Kelly v. McCarrick

ADKINS, Judge. Softball requires each athlete to take the field ready to perform the plays that are necessary for the team to win. One thing that veteran ballplayers and fans know, long before the opening pitch, is that there are dangers on the base path. That is illustrated by this case of 13 year old St. Mark’s Parish second baseman Tara Kelly, whose ankle fractured when a St. Joseph’s Parish player slid into her as she made the tag.

Seeking to revive their $10 million lawsuit, Tara and her parents, Daniel and Terry Kelly, ask us to reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of all five defendants/appellees: St. Mark’s Parish; St. Joseph’s Parish; Phillip John Welch, manager of the St. Joseph’s team; the Catholic Archdiocese of Washington, D.C. (the Archdiocese); and the Catholic Youth Organization (CYO). Restated, the Kellys’ contentions are that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County erred in disregarding evidence supporting inferences that Tara was injured as a result of: I. “Coaching” failures in training players and coaches to safely execute the slide and tag-out play, and in matching players of uneven skill; II. Failure to equip the diamond with “breakaway bases” that might have prevented Tara’s injury; and III.

Improper care of Tara in the aftermath of the on-field collision. As to the first and second liability theories, we agree with the circuit court that the Kellys assumed the risks of Tara’s injury, as well as the risk of playing on a field with stationary bases. As to the third theory, we see nothing in the summary judgment record to suggest that the injuries for which the Kellys seek compensation resulted from any breach of the defendants’ duty of care to Tara after her injury. We shall affirm the judgments. ⁸⁸ FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS The Injury Tara was hurt in an April 22, 1997 fast pitch softball game at St. Joseph’s Parish.

She was playing second base for the St. Mark’s Parish 7th and 8th grade team in a CYO league. In the bottom of the first inning, with no outs, St. Joseph’s was already beating St. Mark’s badly. According to Tara, Amy G., a good player for St. Joseph’s, hit the ball, rounded first, and headed for second base. Amy slid into the base feet first, colliding with Tara, who made the tag for the first out of the inning. 1 Tara’s right foot had been positioned on the back corner of the stationary base, which was anchored by a stake into the ground.

She placed it along the side toward first base, but left most of the base open along the base path, so that she did not obstruct Amy’s path. In the collision, Tara’s ankle was severely fractured. Terry Kelly, Tara’s mother, was watching the game. She had just arrived and was in the process of setting up her chair when she looked out on the field, just in time to see Amy G. sliding into second.

Tara and Terry both described Amy’s slide as curved instead of straight. Although Tara’s ankle was not bleeding and the break was not compound, it was immediately identified as a serious injury. As Tara recalled it, after a just “couple of minutes,” ⁸⁹ she was carried from the field by Coach Welch from St. Joseph’s and a woman whom she did not know. 2 Terry Kelly, in an effort to get Tara to the hospital as quickly as possible, brought her car up next to the field. Tara was carried five or six more steps to the car, then driven by her mother to the emergency room at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda. 3 After three surgeries, Tara has intermittent pain and some activity limitations as a result of the injury.

The Litigation The Kellys filed a nine count complaint against CYO, St. Joseph’s Parish, its coach, and St. Mark’s Parish, as well as the Archdiocese of Washington, under whose supervision the parishes and their staffs work. The counts included negligence allegations that the defendants failed to train players and coaches how to safely play softball, failed to ensure that Tara’s team was not scheduled to play against teams with more skilled players, failed to equip the field with breakaway bases that may have prevented Tara’s injury, and failed to ensure that coaches and volunteers were trained to handle emergencies involving game injuries. Extensive discovery ensued. Tara testified at her deposition that she loved playing sports.

She regularly followed and watched professional baseball. Tara’s grandfather was a professional baseball player, and her father occasionally played softball. She knew “the rules of softball,” including that she had to tag the runner with the ball to make the out. She did not “remember ever being told it, but [she] knew the rule” because she had “kind of ⁹⁰ grown up with baseball” and “the rules are very similar” to softball.

Before her injury, Tara had played CYO softball the three previous years, and T-ball before that. She “[mjainly” played second base and shortstop. She liked softball and considered herself a good player. She was on St. Mark’s “A” team in both her seventh and eighth grade years.

