King v. Kaiser

Stockbrtdge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented by the record in this case is the right of the appellees to the specific performance of an agreement for renewal, contained in a léase from the predecessor in title of the present appellant, to the appellees, eleven in ²¹⁵ number. Tbe paper out of which the controversy arises is as follows: “Baltimore, Md., April 30th, 1908. “This Lease, Made this 30th day of April, one thousand nine hundred and eight, by Louis Sinsheimer, of Baltimore City, as party of the first part,-and Ernest Kaiser, Henry Harman, William Kerner, Louis Hugel, Henry Hugel, Thomas Little, William Hugel, John Walz, John Eigner and William Pfaifenberger, trading as the Prospect Point Pishing Club, as parties of the second part. “Now, whereas, in consideration of the payment of the annual rent of fifty dollars payable by the parties • of the second part to Louis Sinsheimer, quarterly in advance, beginning on the first day of May, 1908, the said Louis Sinsheimer does hereby lease for a period of five years renewable for an additional period of twenty years at Sixty Dollars per year, unto the said Ernest Kaiser, Henry Harman, William Kerner, Louis Hugwl, Henry Hugwl, Thomas Little, Wm. Hugel, John Walze, John Eigner and Wm.

Pfaffenberger, trading as Prospect Point Fishing Club, all that tract or parcel of land lying in Baltimore County, and described as follows: “Viz: Beginning for the same at a stone placed at a pine tree at a head of a small cove emptying into Dark Head and running northeasterly alongside said cove ninety feet to a pine tree marked “S. E.”; thence southeasterly along said cove one hundred and thirty-six feet to a stone alongside of a tree on-the. bank of Dark Read; thence running southwesterly along Dark Head two hundred and eighty feet to a stake in the bank on said Dark Head; thence running westerly two hundred feet to a stone; thence northeasterly by a straight line to the place of beginning. “Being the same piece or parcel of ground which hy lease dated the 30th day of April, 1903, was leased by the parties of the second part, viz: Ernest Kaiser, Henry Harman, Wm. Kerner, Louis Hugel, Henry ²¹⁶ Hugel, Thomas Little, ¥m. Hugel, John Walz, John Eigner and Wm. Pfaffenberger, trading as the Prospect Point Pishing Club. “The parties of the second’ part do further agree that they will not conduct upon said premises any saloon, hotel or bawdy house, and will not interfere with other tenants on said premises. “It is also further agreed that if the said rent shall be in arrears thirty days, then the said Louis Sinsheimer shall have the right to distrain for the same. “It is .also further agreed that the said parties of the second part shall not assign this lease without the written consent of said Louis Sinsheimer, nor sublet a portion of said ground leased. “It is further agreed that the improvements placed by the parties of the second part shall be removable by them at the expiration of their term. “Witness our hands and seals this thirtieth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and eight. “Jno.

E. Eigner. “Louis Sinsheimer, “Wm. Pfaffenberger, “Ernest Kaiser, “Geo. W. Kerner, “Henry Hannan, “Louis Hugel, “Henry Hugel, “William Hugel, “John Walz, Jr., “Thomas M. Little.” The appellees had originally entered upon the property referred to in the lease in April, 1903. five years before the signing the paper just quoted. Sinsheimer, who- is named as lessor in the paper, in April, 1909, conveyed a tract of fifty-three acres, including that leased to and occupied by the appellees, to the present appellant.

The lease was, therefore, in force and the appellees in occupancy of the property at the time of the transfer from Sinsheimer to King. ²¹⁷ The five-year period, named in the lease having expired, the appellees filed a bill to require King to carry out the agreement embodied in the following language contained in the lease: “The said Louis Sinsheimer does hereby lease for a period of five years renewable for an additional period of twenty years at sixty dollars per year * * * all that tract or parcel of land, etc.” Mr. King seeks to avoid the execution of a renewal lease for a period of twenty years, and various grounds are set up to sustain his contention. To maintain a bill for specific performance it is requisite, and conceded, that the agreement which the Court is asked to require to be performed must be fair, just, reasonable, bona, fide, certain in all its parts, and made upon a good and valuable consideration. Griffith v. Frederick Co. Bank, 6 G. & J. 424 , and numerous cases since. While a decree for specific performance is never ex debito justitice, the rules controlling a court of equity, where this nature of relief is asked, have been so often and so clearly stated that it is unnecessary now to repeat them.

The first contention on behalf of the appellant is that the agreement is too uncertain in its character to admit of a decree for specific performance. Several grounds are urged as to the supposed indefiniteness of the agreement; thus, the fact that the property is in the State of Maryland nowhere appears in the agreement is given as a basis for the supposed indefiniteness, and the case of Ellis v. Park, 8 Tex. 205 , is relied on to support the proposition, a decision which the editor of Cyc., in a note on page 859 of Volume 16, characterizes as “anomalous.” The general rule in that respect is stated in Gyc., Volume 16, pages 858 and 859, as follows: “Courts have judicial notice of the prominent geographical features of the territory over which or State in which they exercise jurisdiction. * * * Courts sitting in a particular State of Territoy have judicial knowledge of the geographical position of its political divisions, such as counties, cities and villages.” This rule was expressly adopted in this State ²¹⁸ in Acton v. State, 80 Md. 551 , and numerous cases might be cited from nearly every State in the country. For examide, in Higgins v. Bullock, 66 Ill. 37 , and Bailey v. Birkhofer, 123 Iowa, 59 , it was held that the names of the counties of a State are a matter of judicial knowledge. In this respect, therefore, the contention of Mr. King can not be sustained.

Objection is also made to the description as contained in the lease. While it may well be that the description could, have been more precise, it can not be assumed, as the appellant does, that a surveyor could not go upon the ground and identify and mark it out definitely. Certain distinct landmarks are called for, and if any one of them should not be found it would be a comparatively easy matter to reverse the call from another, and so fully locate the premises. The case largely relied on in this contention is the case of Gorter v. Gale, 86 Md. 687 , in which this Court held an agreement too indefinite for enforcement which described the land simply as 13,650 acres more or less in Rockingham County, Virginia.

There was no further description attempted to be given in that case, either by reference to the title, by a specification of metes and bounds, or as adjoining or bounding upon other tracts or lots. The case was, therefore, widely different from that now presented. In the case of Duvall v. Myers, 2 Md. Ch. 401 , which was a bill filed alleging a contract with regard to the cutting of wood, the paper set up as the contract was not signed by one of the parties, and the signature of the other was disputed, and the case did not present one in which there was any contract or agreement shown. In Geiger v. Green, 4 Gill, 472 , there was no contract, merely a license for the digging of ore, and it was, therefore, properly held not to present a case for the specific performance of a contract.

In Gelston v. Sigmund, 27 Md. 334 , where there was a rental by written memorandum for one year, under which the tenant had occupied the property for ten years, upon a ²¹⁹ verbal understanding that Gelston would ^rom time to time renew the lease upon Sigmund’s paying the same rent as could be obtained from other parties, our predecessors refused to decree specific performance upon the ground of indefiniteness, no certain amount of rent being alleged or shown, and no obligation upon Sigmund to remain in the property or to pay any definite