wrongful death action, under Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-901 et seq. of the Courts and ¹⁰² Judicial Proceedings Article, where some of the alleged wrongful acts occurred in Maryland, where other alleged wrongful acts took place in Virginia, and where the death occurred in Virginia. 1 We shall hold that Maryland law determines the threshold matter of whether a particular party may bring the suit. We shall also hold that the Circuit Court erred in ruling that Virginia tort law applied to the alleged wrongful acts of all of the defendants.

In addition, we shall conclude that the Circuit Court improperly dismissed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. I. Since the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ action as to all defendants, we shall set forth the facts of the case in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Rite Aid v. Hagley, 374 Md. 665, 684 , 824 A.2d 107, 118 (2003) (“factual disputes, and the inferences reasonably to be drawn from the facts, are resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment and against the moving party”); Messing v. Bank of America, 373 Md. 672, 683-684 , 821 A.2d 22, 28 (2003); International Broth. of Teamsters v. Corroon Corp., 369 Md. 724, 728 , 802 A.2d 1050, 1052 (2002); Home For Incurables v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 369 Md. 67, 70 , 797 A.2d 746, 747 (2002); Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695 , 785 A.2d 726, 728-729 (2001) (“as the tort action against the defendants ... was decided by a grant of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, we must review the facts, and all inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs”). On September 1, 2000, Corporal Carlton B. Jones and Sergeant Alexandre Bailey, of the Prince George’s County Police Department, driving separate vehicles, followed a vehicle driven by Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. from the District of ¹⁰³ Columbia into Prince George’s County, Maryland, back through the District of Columbia and into Fairfax County, Virginia.

Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. was a resident of Maryland and was driving to Virginia in order to visit his fiancee, Candace Jackson, who resided in Virginia. The police officers were each driving unmarked sports utility vehicles. When Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. pulled into a driveway in a street in Fairfax County, Virginia, Corporal Jones pulled up behind him and blocked his exit. 2 Corporal Jones exited his vehicle, exhibited his weapon, but allegedly failed to identify himself as a police officer. Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. attempted to flee the scene, and Corporal Jones fired sixteen shots at him, five of which hit Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. in the back, and one in the arm.

Sergeant Bailey was not on the scene at this time. Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. died a short time later in Virginia. Following the death of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. his mother, Mabel S. Jones, was appointed, by the Register of Wills of Prince George’s County, Maryland, to be the personal representative of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr.’s intestate estate. 3 At the time of his death, Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. was unmarried but engaged to be married to Candace Jackson, the mother of Nina Jones. Nina had been born on October 2, 1999, and Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. had openly acknowledged her as his daughter.

Candace Jackson consented to Mabel being the personal representative on behalf of her daughter as a beneficiary of the estate of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. Prince Carmen Jones, Sr., the father of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr., as co-guardian of Nina Jones and in his individual ¹⁰⁴ capacity, and Candace Jackson, as guardian and next Mend of Nina Jones, filed this wrongful death action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against Corporal Carlton Jones, Sergeant Alexandre Bailey, Prince George’s County Chief of Police John S. Farrell, the Prince George’s County Police Department, and Prince George’s County, Maryland. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 15-1001(b), the action was also to the use of Mabel S. Jones, the mother of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Corporal Carlton Jones used excess force and that “Corporal Jones and Sergeant Bailey were grossly negligent and reckless in multiple ways that led to the death of Prince Jones. This misconduct included: (1) initiating and continuing the surveillance of Prince Jones without any basis to believe that he had committed or was about to commit any crime; (2) Corporal Jones’s initiating an unnecessary and unlawful encounter with Prince Jones in the driveway on Spring Terrace in Fairfax, Virginia, by blocking Mr. Jones’s vehicle with his own vehicle; (3) Corporal Jones’s unlawful display of a handgun coupled with his failure to properly identify himself as a police officer; (4) Corporal Jones’s mishandling of his encounter on Spring Terrace with Prince Jones that foreseeably escalated into a violent altercation; (5) Sergeant Bailey’s failure to properly supervise Corporal Jones during this episode.” The complaint further asserted that Sergeant Bailey, the Prince George’s County Chief of Police, the Prince George’s County Police Department, and Prince George’s County were vicariously liable for Corporal Jones’s actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In addition, the complaint alleged that these same defendants were directly liable for their own tortious conduct.

