Maryland case law › Kaleta v. Kaleta

Kaleta v. Kaleta

247 Md. 517 (1967) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: AffirmedHammond, C. J.✓ Good law
HoldingAfter years of litigation, the husband filed a second bill for absolute divorce alleging the wife's unjustified rejection of his bona fide offers of reconciliation amounted to desertion.

Hammond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. After litigation between the parties over a period of years, Judge Jones granted the husband an absolute divorce on the ground that the wife unjustifiably had rejected his bona fide offers of reconciliation. The wife asks us to set the divorce aside, claiming (1) that the offers of reconciliation were not bona fide and, in any event, were not corroborated, and (2) that Judge Jones violated the Maryland Rules by taking testimony from the husband without the presence of the wife, knowing that the wife had not personally been served with notice to employ new counsel. None of the contentions has merit.

The couple separated in 1962. Each filed a bill against the other for a divorce a mensa. The hearings in the case were concluded on May 6, 1963. On May 28, approximately a week before the decree in the first case which ruled that neither party was entitled to a divorce was signed on June 4, the wife filed her second bill of complaint for divorce on the ground of desertion.

A final hearing on the second bill was held on February 6, 1964. The wife failed to appear but Judge Cardin, after hearing counsel for both sides, was “inclined to believe” that the husband had made bona fide efforts to effect a reconciliation and dismissed the wife’s bill. On November 27, 1964, the husband filed his second bill for divorce, alleging that the wife’s refusal to accept his bona fide offers of reconciliation amounted to desertion and constituted grounds for an absolute divorce. Judge Jones’s eventual agreement with the husband was based on her finding that his testimony was credible and corroborated and the wife’s testimony was largely incredible.

The wife’s claim that the husband’s search for suitable living quarters for the resumption of life together, his securing options and leases on various apartments and his repeated efforts to see her or talk on the telephone to her to effect a reconciliation were not made in good faith is based on her assertion that Judge Cardin “ordered” the husband to do as he did and his actions therefore were not voluntary. The short answer 519 is that Judge Cardin, as would be expected, did not order either party to do anything looking to reconciliation but, rather, to use his words, “made every effort to attempt a reconciliation between the parties, because each of the parties have indicated they were willing to reconcile,” and “suggested” the execution of a lease for an apartment to be lived in by the couple. (The husband signed a lease, and made a deposit but when the time came for the wife to sign the lease she did not appear.) The wife’s claim that there was no corroboration of the husband’s evidence as to sincere efforts on his part to reconcile is empty. In a contested case, although corroboration of essentials is required, it need be but slight.

The testimony of the husband’s daughter as to her observance of his activities looking to reconciliation, and the wife’s rejections, considered with the mute testimony of the signed leases and rent deposits, were •entirely adequate corroboration. The point of procedure has no substance. The final divorce case had been set for hearing on the merits several times in 1965. In January 1966 counsel for the husband and then counsel for the wife agreed to a hearing on February 9.

It was not reached that day or on the tenth. On February 11, the wife’s counsel advised the court that although he had told his client ■of the hearing on the eleventh she would not appear because she was out “babysitting.” Judge Jones told counsel that if the wife “chooses to make herself unavailable, that is her choice to make. This case will be started today.” Late in the day when Judge Jones could have begun to hear the case, it developed that counsel for the husband could not go on the next day because of a specially set case in another court and Judge Jones said: “Under those circumstances, I have checked with the Assignment Commissioner, who advises me that my assignment for February 23rd, that is on a Wednesday, is open. I have instructed the Assignment Commissioner to set this case down especially for that date, Wednesday, February 23rd, and counsel, both of you make note

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