K.B. v. D.B.

K.B. v. D.B., No. 2860, Sept. Term 2018 and No. 1155, Sept. Term 2019. Opinion filed on April 29, 2020, by Berger, J. DIVORCE - ALIMONY - INDEFINITE ALIMONY Maryland law generally favors fixed-term rather than indefinite alimony, but there are two circumstances under which a circuit court may award indefinite alimony. The first circumstance is when due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming self- supporting. The second is when even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.

INDEFINITE ALIMONY - UNCONSCIONABLE DISPARITY - STANDARD OF REVIEW A trial court’s determination of whether an unconscionable disparity exists is a finding of fact, which the appellate courts review applying the clearly erroneous standard of review. The unconscionable disparity determination is a second-level fact that necessarily rests upon the trial court’s first-level factual findings on the statutory factors set forth in Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 11-106(b) of the Family Law Article. INDEFINITE ALIMONY - UNCONSCIONABLE DISPARITY - LEGAL FRAMEWORK The unconscionable disparity determination usually begins with an examination of the parties’ respective earning capacities.

Although mathematical disparity is only the starting point for an unconscionability analysis, the greater the disparity, the more likely it will be found to be unconscionable. An unconscionable disparity exists and indefinite alimony is warranted when the standard of living of one spouse will be so inferior, qualitatively or quantitatively, to the standard of living of the other as to be morally unacceptable and shocking to the court. INDEFINITE ALIMONY - UNCONSCIONABLE DISPARITY - LENGTH OF MARRIAGE The length of a marriage is a key factor for the court’s consideration when determining whether an unconscionable disparity exists and a long marriage is more likely to result in indefinite alimony. A marriage of almost seventeen years at the time of separation and over nineteen years at the time of trial is a relatively long marriage and the length of the parties’ should have been a key factor for the trial court’s consideration.

INDEFINITE ALIMONY - UNCONSCIONABLE DISPARITY - PRE-MARRIAGE DISPARITY IN LIVING STANDARDS A trial court may consider the parties’ pre-marriage disparity in living standards when determining whether indefinite alimony is appropriate, but it must be considered in the context of other relevant factors and not given undue weight, particularly when the parties were married for a long period of time. INDEFINITE ALIMONY - UNCONSCIONABLE DISPARITY DETERMINATION The trial court erred in finding that there was no unconscionable disparity between the parties’ post-divorce standards of living when the wife’s imputed income of $35,000 per year was approximately two percent of the husband’s income of over one and one-half million dollars per year, the wife was forty-nine years old and had been absent from the workforce for twenty years, and the wife’s primary contributions to the household were in the form of childcare and home care. MARITAL AND NON-MARITAL ASSETS - APPRECIATION - VALUATION - EXPERT TESTIMONY The trial court did not err by crediting the husband’s expert witness’s testimony regarding the valuation of the company in which the husband owned a one-third interest. The trial court was entitled to determine, based upon the expert witness’s testimony, that the business had not increased in value during the parties’ marriage and was, therefore, a non- marital asset.

MARITAL PROPERTY - DISPOSITION OF REAL PROPERTY - TRANSFER OF THE PARTIES’ PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE The trial court did not err in finding that the parties’ New Hampshire property was the parties’ principal residence and ordering the transfer of the property pursuant to Section 8- 205(a)(2)(iii) of the Family Law Article when the parties had moved into the New Hampshire residence with the intent to reside there permanently as a family and it was the last home in which the parties lived together. MARITAL PROPERTY - DISPOSITION OF REAL PROPERTY - CARRYING COSTS OF PROPERTY PENDING SALE The trial court did not err in ordering a sale of lieu of partition of the parties’ Annapolis home and ordering that the parties be jointly responsible for the carrying expenses of the parties’ Annapolis home pending its sale. Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case No. C002-FM-15-004483 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2860 September Term, 2018 No. 1155 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ K.B. v. D.B. ______________________________________ Berger, Reed, Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Berger, J. ______________________________________ Filed: April 29, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act * Melanie M. Shaw Geter, J., did not participate in the Court’s decision to report this opinion (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

Suzanne Johnson 2020-07-27 pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1. 12:12-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This is the second time the parties, K.B. (“Wife”) and D.B. (“Husband”), have been before us on appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in their divorce case. In 2018, we addressed the circuit court’s order regarding custody of the parties’ minor child (“Son”) in an unreported opinion.

