Joyce v. Joyce

Oeth, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. CHATTELS PERSONAL AND THE MARRIED WOMAN Blackstone designated twelve methods by which personal property could be acquired or lost. The sixth mode was marriage. 1 ³ By marriage the husband acquired chattels personal and the wife lost them. Because of “the notion of unity of person between the husband and wife, it being held, that they are one person in law, so that the very existence of the woman is suspended during the coverture, or entirely merged into that of the husband,” chattels which formerly belonged to the wife were, by act of law, vested in the husband, with the same degree of property and the same powers, as the wife, when sole, had over them. * * * As to chattels personal or choses in possession which the wife has in her own right, as ready money, jewels, household goods, and the like, the ⁵¹⁸ husband has therein an immediate and absolute property devolved in him by the marriage, which never can again revest in the wife or her representatives.” 2 There was one instance, however, in which the wife acquired a property in some of her husband’s goods and as to such goods they remained to her after his death and did not go to his executors. “These are called her paraphernalia, a term used in the civil law, and derived from the Greek, signifying something over and above her dower.

In our law it signifies the apparel and ornaments of the wife, suitable to her rank and degree. These she retains at the death of her husband, over her jointure or dower. The husband cannot bequeath by his will such ornaments and jewels of his wife, though perhaps during his life he might have the power to dispose of them. But if she continues in their use until her husband’s death, she shall afterwards retain them against all persons, except creditors, where there is a deficiency of assets.” 3 See Bayne v. State, Use of Edelen, 62 Md. 100, 104 .

The common law rights of the husband in the chattels of his wife have been completely repudiated. Code, Art. 45, § 4 provides: “Married women shall hold all their property of every description for their separate use, as fully as if they were unmarried, and shall have all the power to dispose of by deed, mortgage, lease, will or any other instrument that husbands have to dispose of their property, and no more.” 4 ⁵¹⁹ The pellucid status of the law today leaves no distinction as to property in chattels personal between a husband and a wife. The husband retains property in the chattels personal which were his when, he entered the marital status and holds for his sole and separate use the chattels personal he acquires during coverture; 5 the wife ⁵²⁰ retains property in the chattels personal which were hers when she entered the marital status and holds for her sole and separate use the chattels personal she acquires during coverture. We are led to inquire by this case as to the rights of each spouse in chattels personal upon termination of the marital status.

In the factual posture here, however, the inquiry is limited to a partial or qualified termination, a divorce a mensa et thoro, under which the parties are legally separated and forbidden to live or cohabit together but with the marriage bond not being dissolved. 6 By a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City Dorothy Joyce (appellant) was divorced a mensa et thoro from Osier Collinson Joyce (appellee). 7 The decree contained provisions concerning certain personal property of the parties. A gun collection was declared to be the sole and separate property of appellee and awarded to him. A determination of the ownership of the contents of their household and a book collection was reserved for further ruling by the court. A special master was appointed to determine the ownership of that property and report his findings and conclusions to the court.

He was invested with the power to decide on the competency, materiality and relevancy of any question proposed by either party ⁵²¹ or evidence elicited subject to final ruling by the court upon exceptions to the report of the Special Master. See Rules of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, Rule 571 D. The Special Master visited the home of Dr. and Mrs. Joyce and prepared a complete listing of the household furniture, furnishings and book collection. He conducted evidentiary hearings to determine the ownership of the goods. There was evidence that many of the chattels were given appellee by his mother “as a regular procedure wherein she gave items of furniture and furnishings to each of her children.” 8 As to books and plates on Ornithology and Natural History Costume, Reference Works and Bibliography, Water and Game Birds and Birds of Great Britain, apparently the book collection referred to in the decree, there was evidence by way of a letter from the seller in which it was stated that they were purchased by appellee.

Appellant testified that many of the gifts from appellee’s mother were to them jointly or to their children and, as to items purchased, her testimony was generally to the effect that they were purchased as husband and wife, the “assumption being that anything purchased was purchased or were given to the parties as husband and wife; and, therefore are held as husband and wife.” She testified that 28 household items listed by the Master and characterized by him as “not items of any particular consequence,” belonged to her. The Master concluded: “The facts indicate that the ownership of the personal property involved between these contesting parties was primarily obtained by gift from Dr. Joyce’s Mother or by purchase by Dr. Joyce. The facts indicate that Mrs. Joyce was ⁵²² never gainfully employed and that she carried on her duties as a wife and mother at their Joyce Lane property for the period of the marriage.” The Master submitted a division of the property. List No. 1 designated the chattels which had been found to be the property of appellee and set them over to him.

List No. 2 designated the chattels which had been found to be the property of appellant and set them over to her. List No. 3 designated the chattels found to have been jointly owned by appellant and appellee. The court by its order 9 ' awarded the chattels in list No. 1 to appellee and the chattels in list No. 2 to appellant. It declared the chattels in list No. 3 to be held by appellee and appellant as tenants by the entireties. 10 The court had statutory power to hear and determine the ownership of the chattels personal.

Code, Art. 16, §: 29, reads: “Whenever a court shall grant a divorce a mensa et thoro or a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, it shall have the power to hear and determine all questions which may arise between the parties to such proceeding in connection with the ownership of personal property [except chattels real] held, possessed or claimed by either or both of them, and shall have the power to make a division of such property between them, or order a sale thereof and a division of the proceeds of such sale, or make such other disposition thereof as the court may deem proper.” This statute does no more than to empower the court, in ⁵²³ decreeing a divorce, to determine the ownership of the personal property of the parties and to apportion the property accordingly. Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509 . It confers no power to transfer the property of either spouse to the other, or otherwise to dispose of it. And it is firmly established that a court of equity has no power, unless conferred by the legislature, to transfer the property of either spouse to the other, or otherwise to dispose of it.

There is no statute authorizing the court to adjust the property rights of the parties in a suit for divorce, except to award to the wife such property or estate as she had when married. Hall v. Hall, 180 Md. 353 . See Brucker v. Benson, 209 Md. 247 ; Lickle v. Boone, 187 Md. 579 ; Gunter v. Gunter, 187 Md. 228 ; Elko v. Elko, 187 Md. 161 ; Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21 . The statute referred to in Hall is codified as Code, Art. 16, § 25.

It provides in relevant part: “* * * [i] n an cases where a divorce [a mensa et thoro] is decreed, the court passing the same shall have full power to award to the wife such property or estate as she had when married, or the value of the same, or of such part thereof as may have been sold or converted by the husband, having regard to the circumstances of the husband at the time of the divorce, or such part of any such property as the court may deem reasonable * * 11 The lower court did not err in accepting the findings or conclusions of fact appearing in the report of the Special Master. They were not clearly wrong when due regard is given to the opportunity of the Special Master to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Supreme Bench Rule 574 (a). ⁵²⁴ Since the finding that the chattels awarded to appellee were acquired by him by gift to him or purchase by him was proper, the only question is whether they were his separate property, free and clear of any property in appellant. If they were, the award was proper, for then the court did no more than it was empowered to do under Art. 16, § 29, namely, apportion the property to the party owning it.

We observe first that the evidence before the Master did not establish that appellee had made a gift to appellant of the chattels in list No.l, nor does it show that he transferred them to her in any manner. Appellant contends, however, that household goods and furnishings, within which category she places the chattels in list No.l, when used in the marital home are held by the entireties even though contributed or paid for by the husband. She relies strongly on DuPont v. DuPont, 33 Del. Ch. 571 , 98 A. 2d 493 (1953) and Plohn v. Plohn, 135 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1954), modified on other grounds, 149 N.Y.S.2d 32 as holding in effect that “where husband and wife jointly use