That year, the St. Mark’s team was one of the average teams in the league, not the worst, but not the best. Later, in an affidavit opposing summary judgment, Tara declared that she was never trained by [her] softball coach, Mrs. Brady, in the “rules of softball” and did not know the actual rules of softball. This is apparent since I thought I had to keep my foot on the base in order to tag out a runner. It is clear that I was given the wrong instruction on how to tag out a runner sliding into second while avoiding the runner.

Daniel Kelly, Tara’s father, testified at his deposition that he was not at the game when Tara was injured. But he was the St. Mark’s Parish softball commissioner at that time. He had watched some of the St. Mark’s practices, and hit ground balls for the players. He recounted that one of St. Mark’s coaches taught Tara how “to get a foot and one corner” of the base.

Tara also learned “[t]o reach into the base to tag out and there should be no problem.” Tara’s coach, Patricia Brady, testified at her deposition that she considered the CYO league to be for “developmental instruction,” “participation,” and “fun.” She described Tara as “one of the better skilled” players on the St. Mark’s team. With respect to instruction and training, Brady explained that she “work[ed] with [her] infield girls .... a lot[,]” and specifically coached Tara in how to play second base. Brady’s daughter, who played second base on her high school softball team, also “had come ... at least on two occasions specifically to work with Tara” on fielding at second base. ⁹¹ One constant and transcending lesson was “not to block the base,” which Brady taught to avoid injury. In addition, Brady coached Tara “to stand either in front of the base, behind the base, or ... on the side of the base where the runner would not be coming.” When asked whether she “train[ed] her, in terms of how she would know where the runner was going to be coming,” Brady replied, “No, I did not.

I don’t think that’s a skill that needs to be trained.” In her view, the “element of risk” involved in fielding against a sliding base runner was a matter that “everybody knows” as a matter of “common sense[.]” Thomas Manco, director of CYO programs, testified in deposition that, “[ujnder the rules, the batter/runner has the right to reach the base without obstruction by the fielder.” The rules in use for the CYO league stated that “[rjunners are never required to slide,” but also provide that a base runner is required to “legally attempt to avoid a fielder in the immediate act of making a play on her.” Sliding is one common way to do so. Phillip Welch coached both the St. Joseph’s team and a “select” team in a different competitive league called the “Marylanders.” The Marylanders team was not affiliated with CYO or any of the parishes. Tara recalled that one of her St. Mark’s teammates and another of her St. Mark’s classmates played for the Marylanders. After she was injured, Tara also came to believe that Amy G. was on the Marylanders; Welch, however, testified that she was not on his Marylanders team that year.

Welch instructed his players to slide “[a]ny time there is a play at the bag that they are going to,” for “[sjafety reasons.” He pointed out that “[t]he alternative is the two girls running into each other, versus sliding into the base.” Welch told his team that sliding “was mandatory” because “National High School Federation rules require you to slide into a bag ... at any time during a play at any bag. You cannot go in and run over a player at a bag or you’re automatically thrown out of the game.” He “spent hours on sliding drillsf,]” telling the ⁹² players that “the sliding was for their safety, as well as the other player.” He taught them to go into the bag with their lead foot, which in Amy’s case was her right foot. Welch told her that she should “[ajlways” aim for the bag. He “[njever” told his players that they were allowed to try to knock the fielder down.

The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted summary judgment on all counts to all defendants. As to the negligent training and mismatch claims, the court concluded that “a person of normal intelligence, in a similar position as [the Kellys], would clearly have comprehended the danger” in tagging out a sliding base runner. Citing Tara’s four years in softball and her “normal intelligence,” the court held that [t]he issue of whether [Tara] had knowledge of the danger and appreciated that risk, and thus, assumed the risk is for the Court.... [The Kellys] clearly understood the risk of injury by participating in softball and especially when Tara Kelly positioned herself in front of or in the path of a runner that could result in a collision. Contact between a runner and the base defender is a risk incidental to the game of softball, which is obvious and foreseeable.