K.B. v. D.B., No. 1769, Sept. Term 2017 (filed June 19, 2018). In the prior appeal, we vacated the trial court’s order granting primary physical custody of Son to Husband and remanded the custody matter for further proceedings. This appeal involves economic matters only. Wife presents four questions for our review, which we have rephrased slightly as follows: I. Whether the circuit court erred and/or abused its discretion in connection with its alimony award.

II

Whether the circuit court erred and/or abused its discretion in connection with its determination of marital property and the monetary award.

III

Whether the circuit court erred in connection with its child support order.

IV

Whether the circuit court erred in connection with its counsel fees award. For the reasons explained herein, we shall affirm the circuit court’s judgment of divorce but otherwise vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS We set forth much of the relevant factual and procedural background in our opinion in the parties’ prior appeal:1 I. History of the Family Prior to the Separation of [Wife] and [Husband] in 2015 A. General Information [Wife] was born in Arnold, Maryland in 1968. [Wife] received a bachelor’s degree from Towson University and worked for four years as a flight attendant. [Wife] pursued a master’s degree in teaching at Johns Hopkins University, but she dropped out prior to graduation after the dissolution of her first marriage. [Husband] was born in 1955 in Exeter, New Hampshire. After graduating from the University of New Hampshire with a business degree in 1980, [Husband] worked for Nike in sales and marketing. [Husband] moved to Annapolis, Maryland in 1982.

Four years later, [Husband] left Nike and became a salesman for commercial jets. In 1991, [Husband] and two co- workers formed their own company, which buys, sells, and brokers corporate jets. [Husband] and [Wife] met in 1996 when [Wife] was working at [Husband]’s business. [Husband] and [Wife] were married in 1998 in Meredith, New Hampshire. [Husband] had three children from a prior marriage. For most of their marriage, the couple lived in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. B. Birth of Son Son was born in 2003. [Wife] testified that she was the primary caregiver for Son and that she tended to his daily needs, made his meals, bathed him, and put him to bed. [Wife] testified that she took Son to school and extracurricular activities and picked him up afterward. [Wife] testified that she was responsible for planning social events, birthday 1 In the prior appeal, we set forth the facts relevant to the custody issue in detail.

In the present appeal, we need not address many of the custody-related facts in detail. 2 parties, holidays, and family events. [Wife] testified that she made doctor and dentist appointments for Son, attended school functions and parent-teacher conferences, helped Son with homework and school projects, and volunteered in Son’s classrooms. [Husband] testified that [Wife] was frequently unable to care for Son due to health issues. [Husband] testified that [Wife] suffered from severe depression, fibromyalgia, Lyme disease, and bipolar disorder. [Husband] testified that [Wife] would stay in bed for long periods of time. [Husband] testified that these health issues interfered with [Wife]’s ability to parent for “40, 50 percent” of their relationship, leaving [Husband] to take on the role of primary caregiver for Son. [Husband] testified that he sometimes took Son to school, made meals for Son, and took Son shopping. [Husband] testified that he regularly took Son to the pediatrician and dentist during his marriage to [Wife]. [Wife] denies that she has any mental health problems that have affected her parenting. [Wife] testified that she suffered from “situational depression” after discovering her father’s dead body, and that she was prescribed an antidepressant around that time, but she no longer takes it. [Wife] also testified that she was prescribed 25 milligrams of Seroquel — an anti-psychotic at much higher dosages — as a sleep aid. In a letter supporting [Wife]’s request to take a support animal on an airplane, [Wife]’s therapist stated that [Wife] suffers from depression. [Wife] testified that [Husband] had obtained a similar letter, and that the purpose of the letters was to facilitate traveling with their pets. [Husband] testified that his work schedule during the marriage was erratic and that he worked forty to fifty hours a week, including nights and weekends. [Husband] testified that he sometimes had to travel for business, but not more than one day every couple of weeks. [Husband] testified that [Wife] took two or three vacations by herself every year for many years, and that [Husband] took care of Son during these times. [Husband] testified that he had a good relationship with Son prior to the spring of 2015. [Husband] testified that he and Son would play baseball, ride all-terrain vehicles and dirt bikes together, and do “a lot of that kind of stuff.” [Husband] also 3 testified that [Wife] began turning Son against him prior to the dissolution of their marriage. [Husband] testified that as “the disciplinarian,” he was “vilified” and became “the common enemy” of Son and [Wife]. K.B., supra, Slip Op. at 1-3. In the prior appeal, we summarized the circumstances of the parties’ separation as follows: II.

