Keller v. Serio & GEICO

ADKINS, J. In this case we are asked to decide whether it is reversible error for a trial court to reject a jury instruction on the nature of underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage when an insurer is a party to the suit, but the issue of coverage is not before the jury. Because we fail to see how a question pertaining to coverage can constitute an essential part of a plaintiffs theory of the case in litigation confined to causation and damages, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. ²⁸¹ FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS This appeal arises out of a dispute between Kara A. Keller (“Petitioner”), who was injured in a motor vehicle accident, and her UM coverage provider GEICO and the at-fault driver Charles J. Serio (collectively “Respondents”). On April 21, 2006, Petitioner was rear-ended by Serio. Petitioner’s car suffered superficial damage.

After the accident, Petitioner and Serio exchanged insurance information. Keller subsequently drove home, called an attorney, and went to the emergency room. Her medical treatment, which lasted over five years, spanned multiple care-givers and addressed headaches, back pain, and overall chronic pain. Her medical bills totaled $27,355.69.

In April of 2009, Keller filed suit against Serio in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Keller later informed her motor vehicle insurer, GEICO, with whom she had UM coverage, of the potential for a UM claim. GEICO then successfully moved to intervene as a defendant to protect its possible interest in the litigation. At the trial, the parties stipulated that Serio was at fault for the accident.

The only issues before the jury were causation and damages. In her opening statement, Petitioner’s counsel identified Serio as the at-fault driver, and identified GEICO as Keller’s UM policy carrier. GEICO’s counsel identified herself at trial. GEICO did not offer an opening statement, did not question witnesses, and did not present a closing argument.

After Keller and Serio presented their cases, the trial court instructed the jury on the questions of causation and damages as they appeared on the verdict sheet. Keller’s counsel offered a proposed jury instruction on the nature of UM coverage. 1 The trial court refused to give this instruction, ²⁸² noting that insurance was not at issue at the trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Keller for $27,355.69, which was the amount of her medical bills. On the itemized verdict sheet, the jury entered $0 for both future medical expenses and non-economic damages.

Petitioner later filed a motion for a new trial claiming that the jury award was inconsistent by awarding damages for medical expenses related to alleviating pain, but no damages for pain and suffering, and that in not giving an instruction about the nature of UM coverage, the trial court confused the jury. The court denied this motion. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court declined to find an abuse of discretion either in the trial court’s declining to instruct the jury on the definition of UM coverage, or in its declining to order a new trial on the basis of the inconsistent verdict.

We granted certiorari to address the following question: 2 [Whether] the failure to instruct the jury about the reason the plaintiffs underinsured motorist carrier is a party to a tort suit is reversible error? Because the issue of UM coverage was not before the jury, we answer this question in the negative. Petitioner has no right to a jury instruction on a matter that is not properly before the jury. ²⁸³ DISCUSSION We review a trial court’s refusal or grant of a jury instruction under the abuse of discretion standard. See Stabb v. State, 423 Md. 454, 465 , 31 A.3d 922, 928 (2011).

In determining abuse of discretion in this context, we look to the following factors: “(1) whether the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law; (2) whether it was applicable under the facts of the case; and (3) whether it was fairly covered in the instructions actually given.” Stabb, 423 Md. at 465 , 31 A.3d at 928 (citing Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 348 , 701 A.2d 374, 381 (1997) (internal citations omitted)). Keller interprets the question of why GEICO was a defendant at trial as identical to the question of how UM coverage works and presents three interrelated arguments to support her claim that refusing an instruction on UM coverage was error. Petitioner’s first argument is that litigants are entitled to an instruction on their theory of the case. Petitioner advances that disallowing such an instruction prevented her from instructing the jury on her theory of the case, theorizing that the nature of UM coverage could be confusing to a layperson.

Keller’s second argument is that in not instructing the jury on the nature of UM coverage, the trial court caused the jury to be confused and possibly make adverse inferences about why GEICO was a defendant in the action. Finally, Keller avers that because the trial court never “mull[ed] over” whether the proposed instruction would have been sufficient, it was improper for the Court of Special Appeals to deem it insufficient. We examine the arguments in turn. Petitioner avers that she was prevented from explaining her claim against GEICO, thereby making her unable to explain her theory of the case.

She claims that she was so inhibited because “UM coverage” is a confusing term, and the jury was unable to adequately comprehend the role and presence of GEICO at trial. Thus, Keller says, she could not fully explain her case against GEICO at trial. In support of this argument, Petitioner relies heavily on Boone v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. for ²⁸⁴ the proposition that UM coverage is a confusing concept, and that such confusion can lead to prejudice. 150 Md.App. 201 , 819 A.2d 1099 (2003). To be sure, in Boone, the intermediate court held that an accurate understanding of UM coverage was necessary for the jury to properly understand that case. 150 Md.App. at 231, 819 A.2d at 1116.