The plaintiffs contended that Corporal Jones’s use of excessive force was “part of a pattern of excessive force by Prince George’s police officers” and was “the result of a municipal policy and custom, implemented and controlled by Chief Farrell, of providing inadequate training and supervision for its officers in how to handle street encounters with civilians without unnecessary use of lethal force.” It ¹⁰⁵ was alleged that the Prince George’s County Police Department “had a policy of tolerating and even encouraging these episodes of excessive force by failing to investigate and take appropriate disciplinary and restraining actions against the officers involved,” and that the Police Chief “knew ... that county police officers were repeatedly injuring civilians by use of excessive force.” The plaintiffs claimed that Prince George’s County’s failure and/or refusal to provide proper supervision and training to its police officers “led directly to the death of Prince Jones, Jr.” The complaint also alleged violations of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr.’s constitutional rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The complaint asserted that some of “the wrongful conduct causing the death of Prince Jones occurred in Virginia” and was, therefore, governed by “Virginia substantive law.” The complaint also asserted that, “because some of the negligent and wrongful conduct described herein occurred in Maryland,” to some “extent ... this action is ... governed by Maryland substantive law.” The plaintiffs sought both compensatory and punitive damages. Mabel S. Jones, whom the Prince George’s County Register of Wills had appointed to be personal representative of the estate of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr., filed a motion to intervene which the Circuit Court granted. Mabel Jones then filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs’ entire action on the ground that Virginia law controlled and that, under Virginia law, she, as the personal representative of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr.’s estate, was the only person authorized to bring a wrongful death action. 4 In her motion for summary judgment, Mabel Jones stated that ¹⁰⁶ she had brought a wrongful death action, based on the death of Prince Carmen Jones, Jr., in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 5 The defendants Carlton Jones, Alexandre Bailey, Police Chief John Farrell, the Prince George’s County Police Department, and Prince George’s County also sought a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action on the ground oí forum non conveniens.

As earlier indicated, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted Mabel Jones’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the entire action. The Circuit Court held that, “[ujnder Maryland law, in a wrongful death action where the wrongful death occurs in another State, ‘a Maryland Court shall apply the substantive law of that jurisdiction.’ ” The court went on to hold that the proper party to bring a wrongful death action was a matter of substantive law which was controlled by the law of Virginia, and that, under Virginia law, only Mabel Jones was entitled to bring the action. 6 The Circuit Court also agreed with the defendants’ “position that Virginia is a more convenient forum” because “[t]he shooting occurred in Virginia. Plaintiff Nina Jones and her mother reside in Virginia. Virginia law will govern this case, and witnesses and key evidence are located in Virginia.” 7 The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging all three rulings by the Circuit Court. 8 Prior to ¹⁰⁷ oral argument in that intermediate appellate court, we issued a writ of certiorari.

Jones v. Prince George’s County, 369 Md. 570 , 801 A.2d 1031 (2002). We shall address all three issues raised by the plaintiffs, although not in the same order.

II

In a Maryland wrongful death action, based upon a wrongful act occurring outside of Maryland, the Maryland wrongful death statute itself specifies which jurisdiction’s law shall govern. Section 3-903 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Code states as follows: “ § 3-903. When wrongful act occurs outside of Maryland. “(a) Application of substantive law of another state. — If the wrongful act occurred in another state, the District of Columbia, or a territory of the United States, a Maryland court shall apply the substantive law of that jurisdiction. “(b) Maryland court to apply own mies of pleading and procedure. — Notwithstanding the fact that the wrongful act occurred in another jurisdiction, a Maryland court in which the action is pending shall apply its own rules of pleading and procedure.” Consequently, the Circuit Court erred in holding that, “where the wrongful death occurs in another State, ‘a Maryland Court shall apply the substantive law of that jurisdiction.’ ” (Emphasis added). Under the plain language of the statute, it is the place of the wrongful act, and not the place of the wrongful death, which determines the substantive tort law ¹⁰⁸ to be applied in a particular wrongful death action.

