Klein v. Weiss

Murphy, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an ill-fated business venture in Ocean City, Maryland, known as the Seventy-Sixth Street Limited Partnership (the Limited Partnership), which the parties ⁴⁰ intended to form pursuant to the provisions of the Maryland Uniform Limited Partnership Act (the Uniform Act), Maryland Code (1975) §§ 10-101 through 10-129 of the Corporations and Associations Article. The central issue in the appeal is whether the receiver of the Limited Partnership, appointed on behalf of creditors, may enforce agreements executed by the limited partners for capital contributions to the Limited Partnership. The Uniform Act provides for the formation of a limited partnership, consisting of one or more general partners and one or more limited partners, the latter not being bound by the obligations of the partnership. § 10-101.

Persons desiring to form a limited partnership under the Act's provisions must, as a statutory prerequisite to formation, execute a certificate of limited partnership and record it with the clerk of the appropriate circuit court; the certificate must set forth a number of details of the partnership, including the identity of the partners, and the capital contributions to be made by each limited partner. § 10-102. Section 10-115 of the Act governs the withdrawal of the capital contributions made by limited partners; it generally provides that such contributions may not be returned until the liabilities of the partnership have been satisfied. Section 10-116 provides that a limited partner’s liability, as set forth in the certificate of partnership, cannot be waived or compromised to adversely affect the right of a creditor of the partnership who extended credit to it after the certificate was filed, and before it was canceled or amended, to enforce his claims against the partnership. The Limited Partnership evolved from these facts: John Fulton, an Ocean City real estate broker, and Victoria Rinaldi, his associate, devised a plan to commercially develop a tract of bayfront land located in Ocean City, which was then owned by the Seventy-Sixth Street Joint Venture (the Joint Venture).

On October 10, 1972, Fulton and Rinaldi contracted to purchase the property from the Joint Venture for $450,000. The contract was signed by Fulton and Rinaldi as general partners of the Seventy-Sixth Street Limited Partnership, although no such partnership was then in existence. Under ⁴¹ the terms of the contract, $10,000 was paid at the time the contract was signed; settlement was to take place on March 15, 1973, at which time $175,000 was to be paid in cash, and the Limited Partnership was to assume an existing mortgage not to exceed $124,000, and execute a purchase money mortgage to the Joint Venture in the amount of $141,000. To raise the money needed to purchase the property, Fulton and Rinaldi decided to create a limited partnership pursuant to which they would act as general partners, and sell 25 limited partnership units for $9,000 each, thereby generating $225,000.

Of this amount, $185,000 would be used to pay the cash obligation under the contract. The balance would service the mortgages during the first year and pay settlement and other costs. Lloyd Whitehead, of the law firm of Perdue, Owrutsky & Whitehead, was employed by Fulton to prepare the legal papers and documents necessary to effectuate the plan. In late January or early February of 1973, Whitehead drafted an instruction letter, a subscription agreement, a limited partnership agreement and a certificate of limited partnership, all to be used in the solicitation of prospective limited partners.

As originally drafted by Whitehead, the partnership agreement and the partnership certificate required that each limited partner make an initial capital contribution of $9,000 for each partnership unit purchased; it also called for a future contribution of $15,298 per unit, representing the per unit share of the mortgage debt to be created on the property to be acquired from the Joint Venture. This future contribution was to be paid in accordance with a mortgage payment schedule which was attached to the partnership agreement and listed the annual per unit payment, based on 25 contributing shares, for the years 1973 through 1981. The agreement specified that the dates on which these payments were due would be provided to the limited partners by the general partners or the escrow agent, Perdue, Owrutsky & Whitehead, not later than 90 days before the first such payment was required. The proposed partnership agreement acknowledged that ⁴² there was a pre-existing business arrangement between the limited and general partners.

