Jordan v. State

Moylan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, James Frederick Jordan, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County by a jury, presided over by Judge William H. McCullough, of armed robbery. UponAhis appeal, he raises three somewhat novel contentions: (1) That the in-court identifications of him by the robbery victims were tainted because they were the products of earlier photographic viewings; (2) That he was erroneously denied the identity of an anonymous tipster; and (3) That the trial court committed error in denying his motion for a mistrial when the State was permitted to develop improper rebuttal testimony. The In-Court Identifications The robbery occurred on October 10, 1972.

On October 13, two victims, Morris Pincus and James Cheek, picked out photographs of the appellant. There is no question raised as to the propriety of that photographic viewing and, furthermore, it is clear from the evidence that it was fair in all regards. The ultimate in-court identifications were made on January 18, 1973. Between those two dates, the witnesses had an opportunity to confirm or refresh their identifications.

When the case was called for trial and then postponed on December 12, 1972, Pincus and Cheek again looked at the group of six photographs and again picked out the photograph of the appellant. The appellant claims that this “refresher” may well have assisted Pincus and Cheek in making in-court identifications at trial. He may well be absolutely right, but that fact does not contaminate the State’s case. An in-court identification will only be excluded when it is shown to be the product of an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification.

United ²⁸⁵ States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 , 87 S. Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 ; Smith and Samuels v. State, 6 Md. App. 59 , 250 A. 2d 285 . There is no requirement that an in-court identification must flow from an independent source, rather than be the product of a proper pretrial identification. Whether Pincus and Cheek, when they made their in-court identifications, did so because they had independent recollection from the crime scene or did so because they remembered the photograph which they had earlier identified is a matter which the appellant could