See Powell v. Erb, 349 Md. 791, 801 , 709 A.2d 1294, 1300 (1998). This choice of law principle was illustrated by a case in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Farwell v. Chong H. Un, M.D., Linwood W. Briggs, M.D., 902 F.2d 282 (4th Cir.1990). In Farwell , a resident of Maryland, suffering from a mental disorder or disease, was treated in Maryland by one of the defendant physicians, was treated in Delaware by the other defendant physician, and thereafter committed suicide in Pennsylvania. The decedent’s widow brought a wrongful death action, based on diversity of citizenship, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, against both physicians, alleging that their negligent treatment of the decedent in Maryland and in Delaware proximately caused his death in Pennsylvania.

In rejecting an argument that Pennsylvania substantive tort law should apply, the United States Court of Appeals emphasized that “Maryland’s wrongful death statute speaks directly to the choice of law rule to be applied in such cases,” 902 F.2d at 287 . The court held that, as to the claim against Dr. Un, the statute directly required “application of the law of Delaware where occurred the ‘wrongful act’ charged to him.” Ibid. The Court continued (ibid.): “[The statute] does not speak directly to the claim against Dr. Briggs, for the “wrongful act’ charged to him occurred in Maryland and not ‘in another state.’ But by the strongest implication it points to Maryland as the proper source of law for deciding the Briggs claim. This is because the Maryland statute specifically identifies the locus of the ‘wrongful act’ rather than the locus of death as the critical choice of law determinant in wrongful death actions with multi-state connections.

In this respect, this statute makes specific for wrongful death cases the ‘place-of-wrong’s-standard of care’ exception to the classic lex loci rule, thereby displacing in this context the ‘last-act-to-complete-the-tort’ aspect of that rule.” See also Sacra v. Sacra, 48 Md.App. 163 , 426 A.2d 7 , cert. denied, 290 Md. 720 (1981) (Wrongful death action based on an ¹⁰⁹ automobile collision in Delaware near the Maryland border, with the vehicle carrying the decedent being propelled into Maryland where it struck a Maryland utility pole, thereby causing the death in Maryland, and the court applied the substantive tort law of Delaware); White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 109 F.Supp.2d 424, 427 (D.Md.2000) (While the decedent died in Pennsylvania, and while Pennsylvania law would have been applied under the normal lex loci rule, in light of the Maryland wrongful death statute “this Court concludes that Maryland law applies because most of the wrongful acts charged to defendants occurred in Maryland”). Cf. Philip Morris v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 745 , 752 A.2d 200, 231 (2000) (The case did not involve a statute specifying the choice of law, and Judge Raker for the Court pointed out that, under Maryland common law choice of law principles, “when the events giving rise to a suit occur in a number of states ... [, a]s a general rule, the place of the tort is considered to be the place of injury”). Accordingly, in a Maryland wrongful death action, where a particular defendant’s alleged wrongful act or acts all occurred in Maryland, the substantive tort law of Maryland applies and not the law of another state where the death occurred.

In the case at bar, therefore, the claims directly against the Chief of Police, the Police Department, Prince George’s County, Maryland, and possibly Sergeant Bailey, based on alleged tortious “municipal policy and custom,” negligent training, and negligent supervision, all of which occurred in Maryland, are governed by substantive Maryland tort law. 9 On the other hand, the claim against Corporal Carlton Jones was based on alleged wrongful acts which, at least for the most part, occurred in Virginia. As the plaintiffs have ¹¹⁰ consistently conceded, the wrongful death action against Corporal Jones should be governed by Virginia substantive tort law. White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, supra, 109 F.Supp.2d at 427 . Furthermore, the wrongful death claims against the other defendants, to the extent that the plaintiffs seek to hold them vicariously liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for Corporal Jones’s alleged tortious acts, should be governed by the substantive law of Virginia.

III

While the Maryland wrongful death statute mandates the general choice of law principles and specifies who are the beneficiaries of the action, 10 the present statute is silent with ¹¹¹ regard to the person or persons who have standing to bring the action. Nevertheless, both the history of the statute and the general Maryland choice of law principles concerning the right to bring an action disclose that, for the purposes of the wrongful death statute, this is a procedural issue governed by the law of the forum and not a substantive issue governed by the law of another state where the wrongful act may have occurred. Consequently, the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the action on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A. The Maryland wrongful death statute was enacted by Ch. 299 of the Acts of 1852, and it was based on the Lord Campbell’s Act enacted by the British Parliament in 1846.