It stated that the limited partners ratified the contract made by Fulton and Rinaldi in October of 1972 to purchase the Joint Venture property. It provided that a maximum of 25 limited partnership units would be sold and that no limited partner had the right to withdraw his capital contributions unless there was sufficient cash or other property to operate the partnership or upon dissolution. Under the proposed partnership agreement, the general partners were authorized to take title to the Joint Venture property and to execute any documents on behalf of the partnership which related thereto, whether before or after the filing of the partnership certificate, as to which the limited partners “hereby ratify and confirm any such action by the General Partners.” The agreement also provided that the limited partners consented to any mortgage by the general partners of the partnership’s assets “on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the General Partners, and to any contract, agreement ... or arrangement with ... [others] as the General Partners may deem necessary to accomplish the purposes of this Partnership----” The general partners were empowered, in their absolute discretion, “to borrow money and as security therefor to mortgage or subject to other security device any part of the property of the Partnership; to... refinance, recast, increase, modify ... or extend any such property ... upon such terms as they deem proper ... [and] to execute, acknowledge and deliver any and all instruments to effectuate the foregoing.” The agreement designated the general partners as attorney and agent for the limited partners to execute and record on their behalf “all certificates or other instruments ... which the General Partner deems appropriate to qualify or continue the Partnership as a Limited Partnership ... [and] all instruments which the General Partner deems appropriate to effect a change or modification of the Partnership in accordance with the terms of this Agreement____” The proposed partnership agreement and certificate set forth the names and addresses of Fulton and Rinaldi as ⁴³ general partners. With respect to the identity of the limited partners, the partnership documents stated: “See attached Instruments of Execution.” The certificate made no mention of the number of limited partnership units to be sold.

The instruction letter which Whitehead had prepared for the information of prospective limited partners set forth the steps to be taken by persons interested in investing in the venture. The letter directed prospective subscribers to execute the subscription agreement; that agreement specified that the subscriber had received and read the limited partnership agreement and the limited partnership certificate prior to executing the subscription agreement. The instruction letter directed prospective limited partners to sign “instruments of execution,” which were therewith provided, these being separate documents to be separately appended to the partnership agreement and certificate; they disclosed the identity of the limited partners, and recited their acceptance and adoption of all the provisions contained in the partnership agreement and certificate. Finally, the instruction letter directed subscribers to send all the subscription documents to the limited Partnership, together with a check in the amount of the initial capital contribution.

It was provided in the subscription agreement that at the time the Limited Partnership settled on the Joint Venture property, Fulton and Rinaldi, individually, would enter into a contract with the Limited Partnership to repurchase the property within one year thereafter, paying an amount therefor which would yield to the limited partners net proceeds of $100,000 in excess of their initial capital contribution. Thus, the subscription agreement led each subscriber to expect within a year a substantial return on his original $9,000 investment without ever being called upon to make any part of the additional $15,298 contribution specified in the partnership agreement and certificate. Of the maximum 25 limited partnership units for sale, only 7 units were sold, including the 3V2 units purchased by the appellees in this case. The initial capital contribution of $9,000 for each subscribed partnership unit was duly paid to the Limited Partnership. ⁴⁴ The appellee Hammond had been solicited by Whitehead in February of 1973 and purchased a unit as a tenant in common with another individual.

Hammond signed the “instruments of execution” on March 1,1973 and paid $4,500, representing his one-half share of the initial capital contribution. He claimed that he never read the agreement or certificate of limited partnership. The appellee Weiss had been solicited by a real estate salesman employed by Fulton. He purchased a full share and signed the “instruments of execution” on February 7, 1973.

He saw a copy of the partnership agreement and certificate and expected that the “instruments of execution” which he signed would be attached to these documents. The appellee Anthony had been told of the opportunity to invest in the Limited Partnership by John Nason, one of Whitehead’s law partners. He subscribed to one partnership unit in his own name and a second unit as a tenant in common with the appellee Christ. Anthony signed the “instruments of execution” for the share which he individually purchased on March 12,1973.

As to the unit owned in common with Christ, both men signed the documents on March 15, 1973. Because the Limited Partnership sold only 7 partnership units, Fulton and Rinaldi were unable to raise the money necessary to settle for the Joint Venture property on March 15,1973, as previously agreed. Fulton obtained an extension of the settlement date by one week to March 22,1973. In the interim, he arranged, on behalf of the Limited Partnership, a two-year, $309,000 loan, from Commercial Credit Development Corporation (Commercial Credit).