Separation of [Wife] and [Husband] In late 2014, the family began living in a house in Alton, New Hampshire that they had purchased the previous year. [Wife] testified that it was essentially a vacation house, whereas [Husband] testified that they had purchased the house with the intention of moving to New Hampshire. [Wife] testified that the family was vacationing at the new house in December of 2014 when [Husband] stated that he did not want to return to Maryland. [Wife] testified that she agreed to remain in New Hampshire for a six-month trial period. [Husband] testified that both [Wife] and Son were “on board” with the move. [Wife] testified that she and Son were isolated and lonely in New Hampshire. [Wife] testified that the rural milieu made it difficult for Son to make new friends. [Wife] testified that [Husband]’s drinking and drug use escalated in New Hampshire, and that [Husband] would verbally abuse, bully, and intimidate Son and her. [Wife] testified that [Husband] would call Son “a disrespectful little punk” and tell Son that his opinion did not matter. [Wife] testified that [Husband] called her names and “physically intimidated” her in front of Son. [Wife] testified that Son did not like the way [Husband] spoke to her, which led to “many verbal go-arounds” between [Husband] and Son. [Wife] testified that Son would tell [Husband] “that he hated him and that he hated where we lived and he wanted to go home.” [Husband] testified that Son was excited to live in New Hampshire. [Husband] testified that the house was on a lake and five miles from a mountain, giving Son many opportunities to enjoy his favorite outdoor activities. [Husband] testified that Son enjoyed boating and fishing on the lake, and that Son frequently went snowboarding with friends. [Husband] 4 testified that he often observed Son snowboarding with “huge smiles on his face.” [Husband] testified that Son adapted to his new school, made friends, and ran track. [Husband] testified that the family joined a local church and Son befriended the pastor’s son. [Husband] testified that Son was thriving in a clean, healthy environment, and that “by every account and every conversation I ever had with him, he was happy.” In May of 2015, [Wife] and Son took a 2–day trip to Maryland to attend a party in their old neighborhood. During that trip, [Wife] decided that she and Son would not return to New Hampshire. [Wife] testified that Son asked her “why we were living in a place where we didn’t want to be for someone that didn’t treat us with kindness.” [Wife] testified that “[a]t that point I realized I really had failed my son.” [Wife] told [Husband], “I can’t live here and [Son] and I are moving back to Maryland.” [Husband] testified that he was shocked and asked [Wife] to stay. [Wife] and Son returned to New Hampshire for a short period so that Son could finish the school year before returning to Annapolis. [Husband] testified that he told Son he did not have to leave, to which Son replied, “Dad, you know, mom needs me.” [Husband] testified that his marriage to [Wife] was characterized by a pattern of separation and reconciliation. [Husband] testified that [Wife] had abandoned him and taken Son on three of four occasions prior to this, and that [Wife] had threatened to leave [Husband] many more times. K.B., supra, Slip Op. at 7-8. Wife filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on November 6, 2015.