The original Maryland statute did not deal with the applicable law if the wrongful acts or death occurred outside of Maryland. The statute did, however, expressly provide that the action “shall be brought by and in the name of the State of Maryland, for the use of the person entitled to damages.... ” Ch. 299 of the Acts of 1852, § 2. In Ash, Administratrix v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 72 Md. 144 , 19 A. 643 (1890), the decedent, a citizen of Maryland, died in West Virginia “by means of the negligent and improper structure of one of the bridges on the road of the defendant, in the State of West Virginia.” 72 Md. at 145 , 19 A. at 644 . The decedent’s administratrix, appointed in Maryland, brought a wrongful death action against the Railroad Company in the Circuit Court for Cecil County.

Under the West Virginia wrongful death statute, the personal representative was the proper person to bring the action. This Court, in an opinion by Chief Judge Alvey, held that the action could not be maintained either under the Maryland ■wrongful death statute or under the West Virginia wrongful death ¹¹² statute. The Court took the position that it could not ( 72 Md. at 147 , 19 A. at 644 ) “attempt to give extra-territorial force to our statute, and to make it apply to acts and transactions occurring in other States. And if our statute cannot be so extended and applied, there can be no reason why statutes of other States, not similar in provisions to our own, though belonging to the same general class of legislation, should be allowed extraterritorial force and operation, by the courts of this State.” The Court, after discussing differences between the Maryland and West Virginia statutes, then drew a distinction between common law tort actions and statutory tort actions ( 72 Md. at 148-149 , 19 A. at 645 ): “In Rorer on Inter-State Law, 144, 145, upon review of the authorities, the author states his conclusions to be, that in all purely personal actions of a transitory nature for torts at common law a citizen of a State may sue a citizen of another State in the courts of such other State, or of any State wherein he may reside, or may be found and served with process, "without regard to the place or State in which the injury may have been inflicted.

But that where certain acts are made wrongs by statute, which were not such theretofore, or where remedies additional to those which existed at common law are provided by statute,'advantage can be taken of these new and additional remedies only within the territory or locality in which the statute has force. These constitute new rights, so to speak, and depend for their enforcement always upon the statutes by which they are created. And such statutes will be enforced only by the courts of the State wherein they are enacted.” This Court adhered to the holding in Ash for the next 46 years. See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Harris, 108 Md. 597, 608-612 , 71 A. 81, 83-85 (1908); London Guarantee & Accident Company v. Balgowan Steamship Company, 161 Md. 145, 147-150 , 155 A. 334, 335-336 (1931) (refusing to depart from the Ash holding despite its “inconsistency] with the present trend of the law”); Davis v. Ruzicka, 170 Md. 112, 114 , 183 A. 569, 570 , ¹¹³ cert. denied, 298 U.S. 671 , 56 S.Ct. 943 , 80 L.Ed. 1394 (1936) (“[T]he courts of this state may not be employed to enforce generally legislation of this character”).

See also Olewiler v. Fullerton Supply Company, 162 F.Supp. 563 (D.Md.1958), and Kaufmann v. Service Trucking Co., Inc., 139 F.Supp. 1 (D.Md.1956), for discussions concerning the history of this issue. The 1936 decision in Davis v. Ruzicka, supra, 170 Md. 112 , 183 A. 569 , apparently prompted legislative action. By Ch. 495 of the Acts of 1937, the General Assembly added a new section to the wrongful death statute which provided as follows (Code (1935), Article 67, § 1A): “1A. In any action instituted in the Courts of this State where it shall appear that the death of a person has been caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another person, firm or corporation, and such wrongful act, neglect, or default shall have occurred outside of the State of Maryland, whether in another state, the District of Columbia or territory of the United States, the Courts of this State shall apply the law of such other state, District of Columbia or territory of the United States, to the facts of the particular case, as though such foreign law were the law of this State, provided, however, that the rules of pleading and procedure effective in the Court of this State in which the action is pending govern and be so applied as to give effect to the rights and obligations created by and existing under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction in which the wrongful act, neglect or default occurred; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall apply to causes of action arising prior to June 1, 1937.” This provision, later re-numbered as § 2, is essentially the same as the current § 3-903 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

In 1947, the General Assembly for the first time addressed the question of the proper