Kirkland v. Krebs

Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. A scire facias was issued on the 24th February, 1868, to revive a judgment recovered by the plaintiffs on the 29th June, 1855, to which the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations, and the question is whether the statute was suspended as against this judgment during the stay of execution and sale, prescribed by the Acts of 1861, ch. 17, and 1862, ch. 249, known as the stay laws. That the Legislature did not intend to interfere with the statutory limitations in regard to judgments we think quite clear, for' although the above Acts of Assembly expressly declare that the stay thereby prescribed, shall not be computed as part of the three years within which execution may issue, we find no such provision or exemption in regard to the judgment itself. Moreover, it is well known that these laws were passed soon after the commencement of the late war, and the purpose, the sole purpose, was to protect the property of the debtor from seizure and sale, at a time when the condition of affairs was such that forced sales would have proved ruinous to the debtor. ⁹⁷ But it was insisted that the operation of these laws deprived the plaintiff of the effectual prosecution of his remedy by scire facias, and that the suspension of the Statute followed as a necessary consequence upon this suspension of the remedy.

Now, it is true, the term cause of action implies the right of action, and hence certain exceptions, have been engrafted upon the Statute, not perhaps within its letter, as for instance, whore there is no person capable of suing or being sued, or when a temporary incapacity to sue grows out of some particular provision of a statute. Trecothick vs. Austin, 4 Mason’s Cir. Ct. Rep., 16; Dowell vs. Weber, 2 Smedes & Mars., 452; Tarver vs. Cowart, 5 Ga., 66 ; Murray vs. The East India Co., 5 Barn, & Ald., 204. To permit the Statute to run in such cases, where no laches can be imputed to the parties, and where it is impossible, by suit or otherwise, to prevent its operation, would not only be extremely unjust, but, in the language of the authorities, contrary to the conclusions of reason that the framers of the Statute