Trial was held over twelve days between June and September of 2017. On October 2, 2017, the trial court issued its custody order, which granted primary physical custody of Son to Husband during the school year and primary physical custody of Son to Wife during the summer break. The circuit court held the economic issues sub curia. On appeal of the custody order, we vacated the custody 5 determination and remanded for further proceedings, including the appointment of a best interest attorney for Son and a custody evaluation, in an Opinion issued June 19, 2018.

As a result of the remand, a prior pendente lite custody arrangement was revived. On July 13, 2018, the circuit court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Judgment of Absolute Divorce resolving all non-custodial issues. The July 13, 2018 opinion and order did not address child support and referred to Husband having primary physical custody of Son. The trial court awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $12,000.00 per month for thirty months.

The trial court also ordered that Husband pay Wife a monetary award of $456,547.28, which was subsequently modified to $446,547.29. The circuit court further addressed issues relating to the parties’ homes in the July 13, 2018 order. The court ordered that the parties’ Annapolis home be sold, with the proceeds divided equally between the parties. Between the date of the court’s order and the sale of the property, the court ordered that both parties were “jointly responsible for the mortgage and expenses” for the Annapolis property.

The court found that the New Hampshire home was the family home and ordered that, within ten days of settlement of the Annapolis home, “the deed to the New Hampshire home is to be transferred to [Husband] via a Quit Claim Deed in exchange for [Husband] paying [Wife] her portion of the equity in the New Hampshire home computed as $202,192.50 . . . minus any monies owed to [Husband] if he is forced to pay more than his joint portion of the mortgage and expenses for the Annapolis property.” Wife filed a motion to alter or amend the July 13, 2018 order, which the trial court denied. 6 The trial court set a hearing for October 12, 2018 to address child support pending further custody proceedings. On that date, the parties, as well as the best interest attorney who had been appointed for Son, reached an agreement as to a pendente lite custody arrangement. On November 19, 2018, the circuit court issued a child support order, requiring Husband to pay $4,000.00 per month in child support pending a trial on the issue of custody. The trial court entered a pendente lite custody and visitation order on November 25, 2018.

The court denied Wife’s request for pendente lite use and possession of the Maryland home. On December 5, 2018, Wife noted an appeal of the July 13, 2018 order, the November 25, 2018 pendente lite order, and the trial court’s orders addressing multiple motions to alter or amend. The parties ultimately reached an agreement on custody, pursuant to which Wife was awarded primary physical custody of Son. The agreement was formalized in a consent order filed on January 25, 2019.

Following two days of testimony in February and April 2019, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and order on August 20, 2019 addressing issues of child support and attorney’s fees. The court ordered that Husband pay $6,777.00 per month in child support and 90% of Son’s private school tuition. The trial court further ordered that Husband pay $15,000.00 toward Wife’s attorney’s fees. Wife noted an appeal on August 29, 2019.

Wife filed a motion seeking legal fees associated with the prior appeal in the custody case as well as in the present appeal. The trial court denied Wife’s motion on October 16, 2019. Wife noted an appeal on October 18, 2019. 7 Additional facts shall be discussed as necessitated by our consideration of the issues on appeal. DISCUSSION I. The first issue before us on appeal is whether the trial court erred by granting Wife rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $12,000.00 per month for a term of thirty months and denying her request for indefinite alimony.

Wife asserts that the trial court erred with respect to both the amount and duration of the alimony award. A. The Evidence Below and the Trial Court’s Ruling In his memorandum opinion, the trial judge explained his decision to grant Wife rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $12,000.00 per month for a period of thirty months. The court explained that it was expressly considering the factors set forth in Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 11-106(b) of the Family Law Article (“FL”).2 2 FL § 11-106(b) requires the trial court to consider the following when determining a “fair and equitable award”: (1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting; (2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment; (3) the standard of living that the parties established during their marriage; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (7) the age of each party; (8) the physical and mental condition of each party; (9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony; (10) any agreement between the parties; (11) the financial 8 The trial court first considered the ability of Wife to become wholly or partly self-supporting.