Furthermore, sliding is a part of softball.... [The Kellys] had knowledge of the risk of collision and injury, appreciated that risk and voluntarily participated and permitted Tara Kelly to expose herself to that risk by participating in the softball game. As to the negligence and premises liability claims relating to the use of stationary bases, the court also held that the Kellys had assumed the risk of playing on field with them. Even “[a]ssuming the use of the non-breakaway bases created a dangerous condition[,]” the stationary staked bases “were open and visible and available for inspection.” With respect to the negligent training in emergency care claim, the court concluded that the Kellys “failed to present admissible evidence of negligence” to show either that “the [defendants breached their duty of care in the manner in which Plaintiff Tara Kelly was treated after sustaining an ⁹³ injury” or that Tara’s “injuries were worsened when she was removed from the field or thereafter.” 4 The Kellys noted this appeal, in which they challenge the judgments on their training, mismatch, breakaway bases, and emergency care claims. 5 DISCUSSION Assumption Of The Risk “Assumption of the risk negates the issue of a defendant’s negligence by virtue of a plaintiffs previous abandonment of his or her right to maintain an action if an accident occurs.” McQuiggan v. Boy Scouts of America, 73 Md.App. 705, 710 , 536 A.2d 137 (1988). The concept is grounded on the theory that a plaintiff who voluntarily consents, either expressly or impliedly, to exposure to a known risk cannot later sue for damages incurred from exposure to that risk.... “[The defense] rests upon an intentional and voluntary exposure to a known danger and, therefore, consent on the part of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chances from harm from a particular risk.” Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 640-41 , 751 A.2d 481 (2000) (citations omitted).

Thus, if the plaintiff “(1) had knowledge of ⁹⁴ the risk of danger, (2) appreciated that risk and (3) voluntarily exposed himself to it[,]” then assumption of the risk has been established. Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 630 , 495 A.2d 838 (1985) (citation omitted); see McQuiggan, 73 Md.App. at 710 , 536 A.2d 137 . Whether a risk has been assumed in a particular situation is measured by an objective standard. 6 See ADM P’ship v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 91 , 702 A.2d 730 (1997); Saponari v. CSX Transp., Inc., 126 Md.App. 25, 32 , 727 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 353 Md. 473 , 727 A.2d 382 (1999). “ ‘[A] plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been obvious to him.’ ” ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 91 , 702 A.2d 730 (citation omitted). “Although the ⁹⁵ question of whether the plaintiff assumed the risk is normally for the jury, if it is clear that an individual of normal intelligence, in the plaintiffs position, must have understood the danger, then the issue is for the court.” Saponari, 126 Md.App. at 32 , 727 A.2d 396 ; see ADM P’ship, 348 Md. at 91-92 , 702 A.2d 730 ; Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 283-84 , 592 A.2d 1119 (1991). Assumption of the risk principles apply to children as well as adults.

See Bliss v. Wiatrowski, 125 Md.App. 258, 273 , 724 A.2d 1264 , cert. denied, 354 Md. 571 , 731 A.2d 970 (1999); McQuiggan, 73 Md.App. at 710-12 , 536 A.2d 137 . Like adults, children are held to an objective standard, albeit one reflecting the child’s age, mental capacity, experiences, and circumstances. 7 For example, in McQuiggan , we held that a 12 year old boy assumed the risk of an eye injury that occurred shortly after he decided to stop playing a rubberband-paper clip shooting game with his friends. See McQuiggan, 73 Md.App. at 711 , 536 A.2d 137 . In doing so, we recognized that “there is no doubt that a child of that age can assume the risk of his or her actions.” Id.

In Bliss v. Wiatrowski, we approved the following jury instructions in a case involving a 16 year old passenger’s negligence claim against the intoxicated driver with whom she accepted a ride: [Assumption of the risk ... may bar recovery by a guest passenger of a drunken driver, who knows or should know ⁹⁶ of the driver’s condition, if the driver’s negligence, due to intoxication, is the cause of the accident causing injury.... A child, however, is not to be held to the same standard or degree of care that an adult would have used.... A child should be deemed to have assumed the risk if another child of similar age, intelligence, experience and development, would have acted differently, under the same circumstances. Bliss, 125 Md.App. at 273-74 , 724 A.2d 1264 (emphasis added).

