Key v. Key

Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, This case presents for consideration the question of the validity vel non of Chapter 325 of thei Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland of 1916, and if valid, a proper construction of the Act itself. The precise question to be determined isi, what interest and estate does the surviving widow, the appellee in this case, take under the Act in the real estate of her deceased husband at the date of his death, that is., is she entitled as heir to onetliird of the real estate in fee simple belonging" to her husband at the date of his death or has she a life estate only in one-third thereof. The Act in question is entitled “An Act ten repeal sections 1 to 23 (inclusive), 25, 26, 27, 28 and 31 of Article 46 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland, title ‘Inheritance,’ in Bagbv’s Annotated Code of Laws;” and to enact in lieu thereof four new seetionsi of Article 46, to be known as sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of said Article, thereby assimilating the law, relating to the real property of decedents more nearly to the law relating to personal property. By this Act it will be seen that certain sections of Article 46 of the Code were repealed, and four (4) new sections were enacted in lieu thereof. ⁴²⁰ Section 2 of the Act provides: “If said intestate leave a widow or a surviving husband, such widow or surviving husband shall take, as an heir, the same share or proportion of such lands, teneménts or hereditaments as a widow or surviving ’ husband takes as a distributee in the personal property of her or his deceased spouse under such laws relating to personal property.” The first half of section 3 of the Act provides: “A surviving husband or widow shall take, as heir, the same share or proportion in lands, tenements or hereditaments within this State belonging to the deceased spouse, at the time of his or her death, though such deceased spouse die testate, which such surviving husband or widow would take in the personal property of a resident spouse so dying testate.” The facts of the case appear from, the pleadings and are substantially as follow»: Joseph Harris Key, died in St. Mary’s County on the 7th of June, 1917, leaving a last will and testament dated the 18th of April, 1913.

The will was admitted to probate in the Orphans’ Court of St. Mary’s County on June 26th, 1917, and letters testamentary were granted to the executors named in the will.. By the will the testator disposed of a large and valuable estate, both of real and personal property, but made no devise or bequest to his wife, but by the fifth clause of the will states: “I recognize fully the rights of my wife- to a dower and distributive share, but I think they can be more satisfactorily adjusted after my death than at this time.” Mr. Key was married three times and the present appellee is his third wife. They were married.on April 24th, 1895, and there was no child or descendant of a child by this marriage, but the defendants are children by his former marriages. ⁴²¹ The contention that the statute is, invalid because its, title does not conform to but offends, section 29 of Article; 3 of the Constitution, which requires that “every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title,” is clearly without merit and cannot be sustained. The title of the Act, upon examina,tion will be seen, states that it is an Act to repeal certain designated sections of Article 46 of the Code, title “Inheritance,” and to enact in lieu thereof four new sections,, to be known- as, sections, 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article 46 of the Code, thereby assimilating the law relating to the real property of decedents more nearly to the law relating to personal property.

This title is not only broad, and comprehensive but, contains a sufficient description of the purpose and subject matter of the Act. It is tire usual title, form, and method adopted in legislation for the repeal of sections of statutes and the enactment of now sections in lieu of the repealed sections and has been frequently sustained by recent decisions of this Court. Worcester Co. v. School Commissioners, 113 Md. 305