The parties had stipulated that Wife had the capacity to earn a yearly salary of $35,000.00 within four months by obtaining a position as an administrative assistant. As of the trial court’s alimony ruling, Wife was forty-nine years old and had not worked outside of the home since she was thirty. Wife has a bachelor’s degree in psychology from Towson University but had never worked in the field of psychology. Wife had taken courses toward a Master’s Degree in teaching from Johns Hopkins University, but the trial court observed, “[t]here is some question as to how many of these Master’s Degree courses would need to be repeated due to staleness.” The trial court found that Wife was “young and in good health” and found there was “simply no reason to justify why [Wife] has not made any effort to support herself or to improve her ability to support herself.” The trial court observed that there was “clearly nothing preventing [Wife] from making substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting.” The court concluded that “[i]n light of the years where [Wife] was not in the work force, it would be reasonable to needs and financial resources of each party, including: (i) all income and assets, including property that does not produce income; (ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article; (iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party; and (iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits; and (12) whether the award would cause a spouse who is a resident of a related institution as defined in § 19-301 of the Health-General Article and from whom alimony is sought to become eligible for medical assistance earlier than would otherwise occur. 9 conclude that she will need three or four years to develop and fully implement a rehabilitative plan.” With respect to the standard of living established by the parties during their marriage, the trial court characterized the lifestyle as “above average.” The trial court emphasized that the parties had met with a financial planner to discuss Husband’s anticipated retirement at age sixty-five and “[a] plan was put in place to meet the goals of being debt free by [Husband’s sixty-fifth] birthday and having an annuity in place that would provide $25,000.00 per month for the family’s living expenses during retirement.” The court reasoned that “[w]ith this in mind, it is reasonable to expect both parties to have begun living a more reasonable lifestyle.” With respect of the length of the marriage, the trial judge characterized it as “not a very long one” in that “[t]he parties were married for more than sixteen (16) years from the date of the marriage to the time that [Wife] left New Hampshire, and a little over nineteen (19) years at the time of the hearing.” Regarding the contributions of each party to the well-being of the family, the trial court found that Wife “provided the primary non- monetary contributions for the household in terms of childcare and home care” while Husband “provided the monetary contributions for the household.” The trial court discussed at length the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties.

The court observed that both parties had testified that the marriage was “tumultuous” and “both allege[d] mistreatment by the other.” The court found that “while both parties contributed to their estrangement, [Wife] bears most of the responsibility.” The court emphasized that Wife “abandoned the marriage in May 2015, 10 only six (6) months after moving with the family to New Hampshire” and moved back to Maryland with Son “against [Husband’s] wishes.” The court further found that “[a]nother issue that greatly contributed to the estrangement of the parties and their inability to reconcile involved efforts by [Wife] to estrange [Husband] from [Son].” The trial court noted that Wife was forty-nine years old and Husband was sixty-two years old and that both were “in good health and of sound mind.” The court, however, had “concerns about [Wife’s] mental status in light of what appears to be an unhealthy attachment to [Son], that resulted in the estrangement between [Husband] and [Son].” With respect to the ability of Husband to meet his own needs while meeting the needs of Wife, the trial court found that Husband “ha[d] the financial ability to provide some support to [Wife] while meeting his own needs and the needs of their child.” The trial court noted that Wife had sought $25,000.00 per month in indefinite alimony, while Husband had conceded that rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $10,000.00 per month until his retirement at age sixty-five would be appropriate. When considering any agreement between the parties, the court found that the parties had agreed that neither party would withdraw substantial funds from their joint checking account, which contained approximately $900,000.00, but that Wife had subsequently withdrawn $700,000.00 in July 2015. Wife later returned $250,000.00 to the account. The court also found that the parties had discussed a plan for Husband to retire at age sixty-five in December 2020, which would require a change in the parties’ spending habits.