The loan was to be secured by a first mortgage on the land, with interest to float 5% over the prime interest rate. The Joint Venture agreed to accept a second mortgage on the property for $141,000. The loan from Commercial Credit substantially increased the mortgage debt of the Limited Partnership over that projected in the original partnership agreement and certificate, necessitating the making of changes in these documents to reflect the increased liability to the limited partners. Fulton told Whitehead to make the necessary ⁴⁵ changes and said that he would contact the limited partners, notify them of the changes, and obtain their consent.

The original partnership agreement and partnership certificate, which called for an additional contribution of $15,298, were revised by Whitehead on March 21 or 22,1973. The revised documents reflected that each limited partnership unit was liable, over and above the $9,000 per unit initial capital contribution, for 4% of the total mortgage debt — an amount substantially greater than the $15,298 specified in the original documents. The schedule of mortgage payments which had been appended to the original partnership agreement, and which was structured to service the mortgage debt incurred under the original plan for financing the acquisition of the Joint Venture property, was removed from the revised document. The “instruments of execution” previously signed by each of the subscribing limited partners, which were to be appended to the original partnership documents, were attached to the revised partnership agreement and certificate.

Based on these revised documents, Fulton and Rinaldi went to settlement on March 22, 1973. Whitehead was present at the settlement with Fulton and Rinaldi; Commercial Credit and the Joint Venture were each represented by counsel. Fulton and Rinaldi signed the partnership agreement and certificate at settlement. According to Whitehead, neither counsel for Commercial Credit nor the Joint Venture examined the partnership documents; he acknowledged, however, that “it was necessary to have the Certificate at the time of settlement,” which included the instruments of execution signed by the limited partners.

Counsel for the Joint Venture was uncertain whether he inspected the partnership documents; he said that it was “likely” that he checked the papers and knew that the general and limited partners “were good.” He said that as security for the second mortgage, he relied “on the fact that there were certain signers on the Limited Partnership.” Whitehead did not tell counsel for Commercial Credit or the Joint Venture that the original partnership documents had been revised. The Limited Partnership executed the required ⁴⁶ mortgages in favor of the Joint Venture and Commercial Credit. Fulton and Rinaldi, in their individual capacities, contracted with the Limited Partnership to repurchase the property within one year, as had been previously agreed. Immediately after the settlement was concluded, the partnership certificate was recorded with the clerk of the court; counsel for Commercial Credit obtained a copy of the recorded certificate at that time.

Shortly after the settlement was concluded, Whitehead learned that the limited partners had not been notified by Fulton of the changes made to the partnership documents. He therefore prepared a document entitled “Notice to Limited Partners of Right to Rescind Limited Partnership Subscription of Seventy-Sixth Street Limited Partnership and of Right to Receive Refund of Limited Partnership Capital.” The document related that the partnership agreement and certificate had been revised. It outlined the details of the newly substituted method of financing the purchase of the property. It stated that the property had a total indebtedness against it of $450,000, and that this resulted in an increase of each limited partner’s potential risk from $15,298 to $22,425 (the latter figure being based on certain assumptions regarding the prime interest rate).

The document was sent to each limited partner, and required an election to rescind or not to rescind his subscription. Anthony elected not to rescind the share which he individually owned. Anthony and Christ elected to rescind the share held in common and they received a return of their $9,000 initial capital contribution. Hammond elected to rescind as to his one-half share and $4,500 was returned to him.

Weiss never received the document and therefore made no election. Neither the partnership agreement nor the certificate was amended to reflect these changes in the capital structure of the Limited Partnership and none of its creditors was notified. Fulton and Rinaldi did not perform their contract to purchase the property from the Limited Partnership, and after approximately one year it defaulted on the mortgages. Commercial Credit foreclosed its first mortgage and obtained ⁴⁷ a deficiency decree for $100,372.

The Joint Venture recovered nothing on its second mortgage claim of $202,476. Gerald Klein was subsequently appointed as receiver for the Limited Partnership and vested with authority to take possession of partnership property, collect its debts, and recover all capital contributions receivable from the limited partners. Commercial Credit and the Joint Venture filed their claims with the receiver. The receiver sued the limited partners on behalf of the creditors for 4% of the mortgage debt for each unit owned, and for recovery of the initial capital contributions which had been returned to appellees Hammond, Anthony and Christ.

