Kemp v. Bradford

Stone, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit in equity was brought by the appellants to recover an undivided interest in certain leasehold property in the City of Baltimore. Whether they are entitled to recover depends upon the true construction of a deed, executed by a certain Lott Ridgely, in the year 1820. That deed conveyed the property in dispute to trustees, for the benefit of his wife, Mary, for her life, and then goes on to say: “And from and immediately after the death of the said Mary Ridgely, then in trust, as to the whole of the grounds and premises aforesaid, with the appurtenances for the proper use and behoof of Greenbury William Ridgely, Mary Ann Ridgely, James Lott Ridgely, William Ridgely, Charles Ridgely, Sarah Jane Ridgely, Eliza Ridgely, and David Ridgely, the present children of the said Lott and Mary Ridgely, and of all other, the children to be born of the said Mary Ridgely, by the said Lott Ridgely, or the ³³² ■survivors of them living at the time of the decease of the said Mary, and the issue of any deceased child of the said Mary, by the said Lott Ridgely, if such issue there be, and the child or descendants of any such deceased child, to take the part, share or portion which its or their parent would, if living, be entitled to, to be then conveyed, assigned, and delivered over to the said children and descendants, in manner aforesaid, to be thenceforth held by them and their legal representatives as-tenants in common,” &c.

The Greenbury William Ridgely mentioned in the foregoing deed, died, leaving one child, Mary Ann, who after-wards married Lewis G. Kemp. Lewis G. Kemp and Mary Ann, his wife, conveyed their interest in this property to Bradford, administrator of Kell, by a conveyance which was executed in the life-time of Mary Ridgely, the tenant for life, who survived both her son, Greenbury W. Ridgely,'and her granddaughter, Mary Ann Kemp. The •complainants are the children of Mary Ann Kemp, and they insist that their mother, at the time she executed the -deed to Bradford, had no vested interest in said property, ■as the life tenant was then living, and that the interest vested in the complainants, at the death of the life tenant -and not before. If the deed before us contained no other expressions .after the terms : “ Survivors of them living at the time of the decease of the said Mary,” this case would come within the decisions of Turner, et al. vs. Withers, et al., 23 Md., 18 , and Gable, et al. vs. Ellender, et al., 53 Md., 311 , and the claim of the complainants would be well founded.

But this deed does contain other expressions, so connected with and explanatory of the term survivors as take it out of the operation of the principle, decided in those cases, which was simply this: that where in wills the remainder is limited to “ surviving children ” the descendants of deceased ■children are not included. ³³³ While less latitude is allowable in the construction of deeds than of wills, still the controlling object in both is to get at the intention of the party executing the instrument, and to carry it into effect whenever it can be done without violating some established rule. The law has attributed a meaning to certain phrases and expressions, when they stand alone, and unqualified by other words, which it would be unwise now to depart from. But cases are constantly occurring where such expressions are coupled with others that essentially change the meaning they would otherwise have. Such is the case, we think, in the deed before us.

In the deed we are called upon to construe, the term survivors includes both the children of the grantor and their issue, and is not confined to children alone. Those only arc excluded who might happen to die before Mary, the life tenant, without issue. All the children of the grantor, as well as all the children of any deceased child, stand upon the same footing. The words in this deed,, subsequent to the word “ survivors ” clearly indicate that the grantor designed the descendants of his children to be included in that expression.

He says, “ The descendants of any such deceased child to take the part, share, or portion which its or their parent would, if living, be entitled to, to be then conveyed, assigned, and delivered over to the said children and descendants in manner aforesaid.” The expression, then conveyed, clearly refers to the death of Mary, the life tenant, and means, that at that time, the descendant of the dead child, as well as the living child, should each receive its portion, and negatives the idea that “ survivors ” mean children only. Whatever is true of the whole, must be true of a part, and what applies to the children of Lott Ridgely collectively must apply to each one separately. Taking any one of his children, as for example the ancestor of the complainants, Gfreenbury