Kacour v. State

WILNER, Judge. On February 17, 1987, following oral argument in this case, we entered a per curiam Order dismissing this appeal and ordering the mandate to issue forthwith. We now explain why we dismissed the appeal and why we did so in that unusual manner. On the evening of December 23, 1985, appellant was stopped by a police officer and given four traffic citations.

The citations charged him, respectively, with (1) “Exceeding Max. Speed 47 MPH in 30 Zone,” in violation of § 21-801.1 of the motor vehicle law (No. C 123709); (2) “Fleeing & Eluding Marked Police Unit,” in violation of § 21-904 of that law (No. C 123710); (3) “Driving While License Cancelled, Revoked, Suspended, or Refused,” in violation of § 16-303(a) (No. C 123711); and (4) “Negligent Driving,” in violation of § 21-901.1(b) (No. C 123712). Each citation was on the Maryland Uniform Complaint and Citation form; each was fully completed, giving the date, time, and place of the alleged offense and the year, model, and license tag number of the vehicle; and each was signed by the officer. On or about April 9, 1986, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County by reason of appellant’s request for jury trial.

A month later, appellant filed two written motions to dismiss, one contending that Citations C 123709 and C 123710 were “duplicitous,” and one contend ⁶²⁷ ing that each of the citations failed to allege the requisite elements of the respective offense charged. At oral argument on the motions, appellant launched a broad attack on the Uniform Complaint and Citation form itself. Relying on Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155 , 438 A.2d 1150 (1981), and Pedzich v. State, 83 Md.App. 620 , 365 A.2d 567 , cert. denied 279 Md. 684 (1976), but never mentioning the later cases of Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787 , 490 A.2d 1277 (1985), Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323 , 493 A.2d 1062 (1985), or State v. Chaney, 304 Md. 21 , 497 A.2d 152 (1985), cert. denied — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 824 , 88 L.Ed.2d 796 (1986), he pressed his argument that none of the citations were valid in that they failed to allege all of the requisite elements of the respective offense charged. The court denied the motion, whereupon counsel was somehow able to persuade the court that, as his argument was “jurisdictional” in nature and was not frivolous, he should be allowed to seek appellate review of the court’s denial of the motion pursuant to Ch.

K of the Maryland Rules. It should be noted that the case was scheduled for trial that day. Once the motion was denied, a jury was ready to be called for voir dire and commencement of trial. Counsel proffered the notion, however, that he had a right under the Ch.

K Rules to ask a judge of this Court to sign a writ of certiorari permitting appellant to take an immediate appeal from the denial of the motion. “It may take, as it did in another case ... a year to a year and a half to get it heard and then get a ruling on it,” he said. At the court’s insistence, he then had his client formally waive his right to a speedy trial and authorize his counsel to prepare a “petition” and search out an appellate judge willing to issue a writ of certiorari. This hearing took place on July 18, 1986—-a Friday. Counsel tells us that, over the ensuing weekend, he learned that certiorari was not available, and so, the following Monday—July 21—he filed a routine notice of appeal without attempting to obtain a writ of certiorari.

Unfazed by ⁶²⁸ this change in approach, on July 24 the court entered an order staying all further proceedings pending a resolution of the