Katski v. Triplett

Delaplaine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit was filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on May 8, 1942, by Clayton N. Triplett, Alfred G. Triplett and Clayton N. Triplett, Jr., copartners trading as Baltimore Gas Light Company, against Harold J. Katski and Ellen N. Katski, his wife. The plaintiffs, intending to bring the suit under the Speedy Judgment Act of Anne Arundel County, filed with their declaration a statement under affidavit claiming that the defendants were indebted to them in the sum of 8696.06. The statement, however, did not mention any items of merchandise alleged to have been sold to the defendants.

It appears from the record that the defendants were required to plead within fifteen days after the return day, the third Monday in May. But as the defendants filed a petition on May 25 for a bill of particulars, the court extended the time for filing pleas until fifteen days after compliance therewith. On June 4 the plaintiffs filed a bill of particulars containing (1) an invoice showing items of merchandise sold to the defendants, (2) ⁵⁴⁷ a statement of payments made by the defendants on account, and (3) a copy of an agreement wherein the defendants promised to be liable for merchandise purchased from the plaintiffs in any amount up to §1,000. While the defendants did not plead within fifteen days thereafter, Mrs. Katski on June 24 filed a demurrer to the declaration and bill of particulars, and moved for an extension of time within which to plead.

On June 29 the court extended the time for pleading until ten days after determination of the demurrer. On July 3 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to plead within fifteen days after the filing of the bill of particulars, and moved that the court’s order of June 29 granting additional time for pleading be rescinded, and that judgment be rendered against the defendants for want of plea verified by affidavit. The court struck out the demurrer, rescinded the order of June 29, and entered judgment by default in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum of §696.06. The question on this appeal is whether the suit was brought in accordance with the Speedy Judgment Act.

This statute, enacted by the Legislature of Maryland in 1935, provides that in any action on contract the plaintiff shall be entitled to a judgment at any time after fifteen days from the return day, unless the defendant shall plead as required by the Act, provided that the plaintiff shall file with his declaration at the time of bringing the action (1) an affidavit stating the true amount the defendant is indebted to him, and (2) the bond, bill of exchange, promissory note or other writing or account by which the defendant is so indebted. The Act also requires that a copy of the declaration, affidavit, notice to comply with the provisions of the Act, and cause of action shall be served upon each defendant at the time of the service of summons. Acts of 1935, Chap. 169; Code P. L. L„ 1930, Art. 2, Secs. 189A, 189B. In 1914 the Legislature enacted a general rule providing that in all jurisdictions were provision has been or shall be ⁵⁴⁸ made for the obtention of speedy judgments, when the cause of action filed with the declaration shall set forth the plaintiff’s claim with the particularity required for a bill of particulars, the cause of action shall be considered as one of the pleadings in this case,