Petitioner construes Boone as creating a “requirement that a jury must be told the details of underinsured motorist claims[.]” Thus, she says, in completely failing to instruct the jury on the issue of UM coverage, the trial court erred. In Boone, a woman injured in a car accident obtained a financial settlement from the at-fault driver’s insurer. 150 Md.App. at 204, 819 A.2d at 1100. Although this settlement was for the policy limits, Boone thought her true damages exceeded her policy amount. Id.

She then sued her UM insurer for her remaining expenses and pain. Id. At the end of trial, Boone requested that the court instruct the jury on how UM coverage works. 3 Boone, 150 Md.App. at 219, 819 A.2d at 1109. The trial court recognized the potential for the jury being confused on the issue of UM coverage, but ultimately declined to deliver Boone’s proposed instruction.

Boone, 150 Md.App. at 221, 819 A.2d at 1110. The trial court did, however, attempt to explain UM coverage to the jury as follows: [Tjhere’s been some kind of obscure references to ... what we call underinsurance ... and ... it simply means that when you recover for someone’s fault that harms you, you recover against the person who harmed you. But suppose, for example, you don’t believe it’s enough? It’s not a fair compensation.

You have a right under certain circumstances to go against or to claim against your own policy ²⁸⁵ which may carry what we call under insurance so that in a sense you make up a deficit.... What do you think is fair compensation, given the accident, given what she’s testified to? What she may or may not be looking elsewhere for, has absolutely nothing to do with this case. Nothing.

Keep your blinders on and look only at that one question, phrased here as two questions. What are the damages, if any? Id. The Court of Special Appeals found this instruction insufficient and found that it was error to reject an instruction on UM coverage.

Boone, 150 Md.App. at 281, 819 A.2d at 1116. Particularly, the intermediate court found error because: The jury was not told that the sum previously recovered by appellants from Sites would be deducted from the amount of any award of damages. The jury’s ignorance as to that matter certainly could have affected its understanding of the value to appellants of any damages that it awarded. Id.

Petitioner asks us to apply the Boone holding to this case, and similarly find an error in the Circuit Court’s failure to instruct the jury as requested. Boone is inapposite here because in this case the issue of insurance coverage was not before the jury. In Boone, the UM insurer was the sole defendant in the action, and the central issue was whether Boone merited coverage under the terms of the policy. 150 Md.App. at 204, 819 A.2d at 1100. As the Boone court explained: There is no question that the jury was informed that appellants had already recovered some money from Sites, and that the Boones were not satisfied with the amount of that recovery.

The jury was also told that, as a result of that dissatisfaction, appellants brought an underinsurance claim against American, their own Insurer. On more than one occasion, the court attempted to explain the concept of underinsurance to the jury. Indeed, in its final jury instructions, the court twice told the jurors that appellants pursued their claim against American because of the alleged “deficit” with regard to appellant’s recovery from the tortfeasor. ²⁸⁶ Boone, 150 Md.App. at 231, 819 A.2d at 1116. In the Boone context, the nature of UM coverage could be perplexing to the jury.

Here, the situation is quite different. Although GEICO was a party defendant though its intervention, Petitioner filed no complaint against it. GEICO was only present to protect its potential interest in the case 11 months after Keller brought suit against Serio. Yet Keller never brought a claim against GEICO and, until the resolution of the underlying litigation, GEICO did not have (and thus could not breach) any contractual obligation to Keller.

At no point during the trial was the subject of UM coverage mentioned. GEICO did not offer a defense, did not question any witnesses, and did not present any arguments to the jury. Though a party, GEICO was not defending any claim, and was only present to protect a possible interest that would not become clear until after the jury delivered its verdict. Simply put, Keller’s case against Serio did not involve UM coverage, or GEICO, in any meaningful legal sense.

We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that “the issue of insurance was not an issue in the case and the requested instruction did not inform the jury on the principles of law that applied to and governed the facts in the case.” As explained above, the only questions presented to the jury were on causation and damages. This distinguishes the present case from Boone, because in Boone, the UM insurer was the defendant in a breach of contract lawsuit in which it was the only target. Because coverage was not an issue, an instruction as to the definition of UM coverage is not applicable under the facts of the case. Petitioner’s repeated insistence that she was prevented from having her theory of the case presented to the jury is