The trial court found that this change in spending habits “did not occur.” 11 The trial court discussed at some length the parties’ financial needs and resources. The trial court found that Husband’s “reported 2014 income was $2,239,659.00.” Husband’s earnings came from his business, which we shall refer to as “Company.”3 The court observed that Husband “admit[ted] a gross income for 2015 of $1,514,270.00 although he has not provided the [c]ourt with his 2015 tax return.” The trial court found that Wife was voluntarily impoverished and imputed to her the ability to earn $35,000.00 per year. The court discussed each of the parties’ claimed monthly living expenses, including those for Son. Wife claimed monthly living expenses in the amount of $37,166.86, of which $14,457.19 was attributed to Son’s expenses.

The trial court found that these needs would “now be paid directly by [Husband.]” The trial court apparently did not consider that this Court had vacated the prior custody order granting Father primary physical custody of Son. The court found certain of Wife’s claimed expenses “questionable,” specifically: $827.15/month for medical and dental expenses above the cost of insurance, $1,428/month for an automobile payment, $250/month for automobile repairs, and $1,118.91/month for household supplies. The court found other claimed expenses not merely questionable, but “exorbitant or frivolous”: $528/month for replacement furnishings, $669.46/month for lawn care, $625/month for domestic assistance/housekeeping, $2733/month for vacations, $2000/month for clothing, 3 In order to maintain the parties’ and their minor child’s privacy, we shall refer to Husband’s business as “Company.” Company engages in the purchase, sale, and brokering of transactions involving airplanes. Husband owns one-third of Company.

Husband testified that due to the nature of Company’s business, his income fluctuated depending on the market. 12 $1025/month for banking expenses, $2500/month for religious contributions, and $563.15/month for a hairdresser. The trial court deemed $14,267.67 of Wife’s claimed expenses to be excessive. The trial court further discussed Wife’s housing expenses, reasoning that Wife would reasonably incur housing expenses “in the neighborhood of $3,000.00 per month” after the Annapolis home was sold. With respect to Husband’s living expenses, the trial court observed that Husband claimed total monthly living expenses of $30,015.00.

The court found that Husband’s expenses had “necessarily increased as he now has custody of [Son],” but the court failed to acknowledge this Court’s ruling vacating the order awarding custody of Son to Husband. The trial court found certain of Husband’s claimed expenses to be exorbitant, including “$100.00/month for household repairs, $1500.00/month for dining out over and above $100.00 for food, $1000.00/month in additional recreation and entertainment over and above $1000.00/month for vacations, and $200.00/month for massage.” The court found that both parties had engaged in “lavish expenditures over the years” but explained that “[u]nnecessary and lavish expenditures will not establish need for either party, especially since the parties had contemplated reducing expenses as retirement for [Husband] approached.” The trial court found that “with [Husband’s] retirement approaching, each part[y’s] standard of living must be adjusted downward” but concluded that “the evidence establishes that [Husband] has the ability to provide some level of rehabilitative support to” Wife. After addressing each of the statutory factors, the trial court considered the standard for awarding indefinite alimony set forth in FL § 11-106(c), which provides: 13 The court may award alimony for an indefinite period, if the court finds that: (1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting; or (2) even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate. The court found that there was “clearly nothing preventing [Wife] from making substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting,” and therefore turned its attention to whether there was an unconscionable disparity between the parties’ standards of living pursuant to FL § 11-106(c)(2).

