Kirby v. Kirby

²¹⁴ ADKINS, Judge. We must decide in this appeal whether the Circuit Court.for Prince George’s County erred in enforcing a consent order and ordering David Kirby, appellant, to pay one-half of the college tuition of two adult children born during his marriage to Helen Christine Kirby, appellee. For the reasons that follow, we find no error in the decision of 'the trial court and affirm the holding below. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Appellant and appellee were married on April 14, 1968, and divorced in October 1984.

During the marriage, the parties had three children, the two youngest being Kerry, born January 14, 1976, and Kelly, born January 23, 1977. After their divorce, while litigation was pending pertaining to child support and visitation matters, the parties signed a consent order, which was executed by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on December 26, 1985. The consent order provided, in part: ORDERED, that the husband shall pay one-half of all net costs of tuition, books, room and board, school transportation and other educational fees incurred by each child for college, technical and vocation training beyond high school, provided, however, that said obligation shall not exceed the amount charged a Maryland resident at the University of Maryland. Said obligation for payment of said schooling shall continue as long as the child is a full-time student in pursuit of an undergraduate technical or vocational degree, but for not longer than four years____ Appellee sued appellant to recover one-half of the educational expenses she paid for the college education of Kerry and Kelly.

At a hearing before a domestic relations master, evidence was presented that Kerry and Kelly attended the University of Maryland. Kerry began her studies in 1994 and graduated in December 1997. Kelly entered college in 1995 and was scheduled to graduate in May 1999. Appellant, ²¹⁵ however, ceased making payments toward the education of his children in the fall of 1996.

Appellant argued to the master, and later to the circuit court, that he was not required to pay for Kerry and Kelly’s education because it was beyond the authority of the court to enforce a consent order requiring him to pay for his children’s education. Both the master and the circuit court rejected this argument, and the circuit court, adopting the recommendations of the master, ordered appellant to pay $8,925.09, representing his share of the college education expenses. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION Appellant contends that the consent order provision relating to his children’s education is unenforceable because the obligation to pay the educational expenses of one’s children terminates when the children reach the age of majority, which is defined by statute as eighteen years of age.

See Md.Code (1957, 1998 Rep.Vol), Art. 1, § 24. He contends that Maryland law only permits enforcement of contractual obligations respecting support for adult children if they are contained in a property settlement agreement. We reject appellant’s contention, and explain. Appellant correctly states that a court cannot require a parent to support a child after the child reaches the age of eighteen.

See Quarles v. Quarles, 62 Md.App. 394, 403 , 489 A.2d 559 (1985). Parents can, however, contractually obligate themselves to support a child after the age of majority, and incorporate such agreement into an enforceable consent order. “[A] consent order is a valid contract between the parties that is judicially enforceable.” A.H. Smith Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Maryland Dept. of Env’t, 116 Md.App. 233, 243 , 695 A.2d 1252 (1997). Consent orders “have attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees.” Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md. 470, 478 , 610 A.2d 770 (1992).

Because a ²¹⁶ consent judgment is the product of a negotiation, it “is subject to construction as a contract.” Ramsey, Inc. v. Davis, 66 Md.App. 717, 727 , 505 A.2d 899 , cert. denied, 306 Md. 514 , 510 A.2d 260 (1986). Where the language of the consent decree is clear and unambiguous, all terms in the decree “are to be given their plain meaning in construing the order.” Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Department of Env’t, 92 Md.App. 103, 112 , 607 A.2d 66 , cert. denied, 328 Md. 94 , 612 A.2d 1316 (1992). “[I]f parties stipulate to terms embodied in a proposed consent order, the fact that a court must approve and sign the order does not affect the parties’ ability to reach a valid agreement.” Chernick, 327 Md. at 479 , 610 A.2d 770 . In Chernick , the parties agreed to a consent order in which Mr. Chernick’s obligation to pay alimony was terminated, but Ms. Chernick reserved future entitlement to alimony.

Ms. Chernick argued that she was not bound by the terms of the consent order because she withdrew her consent prior to the order being signed by the court. The Court of Appeals held that the order was enforceable even in the absence of the court’s approval because the fact that a court must sign the order does not affect the parties’ ability to reach an agreement. Id. Appellant contends that the consent order in the present case is unenforceable because the underlying agreement was not a “property settlement agreement.” He argues that our prior decision in Corry v. O’Neill, 105 Md.App. 112 , 658 A.2d 1155 (1995), imposes such requirement in order for a consent order respecting child support obligations for periods after a child’s age of majority to be enforceable.

We do not agree with appellant’s interpretation of Corry . In Corry , the parties entered a written separation and property settlement agreement in which the father agreed to pay child support in the amount of $100 per month for each child, until such child reached age twenty-one. Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties after the separation agreement, the trial court modified the amount of child support to ²¹⁷ $250 per month for two children, 1 and the higher sum was included in the divorce decree. The father’s appeal raised the issue of whether the modified, higher amount could be enforced against him after each child reached age eighteen, the age of majority.

We held that when the younger child reached age eighteen, the father was only obligated to pay $100 per month per child, the amount originally agreed upon in the support agreement. Appellant relies on this holding to support his contention that a consent decree relating to support of a child must be supported by a written property agreement to be enforceable beyond the age of majority. We think that a careful reading of the Corry opinion makes it clear that this Court declined to enforce the increased support beyond the age of majority because it considered both modifications as having been judicially imposed. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the Court intended to draw a distinction between support agreements incorporated in property settlement agreements and those not so incorporated.

Because there was a stipulation by the parties in Corry that the father would pay $250 per month at the time of the divorce, and a later stipulation increasing the amount to $350 per month, the increased obligation may not, in fact, have been