The cause of action was based upon the revised partnership documents, which were appended as exhibits to the declaration. The receiver claimed that Weiss was liable for $23,428, representing a 4% share of the mortgage debt; that Anthony was liable, as to his separate unit, for the same amount; that Christ and Anthony, as to their joint unit, were liable for $23,428, plus $9,000 representing the initial capital contribution refunded to them; and that Hammond was liable for $23,428, less $3,500 received from his cotenant who settled with the receiver, plus $4,500 in the returned initial capital contribution. 1 At the trial before the Circuit Court for Worcester County, the appellees adduced evidence through Whitehead of the alteration of the original partnership agreement and certificate and of the substitution and use of the revised partnership documents in their place. The receiver subsequently moved to exclude this evidence on the ground that the appellees had not, in answering his interrogatories and requests for admissions of fact, revealed the existence of the original partnership documents — a fact of which the receiver had no prior knowledge. The trial court (Everngam, J.) overruled the motion, and after considering all the evidence received at the trial, held that the limited partners were not liable to the receiver for any of the amounts claimed.

The court said that the appellees agreed to become limited ⁴⁸ partners only on the basis of the partnership agreement and certificate originally prepared by Whitehead. It said that these documents were predicated on the sale of all 25 limited partnership units, with a total mortgage liability of only $265,000; and that absent full subscription no partnership was formed. The court held, alternatively, that the later revision in the partnership documents made by Whitehead without the knowledge or consent of the limited partners changed the entire financial structure of the partnership; that because the alterations were material, the partnership “never came into being” and, as to the appellees, the partnership agreement and certificate were void. The court said: “Under the first original Agreement, the entire mortgage debt of $265,000 was to be shared by 25 limited partners, or 4%.

The risk was that one or more of the limited partners might not be able to pay his share. Cushioning that risk was the $185,000 equity of the partnership in the land. “Under the altered Agreement, there was no equity of the partnership in the land, since it cost $450,000 and the two mortgages therein totaled $450,000. Although the limited partner’s obligation remained only 4%, it was of a substantially larger mortgage debt ($450,000 vs. $265,000) and his risk was increased by the fact that there were only seven and not twenty-five limited partners to share that burden. The difference would have to be picked up by the two general partners whose financial position was such that they had to originate this method of financing the whole deal.

The result in banker’s and realtor’s language is that the greater risk lacked the ‘equity cushion’ because the entire purchase price had been ‘financed out’. “It is axiomatic that any (unauthorized and unknown) change in a legal instrument substantially increasing the amount of money to be paid thereunder or increasing the risk incurred is a material alteration that renders the instrument void, [citations omitted] ⁴⁹ “It follows that where a cause of action is based on an altered instrument so as to destroy its efficacy to such an extent that no rights can be asserted or proved by it, then it cannot be the gravamen of the suit. “In addition we believe that alteration of the partnership agreement and certificate without the consent and knowledge of the limited partners constituted a fraud upon them, [citations omitted] “The later partnership agreement and certificate were materially altered in substance, if not in form. To those were unauthorizedly appended the Instruments of Execution that had been signed to be a part of a different and potentially less hazardous investment. “Those partnership documents used at settlement and for the execution of the two mortgages and recorded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Worcester County, had been approved and executed by the two general partners without authority or knowledge of the intended limited partnership. In this Court’s view it was the same as if they had clipped the names of those signing a legal document and pasted them on a spurious substitute. It was an improper and illegal thing to be done.” The receiver appealed from the trial court’s judgment exonerating the limited partners of all liability for any of the amounts claimed.

We granted certiorari prior to decision by the Court of Special Appeals to consider the important issues raised by the appeal. The receiver presents these principal questions: “1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the alteration of the Certificate of Limited Partnership when the fact of such alteration had been withheld by Appellees in their response to ⁵⁰ Interrogatories and Requests for Admissions of Fact; 2. Whether the Receiver of a Limited Partnership, suing on behalf of creditors to enforce capital contribution obligations and to regain capital refunded to Limited Partners, is barred from recovery by the failure of full subscription to Limited Partnership Units when no requirement of full subscription conditioned the capital contribution obligations; 3.