The court found that Husband’s 2015 gross income was $1,514,270, but emphasized that the parties had agreed during the marriage that Husband would retire at age sixty-five in December of 2020. The court found that Wife “was last employed on a full-time basis in 1998 as a pharmaceutical sales representative” which had “afforded her the ability to purchase her own apartment in Montgomery County.” The trial court emphasized that “the respective standards of living of the parties have been greatly disparate since well before the beginning of the marriage.” The trial court further found that the distribution of marital property pursuant to the court’s order mitigated any disparity between the parties’ post-divorce standard of living. Ultimately, the trial court found no unconscionable disparity, reasoning as follows: Accordingly, after taking into account all relevant factors, including the relatively short length of the marriage (less than 17 years), the monetary award the [c]ourt grants below to [Wife], the monies [Wife] will be receiving as a result of the sale of the Annapolis home, the extent of her non-monetary assets, the receipt of [Husband’s] monetary portion of the value 14 of the New Hampshire home, [Wife’s] substantially similar living standard before and after the divorce, and [Wife’s] uninhibited ability to seek and obtain full-time employment to improve her living standard, the [c]ourt finds that the post- divorce living standard of [Wife] will not be altogether unconscionably disparate from the lifestyle she was accustomed to prior to their separation. (Emphasis in original.) The trial court, therefore, denied Wife’s request for indefinite alimony and instead awarded rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $12,000.00 per month for a period of thirty months.

The trial court addressed the unconscionable disparity issue again in its November 19, 2018 order and memorandum opinion ruling on Wife’s motion to alter or amend. The trial court declined to amend its alimony award, explaining as follows: Finally, there is an obvious disparity between the parties’ respective incomes. [Husband] makes around $2 million per year while [Wife] has voluntarily remained unemployed for the past several years. It is true that even if [Wife] finished her master’s degree in education and began teaching, she would not receive nearly the same income as that of [Husband’s]. However, as this [c]ourt found in its Judgment of Absolute Divorce, it is also true that the parties’ respective standards of living have been greatly disparate since well before the beginning of the marriage.

The source of [Husband’s] high income -- his business, [Company] -- was established and highly lucrative prior to the marriage, and there has been no increase in the value of the business since the parties wed in 1998. In this context, the disparity between the parties’ incomes is not unconscionable given that this disparity pre- dated the marriage. B. The Parties’ Contentions on Appeal Wife asserts that the trial court erred by failing to properly consider several of the alimony factors set forth in FL § 11-106(b) and that the trial court’s conclusions on several 15 of the factors were unsupported by the record. Wife further contends that the trial court’s finding of no unconscionable disparity between the parties was clearly erroneous.

Husband responds that the trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence and that the trial court’s decision to deny Wife’s request for indefinite alimony was not an abuse of discretion. C. The Law of Alimony The purpose of alimony in Maryland is the “rehabilitation of the economically dependent spouse.” St. Cyr v. St. Cyr, 228 Md. App. 163, 184 (2016) (quoting Whittington v. Whittington, 172 Md. App. 317, 335-36 (2007)). Although “the principal function of alimony once had been maintenance of the recipient, dependent spouse’s standard of living,” this changed with the adoption of the Maryland Alimony Act in 1980. Whittington, supra, 172 Md. App. at 335 . “The statutory scheme generally favors fixed- term or so-called rehabilitative alimony . . . where practicable to ease the transition from the joint married state to their new status as single people living apart and independently.” St. Cyr, supra, 228 Md. App. at 184 -85 (quoting Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 202 (2004) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 391 (1992))).