These instructions “accurately set[] forth the separate standard of care for minors.” Id. Assuming Sports Risks Among the dangers commonly cited to illustrate assumption of the risk concepts are the physical risks intrinsic to the sport of baseball. See, e.g., Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 68, at 488 (5th ed. 1984)(“There are some things, as for example the risk of injury if one is hit by a baseball driven on a line, which are so far a matter of common knowledge in the community, that in the absence of some satisfactory explanation a denial of such knowledge simply is not to be believed”); Yount v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 585 , 915 P.2d 341, 345 (App. 1996)(“A baseball can be hit or even thrown with bone-crushing velocity. Rules permit hard sliding, even the occasional close pitch.

It is all part of the game, and its contours are commonly understood, whether in the stadium or in the sandlot”). But softball and baseball players do not assume all risks of injury simply by participating in a game. See McQuiggan, 73 Md.App. at 711 , 536 A.2d 137 . With respect to athletes injured during play, the general rule is that “ ‘[a] voluntary participant in any lawful game, sport or contest, in legal contemplation by the fact of his participation, assumes all risks incidental to the game, sport or contest which are obvious and foreseeable.’ ” Nesbitt v. Bethesda Country Club, Inc., 20 Md.App. 226, 232 , 314 A.2d 738 (1974)(quoting 4 Am.Jur.2d § 98)(emphasis added).

Thus, the risks assumed by participating in a game are only the “usual” and foresee ⁹⁷ able dangers that a similarly situated player reasonably would expect to encounter during that game. See McQuiggan, 73 Md.App. at 711 , 536 A.2d 137 . These foreseeable dangers include risk of injury resulting from the type of physical contact that is an integral part of the sport as it is typically played. See Hammond v. Bd. of Educ. of Carroll County, 100 Md.App. 60, 69-70 , 639 A.2d 223 (1994).

We have applied these principles in cases involving a variety of injuries incurred during voluntary games. See, e.g., id. (general rule supported summary judgment against 16 year old girl severely injured during contact football scrimmage); McQuiggan, 73 Md.App. at 712 , 536 A.2d 137 (affirming summary judgment against 12 year old who assumed risk of eye injury during rubberband-paper clip shooting game); Nesbitt, 20 Md.App. at 232 , 314 A.2d 738 (rule supported summary judgment against 15 year old golfer who assumed risk of injury during driving range practice). The Kellys, however, have eschewed the “negligent play,” “negligent supervision,” and “failure to warn” claims that we addressed in those cases, in favor of negligent training, matching, and equipping claims.

Moreover, instead of suing her coach or the player who injured Tara, the Kellys sued only the St. Joseph’s coach, the parishes who sponsored the two teams, the CYO league, and the Catholic Archdiocese, which is the sponsoring organization for the CYO league and the two parishes. The Kellys contend that, even if they assumed the risk of injury resulting from negligent play, they could not have assumed the risk of injury from failing to adequately instruct players and coaches how to avoid this type of sliding injury, failing to match players of similar skill, or failing to use the safer breakaway bases. We found no Maryland precedent considering assumption of the risk, or the “no duty” principles underlying that concept, in the “negligent coaching” context. In Hammond , we did recognize the viability of an assumption of risk defense to a negligent coaching claim.

In that case, we affirmed summary judgment against the family of a 16 year old girl who was permanently injured while playing in her first varsity football scrimmage. See Hammond, 100 Md.App. at 70 , 639 A.2d 223 . ⁹⁸ Although the Hammonds had signed a written consent and waiver form permitting their daughter to play on the boys’ team, they claimed that the waiver was invalid because school officials failed to adequately warn them about the risk of such a serious injury. We rejected that claim, observing that “ ‘the law does not make a school the insurer of the safety of pupils at play[,]’ ” and that “courts have been extremely inhospitable to claims that properly equipped, injured ... players should be able to recover from school officials for injuries sustained during an ordinary, voluntary contact sport game.” 8 Id. at 66-67 , 639 A.2d 223 (citation omitted). We also emphasized what is obvious to anyone who plays and watches sports — that many games require physical contact between opposing players, so that participants are presumed to know that “ ‘there is no other way to play’ ” without some risk of physical injury during such contact.