Whether a Receiver of a Limited Partnership, suing on behalf of creditors to enforce capital contribution obligations and to regain capital refunded to Limited Partners, is barred from recovery by the failure of the Limited Partnership to make the calls for capital contribution contemplated by the terms of its Certificate; 4. Whether a Receiver of a Limited Partnership, suing on behalf of creditors to enforce capital contribution obligations and to regain capital refunded to Limited Partners, is barred from recovery by the alteration of the Certificate of Limited Partnership by the Partnership’s General Partners and attorney; 5. Whether a Receiver of a Limited Partnership, suing on behalf of creditors to regain capital contributions refunded to Limited Partners, is barred from recovery by Limitations when proceedings to enforce such claim were instituted within three years of the Receiver’s discovery of the refund but beyond three years from its occurrence.” (A) Limited partnerships were unknown at common law; they are exclusively a creature of statute, their main purpose being to permit a form of business enterprise, other than a corporation, in which persons could invest money without becoming liable as general partners for all debts of the ⁵¹ partnership. 2 R. Rowley, Rowley on Partnership § 53.0 (2d ed. 1960); 60 Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 371 (1972). “The general purpose of [limited partnership] acts was not to assist creditors, but was to enable persons to invest their money in partnerships and share in the profits without being liable for more than the amount of money they had contributed.

The reason for this was to encourage investing.” Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md. 665, 670 , 80 A. 2d 906 (1951). The first limited partnership statute in the United States was enacted by New York in 1822; Maryland adopted a similar statute by ch. 97 of the Acts of 1836. These early statutes required the recording of a partnership certificate giving notice to the public of the exact terms of the partnership, including the amount of the capital contributions of the limited partners, so that the public could deal with the partnership “advisedly.” Lineweaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465 , 2 A. 693 (1886). The fundamental difference between the liability of general and limited partners under these statutes was “that the former are responsible in solido for the debts and obligations of the firm, as in the case of ordinary partnerships, without regard to the amounts contributed by them to the social capital; whilst the latter is not personally liable if the statute has been complied with, because his cash contribution is substituted for a personal liability.” Safe Deposit Co. v. Cahn, 102 Md. 530, 546 , 62 A. 819 (1906).

Strict compliance with all statutory provisions was deemed essential to create a limited partnership under these early statutes, since they were in derogation of the common law. As a consequence, even minor or trivial infractions of the statute were held by some courts to subject the limited partners to unlimited liability as general partners. Rowley, supra, at § 53.0; A. Bromberg, Crane and Bromberg on Partnership §§ 26, 32 (1968). Because the strict construction of these statutes inhibited the effective accomplishment of the purpose for which they were intended, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed the adoption in 1916 of a Uniform Limited Partnership Act.

Maryland enacted the Uniform Act by ch. 280 of the Acts of 1918, and the statute with minor ⁵² modifications is now in effect in every state in the country except Louisiana. The Act’s provisions are intended to govern the determination of essentially all questions arising out of the formation and operation of limited partnerships. The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed is expressly made inapplicable to the Uniform Act. Decisions interpreting the Uniform Act recognize that a limited partnership consists of general partners who conduct the business and who have unlimited liability to creditors for its obligations, and of limited partners who have no right to participate in the management of the business, and whose liability is limited to the amount of their capital contribution.

See, e.g., McCully v. Radack, 27 Md. App. 350 , 340 A. 2d 374 (1975); Garbo v. Hilleary Franchise Systems, Inc., 479 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. App. 1972); Freedman v. Tax Review Bd. of City of Philadelphia, 212 Pa. Super. 442 , 243 A. 2d 130 (1968); Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 268 N.Y.S.2d 854 , 25 A.D.2d 291 , aff’d, 18 N.Y.2d 540 , 277 N.Y.S.2d 386 , 223 N.E.2d 876 (1966); Hoefer v. Hall, 75 N. M. 751, 411 P. 2d 230 (1965); Vulcan Furniture Manufacturing Corp. v. Vaughn, 168 So. 2d 760 (Fla. App. 1964); Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N. Y. 191 , 111 N.E.2d 878 (1953); Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N. Y. 32 , 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939).