We have explained: The preference for fixed-term alimony stems from “the conviction that ‘the purpose of alimony is not to provide a lifetime pension, but where practicable to ease the transition for the parties from the joint married state to their new status as single people living apart and independently.’” Simonds [v. Simonds], 165 Md. App. [591,] 605 [(2005)](quoting Tracey, supra, 328 Md. at 391 , 614 A.2d 590 ). See also Turrisi v. Sanzaro, 308 Md. 515, 524-25 , 520 A.2d 1080 (1987) (noting that fixed-term alimony “promote[s] the transitional or 16 rehabilitative function” of the Act); Jensen v. Jensen, 103 Md. App. 678, 693 , 654 A.2d 914 (1995) (stating that “one of the purposes of the [Act] was to change the focus of alimony from a form of lifetime pension toward a bridge to self- sufficiency”); Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 66 Md. App. 68, 75 , 502 A.2d 1068 (1986) (observing that alimony “is chiefly rehabilitative and is not designed to be a life-time pension” (citation omitted)); 1980 Report of the Governor’s Commission on Domestic Relations Laws (hereinafter “Governor’s Commission’s Report”), at 4 (stating that “the purpose of alimony at the time of divorce is not to provide a lifetime pension”). Notwithstanding the general rule favoring fixed term alimony, the statutory scheme adopted by the Act recognizes two exceptional circumstances in which a circuit court may award indefinite alimony. Turrisi, supra, 308 Md. at 527 , 520 A.2d 1080 (observing that “the use of indefinite alimony only in exceptional circumstances” is one of the concepts underlying the Act); Roginsky v. Blake-Roginsky, 129 Md. App. 132, 142 , 740 A.2d 125 (1999).

These exceptional circumstances appear in the Act at Md. Code (2006 Repl. Vol.), section 11-106(c) of the Family Law Article (“FL”). First, the court has discretion to award indefinite alimony if, “due to age, illness, infirmity, or disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial progress toward becoming self-supporting[.]” FL § 11-106(c)(1). And second, the court may award indefinite alimony upon a finding that, “even after the party seeking alimony will have made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably be expected, the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.” FL § 11–106(c)(2).

These exceptions are a “restraint upon the doctrine of rehabilitative alimony” that exist to “protect the spouse who is less financially secure from too harsh a life once single again.” Tracey, supra, 328 Md. at 392 , 614 A.2d 590 . Whittington, supra, 172 Md. App. at 336-37 (footnote omitted). 17 A trial court’s determination of whether an unconscionable disparity exists is a finding of fact, which we review applying the clearly erroneous standard of review. Solomon, supra, 383 Md. at 196 . “It is a second-level fact, however, that necessarily rests upon the court’s first-level factual findings on the factors, listed in FL section 11-106(b), that (so long as they are applicable) are relevant to all alimony determinations, and ‘all the factors,’ including those not listed, ‘necessary for a fair and equitable award’; and upon how much weight the court chooses to give to its various first-level factual findings.” Whittington, supra, 172 Md. App. at 337-38 . The unconscionable disparity analysis requires a “fact-intensive case-by-case analysis.” Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md. App. 317, 338 (2002); see also Tracey, supra, 328 Md. at 393 (explaining that alimony awards “are founded upon notions of equity” and “equity requires sensitivity to the merits of each individual case without the imposition of bright-line tests”).

The determination of “[w]hether there will be a post-divorce unconscionable disparity in the parties’ standards of living usually begins with an examination of their respective earning capacities.” Whittington, supra, 172 Md. App. at 338 . “In so doing, the court must project forward in time to the point when the requesting spouse will have made maximum financial progress, and compare the relative standards of living of the parties at that future time.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). “Mathematical disparity is only the starting point for an unconscionability analysis.” Goshorn v. Goshorn, 154 Md. App. 194, 214 (2003). “The greater the disparity, the more likely that it will be found to be unconscionable.” Ware v. Ware, 131 Md. App. 207, 229 (2000) (quotation and citation omitted). An unconscionable disparity exists and indefinite 18 alimony is warranted when “the standard of living of one spouse will be so inferior, qualitatively or quantitatively, to the standard of living of the other as to be morally unacceptable and shocking to the court.” Karmand, supra, 145 Md. App. at 338 . We have further described an unconscionable disparity in living standards as one that works a “gross inequity.” Brewer v. Brewer, 156 Md. App. 77, 100-01 (2004). “In cases involving dramatic income disparities after long marriages, this Court has found an abuse of discretion in a trial court’s failure to award indefinite alimony.” St. Cyr, supra, 228 Md. App. at 196 . “Even in cases where indefinite alimony is granted,