See id. at 66-67 , 639 A.2d 223 . “[Pjermeating the sports injury cases is the recognition that ‘[pjhysical contact in ... an athletic contest is foreseeable and expected.’ ” Id. (quoting Albers v. Indep. Sch. Dist.

No. 302 of Lewis County, 94 Idaho 342 , 487 P.2d 936, 939 (1971)). Moreover, “it is ‘common knowledge that children participating in games ... may injure themselves and ... [that] no amount of supervision ... will avoid some such injuries[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Brackman v. Adrian, 63 Tenn.App. 346 , 472 S.W.2d 735, 739 (1971)). Because playing voluntary sports is a matter of individual choice, anyone who may be “weak, slow, disabled, etc.” can avoid the obvious dangers in playing the game by choosing not to participate.

See id. at 65 n. 2, 639 A.2d 223 . Although we were not asked to consider a negligent coaching theory of liability, we did acknowledge that the same assumption of risk principles applicable to “negligent play” claims asserted against another player have also been applied to negligent coaching claims. See id. at 66 , 639 A.2d 223 . We ⁹⁹ cited “numerous [out-of-state] cases in which minors injured while playing in school sporting events have sued school officials (or others similarly situated) asserting that the officials’ negligence caused the participant’s injuries,” including cases involving “inadequate instruction or training” and “inadequate or improper supervision” by coaches.

See id. at 65-66 , 639 A.2d 223 . I. Negligent Coaching The Kellys complain that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on their various “negligent coaching” claims, which we view as falling into two related but distinct aspects of coaching duties categories — negligent training and negligent mismatching. 9 In Count 1 of their amended complaint, the Kellys allege that Tara was not trained in how to tag out a runner sliding into second base. In Count II, the Kellys claim that the Archdiocese, CYO, and both parishes negligently failed to train their coaches, volunteer staff, and others so that they in turn could “properly train players such as Plaintiff Tara Kelly in correct procedures to play softballf.]” In Count IV, they contend that the same defendants negligently failed to ensure that Tara’s team “was assigned to play other teams and other players of reasonably comparable age, skill, size, strength, experience, training, and level of competitiveness” to Tara and the St. Mark’s team. Before examining the Kellys’ arguments with respect to these claims, however, we wish to underscore what we are not considering here: ¹⁰⁰ • First, we are not addressing mandatory sporting activities, such as those that might occur in a school physical education class or a professional sport. 10 • Second, we do not address injuries incurred as a result of off-field conduct that is not an intrinsic part of the sport, such as, for example, injury resulting from a coach’s negligence in driving players to the field. • Third, we do not address injury resulting from an intentional or reckless act by another coach, such as a coach’s instruction to a base runner to execute an illegal take-out slide that presents a clear safety threat to the fielder. 11 Whether a player assumes the risk of “flagrant infractions unrelated to the normal method of playing the game and done without any competitive purpose,” Turcotte v. Fell, [ 68 N.Y.2d 432 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 ] 502 N.E.2d 964, 970 (N.Y.1982[1986]), is simply not presented by this case. ¹⁰¹ • Fourth, because the grant of summary judgment rested solely on assumption of the risk principles, we need not decide whether evidence of “merely negligent” coaching that falls short of intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent behavior is actionable under Maryland law. 12 Coaching Liability As we noted, Maryland has no reported case law considering a negligent coaching claim.

We see no reason that assumption of the risk principles applicable to negligent play claims should not also apply to negligent coaching claims. We agree that “the same general standard should apply in cases in which an instructor’s alleged liability rests primarily on a claim that he or she ... failed to provide adequate instruction ¹⁰² or supervision before directing or permitting a student to perform a particular maneuver that has resulted in injury to the student.” Kahn v. East Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal.4th 990 , 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103 , 75 P.3d 30, 32 (2003). Similarly, these standards also govern analogous negligence claims based on “mismatching” athletes and teams.