As the Official Comment to § 1 of the Uniform Act makes clear, a limited partner, though so called by custom, is not “in any sense” either a partner or a principal in the business or transactions of the partnership; his liability, except for known false statements in the certificate of partnership, is to the partnership, and not to its creditors. See 6 Uniform Laws Annotated, Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 1 (Master ed. 1969). Succinctly put, a limited partnership interest in a business is in the nature of an investment. In re Panitz & Co., 270 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1967), aff’d sub nom.

Hammerman v. Arlington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 385 F. 2d 835 (4th Cir. 1967). Section 10-116 (a) of the Uniform Act delineates the extent of the limited partner’s investment in the business; it makes him liable to the partnership: “(1) For the difference between his contribution as ⁵³ actually made and that stated in the certificate as having been made; and (2) For any unpaid contribution which he agreed in the certificate to make in the future at the time and on the conditions stated in the certificate.” The creation of a limited partnership is not a mere private, informal, voluntary agreement as in the case of a general partnership, but is a public and formal proceeding which must follow the statutory requirements of the Uniform Act. 2 J. Barrett and E. Seago, Partners and Partnerships, Law and Taxation, ch. 13, § 2.1 (1956); 2 Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations § 39.01 (3) (1977); Crane and Bromberg on Partnership § 26. The Act prescribes, § 10-102 (b) of the Corporations Article, that a limited partnership is formed “if there has been substantial compliance in good faith” with the requirements contained in § 10-102 (a). That subsection mandates that a certificate of partnership be signed by the parties, acknowledged, and recorded with the clerk of the court.

It requires that the certificate set forth 14 designated partnership details, including the name of the partnership, the character and location of the business, the identity of the general and limited partners, the term of the partnership, the cash contributions made by the limited partners, and such additional contributions, if any, which the limited partners have agreed to make in the future. The certificate is a statutory prerequisite to creation of a limited partnership and until it is filed, the partnership is not formed as a limited partnership. The principal function of the certificate is to give third persons notice of the essential features of the limited partnership. Of course, whether a limited partnership has been formed is of particular importance in determining whether a person has achieved the status of a limited partner with the attendant limitation of his liability to third persons dealing with the partnership.

See Hoefer v. Hall, 75 N. M. 751, 411 P. 2d 230 (1965); Holvey v. Stewart, 265 Or. 242 , 509 P. 2d 17 (1973); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 400 , 562 P. 2d 244 (1977); Brown v. Brown, 15 Ariz. App. 333 , 488 P. 2d 689 (1971); Rowley, supra, § 53.2; Business Organizations, supra, at § 39.05. ⁵⁴ (B) (1) The receiver contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the alteration of the partnership agreement and certificate when the fact of such alteration had been withheld by the appellees in their responses to pretrial interrogatories and requests for admissions of fact. He claims that the failure of the appellees to reveal this information was highly prejudicial and compromised his ability to counter what became the appellees’ principal defense — that the partnership agreement and certificate attached to the receiver’s declaration as an exhibit were not the original documents upon which they agreed to be bound. The receiver’s discovery efforts were well calculated to flush out the existence of all pertinent documents pertaining to the obligations of the limited partners.

It is equally clear that the appellees’ pretrial responses to the receiver’s attempted discovery efforts did not provide the requisite, information. While the appellees’ explanation for their failure to disclose the information until trial is tenuous at best — being based essentially on a claim of ignorance of its existence — we nevertheless conclude that the trial judge did not, in the circumstances of this case, abuse his discretion in admitting the contested evidence. Whitehead testified for the appellees that he prepared a first draft of the agreement and certificate in January or February of 1973, and a second draft on March 21 or 22,1973. He was asked to explain the structural basis of the limited partnership as reflected in these documents.

The receiver objected on the specific ground that the limited partnership certificate was a plain, unambiguous and integrated document, and that any explanation which varied the terms of the recorded certificate was irrelevant and inadmissible; the objection was overruled. Whitehead explained that under the first draft the future contribution of each limited partner was $15,298, but that a subsequent modification of the method of financing necessitated changes in the additional ⁵⁵ obligation of each subscriber; hence, the second draft documents were prepared. The receiver thereafter objected to testimony by Whitehead concerning Fulton’s contract to purchase the property from the Limited Partnership, again on grounds of relevancy. Shortly thereafter, when the appellees sought to