Jones v. State

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Sir William Blackstone, “One of the Justices of His Majesty’s Court of Common Pleas,” recorded in his Commentaries on the Laws of England that “[t]he power to punish for contempt seems to have originated in the fact ⁴⁹¹ that the king, in contemplation of law, is supposed to be always present in his courts.” II Cooley’s Blackstone, Bk. IV, p. 283, n. 1 (4th ed.) A reminiscence of that ominous majesty is present in contemporary courts as the robed figure presiding to dispense the sovereign’s justice. The inherent power of contempt is the means of assuring that justice will be decorously dispensed.

Obviously the dignity surrounding the conduct of a trial has certain minimum standards, but there is considerable play in the wheels of justice, and beyond those minimum standards an area exists within which the rigidity of courtroom decorum is left to the discretion of the presiding judge. Because such individual differences may exist in the exercise of this potentially drastic power of the court, trial judges must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstructions of the administration of justice. Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 153 . The judge must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct complained of is contemptuous, Goldsborough v. State, 12 Md. App. 346, 358 .

At common law a court of competent jurisdiction was the sole judge of contempts, and its judgment in such cases was final and conclusive and was not reviewable by any other tribunal by appeal or otherwise. Kelly v. Montebello Park Co., 141 Md. 194 . Recognizing that judges too are subject to human vagaries and that what is flattery to one may be offensive to another, the Legislature has provided that “[a]ny person may appeal from any order ... passed to ... vindicate the dignity of the court and adjudging him in contempt of court.” Cts. Art., § 12-304.

The appellate courts must also be on their guard, however. “It is no less important for this Court to use self-restraint in the exercise of its ultimate power to find that a trial court has gone beyond the area in which it can properly punish for contempt. We are not justified in sliding from mere disagreement with the way in which a trial court has dealt with a particular matter . . . into a condemnation of the court’s action as an abuse of discretion.” Brown, supra, 356 U. S. at 153-154 . ⁴⁹² To facilitate appellate review, Md. Rule P3 requires that the court's order of contempt recite the facts upon which the contempt is based. The purpose of this recitation of facts is not to provide the reviewing Court an opportunity to reevaluate and weigh the evidence, but to provide a basis for an assessment of its legal sufficiency, Kandel v. State, 252 Md. 668, 672 . The appellant in the case now under consideration was an observer at the trial of a friend conducted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore.

The act for which he was held in direct contempt by the judge consisted of slapping the back of the bench in front of appellant, apparently in exasperation at the justice meted out to him by the judge following an inquisitional proceeding conducted to determine what, if any, disorder might have occurred out of the presence of the court while the trial was in progress. Appellant was summarily sentenced to three months in the Baltimore City Jail for that act (16 days of which appellant served prior to this appeal). 1 “Well, just one minute. The Court wishes to observe that in the presence of the Court and while the Court was on the Bench, this young man arose and slammed his hands down upon the Bench [back of the bench seat] in such a way as to constitute a direct contempt of this Court. Accordingly, Madam Reporter, you will transcribe these proceedings as required by the rules for proceedings for summary conviction for direct contempt and finds him guilty of contempt of this Court and prejudice himself on that contempt will serve three months in the Baltimore City Jail.

Sheriff, take him away.” In explaining his decision to the remaining observers, the judge made it clear that he predicated his decision more ⁴⁹³ upon that which had led up to appellant’s act than upon the act itself. “The Court wishes to point out to all who remain, that the purpose of a trial in court is to determine the truth of the matters in controversy. It cannot be done in an atmosphere of intimidation or any sort of cavalier conduct where the officers of the state and city who are there to discharge their functions. Any one who indicates any disrespect to these officers or who attempt in any way to hassle them, molest them or embarrass them is going to be dealt with promptly and severely by this Court. We welcome your attendance here in the courtroom.

One of the rights guaranteed to every citizen in this country by the Constitution is to a speedy, fair and public trial. You, as members of the public, are welcome to attend this trial and must do so in an orderly fashion and must make no attempt to contact officers or those who come here to testify. Further actions of this sort will be dealt with in summary fashion by the Court.” As previously noted, appellant had been one of a number of spectators in the courtroom and was especially interested in the outcome of the trial because of his friendship with one of the defendants. We infer from what subsequently transpired that during a recess of that trial, the judge was informed that some sort of disturbance was taking place in the courtroom.

The judge promptly reconvened the court “to determine what, if anything,” had occurred. “THE COURT: Everybody have a seat. Madam Reporter, the Court desires the record to show, during the recess, after the jury had been sent to the jury room, adjoining to the Courtroom and Chamber of this court room that some disturbance had occurred in the court room. We have now reconvened the court out of the presence of the defendants because we apprehended this aspect of the matter has no connection with them ⁴⁹⁴ whatsoever and not intended to be a part of the trial in progress, to determine what, if anything, occurred in the courtroom and whether the Court should take notice of it.” When the attorney for the defendant then being tried interposed an objection to this procedure on behalf of her client, the court attempted to explain: “It has nothing to do with the defendants. It is a matter of internal security and matter in the court and nothing to do with the trial in progress.

It is independent of the case we are now trying.” The first cast by the judge, directed toward the security force, was unproductive: “Now, if you gentlemen of the Security Force will advise the Court what, if anything, came to your attention that you would like the Court to take notice of. Just tell me what the problem is. SHERIFF HOLT: I was sitting at my desk here, Your Honor, and saw one of the spectators in the back lean forward and speak to the lady in the red coat. And when she saw me looking at her she sat back and smiled, but the lady in the red coat sort of turned around halfway and she didn’t finish it.

It was just something that the spectators said to her.” That response having shown little if any disorder, the judge turned his inquiry toward the police officers who were present in the courtroom as witnesses. This cast was more successful: “THE COURT: Anybody say anything to any of you gentlemen? OFFICER HOOK: Yes, Your Honor, they did. While I was out in the hallway, this one got real smart.

He said, I was so shaky, if I had my gun in my hand he wouldn’t like to be in my path. Then I am trying to get in the elevator to get in ⁴⁹⁵ Traffic Court, he brushes right against me; he says, I bumped into him and started to have a lot of words to say about it, you know, meaning he didn’t believe my testimony or whatever I had to say. Evidently he wasn’t happy with what I testified to. I got in the elevator.

I didn’t get a chance to say nothing to him.” The court turned its attention to appellant and demanded an explanation for his presence. “THE COURT: Stand up. What is your name? A SPECTATOR: John Jones. THE COURT: What are you doing here in the courtroom?

MR. JONES: I came here to see my friend that is on trial. THE COURT: You came here to watch the case in trial? MR.

JONES: Yes.” Appellant explained his conduct with candor: “THE COURT: Did you say anything to the officer: MR. JONES: Yes. THE COURT: What did you say to him? MR.

JONES: Like he said I said, ‘He was so shaky if he had his gun in his hand I wouldn’t like to be m his path.’ THE COURT: Say anything else to him? MR.