In a leading assumption of sports risk case, the New York Court of Appeals described the general duty for those involved in sporting events, as a limited duty to exercise care to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be. If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed its duty. Plaintiffs “consent” is not constructive consent; it is actual consent implied from the act of the electing to participate in the activity. Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432 , 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 , 502 N.E.2d 964, 968 (1986)(citing Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts § 68 (5th ed.)(1984); 4 Harper, James & Gray, Torts § 21.1 (2d ed.); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892[2]).

Other courts and commentators generally concur that “[cjoaches must be aware of preventable risks to their athletes and they must take measures to properly supervise and care for their players[,]” but that athletes nevertheless “shoulder a formidable burden in establishing a coach’s negligence in relation to these duties.” Thomas R. Hurst & James M. Knight, Coaches’ Liability for Athlete’s Injuries and Deaths, 13 Seton Hall J. Sports L. 27, 37 (2003)(collecting and discussing cases). In practice, liability of coaches and athletic leagues has been restricted to instances in which the alleged misconduct not only directly resulted in injury, but also , reflected an unusual disregard for a player’s well-being. See generally id. (reviewing cases and concluding that “[it] appears that a showing short of ... serious misconduct” amounting to “inattention, ignorance and indifference to a player’s well-being .... will probably not sustain a plaintiffs suit for a coach’s negligence”). ¹⁰³ When evaluating whether an athlete assumed risks attributable to coaehing, courts have given substantial weight to the dangers of the sport in concluding that the plaintiff assumed its inherent risks.

See generally id. at 39-41 (discussing inherent risk as critical factor in assumption of sports risk cases). “In the sports setting ... conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport itself.” Knight, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d at 708 ; see, e.g., West v. Sundown Little League of Stockton, Inc., 96 Cal.App.4th 351 , 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 849, 851 (2002)(“Los-ing a fly ball in the sun and being hit by it is an inherent risk of baseball assumed by all players whether it happens during little league warm-ups or during Game 7 of the Major League World Series”). One of the dangers inherent in any sport is that instruction and training may not be able to eliminate certain risks that are inherent in playing the sport. For example, in Foronda v. Hawaii Int’l Boxing Club, 96 Hawai'i 51 , 25 P.3d 826, 845 (App.), cert. denied, 2001 Haw. LEXIS 245 (2001), a Hawaii court rejected a negligent coaching claim on behalf of a boxer who died after falling out of the ring during a sparring match.

The court observed that the “hard reality” in that sport is that even the best of coaching and supervision cannot make the risk of falling and injuring oneself anything but inherent. ... Nor can it preclude the risk that a boxer can be seriously injured, or killed, before his coach and trainer can do anything to prevent it; indeed, before they can even be aware that the fighter is in trouble. And it certainly cannot prevent two people who are hitting each other, even if only in practice, from becoming “heated up.” ... All of these risks are inherent in the sport.

Said another way, [the decedent] assumed the risk that coaching and supervision cannot guarantee against injury while boxing. Id. (emphasis added). As in cases involving participant liability, most courts addressing coaching liability claims also consider the plaintiffs knowiedge and experience in the sport.

See Hurst & Knight, ¹⁰⁴ supra, 13 Seton Hall J. Sports L. at 41-43. “[T]he more experience the plaintiff has in the sport, the more likely it is that he made an informed judgment regarding the inherent risks.” Id. at 42; see, e.g., Vendrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 26C, 233 Or. 1 , 376 P.2d 406 (1962)(affirming judgment in favor of coach and school district because experienced high school football player assumed risk of neck injuries during tackle); cf. Morgan v. New York, 90 N.Y.2d 471 , 662 N.Y.S.2d 421 , 685 N.E.2d 202, 205-06 (1997)(affirming summary judgment because experienced bobsledder assumed the risk of crash injury). Some courts also have cited policy reasons for limiting coaching liability to circumstances in which a coach increases the inherent danger of a sport, so that coaches may not be held liable for failing to decrease risks inherent in the game.

In California, where sports law concerning assumption of inherent risks has been developed through case law, the Supreme Court has held that “a sports instructor or coach owes a duty of due care not to increase the risk of harm inherent in learning an active sportf.]” Kahn, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103 , 75 P.3d at 39 . [A]s a matter of policy, it would not be appropriate to recognize a duty of care when to do so would require that an integral part of the sport be abandoned, or would discourage vigorous participation in sporting events. Accordingly, defendants generally do not have a duty to protect the plaintiff from the risks inherent in the sport, or to eliminate risk from the sport, although they generally do have a duty not to increase the risk of harm beyond what is inherent in the sport. Id. at 103, 75 P.3d at 38 . For example, in Balthazor v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 62 Cal.App.4th 47 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 337, 340-41 (1998), a California appellate court held that a baseball league did not have a duty to decrease the inherent baseball risk of being hit by a wild pitch.

The court concluded that the league had not increased the inherent risk of harm by failing to end the game as sunset approached, or by failing to remove a pitcher who ¹⁰⁵ had previously hit batters, since changes in lighting conditions are inherent in the game and requiring pitching accuracy would “alter the fundamental nature of the game and most certainly chill vigorous participation.” Similarly, the Foronda Court observed “[t]he coaching and supervision during the fatal accident did not ... create a new risk or exacerbate an inherent risk.” Foronda, 25 P.3d at 845. A. Negligent Instruction And Training The Kellys argue that “[t]he court made a fundamental logical and legal error in holding that by participating in the softball game for which she and [Amy were] inadequately prepared/trained ..., Tara or her parents ‘assumed the risk’ of the consequences of that inadequate and negligent training.” In their view, a young infielder like Tara cannot assume the risk of being injured by her own improper fielding techniques, or by the base running of an opponent, when that conduct resulted from a coach’s negligent failure to train these players in how to safely handle a contested play at second base. We disagree. As a threshold matter, we are not persuaded that there was a material dispute about what the Kellys knew and appreciated regarding the danger of injury.

That the Kellys may not have anticipated the precise nature, severity, or source of Tara’s injury is immaterial if a reasonable person would have known and appreciated that injury could occur in the manner that it did. 13 See McQuiggan, 73 Md.App. at 711 , 536 A.2d ¹⁰⁶ 137. It was not necessary for defendants to prove that the Kellys had prescient knowledge of the precise accident and injury that occurred. The “specificity, particularity, and magnitude” of risk that must be shown to establish knowledge and appreciation of the risk “refer to the scope and source of possible dangers.” Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal.App.2d 532 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 575, 582 (1966). “ ‘It suffices if it is known to be within the range of possibilities; neither sure nor necessarily apt to happen; but one that will happen if the conditions are ripe for it.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

If there was no dispute as to whether a reasonable person in their respective circumstances must have been aware of the dangers in defending against a sliding base runner, summary judgment was appropriate. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Kahn, 245 A.D.2d 438 , 666 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (1997)(affirming summary judgment against experienced softball player who “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”). In support of their motion, the defendants submitted evidence that the Kellys knew, as any reasonable person with their respective experiences in the sport would have, that Tara could be hurt during the tag-out play that she would be called upon to execute at second base. The circuit court correctly noted that sliding is an integral and well known part of softball and baseball.

Though there is no direct Maryland authority recognizing that fielders and base runners assume some risk of being injured in a tag-out and slide, there is ample persuasive authority for this common sense proposition. See, e.g., Martino v. Vonnes, 298 A.D.2d 505 , 748 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2002)(experienced second baseman injured when defendant slid into him “assumed the risk that he might be injured by a sliding opposing player”); Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787, 790-91 (La.Ct.App.1990)(same); cf. Totino v. Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts, 213 A.D.2d 710 , 625 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 , cert. denied, 86 N.Y.2d 708 , 634 N.Y.S.2d 442 , 658 N.E.2d 220 (1995)(minor plaintiff who was aware that ¹⁰⁷ “[sjliding into base is an integral part of the game of softball” assumed the risk of sliding injury). Indeed, there is no dispute that the tag-out play at issue here required the type of physical contact that we contemplated in Hammond .

When there is no force play, the only way to defend second base against a base runner is for the fielder to tag the runner. Tara testified that she knew from growing up with the game that she had to tag the runner to get the out. This is a routine, if not easily executed, play in both softball and baseball; it is a potentially dangerous but integral part of the game. Moreover, the Kellys must have understood that base runners would be likely to slide into second base.

It is common knowledge to players and fans alike that, in order to avoid being either hit by the ball thrown to second or tagged by the fielder, the base runner usually slides. 14 Sliding in these circumstances not only increases the runner’s prospect of a successful steal under the tag, but it also protects the vulnerable fielder from more serious injury that might occur if a stand-up runner collided at full speed into a fielder just as she extended her arm to catch the ball or reached toward the runner to make the tag. For this reason, sliding is often considered to be a necessary safety precaution. That conclusion is reflected in Picou v. Hartford Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 787 (La.Ct.App.1990).

There, a second baseman suffered an ankle injury when a base runner dove or slid into her as she tried to tag the bag for a force out. The court held that the risk that a base runner would collide with her while sliding into second was inherent in the game of softball. Id. at 790 . “The closer the play, the more likely a collision; and the runner is not obliged to sacrifice himself or “surrender” an out by running outside the line to avoid collision with a ¹⁰⁸ fielder.... Accordingly, the closer the play, the more wary and self-protective the fielder must be to catch the ball while in contact with the base so as to remove himself with dispatch[.]” Id. at 790-91 (citation omitted).

The injury was simply an “unfortunate result of two women who played the softball game competitively and ... with diligence.” Id. at 791 . Cf. Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So.2d 40, 42 (La.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 334 So.2d 210 (1976)(inherent risks of softball include risk of “standing in the base path and being spiked by someone sliding into second base[,]” but not having the base runner run full speed into second baseman standing outside base path by five feet). The summary judgment record here similarly shows that Tara and her parents understood that players trying to reach second base might be sliding toward Tara as she was trying to catch the ball and make the tag.

Tara acknowledged generally that she was aware that “it was possible that you could get hurt playing the game[.]” She was a veteran second baseman, having played that and other infield positions for St. Mark’s in previous CYO games. Thus, the slide and tag-out play, and its inherent risk for fielders, had been a routine part of the games that the Kellys watched, played, and prepared for. We agree with the circuit court that, given the Kellys’ experience and familiarity with the sport as it is commonly played, they must have understood and appreciated the danger that Tara could be hurt as she tried to tag out a sliding runner. There was undisputed evidence here that Tara and her parents knew that base runners would be sliding into second as Tara tried to tag them out, that they appreciated the obvious risk of injury in that play, and that they knowingly assumed it by choosing to play the game.

The deposition testimony of Tara, her father, and her coach established that Tara had played and trained at second base. She and her parents understood that a second baseman must know how to position herself so that she can safely defend the base against a sliding runner. Tara’s coach testified that she instructed her infielders not to place themselves in a base runner’s path ¹⁰⁹ and, more specifically, not to place a foot on the runner’s side of the base. For safety reasons, she trained them to place their feet in front of, behind, or on the far side of the base.

Similarly, Phillip Welch testified that he spent considerable time instructing and training his players during regular sliding drills. The Kellys did not rebut that evidence. There was no evidence to refute Welch’s testimony that he trained Amy G. how to slide safely into second base feet first. Significantly, the Kellys offered no evidence that Patricia Brady or anyone else associated with CYO, St. Mark’s, or the Archdiocese told her that, in order to get the out, she had to touch the base as well as tag the runner.

Tara notably did not dispute Coach Brady’s description of her specific training of Tara and other infielders in how to avoid dangerous contact by keeping her foot away from the side of the base facing the sliding base runner. Nor did she deny that she received second base fielding instruction from Brady’s daughter. Nor could she claim that this tag-out play was a new experience for her. The only evidence that the Kellys offered to dispute the testimony that Tara received instruction and training in how to field when a runner is approaching second base was the awkwardly worded affidavit that the Kellys filed in opposition to summary judgment.

In that affidavit, Tara states only that it “is apparent” that her coach did not train her “in the ‘rules of softball’ ” and that she “did not know the actual rules of softball,” because she “thought [she] had to keep [her] foot on the base in order to tag out a runner.” This was a combination of vague generality (i.e., her coach “apparently” did not train her in “the rules”) and impermissible speculation (i.e., the fact that she misunderstood the rules must mean that her coach did not give her the right instruction). What it is